

**Higher Education Reforms in Greece, France and Germany:
a Comparative Approach with Special Reference to
the Non-University Sector in Greece,
as a European Semi-Periphery**

ELENI PROKOU

**Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
of the University of London**

**Culture, Communication & Societies
Institute of Education
University of London**

January 1999



ABSTRACT

This thesis is about higher education reforms - with special reference to the institutions of the non-university sector of higher education - in Greece, in comparison to apparently similar reforms in France and Germany. Overall, the thesis attempts to analyse and explain the similarities and differences in these reforms (starting from the late 1960s) through an interpretation of Greece as a 'semi-peripheral' society within Europe.

Chapter One presents an overview of the thesis, and thus introduces the background of the research problem, the comparative framing, the purpose, the theoretical orientation, the main argument and the organisation of the thesis.

Then, the thesis has two parts. The first Part is both descriptive and analytical and sets out to show the apparent similarities in the reforms of higher education in the three countries. Chapter Two outlines the higher education reforms in Greece. Chapter Three analyses the reforms in France and Chapter Four analyses the reforms in Germany. Chapter Five summarises the similarities and the differences.

The second Part of the thesis is both theoretical and descriptive. It interprets the Greek case. Chapter Six works on two theoretical approaches to 'semi-peripheral' societies. Chapter Seven presents, in detail, the case of Greece as a 'semi-peripheral' society within Europe. Chapter Eight offers a re-interpretation and an analysis of the similarities and differences in higher education reforms identified earlier, in terms of the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece. This Chapter is also the conclusion of the thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Robert Cowen, Reader in Comparative Education at the Institute of Education, University of London, for his thorough guidance and advice all these years. I thank him for being so exceptionally devoted to this thesis, the completion of which owes the most to his constructive criticism and encouragement. His tutorials have been enlightening and I will miss the doctoral seminars he held in Comparative Education. They were intellectually rich and have formed much of the basis of my future academic development.

I am thankful to Dr. Martin McLean, lecturer in Comparative Education at the Institute of Education, who also supervised this thesis, for his encouragement as well as his constructive and helpful comments during the writing process.

I would also like to express my thanks to Professor Andreas Kazamias, Professor in Comparative Education and Education Policy at the University of Athens and at the University of Wisconsin, for his helpful suggestions at the beginning of my doctoral studies.

I am particularly indebted to Professor Nicos Mouzelis, Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science, for his invaluable comments on the theoretical chapters of this thesis.

My thanks also go to all my fellow doctoral students in Comparative Education for the fruitful academic discussions and the sharing of opinions. Not least, I thank my friends for having helped me in various ways during the process of my writing this thesis.

I would also like to acknowledge the Panchiakon Foundation for Scholarships for their financial support during the first two years of my PhD studies.

My acknowledgements would be incomplete without expressing my gratitude to my father, Georgios Prokos, and my mother, Eugenia Prokou, for their continuous encouragement and support.

To Antonis

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CHAPTER ONE

THE INTRODUCTION

This chapter identifies the purpose, the main argument, and the structure of the thesis.

This thesis is about higher education reforms in Greece, with special reference to the non-university sector. This sector in Greece is relatively new and concentrates on vocational/technical education. It is a crucial issue in Greece now. Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to offer an interpretation of when, why and how the non-university sector of higher education emerged and how it has been shaped in Greece.

However, although the final emphasis of the thesis is on Greece, the thesis begins with a description and analysis of reforms of the non-university higher education sector in France and Germany as well as Greece. In other words, the thesis is a comparative thesis but one which developed in an unusual way.

The thesis took shape gradually. I spent a year reading in university libraries, trying to understand higher education reform patterns in Europe and especially reforms to the non-university sector. According to my initial reading, approximately the same things were being reformed for more or less the same reasons: these three countries appeared to be alike in the reform patterns of their non-university sectors. In that sense, the first Part of the thesis was created inductively. My initial view of the problem was arrived at in a way that is like the methodological proposals of G. Z. F. Bereday and his insistence that comparative education begins with pedagogic description.¹

Retrospectively, it may of course be suggested that the choice of France and Germany as places of comparison with Greece was reinforced by the influences which the higher education systems of these two countries have exerted across Europe, and their influence on the Greek higher education system.² In reality, the choice of France and Germany for comparison was based on this early

perception from my wide reading and on one narrow criterion: their reforms of this sector of higher education were like the reform patterns in Greece. Approximately the same things were being reformed for approximately the same reasons, according to my initial reading: these three countries appeared to be dramatically alike in the reform patterns of their non-university sectors.

Thus, the first Part of the thesis – in methodological terms - is inductive. It is inductive in that it required a lot of reading. It is inductive in its choice of countries. It is inductive in that it follows by and large the first step in Bereday's methodology which he calls 'browsing'. The 'browsing' was serious and sustained but nevertheless, methodologically, the first step in the thesis is understandable in Bereday's terms.

It was only after identifying such similarities (and some differences) that I began to shape the whole thesis, the thesis idea itself. I began to think that these similarities, on close investigation, would turn out to be non-similarities.

I decided first to show in detail these patterns of 'similarities', and then to see if I could re-analyse or re-interpret them. This decision gave the shape of the thesis: Part I is a demonstration of apparent 'similarities'; Part II is an effort to show how the particulars of the Greek situation mean that the 'similarities' of policy (with France and Germany) need re-interpretation in the Greek socio-economic context. It was only after these research and reflection processes that I was able to express in fairly formal language the purpose and argument of the thesis.

The descriptive purpose of the thesis is to establish clearly the patterns of similarities (and differences) in the reform in the non-university sector of higher education in Greece, France and Germany. In the first Part of the thesis, this description covers the period from the late 1960s up to the 1990s. The analysis of the non-university sector of higher education refers, in Greece, to the Technological Educational Institutions [*Τεχνολογικά Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα (ΤΕΙ)*],

in France, to the *Instituts Universitaires de Technologie* (IUT) and, in Germany, to the *Fachhochschulen* (FHS).

Central to the higher education reforms, in practice, in all these three countries was the role of the State and the intentions behind State policies. Overall, in these three countries, the State was an important actor influencing and shaping higher education systems.³

However, it is not the State that is the focus of the thesis, especially within the first Part. The first Part of the thesis identifies the State as an actor but concentrates on identifying the similarities in reform patterns in higher education between Greece and the other two European countries on this narrow dimension. It is important to notice that this description does not offer a full and equal comparison of the social, historical and political contexts of these three countries, though the operational categories of description are the same in the three chapters.

This description was informed by the potential comparative categories that seemed most likely to permit sensitivity to similarities and differences in higher education reforms, and similarities and differences in state action. The categories were: the politics, the aims and purposes of the state, the laws passed and the major higher education reforms, the major debates, and the differentiation between the non-university sector and the universities. The description within these categories was assembled in two time periods (the 1960s-1970s, and the 1980s-1990s).

Initially, on the basis of this description, the major similarities clustered around the notions of 'equity' and 'efficiency'. 'Equity' was about the introduction of the non-university sector within higher education as part of the expansion of the higher education system. It looked, on the basis of initial reading, as if this expansion was necessary because there was a powerful social demand for higher education and because the economy needed more graduates. The non-university sector was also to provide social mobility. 'Efficiency', it seemed on

initial reading, was about the need for a better response of the higher education system to the needs of the economy. The advantage expected of this new type of higher education was that it was vocationally and practically orientated. However, the non-university sector also had another mission: to relieve the overcrowded universities from the increasing numbers of students wishing to enter higher education. In this way, the non-university sector would contribute to the rationalisation of the higher education system and for this reason the unity of the higher education system was emphasised.

On the basis of these kinds of insight, the first part of the main argument of the thesis began to take shape:

- There are major similarities (and some differences) between the Greek and the French and German patterns of higher education reforms.
- These similarities can be grouped in terms of the policy concepts (and the analytic categories) of 'equity' and 'efficiency'.

In the thesis, this first part of the main argument will be tested and there will be a conventional statement of similarities at the end of the first Part of the thesis (Chapter Five). In this sense, the final chapter of the first Part of the thesis is not an ending; it is also a beginning. The ending of the first Part is crucial for the construction of a new interpretation, which is the work of the second Part of the thesis.

Within the second Part of the thesis, the main argument – which is relevant to the proposition that comparative education should begin outside education, in a reading of the cultures, histories and sociologies of social formations, against which educational patterns are understood⁴ - continues. The argument is that:

- the similarities (and some of the differences) – listed at the end of Chapter Five - between the Greek, and the French and the German patterns of higher education reforms can be deconstructed, re-analysed and thus re-interpreted

by taking into consideration the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece within Europe.

This part of the overall argument of the thesis will be tested within the second Part of the thesis, and within the framework of a theoretical approach drawn from world systems analysis. Greece will be viewed as a 'semi-peripheral' society within Europe.

Thus, in the comparative work of this thesis, the model of comparison and the choice of the theoretical framework for analysis is not the three countries as such. The starting point of the problematic of the thesis is the similarities (and some of the differences) between Greece and the other two European countries in their higher education reform patterns. These 'similarities' take a summary statement in Chapter Five – which is the new problematic for the rest of the thesis. The thesis will deconstruct, re-analyse and thus re-interpret the similarities (and the differences) identified in Chapter Five.

It is this conceptualisation that creates the structure of the thesis. The methodological and theoretical framework of the thesis is a double one: induction and Bereday's first step of pedagogical description in the first Part, and world systems analysis in the second Part of the thesis.

For the deconstruction of the similarities and the differences in the second Part of the thesis, a definition of Greece as a European 'semi-periphery' will be provided. Two theoretical perspectives taken from the literature of comparative and historical sociology will be explored. Both perspectives elaborate a theory of the 'semi-periphery' but emphasise different aspects of societies. In the end, a synthesis of both of these two theoretical perspectives will be suggested for analysing the case of Greece. The suggested synthesis will then be applied on a full analysis of Greece, as a 'semi-peripheral' society within Europe.

More precisely, the theoretical perspective of the second Part of the thesis is 'world systems analysis', which belongs to historically oriented Marxism⁵. The choice for a Marxist paradigm was because the Marxist political economy approach views development as an overall societal transformation, and thus sets out to discover how contradictions and struggles within the economy are systematically related to changes in the political and cultural spheres.⁶

Furthermore, within the 'world systems' approach, there is a considerable amount of work on the case of the Southern European 'semi-peripheral' zone, to which Greece belongs. Also, 'world systems analysis' uses the concept of the 'semi-periphery'. The use of this concept differentiates 'world systems' theory from neo-Marxist dependency theory, which uses the terms of 'core' and 'periphery' only.⁷

The concept of the 'semi-periphery' can be described in very broad terms as follows. World systems analysis explains that 'core'-type and 'peripheral'-type activities are unequally distributed across the world-system. The position of a state in the world-system is usually defined by a mixture of 'core' and 'peripheral' activities. If the vast majority of activities within a state are 'core', then this state is a 'core' state. If the vast majority of activities within a state are 'peripheral', then this state is a 'peripheral' state. If there is an even balance of 'core'-type and 'peripheral'-type activities within a state, then this is a 'semi-peripheral' state.

The neo-Marxist origin of 'world-system analysis' permits the study of Greece in its historical transformation as a 'semi-peripheral' society within Europe and points to economic and international relations. However, world systems analysis neglects, or does not sufficiently explain the special nature of the State in 'semi-peripheral' societies.

The second theoretical perspective, which comes from the domain of historical sociology, supplements the perspective of 'world-system analysis' in that it views the State as an important actor within semi-peripheral societies. In this

way, the thesis points to the economic reductionism of Marxism and places a special emphasis on the role of the 'polity', that is the State, in peripheral capitalism. The State is considered to be an important actor, within semi-peripheral societies: it most often hinders their developmental process.

Thus, at the heart of the problematic of the second Part of the thesis is the nature of the Greek State and how it can be an obstacle to development.

However, it is equally important to mention that the authoritarian structure of the Greek State also means that the State tends to introduce education reforms without involving the actors who are immediately concerned with the reforms being introduced. This attitude of the State is assisted by the fact that Greece has a highly centralised education system.

Thus, this thesis aims at offering an interpretation, from a historical perspective, of the choices of the State and ends with a critique through the analysis for Greece that it offers. This thesis is thus empathetic to the critical model of the social science.⁸

The critical model of social science attempts to integrate theory and practice in social theory. This model is 'critical' in that it sees theories as analyses of a social situation which can be altered to eliminate frustrations which people in their social situation are experiencing.⁹ The translation of a critical social science into practice requires the participation and active involvement of the social actors themselves in this process.¹⁰ Finally, the 'critical model' emphasises 'history', in that the critical social scientist seeks to reveal how the historical process made the social order, which he/she is examining, incapable of satisfying some of the wants and needs which it engendered. The effort is to account for structural conflict and accompanying social discontent.¹¹

Overall, this thesis follows only part of the critical theory research paradigm, in that a) it aims at the interpretation, clarification and analysis of the issue under investigation, and b) it is historical. However, the thesis does not involve the

actors who are immediately confronting the situation under investigation (e.g. the students) and thus it is not aiming at policy formulation and implementation.

After the current chapter (Chapter One: the Introduction), the structure of the thesis is as follows. As has already been indicated, the thesis has two Parts.

Part I is basically descriptive and includes Chapters Two, Three and Four which refer to the higher education reforms - with special reference to the non-university sector - in Greece, France and Germany. This Part ends with Chapter Five, which offers an initial account of the similarities and differences between Greece and the other two European countries. Chapter Five is the linking Chapter of the two Parts of the thesis.

Part II of the thesis is more theoretical. In Chapter Six, the thesis elaborates a theory of the 'semi-periphery', following the ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein, and Nicos Mouzelis. Chapter Seven presents the case of Greece as a 'semi-peripheral' society within Europe, and within the Southern European 'semi-peripheral' zone. Then, in Chapter Eight, in the context of the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece, the thesis re-analyses the similarities and differences that were identified in Part I. This Chapter is also the conclusion of the thesis.

ENDNOTES

¹ The four stages of Bereday's model of pedagogical description are: description, interpretation, juxtaposition and comparison. For more information on Bereday's model, see JONES, P. E., (1971), *Comparative Education: Purpose and Method*, Queensland, University of Queensland Press, pp. 83-92. Also, see BEREDAY, G. Z. F., (1964), *Comparative Method in Education*, New York, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, Inc.

² About the influence of the French and German higher education systems on the Greek higher education system, see PESMAZOGLOU, S., (1989), "Technical and Educational Assistance to Greece: a Case Study of Certain Post-War Realities and Mythologies", *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, Vol. 5, pp. 33-82.

³ The State as an actor, obviously influenced by the society surrounding it, also shapes social and political processes. [See EVANS, P. B., RUESCHEMEYER, D., & SKOCPOL, T., (eds), (1985), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. vii.]

⁴ COWEN, R., (1996), "Last Past the Post: Comparative Education, Modernity and perhaps Post-Modernity", *Comparative Education*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 151-170.

⁵ RITZER, G., (1996), *Sociological Theory*, New York, McGraw-Hill, p. 307. Present day historical sociologists are more sensitive to context. Their approach tends to be holistic without being teleological, no matter whether they look at nation-states, pre-industrial empires, or ancient city-states. Thus, the approach of the historical sociologists is distinct from Spencerian / Durkheimian / Parsonian oriented modernisation theorists, which are a-historical, in that they neglect context in time and space. [See MOUZELIS, N., (1994), "In Defense of 'Grand' Historical Sociology", *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, p. 32.]

⁶ MOUZELIS, N., (1988), "Sociology of Development: Reflections on the Present Crisis", *Sociology*, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 35. Also, another advantage that Marxism claims is that it can suggest useful ways of looking at societies from the point of both agency and institutional structure, unlike other paradigms. (See *ibid*, p. 35.)

⁷ Neo-Marxist dependency theory - as a critique of the modernisation school of development - claimed that the various states were not separate, independent entities to be conceived as being in various "stages" of parallel processes of "development", but rather they were part of a "world-system". The categories of "developed" and "underdeveloped" were simply the descriptive terms applied to the poles of a unified, centrifugal process of overall development. Dependency theory used the terms of "core" and "periphery", as relational terms, which are implicitly the pluses and minuses of a zero-sum concept. This means that within the "world-system", the more one zone became "core-like," the more another became "peripheral." [See WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe", in ARRIGHI,

⁸ In this sense, the approach of the thesis is in contrast to the positivistic educational research paradigm, with origins in the scientific method employed mainly in the physical sciences. The latter is concerned with “objectivity, prediction, replicability, and the discovery of scientific generalisations or laws describing the phenomena in question.” [See ERNEST, P., (1994), *Educational Research, its Philosophy and Purpose: an Introduction to Research Methodology and Paradigms*, Exeter, The Research Support Unit / Educational Research Monograph Series, p. 22.] For instance, sociology is positivistic when it is seen “as a ‘natural science of society’ which can hope to reproduce a system of laws directly similar in form to those achieved in the natural sciences.” [See GIDDENS, A., (1978), “Positivism and its Critics”, in BOTTOMORE, T., & NISBET, R., (eds), *A History of Sociological Analysis*, London, Heinemann, p. 238.] ‘Positivistic social science’ is the hypothetico-deductive model of science and has as its four essential features: the deductive-nomological account of explanation, the belief in a neutral observation language, the value-ideal of scientific knowledge and belief in the methodological unity of the sciences. [See FAY, B., (1975), *Social Theory and Political Practice*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., pp. 13-14.] The positivistic model is also associated with the emphasis on the methods used. The methods refer to the techniques and procedures used in the process of data gathering. [See COHEN, L. & MANION, L., (1994), *Research Methods in Education*, London and New York, Routledge, pp. 38-39.] Finally, ‘positivistic social science’ is related to policy science: “that set of procedures which enables one to determine the technically best course of action to adopt in order to implement a decision or achieve a goal.” [See FAY, B., (1975), *Social Theory and Political Practice*, op. cit., pp. 13-14.] In the positivistic model, there is no requirement that the policy expert asks the public about its needs and wants. (See *ibid*, p. 108.)

⁹ FAY, B., (1975), *Social Theory and Political Practice*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., p. 92. The critical model tests the truth of a social scientific theory and consists partially of ascertaining the practical relevance of the theory in leading to the satisfaction of both human needs and purposes. (See *ibid*, p. 92.)

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 102. The critical theory research paradigm is concerned with understanding, but also with social critique, social and institutional change and social justice, with participant engagement and validation. [See ERNEST, P., (1994), *Educational Research, its Philosophy and Purpose: an Introduction to Research Methodology and Paradigms*, Exeter, The Research Support Unit / Educational Research Monograph Series, pp. 28-29.]

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 96.

PART I

CHAPTER TWO

THE GREEK REFORMS

2.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

In this chapter, the higher education reforms in Greece – with special reference to the non-university sector – are interpreted, from the late 1960s up to the 1990s. The role of the state and its rationale for its policies is identified in the laws, aims and purposes stated by the state, and in contemporaneous political debates. The major debates among academics are also described, since they illuminate the political, social, economic and international context of the reforms.

The analysis is broken up into two periods: the 1960s-1970s and the 1980s-1990s. The differentiation between the *TEI* [*Τεχνολογικά Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα* (Technological Educational Institutions)] and the universities is placed within the second period, since it was then that the *TEI* were created within higher education.

Overall, the line of argument in this chapter is that during the 1960s-1970s, there were two major tensions. The first tension was about ‘efficiency’: the education system had to contribute to ‘modernisation’ and ‘economic development’, and be itself modernised. Therefore, higher technical education was emphasised, within a human capital theory approach.¹ The introduction of the earlier technical institutions, under the influence of international organisations, was to serve those major priorities.

The second tension was ‘equity’: the whole education system had to be expanded and contribute to ‘democratisation’. Equality of educational opportunity was mainly oriented towards the ‘input’ aspect of education. However, the reforms of this period were characterised by a manpower approach² to educational planning.

During the 1980s-1990s, the tensions over 'equity' and 'efficiency' were still important, but changed their balance. These tensions also dominated the reforms in the universities {AEI [Ανώτατα Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα (Highest Educational Institutions)]}.

For the *TEI* in particular, the issue of 'efficiency' was identified in the creation of the *TEI* as part of the modernisation of the higher education system to contribute to economic development, increasingly understood as self-reliant development. However, efficiency also meant relieving the already overcrowded universities: to be more successful, the *TEI* would belong to higher education, unlike the earlier institutions. International experience – the experience of other countries – was emphasised.

The issue of 'equity' was defined in terms of increasing access to higher education (particularly to the *TEI*) to respond to the strong demand for higher education. Thus, the social demand approach to educational planning was dominant and the equality of educational opportunity argument was intensely used.

Accordingly, the narrative that follows and which covers the 1960s-1970s will illustrate the tension between economic and modernisation concerns and democratic and domestic political concerns. Education policy shifted in and out of focus and changed emphasis around these issues.

2.2 THE 1960s-1970s: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, AND MAJOR EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS

The purpose of this section is to present the 1960s and the 1970s reforms. In both of these reforms:

- The first tension was over 'equity', which was expressed in the themes of the expansion and democratisation of the education system.
- The second tension was over 'efficiency', identified in the stated aims and political debates by the importance placed on technical education for

modernisation and economic development, within a human capital theory approach.

- The third tension concerned the intervention of international organisations, which stressed 'efficiency'.

The 1958 education reform, that preceded the 1960s reforms, addressed the theme of efficiency. This reform attempted for the first time, to link education with production through the establishment of the first technical schools by the State.³ This took place in a political context: since the mid-twentieth century, there had been a tendency toward the over-development of the tertiary sector. The consequence was that Athens had attracted people from the countryside who preferred to have a badly paid but secure job in the public services, rather than remaining in the agricultural sector.⁴

From the beginning of the 1960s, and especially since *Ενωσις Κέντρου* (the centrist liberal regime of George Papandreou) took power, educational matters were given primary consideration and educational expenditure was increased.⁵ A spirit of enthusiasm for education drove the reform of 1964, and a systematic effort was made to remove the obstacles and barriers to access in education. The outcome was educational expansion. E. Papanoutsos (the Minister of Education during that period) emphasised that among all expenses, education provided the greatest and the most secure return.⁶ Thus, from 1960 until 1966, public educational expenditure continuously increased, and in 1966 it reached a maximum of 16.2% of Gross Domestic Product. Having started from a minimum of 3.4% in 1948 and 4.8% in 1950, in 1955, public educational expenditure became 10.6%. For the whole 1960-1984 period, it averaged between 13% and 15%.⁷

The principles of the democratisation of education and of equality of educational opportunities were expressed through a number of measures. These included the abolition of entrance examinations to the Gymnasium, the creation of gymnasiums in agricultural and highland areas, and the foundation of new universities in big urban centres.⁸

There were also international agencies influencing Greek educational politics. At the beginning of the 1960s, OECD was subsidised by the Ford Institute to work on the "Mediterranean Regional Project", aimed at the development and modernisation of the educational systems of six countries: Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia and Turkey.⁹

The general philosophy of the plan was summarised at a conference held in Washington in 1961. In this conference, it was stated that education was of vital importance for productivity and economic growth and was thus considered to be an important investment. It was also suggested that educational goals should be oriented especially towards secondary and higher technical and vocational education, in the context of economic plans and of the economy as a whole.¹⁰ Moreover, within the report, it was argued that:

Rapid industrialisation depends upon the efficient utilization of all the economic resources of the country - natural, physical, capital, and human resources. There is a growing conviction that the last of these is the key to economic growth. In the case of Greece, in particular, the relative scarcity of natural resources reinforces the emphasis that must be placed on investment in modern capital equipment and, above all, in human resources. The five-year plan fully acknowledges the importance of developing the knowledge, skill and initiative of the people, and the Government is pledged to support education as one of the most important elements of the entire economic development effort.¹¹

The main object of the OECD Report was the specification, in quantitative terms, of the educational changes needed to meet changes in population growth, in income, in the social demand for education and in the structural transformation of the Greek economy. The claims on resources associated with rising standards in education and the reduction of inequalities in facilities between the various regions of the country were also evaluated. Estimates of costs and the programming of expenditures on education in accordance with needs and the availability of resources were also undertaken.¹² However, the 'Mediterranean Regional Project' was not the only form of multilateral technical assistance.

The World Bank also intervened in Greek education by funding the first higher technical educational institutions, known as *KATEE* [*Κέντρα Ανώτερης Τεχνικής και Επαγγελματικής Εκπαίδευσης* (Centres of Higher Technical and Vocational Education)].¹³ The first intervention took place during the dictatorship. The government of the dictatorship – apart from reversing the policy change of 1964-65¹⁴ - signed contracts with the World Bank according to which the latter would finance educational programmes.

So, in 1970, five *KATEE* were created and in 1975 another contract was signed for a third educational programme, which provided for the creation of three more *KATEE*.¹⁵ The establishment of *KATEE* continued up to 1982.¹⁶ The basic aim was the production of middle level cadres to carry out specialised jobs for big enterprises.¹⁷ According to Law 652/70, *KATEE* had as their mission the education of higher level technicians, which would constitute a middle level between scientists and technicians.¹⁸ The highest educational institutions (universities and *polytechnea*) were self-governing independent institutions, while Higher Technical Institutions (*KATEE*) were neither self-governing nor independent. Their task was to train, quickly and efficiently, the required skilled personnel, thus contributing to economic 'efficiency'.¹⁹

Overall, the educational programmes funded by the World Bank took shape within the elaboration of a fifteen - year plan for 'economic development', the "Plan for the model Long-term Development of Greece, 1972-1987". According to this Plan, until 1987, the workforce of the primary sector of the economy would gradually have to be decreased from 1,400.000 to 800,000 persons. By 1987, 1,250.000 persons should be entering the secondary and tertiary levels of the economy (470,000, the secondary, and 780,000, the tertiary level). At the same time, it was estimated that the graduates of technical and vocational education should increase from 335,000 persons in 1971, to 1,600.000 persons in 1987.²⁰

In 1974, the dictatorship fell. Political elections took place and the liberal political party (New Democracy), came to power. Then, a new period of educational reform started,²¹ which led to the 1976-77 reforms.

Again there was a tension between the democratisation and economic motifs. Greece had emerged from a 7-year period of ruthless dictatorship. There were also prospects of the country joining the European Economic Community:

The first reality generated a new political spirit and a determination to create the conditions, which would make a repetition of such a tragic experience impossible. As a result, there has been an emphatic pursuit of democratization in education as an instrument for democratizing society. The second reality has made it necessary to modernize education in order to contribute to the modernization of the social, economic, and political institutions of the country.²²

The issue of democratisation that dominated the 1976-77 reform was more political than social. After the fall of the dictatorship (1974), political liberties and representative parliamentary institutions were restored, and therefore, 'democratisation' became a political demand and an instrument for the restoration of political freedom. The educational reform was thus seen as part of the restoration of democratic institutions and was almost universally welcomed.²³

The values underlining the 1976-77 reform, as Persianis argues, were however those of 'democratisation' and 'modernisation'. These values²⁴ were embodied in Law 576/77 "On the Organisation and Administration of Secondary and Higher Vocational and Technical Education"²⁵, although this was not passed with unanimity.²⁶

However in practice, one of the most important provisions of the educational reform of this period was an economic motif - the reorganisation and expansion of technical and vocational education. The reforms included new subjects giving information about technology and vocational life, and they reorganised and expanded technical and vocational education.²⁷

Both the left wing and the conservative parties supported the drive towards technical and vocational education but within a different model of socio-economic development.²⁸ For instance, the leader of the Communist Party of Greece of Interior (*Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας Εσωτερικού*) stated:

We agree with the provision regarding the structure of the educational system, but we have some reservations and objections to it. It is correct to establish technical and vocational schools to serve economic and social development, and the defence of the country. However, they must not operate in the interests of monopoly or create social barriers to higher education ... We are against any elitist education which destroys the unity of the population and introduces a moral, social and national separation between scientists and skilled workers, a 'Chinese Wall' for the preservation of the ruling class.²⁹

The law on technical and vocational education (Law No. 576/77) was criticised on the grounds that it did not provide sufficient incentives to attract students, and that it favoured the interests of large industrial enterprises.³⁰

Overall, the belief in education as a highly profitable public investment was stressed in the educational reform.³¹ The government wanted to adopt and implement an internationally accepted principle: education as an investment of capital that would be able to produce the manpower required for the economic, social and cultural development of the country. Thus, the government stressed the economic benefits of technical and vocational education.³²

The government intended to regulate the flow of students into the different types and levels of education according to the targets of the state development plan, to ensure the greater employability of those from technical and vocational schools. Within this logic, the binary system of post-secondary education, that is, the distinction between "higher" and "highest" education, and the different legal status of the two, also aimed at economic 'efficiency'.³³ Apart from the binary system of higher education, other provisions aiming at efficiency were the entrance examinations into the lyceums; planning; and special allowances for the most talented students.³⁴

Thus, in both the political context and in the contradictions between the rhetoric of the government and in its actual reforms of higher education a considerable tension can be seen. What was stressed politically was 'democratisation' of the system – equity. The major reform was however the creation of technical and vocational institutions – which stressed an economic motif and modernisation. The above tensions were also reflected in the contemporary academic debates.

2.2.1 Major Debates

The purpose of this sub-section is to describe some of these major debates among the academics.³⁵

- Some of the debates concerned efficiency: the modernisation of the education system was emphasised, albeit in the context of industrial underdevelopment.
- Some debates were critical of the international influences, which were associated with the 'modernisation' school of development. Other debates held that post-secondary technical/vocational education was promoted in the context of dependence.
- Some debates concerned equity: it was argued that the concept of equality of educational opportunity was weak.
- Finally, the failure of the *KATEE* was attributed partly to traditional views about the importance of University education, and to the establishment of these institutions during the dictatorship.

In many ways, the academic debates were quite sophisticated and some of them concerned more than one of the above major themes.

For instance, Pyrgiotakis argued that "abnormal"³⁶ economic development had led to an over-developed tertiary sector and to an under-developed secondary sector of the economy. Therefore, all the efforts for modernisation without industrial development, which continued for many years after the 1958 reform, had had negative effects on the development of educational institutions.³⁷ Furthermore, Pyrgiotakis argued that the 1964 reform had placed emphasis on

equality of educational opportunities, but had confined itself to the removal of the economic barriers and obstacles that the absence of schools created, without taking into consideration social barriers.³⁸

The interventions of international organisations were criticised by Pesmazoglou. He argued that the OECD's "Mediterranean Regional Project" was accepted by the Greek governments due to the lack of integrated and local educational and research policies.³⁹ Pesmazoglou also claimed that the "Mediterranean Regional Project" (MRP) was not aiming at strengthening the coherence and quality of domestic educational institutions, and that it was not oriented towards creating self-reliance.⁴⁰

He suggested that the MRP was "a typical example of the professional economist's application of the neoclassical modernizing model to the educational sphere".⁴¹ Most expert missions emphatically recommended technical and vocational training in general, at the expense of all other types of education. "This entailed an explicit plan regarding the integration of Greece in the international division of education and research activities." At the same time, these expert missions ignored or concealed the role of education in the social division of labour as well as the broader cultural significance of education.⁴² Finally, despite the effort by reports to present foreign aid or technical assistance as unique for each country, the rationale was uniform:

- educational systems geared exclusively to economic growth and long term economic development;
- full adaptation of higher education to priority economic needs;
- combatting all forms of traditional education in a modernizing direction; [sic]
- in practice this meant that every country has: a) a shortage of engineers, mathematicians, trained scientists, intermediate technicians, and teachers; and b) an abundance of lawyers, "men of letters," political science graduates;
- the equation is linear: criteria for all sorts of aid, technical assistance, loans, educational exchanges, scholarships lead necessarily to technical and vocational education, agricultural institutes[sic].⁴³

Like Pesmazoglou, Vergidis stressed the domestic distortions of dependent development. He argued that the way the creation of *KATEE* had been carried

out was dictated by the dependent and distorted economic development of the country, displayed in the "Plan for the model Long-term Development of Greece, 1972-1987". The KATEE institutions would produce a surplus of specialised labour which, in combination with other factors such as internal markets, geographical location, and political stability, would attract foreign capital. In addition, the graduates of higher technical vocational education would look for jobs in the urban centres of the country, compounding the problems of the agricultural sector and the tendencies to over-urbanisation.⁴⁴

Other scholars were critical of the interpretations, in practice, of equality. For example, Persianis argued that the most important social value underpinning the 1976-77 reform was indeed equality, but a weak concept of equality as 'equal opportunities' - to be achieved by educational rather than social measures, and mainly as equality of inputs (common schools, common curriculum, equal equipment, equally qualified and trained staff). Persianis argued that the concept of equality was seen neither in its socio-economic form (public aid for housing, health, social security and legal aid for the poor), nor in its educational form (compensatory education for the socially deprived).⁴⁵

Similarly, Eliou judged the reforms to be an attempt to respond to practical problems such as: "low educational standards, the need for a technically trained labour force, and the rationalised channelling of the particularly pressing demand for higher education."⁴⁶ However, she argued that the social dimension was underestimated: the 1976 reform would raise the educational level of the country, but it would also magnify existing inequalities. Properly implemented, the reform would harness the products of the educational system more effectively to the country's economy, but at the expense of the democratisation of educational opportunities.⁴⁷

In the end, after 1983, the KATEE failed to remain in operation and Kalamatianou *et al* clarify the reasons why. First, although the KATEE were established to serve particular economic development objectives, in effect, they were used as a "breakwater" against the continuously increasing demand for

university education. Second, since the history of tertiary technical education was very short in Greece, the secondary education graduates knew very little about the *KATEE*, while their parents seemed to appreciate only university education. Third, politically, the *KATEE* were established in Greece during the dictatorship, a very difficult period for the country. Finally, the failure was due to the disproportionate growth of enrolments in comparison to material and human resources. Therefore, it was clear that the *KATEE* had serious problems and that something drastic should be done about tertiary technical education.⁴⁸

The academic commentary thus picked up on the tensions between 'equity' and 'efficiency'. The international influences were criticised for offering a narrow view of 'efficiency' and the concept of equality was, it was argued, weakly defined. In practice, the failure of the earlier institutions was followed by a more radical reform in higher education.

2.3 THE 1980s-1990s: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS

The arguments of this sub-section are:

- that with the introduction of the *TEI*, Greece adopted the international model of higher education suggested by UNESCO, within a 'social demand' approach. The *TEI* would contribute to modernisation and 'self-reliant' economic development. The belief was expressed that education was capable of reinforcing wider socio-economic changes.
- that most laws on higher education, which had introduced several innovations at the beginning of the period, remained unchanged for the rest of this period. Whatever changes occurred concerned the differential distribution of power. Issues such as 'quality' did not appear in the case of Greece but 'equity' was dominant in the stated aims of the state though modernisation and 'efficiency' were themes of the early 1990s debate, given the prospect of Greece's participating on equal terms in the European Union.

- that there was increasing unemployment, particularly for *TEI* graduates. However, the *TEI* were promoted also during the 1990s mostly for the satisfaction of social demand and for reducing the number of Greek students studying abroad.

These themes worked themselves out in a political context in which at the beginning of the 1980s the Panhellenic Socialist Movement took power and declared a 'democratic and self-governing socialism', distinct from social-democracy and state socialism.⁴⁹ Within this new political framework, a number of education reforms took place.

Firstly, Law 1268/1982 provided for the reorganisation of the structure and function of the *AEI* [*Ανώτατα Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα* (Highest Educational Institutions)], as well as for the introduction of Pedagogical Departments of Education. Secondly, the *KATEE* were abolished and the *TEI* [*Τεχνολογικά Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα* (Technological Educational Institutions)] were created by Law 1404/1983.⁵⁰

Thus, Greece adopted a model for higher education suggested by UNESCO - two main types of learning institutions for tertiary education: the universities and university type institutions; and non-university institutions. Universities and polytechnic schools (*AEI*) belonged to the first group and offered the highest level of education and related degrees and diplomas. The second group of institutions was mainly the Technological Educational Institutions (*TEI*).⁵¹ (See, for more detail of the Greek higher education system, Appendix One.)

The reforms continued with the 1983-87 'Five-Year Plan', which had as its main objective to create structures which could admit more students. At the undergraduate level, a much broader range of programmes in the arts and sciences would be developed and, at postgraduate level, more opportunities for graduate studies and for research.⁵² Apart from the increase of entrants to higher education, other democratisation steps taken by the government were the creation of the post-lyceum preparatory centres for entrance to higher

education⁵³ and from the beginning of the 1980s, the regional universities already in operation would be further expanded. Three new universities would also be founded in the Aegean, the Ionian and the Thessalian regions.⁵⁴

The government emphasised that the introduction of the *TEI* would help towards the efforts for the 'self-reliant' development of the country *and* the reduction in inequalities of educational opportunity. The acquisition of a social identity, of consciousness for critical thought and the conception of collective effort were emphasised. The emphasis given to social justice was also associated with efforts for the establishment of the welfare state.⁵⁵ Education was considered to be a basic area of activity for the welfare state, aiming at compensating for the unequal distribution of educational goods. Thus, the approach adopted was that of 'social' rather than 'manpower' demand.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, the factor of economic efficiency was prominent in the reform movements of the 1980s. Great importance was attached to technical/vocational education, which was expected to overcome stagnation and inflation and to revive and modernise the economy. It was noted that Greece needed a new and original model of self-governing overall development, which would guarantee that Greece could join the advanced nations.⁵⁷

Socialism was stressed. The educational system was, therefore, expected to undergo a parallel transformation,⁵⁸ compounded by the importance that Greek society attaches to education.⁵⁹ As pointed out by the OECD's Examiners' Report:

Any observer of the Greek educational scene will be struck by an initial and startling paradox. There is the great esteem in which education is held among all sections of the community as the defining factor both in shaping the Greek identity throughout its historic vicissitudes and in advancing the life-chances of individuals, fully reflected in the sacrifices which families are prepared to make for the education of their children. Yet, there is a quasi-universally held view of the existing system as incapable of responding to this popular demand or meeting the aspirations of a highly motivated and gifted clientele.⁶⁰

Thus, during the first period of the socialist government (1981-1985), there was an attempt at the creation of a democratic educational reform. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement had gained a social and political consensus that led it to proceed to changes without serious opposition. So, there was a positive environment for a number of institutional changes to take shape, such as the Laws (1268/1982 and 1404/1983), mentioned above, and the establishment of University Education Departments.⁶¹

The loss of social consensus, and the general conservative turn at the beginning of the second period (1985-1989), had direct effects on educational reform. During the second period, social tension and conflict and teachers' and students' movements reversed the social consensus of the first period (1981-1985). The government slowed education reform – e.g. there were a number of corrections to the Law for Higher Education, and Law 1566/1985 was not put into practice.⁶²

Reforms had begun: Law 1268/82 had drastically changed the operation of universities. The old faculties were divided into departments and the Chair system was replaced by the disciplinary sector (*τομέας*). Policy decisions would be taken by General Assemblies, consisting of all members of the teaching staff and a considerable number of students. Undergraduates would have the same representation, as the members of the academic staff, on the electoral bodies for selecting the administrative heads of the University. The teaching staff would form a single body with four levels: lecturer, assistant professor, associate professor and professor.⁶³

However, the situation remained almost unchanged during the 1990s. In 1992, Law 2083/92 on the AEI was passed, which repeated Law 1268/82.⁶⁴ Law 1268/82 was amended by Law 2083/92, by the Conservative Party.⁶⁵ Among the modifications were the reduction of the participation of students to 50% of the faculty, and the election of the Vice-Rectors in a separate procedure from that of Rectors. However, Law 2083/92 was amended again by Law 2188/94, with the coming back to power of the socialist government.⁶⁶

Overall, what was striking was that the rationale of Law 1268/82 set the agenda of an ongoing debate that lasted throughout the 1980s – the theme of power and control. As Pesmazoglou pointed out:

in examining the hundreds of articles published by the academics in newspapers and journals, the questionnaire distributed by the Ministry of Education in 1991, the replies of collective bodies and of individual academics, and the opposition party proposals, one is struck by the persistence of one theme: the percentage distribution of power.⁶⁷

Both the organisation and the functioning of the *TEI* went on being based on Law 1404/1983, and Presidential and Ministerial decisions were based on this law.⁶⁸ There was no quality assessment procedure at the national level, or internally, for both the universities and the *TEI*.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, from the beginning of the 1990s, with the need for the country to compete in the European Union, the whole education system was called upon to become more efficient, effective and flexible, so that it would generate individuals with adequate up-to-date knowledge and key qualifications according to the requirements of the labour market. However, there was absence in the education system of a mechanism for monitoring developments in the labour market.⁷⁰

In reality, there was a graduate unemployment which was gradually increasing in a context where unemployed youth in 1981 were 29% of all unemployed, while in 1989, they were 52.4%. Especially for the *TEI* graduates, unemployment was higher than for their *AEI* counterparts (9.8% against 6.6%, respectively). In addition, about 80% of the university graduates were employed in the public sector.⁷¹ Furthermore, possession of a university degree was associated with the relatively highest rate of return (3-5%), while *TEI* qualifications were associated with returns below 2%.⁷²

OECD pointed out that they were told of growing connections with industry and business in both the universities and the *TEI*. There were strong

connections between some engineering departments and industrial and governmental sponsors which used them for testing and development services. "Projects financed by the European Union encourage connections and some part-time teachers in universities are recruited from industry. Universities and *TEI* based consultancies are also increasing in number."⁷³ Nevertheless, OECD estimated that the teaching and research agendas were not well matched to the pattern of the Greek economy, which was largely dependent on small, often family owned farms, and to the overwhelming dependence on the public sector for employment.⁷⁴

Finally, with effect from 1996, there were committees and working groups being set up within the Ministry of Education to elaborate a number of action plans in a number of major issues. Among these issues were: the further development of all non-university higher education institutions, as well as the increase of university places to meet the social demand for such education, thus reducing the number of Greek students studying abroad.⁷⁵

Although the issue of efficiency was raised but not realised, there was expansion of the system. In comparison with the previous periods, particularly during the 1980s, tertiary education experienced the highest growth rates of all. The total enrolments rose from 121,000 in the academic year 1980/81 to 268,000 in 1989/90 and 294,000 in 1993/94.⁷⁶ It was within this context that the government decided to increase considerably the number of places for technological higher education, and admissions to the *TEI* rose from 9,300 students in 1981 to 21,200 in 1986.⁷⁷ For the academic year 1992/93, there was a total of 212,745 students in the *AEI* (the increase of graduates was 39%, compared with the academic year 1981/82), and a total of 85,068 students in the *TEI* (the increase of graduates was 29%, compared with the academic year 1984/85).⁷⁸ For the academic year 1992/93, the number of entrants for both *AEI* and *TEI* was about 300,000, an increase from a total number of about 180,000 in the academic year 1984/85. The ratio of the *AEI* and the *TEI* entrants was at an average of about 70% and 30% respectively, in the years 1984 to 1993.⁷⁹

However, the tension between equity (and the *TEI*) and the requirement for the self-reliant development of the country⁸⁰ become explicit in the stated aims and purposes of the State.

Aims and Purposes of the State

The aims and purposes of the reform establishing the *TEI* become visible through the vocabulary the government used. Overall, the Ministry of National Education and Religion made explicit the reasons for the foundation of the *TEI*, by using a three-fold agenda: developmental, educational and social, and international:

- The *TEI* were part of the modernisation of the higher education system for the modernisation and economic development of the country. The *TEI* would contribute to 'self-reliant' and overall development, by promoting an indigenous 'science and technology' infrastructure, with an 'applied' orientation. The *TEI* would also contribute to the rationalisation of the higher education system in two major ways. First, having the advantage of belonging to higher education, the *TEI* would relieve universities from large numbers of students. Second, compared to the universities, the *TEI* would offer more links to production specialisations. The latter would determine the career prospects of graduates. Thus, there was an emphasis on the distinction between the *TEI* and the more 'theoretical' universities, and on the economic division of labour. The *TEI* were also expected to hinder the exodus of thousands of Greek students, abroad. For all the above reasons, the *TEI* were an expression of the 'efficiency' project.
- The *TEI* would alleviate inequality in educational opportunity, as well as contribute to the social status of technical/vocational education.
- Finally, there was an emphasis on 'international' experience.

a) The Developmental Agenda

The Ministry argued that in Greece, the lack of studies in special branches of science and technology, in combination with the lack of the necessary

infrastructure and the proper personnel for the development of technology, had led to the importation of technology from abroad.⁸¹ Moreover, the lack of the necessary specialised labour in many fields was estimated to have led to the retardation of production, to low work efficiency, to the low productivity of the economy and finally, to the production of products, which were non-competitive in terms of their cost and quality.⁸²

The Ministry also pointed out that Greece needed a new pattern of self-reliant and overall development. The creation of a modern, self-reliant, and overall national economy, was a central strategic aim. The development promoted was to be driven by indigenous factors but would draw on the advantages of the international division of labour and be in a position to create innovations.⁸³ The creation of a technological and modern technical/vocational substructure would be the prerequisite for the beginning of the development of dynamic new enterprises. In this way, the country would overcome its technological marginalisation and would attain economic self-reliance (*αυτοδυναμία*).⁸⁴

The Ministry defined the role of the *TEI* within such a developmental framework. Their first role would be to contribute to the aim of self-reliant development, by developing the evaluation, assimilation and application of imported technology, as well as by creating national technology and technical knowledge. Their second role would be to create citizens, who as employees, would understand the social context of their work. Their third role would be to provide specialised labour needed to develop advanced technology, and specialised work of high quality. Their fourth role would be to create personnel for high level services and the development of technology for the betterment of the quality of life. Their fifth role would be to educate personnel for middle-level and self-governing enterprises. Their final role would be to contribute to national research, regional, economic and social development, and rational human resource development.⁸⁵

In the contents of studies, emphasis would be given to 'scientific reason' and to the ability to manipulate scientific methods and to provide problem solving.

So, high-level knowledge would be provided for *TEI* graduates who would develop modern technologies and link theory and practice.⁸⁶ The *TEI* would provide general basic knowledge, together with modern and specialised knowledge. Moreover, the acquisition of advanced knowledge and abilities would be convertible and adaptable to the changing needs of the economy.⁸⁷

In contrast to the *AEI*, which emphasised the promotion and development of science, research and high level theoretical preparation, the *TEI* would be oriented towards the application of knowledge. The *TEI* graduates would be given experience of practical problems. Thus, graduates would be expected to transfer scientific and theoretical findings to the solution of particular problems in the productive process.⁸⁸

According to the Minister of Education, Antonis Tritsis, the special role of the *TEI* was revolutionary. The *TEI*, as part of higher education, would stress: scientific research; applied research; and productive applications. The strategic aim would be the creation of innovations in production aimed at the creation of a modern society. The *AEI* would conduct scientific research with some extensions into applied research. The *TEI* would conduct applied research with extensions into productive applications. From this role, the revolutionary possibilities of the *TEI* for the country's productivity would be increased, along with the social and political role of science. The role of the *TEI* would have to be understood by the students, from whom productive initiatives were expected. Finally, the Minister of Education made it clear that the *TEI* should not be an "antechamber" for the *AEI* and thus, the *TEI* should have an autonomous existence within higher education.⁸⁹

b) The Educational and Social Agenda

The Ministry stated that the reform of technical and vocational education would stop education being a means for the reproduction of social stratification.⁹⁰ The Prime Minister stressed his belief in the absolute equality of thought and action, and of occupations in the offices and factories and laboratories. That is why, as

he argued, not only intellectuals should have the right to education - in all the three levels of education - but also those who would apply scientific achievements to practice. With this belief, the Prime Minister went on, the government would proceed to the abolition of the *KATEE*, which were considered neither educationally nor socially worthwhile. In their place, the Technological Educational Institutions (*TEI*) together with the *AEI* belonged to higher education.⁹¹ The Ministry argued that the status of the *KATEE* - as centres for technical/vocational studies and as an intermediary level - had had negative social results, in addition to the fact that the Greek society considered that only a university degree could offer social and professional status.⁹² In a conference of *ΣΤΕ* [(Συμβούλιο Τεχνολογικής Εκπαίδευσης (Council of Technological Education))] (30.5.1984), the Prime Minister argued that with Law 1404/83, technological education was upgraded. The *KATEE* had functioned as antechambers for the already full *AEI*. He also argued that the *KATEE* had reinforced prejudice about the social and economic superiority of "white-collar" professions over the productive professions.⁹³

The production of *AEI* graduates, in certain fields, had exceeded the needs of the economy, and had led a great percentage of those graduates to qualitative underemployment and therefore, to a completely different role from the one for which they had been educated. As a result, they offered work which was neither effective nor efficient (at a greater cost and with less return). Overall, the high production of *AEI* graduates - who were led to unemployment, or qualitative underemployment - was considered to be inefficient, in terms of educational expenditure.⁹⁴

In contrast, the reorientation and upgrading of higher technical vocational education through the foundation and development of the *TEI* would promote the productive professions and would contribute to the rationalisation of the higher educational system.⁹⁵

Furthermore, the Ministry used the argument that in the future, 'mass' higher education would be reinforced not only by the application of 'science' to

production, but also by the ever-increasing social demand for higher education. The social demand would exercise pressure on the *AEI* (in terms of large number of students), if the non-university sector did not exist. The other choice would be the acceptance of the mass exodus of thousands of young people for university education abroad, with all the undesirable effects on these people and on the economy of the country.⁹⁶

But to play their role, the *TEI* - as an alternative to university education - would have to be an educationally convincing and a socially and professionally attractive solution for all those young people who did not want or could not study in the *AEI*, due to the selection processes. Thus, the *TEI* would have shorter and more flexible studies, which would be modern, linked with production specialisations, and which would assist in the creation of a modern society. At the same time, the *AEI*, with fewer students, would be given the possibility for the production of the high level scientific and technical personnel that the country needed.⁹⁷

As far as the relationship between *AEI* - *TEI* graduates in the labour market is concerned, the Ministry stressed that the suitability for the exercise of a certain profession should be judged on the basis of the correspondence between the professional occupation and the graduate's studies. In cases of overlapping of the cognitive subjects of the specialisations of the *AEI* and the *TEI* (e.g. mechanical engineering), a qualitative differentiation of the professional work that every graduate would exercise should exist. Since in the end, matters of conflict would emerge, there should be a continuous effort, from the *TEI* side, for transformation of certain specialisations to others of a more specialised cognitive area, (e.g. energy technology, automation, etc.), which would cover direct and important needs of production.⁹⁸

The Ministry also anticipated that *AEI* graduates, from the nature of their theoretical studies, would be more suitable for work in research, planning, and high managerial positions. In contrast, *TEI* graduates should have as their basic orientation the assimilation and transfer of scientific data to practical

applications. These general characteristics should determine the fields of professional activities of *AEI* and *TEI* graduates. The Ministry also admitted that it was clear - and was what international experience had proved - that the *AEI* graduates had more possibilities for professional and social development. However, the Ministry advocated the co-operation of the various cadres.⁹⁹

In some fields (e.g. engineering), conflict between *AEI* and *TEI* graduates was observed due to unemployment or underemployment. Nevertheless, the Ministry considered it was wrong to expect that the occupation of *AEI* graduates in downgraded activities would lead to better results. On the contrary, the employment of *AEI* graduates in places of work, where they would be considered over-qualified (e.g. graduates of the School of Social and Political Sciences as accountants), would create greater cost and usually less return.¹⁰⁰

c) The International Influences

Finally, the Ministry emphasised 'international experience', by stressing that a non-university sector had been developed in most Western and Eastern European countries, as well as in America, where the promotion of this type of higher education had been a considerable educational and economic success. Such an international development was reinforcing the Greek choice: it was important to catch up with international practice.¹⁰¹

Clearly, then, and central to the Greek problem was the issue of differentiation of the *TEI* and University level establishments – the *AEI*. How to do this and how to maintain the unity of the higher education system was a major problem for the Greek State. Much of the political effort of the State went into 'harmonisation'.

2.3.1 Structural Inheritance: Differentiation Between the Technological Educational Institutions (*TEI*) and University Level Establishments (*AEI*)

The purpose of this section is to show that:

- The *TEI* were founded within the framework of the unity of the higher education system, realised in issues such as the self-government of institutions. Although both *TEI-AEI* were to co-operate for 'self-reliance', this task was mostly stressed in the case of the *TEI*, which would pursue applied technology research. A special emphasis was also placed on the contribution of the *TEI* to regional development.
- The *AEI-TEI* differed in that the *AEI* were more theoretical. Instead, the *TEI* were more practical/applied oriented, as was evident in their mission, specialisms, teaching, qualifications of their staff, as well as their admission policies.

Thus, according to Law No. 1404/1983, Chapter First / Article 1 (*Κεφάλαιο Πρώτο / Άρθρο 1*), the Technological Educational Institutions were founded, within higher education.¹⁰² With this Law, a harmonisation of the internal structure and function of the two types of educational institutions (*AEI - TEI*) took place. Harmonisation was realised in the self-government and legal foundation of the institutions. With Law 1404/83 the *TEI* were defined as self-governing bodies in public law¹⁰³ and given academic freedom. There was a democratic internal structure with the participation of all the *TEI* educational and administrative personnel and students in decision-making. The educational personnel was expected to have high academic standards, albeit with emphasis on professional experience. There was an effort to co-ordinate the purposes of the *TEI* and the *AEI*: both would make a common effort for the self-reliant economic development of the country, and a research role was given to the *TEI* in the application of technology.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, the role and orientation of the *TEI* were distinguished from the *AEI*. The *TEI*'s main mission was the provision of sufficient theoretical and practical education for the application of scientific, technological, artistic and other forms of knowledge and skills in a professional occupation.¹⁰⁵ They were, according to the same Law, also expected to contribute to the career guidance of their students and to maintain a two-way relationship with productive enterprises in their regions. They were to co-operate among themselves and

with domestic and foreign, educational or technological institutions or bodies.¹⁰⁶

For the *AEI*, within Law No. 1268/1982, it was stated that the State had the obligation to provide the “highest education” (*ανώτατη εκπαίδευση*) to every Greek citizen wishing to have it, through the processes that were every time defined by law. “Highest education” was provided in the “Highest Education Institutions” [*Ανώτατα Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα (AEI)*], which had as their mission to produce and transmit knowledge through teaching and research, and to cultivate the arts. Moreover, the *AEI* were expected to contribute to the development of responsible human beings with scientific, social, cultural and political consciousness, and to provide the necessary means to ensure their adequate preparation for a scientific and professional career. The *AEI* were also expected to meet the social and developmental needs of the country. Finally, the *AEI* were to meet the need for people’s continuing education and training.¹⁰⁷

Since emphasis was placed on the practical orientation of the *TEI*, these differed from the *AEI* also in terms of teaching. Teaching would include theoretical teaching of the subjects, practical, academic or laboratory exercises or exercises in the places of work. The aim of these exercises would be the strengthening of the application of theory, as well as the acquisition of aptitudes for the exercise of a profession. It was also stated that there would be seminars, visits in productive installations and other relevant activities, as well as writing of dissertations.¹⁰⁸

“Specialisms” in the *TEI* included graphic arts, administration and economics, health and caring professions, technological applications, food technology and nutrition.¹⁰⁹ The above were also the main departments of the Technological Educational Institution of Athens¹¹⁰, but agricultural specialisms were also found in *TEI* of peripheral areas of Greece, as seen in the Table of Appendix One. As far as the admission policies are concerned,

For 77% of admissions (i.e. for 77% of the total TE places), admission to the first year is under the same conditions as for university candidates, i.e. after passing the General Examinations administered by the Ministry of Education [8]. The remaining 23% of places are reserved exclusively for technical and vocational lyceum graduates who, although they have the right (like all Lyceum graduates) to participate in the General Examinations, choose not to do so; instead they choose to compete for the reserved places. These particular students gain admission on the basis of grades earned in their lyceum diplomas.¹¹¹

In the *AEI*, teaching would include the independent teaching of a subject, the so-called *προνοτιστήρια* (halls for academic exercises) and the academic exercises, the laboratory, clinical, and practical exercises of students, and finally, the supervision of the dissertations and the carrying out of seminars, aiming at strengthening the knowledge of students.¹¹²

Thus, both the *TEI* and the *AEI* were independent legal entities. They were both guaranteed self-government and academic freedom. They derived their revenue from the same sources and applied the same management and administrative practices. In both types of institutes, students enjoyed the same privileges: no payment of tuition or registration fees of any sort, free distribution of textbooks, etc.¹¹³ The *TEI* ran programmes which led to a final degree called *πτυχίο* (*ptychio*) after at least six semesters of classroom instruction plus one or two additional semesters of practical training. The *AEI* offered programmes which led to a first degree but not necessarily the final one since (unlike the *TEI*) they could establish graduate programmes leading to Master's and Ph.D. degrees. The duration of this first degree was normally eight semesters, apart from engineering and dentistry (10 semesters) and medicine (12 semesters).¹¹⁴

Overall, then, the struggle for harmonisation was a difficult one. Much of the legal and financial basis of the two institutions (the *TEI* and the *AEI*) was similar. They were both within higher education. But the routes, qualifications, knowledge biases and probable subsequent careers of their graduates were different. Efforts to establish 'equality' between the two sets of institutions were made difficult by traditional Greek assumptions about a 'good' higher education and a 'good' career. And the problem was compounded by the

radical vision of 'self-reliant' development. The tensions between equity and efficiency were heavily political and had to do with the difficulties of "modernising" Greece, and the different balances between the social and the economic in this vision. The academic debates illustrate these points well.

2.3.2 Major Debates

As is usual with academics the debates were complex:

- Some academics pointed to the political framework to explain the direction of the reform, and attributed the failure of the reform to the absence of changes in social formation and to the nature of the Greek State.
- However, most of the debates were about the equity issue. The *TEI* were said to be providing social mobility for working-class students. As far as the whole education system is concerned, there were some claims that the 'equality of educational opportunity' argument was being used to blur the issue of 'class'.
- Finally, it was argued that the logic of modernisation went on governing the education reform agenda during this period, but in the context of a 'not in need' labour market. Moreover, it was argued that in the universities, a number of debates in the European context appeared to be non-issues in Greece.

Bouzakis argued that the education reforms of the 1980s were aiming mostly at democratisation,¹¹⁵ a bit like the reforms in the educational systems of western countries in the periods when Socialist and Labour parties had taken power.¹¹⁶ He claimed that in this model, educational reform meant a change in schooling aiming at the support of important social processes and the correction of social injustice: education was to play an active role in society and not simply follow economic developments in a passive way. Education was considered to be "the groundwork of change" and its political dimension was of the utmost importance.¹¹⁷

The failure of the reform was attributed by Bouzakis to the nature of the Greek State, the pattern of socio-economic organisation, and the excessive autonomy of the educational institutions. After the civil war, the Greek State was under the control of conservative regimes (with democratic intervals) and a seven-year long dictatorship (1967-74). So, it had become authoritarian, centralised, inflexible and bureaucratic, controlling educational management, books, curriculum, teacher education, and the examination system.¹¹⁸

Nevertheless, Bouzakis argued that the fact that the Greek State was centralised and bureaucratic had not been an obstacle during the first period. On the contrary, it was a positive factor for the institutionalisation and adoption of a democratic education reform. During the first period (1981-85), the welfare state had proceeded to the establishment of institutions - having to do also with education - which could have been a "bridge" to society. So, society would in theory gradually absorb the State but this did not happen. However, the same State functioned in a negative way during the second period (1985-89) due to the government's conservative turn. During the second period, the State had "absorbed" society and integrated (in a 'top-down' way) the institutions it had previously created. This process of change, Bouzakis suggested, could not have been different in Greece since the reforms were restricted basically to the legal and political institutions (the 'superstructure'). Interventions on the socio-economic base ('substructure') had been very restricted.¹¹⁹

The democratisation steps taken during the 1980s to help the access of less privileged social groups to higher education, Bouzakis argued, did not actually help. The increase of the numbers of entrants to higher education (*AEI* and *TEI*) permitted children from less privileged groups to enter higher education but the majority of them gained access to higher education institutions of low social status. On the other hand, the children from less privileged social groups could find a job only with difficulty in a market which did not need more University graduates.¹²⁰

Psacharopoulos raised the same point. Equity issues could not be defined by reference to the number of students in higher education. The question of whether applicants from the poorer sectors of the population were given the opportunity to pursue higher education was more crucial. In the case of Greece, the distribution of opportunity for higher education by occupational categories showed how unequally opportunities were distributed. In comparing the distribution of students by father's occupation to the distribution of the population among the main occupational categories, it appeared that young persons, whose fathers were in the professions, were three times as likely to attend university as young persons whose fathers were farmers or working men. For the year 1986, the children of executives and managers were nearly four times more successful in gaining admission to University than the children of manual workers were. Nevertheless, the offspring of the latter did better in gaining admission to the technological institutions.¹²¹

Tsoukalas theorised the same point, in an analysis of the two issues of 'democratisation' and 'modernisation' of the Greek education system. Tsoukalas argued that the tendency of an 'over-educated' society to develop into a 'semi-educated' society was enhanced by the rapid wave of democratisation that went back to 1974. 'Mass education' provided an important legitimising principle for growing socio-economic inequalities. He also pointed to opinion polls, which showed that "Greeks cling to the fallacy of their open educational meritocracy even more than to their democratic freedoms". The 'equality of educational opportunity' argument had been useful in blurring the 'class' content of the qualitative difference in those studying in the Greek educational system and those studying abroad:

Thus, the democratisation of Greek education obeys the need to conserve a social consensus constantly threatened with erosion. In this sense, the educational system is *eminently functional*, both on the level of individuating fantasies and on the level of conserving social equilibria.¹²²

For the 1980s, Tsoukalas judged that modernisation was the new panacea, and within this, educational reform had been of crucial importance. However, as Tsoukalas also argued,

The growing discrepancies between the alleged 'needs' of a dormant private labour market (in conjunction with the inevitable restriction of public employment outlets) and the reproduction of given educational practices have become generally apparent. But, (surprisingly) modernising educational discourse is as functionalist and 'other-directed' as that which it aims to supersede. Modernisers preach the need to 'privatise' education, to restrict access to educational mechanisms, to 'adapt' educational orientation towards marketable branches and to strengthen educational control.¹²³

Finally, with regard to the universities, Pesmazoglou pointed out that:

With no effective criteria and modes for evaluating teaching staff, undergraduates and academic competence; with no institutionalised research, nor really structured postgraduate courses; with many professors considering – by necessity or not – their jobs as subsidiary, and a large percentage of 'undergraduates' who in certain disciplines are not seen in class, it is doubtful if one can really speak of a 'university' at all. To be even more precise, within the European context most of the major issues in the ongoing debate on higher education, irrespective of their content and orientation, are non-issues in Greece.¹²⁴

Thus, it becomes evident that most of the academic debate offered a critique of the direction of reforms of this period. It was argued that the failure of the reform was due to the nature of the Greek State, that the 'democratisation' policies were blurring the issue of "class", and that modernisation was promoted in the context of a dormant labour market. Not much was said about the specific higher education policy that this thesis investigates, with the exception of the debate focusing on the kind of social mobility that the *TEI* were offering, and the debate about the absence in Greece of major higher education issues that had appeared in other European countries. This is partly due to the restricted number of theoretical works on the Greek higher education system.

2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To sum up, in Greece during the 1960s-1970s education was seen as a major public investment, within a human capital theory approach. From the 1960s onwards, educational expenditure increased considerably. Within the two priorities of modernisation and economic development, the education system itself was expected to be modernised, and a special emphasis was placed on post-secondary technical education, not least by the international organisations.



The OECD and especially the World Bank urged the foundation of post-secondary technical educational institutions (the *KATEE*) in the early 1970s, a process that took place during the dictatorship. These institutions were criticised for serving the needs of foreign capital and for contributing to dependent economic development in Greece. OECD's "Mediterranean Regional Project" was associated with the modernisation school of development, and was strongly criticised for being against any strengthening of domestic educational institutions, or infusing any self-reliance. In the end, the failure of the *KATEE* was attributed, by academics, to social reasons - the *KATEE* were not preferred by students as places to study, since only university education was considered to be worthwhile, and to political reasons - the *KATEE* were serving limited economic objectives. The reform of the 1960s-1970s period was within the context of manpower planning, with a restriction on the numbers entering higher education.

In the 1980s-1990s, the major priorities of modernisation and economic development went on dominating the education agenda. From the early 1980s, a number of significant higher education reforms took place. Two major laws were passed: one concerning the reorganisation of the universities and another providing for the foundation of the *TEI*. The introduction of the *TEI* was in terms of the two major priorities, and these new institutions were to contribute to 'self-reliant' development, aimed at Greece joining the group of 'advanced nations'.

The *TEI* were partly expressing a version of the modernisation of the higher education system, within the 'socialist' government's plans: education should reinforce changes in society through its own parallel changes. The pressure for modernisation and democratisation of education was also associated with the importance education had in Greek society.

However, there were difficulties in the modernisation of the Greek education system, and some argued that the failure of the reform was due to the absence

of wider changes in social formation and to the nature of the Greek State. The innovations introduced in higher education at the beginning of the 1980s were not followed by radical reforms during the rest of the 1980s-1990s period. A number of laws for the reorganisation of the universities succeeded each other with minor modifications until the early 1990s, but the initial law (1268/82) on the *AEI* seemed to dominate. During the 1990s, debates on the universities in the European context appeared to be non-issues in Greece. Furthermore, in the whole higher education system, there was no quality assessment procedure at the national level. Other debates concerned the modernisation project, which was taking place in the framework of a dormant labour market, thus pointing towards problems in the wider social formation. Nevertheless, the issue of 'modernisation' re-entered the discussion within the prospect of Greece's joining the European Union on equal terms.

The issue of 'efficiency' had been prominent from the 1960s and was linked with the importance attached to technical education for the modernisation and economic development of the country. The 1970s reforms created the *KATEE*, which aimed both at economic efficiency and the creation of a technically trained labour force, as well as relieving the admissions pressure on the universities.

The theme of efficiency continued in the 1980s reforms with the *TEI*, which were part of the modernisation of the higher education system to contribute to modernisation and economic development. The latter was also expected to be 'self-reliant'. The *TEI* were to contribute to 'self-reliant' development (also in co-operation with the *AEI*) by promoting an indigenous 'science and technology' infrastructure, with an 'applied' orientation, in a two-way relationship with productive enterprises in the respective regions. The rationale used by the government included 'international experience': the significance of developments in other countries and in fact Greece adopted the pattern for higher education suggested by UNESCO.

The other version of the meaning of efficiency was the harmonisation of the higher education system. The *TEI* upgraded and expanded and as part of higher education would relieve the universities from large numbers of students. This was particularly important in the context of a strong demand for higher education in Greece.

The harmonisation of the internal structure and function of the *AEI* - *TEI* was realised in the self-government of institutions, in rules on academic freedom, in democratic decision-making, and through the demand for high academic standards of the teaching staff for the *TEI*. The *TEI* were expected to contribute to the rationalisation of the higher education system, by relieving universities – which were estimated to be ‘inefficient’ and ‘ineffective’ - from large numbers of students, and by offering courses linked with production specialisations. The division of labour would be in terms of the distinction between the theoretically minded university graduates and their more practically oriented *TEI* counterparts.

Within the logic of efficiency, meaning modernisation and self-reliant economic development, the government emphasised the practical orientation of the *TEI* towards productive applications and applied research. The special applied orientation of the *TEI* was evident in their teaching, their staff, their specialisms, and their mission statements. In contrast, the *AEI* were more theoretically oriented. The admission policies were roughly the same for both *TEI* and *AEI*, although there were some special regulations for admission to the *TEI*.

The concept of equity had different meanings in the two time periods. During the first period (the 1960s-1970s), this concept reflected concerns about the ‘input’ to education (though not higher education) and ‘democratisation’. During the 1980s, ‘equity’ meant expansion of the whole higher education system and the upgrading of technological higher education.

Thus, the issue of equity was visible in the equality of educational opportunity argument used during both time periods. In the 1964 reform, ‘equity’ meant

expansion of the education system, and was debated on the grounds that it confined itself to the 'input' aspect of education and that it magnified existing inequalities. In the 1976-77 reform, the democratisation of education was expected to contribute to the democratisation of society, although no particular emphasis was placed, in this respect, on post-secondary technical education.

In the 1980s higher education reforms, the foundation of the *TEI* was within the logic of the reduction of inequality of educational opportunity. The reform of this period was characterised by a 'social demand' approach to educational planning. Compared to the previous period, a broader range of programmes within higher education was offered, and the whole higher education system was expanded. The argument of 'equality of educational opportunity' took shape with the increase of the students entering higher education. Particularly, there were increases of places for technological higher education (the *TEI*). The upgrading of higher technical education - accompanied by rhetorical statements about the social restoration of technical/vocational education - was part of the 'equality of educational opportunity' project.

The above developments were within the framework of statements about the purposes of education being for human beings and about the formation of their social identity, consciousness, and critical thinking for collective effort. Education, as a basic area of activity for the welfare state, was to alleviate unequal educational opportunities. Nevertheless, there were debates that the 'democratisation' steps during this period were legitimising socio-economic inequalities. It was argued that the majority of *TEI* students had a working-class background.

In the end, despite the increasing unemployment - particularly for *TEI* graduates - the promotion of the non-university sector went on during the 1990s. This was partly due to the need for the expansion of the higher education system to meet the social demand and to avoid a further increase of Greek students studying abroad.

Overall, there were tensions over equity and efficiency in the state's agenda and, then, in times of political change, an effort was being made to balance these goals and to harmonise the pattern of higher education. The attempt at harmonisation of the higher education system was increased by the coming to power of a 'socialist' government, which stressed the application of science to practice and the contribution of technological higher education to equality of thought and action, thus strengthening the equity project.

Also, within the context of this government's plans, although from the 1960s the major issues were those of 'modernisation' and 'economic development', during the 1980s, one more issue was added: that of 'self-reliant' development. The foundation of the non-university sector of higher education (the *TEI*) in the early 1980s was expressing the modernisation of the Greek higher education system to contribute to all the above priorities. That was what the issue of 'efficiency' meant for the case of Greece. The concept of 'the market' had not entered the higher education policy agenda, unlike the other two European countries (as will be later argued).

Nevertheless, the other version of the efficiency project seemed to be particularly crucial. This meant relieving universities from the burden of large numbers of students, since there was exceptionally strong social demand for higher education. It was within this logic that higher technological education was upgraded and access to it increased considerably. However, such efforts were taking place within a sociological context: in the cultural context of Greece, students and their parents appreciate only university level education.

ENDNOTES

¹ Modern development thought was dominated by two major theories, namely, "modernisation" and "human capital" theories. Modernisation theory emerged in the 1950s and was based "on the notion that there is a direct causal link between five sets of variables, namely, modernising institutions, modern values, modern behaviour, modern society and economic development." [See FÄGERLIND, I., & SAHA, L., (1989), *Education and National Development: a Comparative Perspective*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, pp. 16-17.] Criticism of this theory suggested that: modern attitudes were not necessarily incompatible with traditional ones and modern values and behaviour did not always lead to socio-economic development. Human capital theory saw education as a productive investment, which would improve the individual choices available. An educated population provided the type of labour force necessary for industrial development and economic growth. "Thus the human capital theory postulates that the most efficient path to the national development of any society lies in the improvement of its population, that is, its human capital." (See *ibid*, pp. 17-18.)

² The "manpower" approach to education aims to provide the work force with the abilities required for productive activity. Thus, the system must be reasonably well geared to the production requirements of the economy. [See PARNES, H. S., (1964), "Manpower Analysis in Educational Planning", in BLAUG, M., (ed), (1968), *Economics of Education 1: Selected Readings*, Middlesex, Penguin Books, p. 263.] The 'social demand approach' is a means of quantifying social demand for education, and is based on the belief that more and better education is both socially and economically desirable. Thus, this approach claims that a wide range of courses should be offered. The approach is also based on existing social and demographic trends and free public demand and is commonly used to mean: "the aggregate 'popular' demand for education, that is the sum total of individual demands for education at a given place and time under prevailing cultural, political and economic circumstances". [See COOMBS, P. H., (1970), *What is Educational Planning*, Paris, UNESCO - International Institute for Educational Planning, pp. 37-40.]

³ PYRGIOTAKIS, I. E., (1991), «Η Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Κρίση: Μύθοι και Πραγματικότητες» ("The Greek Educational Crisis: Myths and Realities"), in PYRGIOTAKIS, I. E., & KANAKIS, I. N., (eds), (1992), *Παγκόσμια Κρίση στην Εκπαίδευση* (*World Crisis in Education*), Athens, Grigoris, p. 186. Historically, as Pyrgiotakis argues, there had been a distinction between the two basic functions of education: the 'ideological - political' function and the function of 'specialisation' or 'qualification'. Until the 1950s, the first function was the dominant one and schooling was not corresponding with the productive process. This tendency was even more accelerated by the influence of German neo-humanism. Nor did the school function according to the needs of Greek society. Greece sought social and political identity. However, the themes of 'specialisation' or 'qualifications' dominated the 1958 education reform. (See *ibid*, p. 183.)

⁴ TSOUKALAS, C., (1992), *Εξάρτηση και Αναπαραγωγή: ο Κοινωνικός Ρόλος των Εκπαιδευτικών Μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα (1830-1922)* [*Dependence and Reproduction: the Social Role of the Educational Mechanisms in Greece (1830-1922)*], Athens, Themelio, p. 212.

⁵ PYRGIOTAKIS, I. E., (1991), «Η Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Κρίση: Μύθοι και Πραγματικότητες» ("The Greek Educational Crisis: Myths and Realities"), op. cit., p. 187.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 187-188. «Παιδεία και πάλι Παιδεία, μόρφωσις και πάλι μόρφωσις» ("Education, again and again") was the characteristic phrase of the main introducer of the draft law to Parliament. (See ibid, p. 187.)

⁷ PESMAZOGLOU, S., (1987), *Εκπαίδευση και Ανάπτυξη στην Ελλάδα 1948-1985: το Ασύμπτωτο μιας Σχέσης* (*Education and Development in Greece 1948-1985: the Asymptote of a Relation*), Athens, Themelio, p. 77. From 1966, there was a continuous decrease in educational expenditure until in 1975 it was 12.7%. From 1975 onwards, it increased. For the period 1976-1984, it became steady at percentages between 13.0 and 15.2 (13.2 in 1976, 14.9 in 1978, 13.0 in 1981, 15.2 in 1984). (See ibid, pp. 76-77.)

⁸ PYRGIOTAKIS, I. E., (1991), «Η Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Κρίση: Μύθοι και Πραγματικότητες» ("The Greek Educational Crisis: Myths and Realities"), op. cit., p. 189.

⁹ VERGIDIS, D., (1982), «Η Παρέμβαση των Διεθνών Οργανώσεων στην Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Πολιτική» ("The Intervention of International Organisations in Greek Educational Politics"), in Centre of Mediterranean Studies - Centre for Studies and Self-Learning (Κέντρο Μεσογειακών Μελετών - Κέντρο Μελετών και Αυτομόρφωσης), *Κριτική της Εκπαιδευτικής Πολιτικής 1974 - 1981* (*Critique of Educational Politics 1974 - 1981*), Athens, p. 22.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 22.

¹¹ O.E.C.D., (1965), *The Mediterranean Regional Project: Greece*, Paris, O.E.C.D., p. 19.

¹² Ibid, p. 20. The OECD report coincided with the government of the country by *Ενωσις Κέντρου* (the centrist liberal regime). During that period, the government announced the foundation of a third University at Patras, a plan that had been elaborated by a specialist of OECD in collaboration with other members. The new University of Patras was expected to be international, in the sense that it would accept students from developing countries. There was also the ambition that this University would become a foreign language University, like that of Tel-Aviv. The choice of Patras was not accidental, since the city was expected to become a bridge between Greece and the Middle East. In 1968, the government of the dictatorship entrusted Haywood, an expert of the OECD, with the project on the University of Patras and started negotiating with the

World Bank about funding it. Aiming at the creation of a technological institution in accordance with American models, the World Bank insisted that the University should function on the basis of the "department" and not of the "chair" and that the Administrative Council should consist of representatives from industry and commerce. [See VERGIDIS, D., (1982), «Η Παρέμβαση των Διεθνών Οργανώσεων στην Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Πολιτική» ("The Intervention of International Organisations in Greek Educational Politics"), op. cit., p. 23.]

¹³ The 'Mediterranean Regional Project', and the World Bank's Educational Projects were within the framework of the multilateral technical assistance given to Greece by international agencies. [See PESMAZOGLOU, S., (1989), "Technical and Educational Assistance to Greece: a Case Study of Certain Post-War Realities and Mythologies", *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, Vol. 5, pp. 52-62.]

¹⁴ See LALOUMI - VIDALI, E., (1988), *Social and Professional Foundations of Teacher Education in Greece: a Comparative Study of the Politics of the Reform of Pre-primary and Primary Teacher Education with Special Reference to the 1982 Law*, (PhD Thesis), University of London, Institute of Education, p. 81.

¹⁵ VERGIDIS, D., (1982), «Η Παρέμβαση των Διεθνών Οργανώσεων στην Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Πολιτική» ("The Intervention of International Organisations in Greek Educational Politics"), op. cit., p. 24. Kazamias *et al* claim that the KATEE [Κέντρα Ανώτερης Τεχνικής και Επαγγελματικής Εκπαίδευσης (Centres for Higher and Vocational Education)] evolved after 1976, out of the Centres for Higher Technical Education (KATE) which were originally set up in 1970. [See KAZAMIAS, A., & STARIDA, A., (1992), "Professionalisation or Vocationalisation in Greek Higher Education", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 27, Nos. 1/2, p. 102.]

¹⁶ KALAMATIANOU, A. G., KARMAS, C. A., & LIANOS, T. P., (1988), "Technical Higher Education in Greece", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 273. The KATEE covered 21 faculties with 74 specialised departments which provided courses of four semesters duration in health services, business management, agriculture, food technology and graphic arts, with six semesters for the engineering course. (See *ibid*, p. 273.)

¹⁷ VERGIDIS, D., (1982), «Η Παρέμβαση των Διεθνών Οργανώσεων στην Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Πολιτική» ("The Intervention of International Organisations in Greek Educational Politics"), op. cit., p. 31.

¹⁸ Ministry of National Education and Religion, TEI Special Service - Department of Programmes and Studies (Υπουργείο Εθνικής Παιδείας και Θρησκευμάτων, Ειδική Υπηρεσία Τ.Ε.Ι. - Τμήμα Προγραμμάτων και Σπουδών), (1988), *Οδηγός για το Σπουδαστή Τ.Ε.Ι. (Guide for the Student of T.E.I.)*, Athens, Ο.Ε.Δ.Β. (Organisation for Publication of School Textbooks), p. 85.

¹⁹ PERSIANIS, P. K., (1978), "Values Underlying the 1976-1977 Educational Reform in Greece", *Comparative Education Review: Symposium on Educational Reform in Greece*, Vol. 22, No. 1, February, pp. 56-58.

²⁰ VERGIDIS, D., (1982), «Η Παρέμβαση των Διεθνών Οργανώσεων στην Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Πολιτική» ('The Intervention of International Organisations in Greek Educational Politics'), op. cit., pp. 25-26. In 1978, another contract followed which provided for ten KETE [(Κέντρα Επαγγελματικής και Τεχνικής Εκπαίδευσης (Centres of Vocational and Technical Education)] and four new KATEE. (See *ibid*, p. 24.)

²¹ LALOUMI - VIDALI, E., (1988), *Social and Professional Foundations of Teacher Education in Greece: a Comparative Study of the Politics of the Reform of Pre-primary and Primary Teacher Education with Special Reference to the 1982 Law*, op. cit., p. 81.

²² PERSIANIS, P. K., (1978), "Values Underlying the 1976-1977 Educational Reform in Greece", op. cit., p. 51.

²³ *Ibid*, pp. 51-52. The modernisation of education was considered to be extremely important mainly because it was seen as, first, a proper response "to the intellectual needs of the people", and second, a necessary intellectual as well as technological preparation of the country for joining the European Economic Community. (See *ibid*, p. 53.)

²⁴ Other values – primarily cultural, social and economic, and to a lesser degree educational - were also implicit in the laws. (See *ibid*, p. 51.)

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 51.

²⁶ MARKOPOULOS, A., (1986), *Politics and Education: the Democratization of the Greek Educational System*, (PhD Thesis), University of London, Institute of Education, p. 166. Two other laws were Law 309/76 "On the Organisation and Administration of General Education", and Law 186/75 "On KEME" [Κέντρο Εκπαιδευτικών Μελετών και Επιμόρφωσης (Centre of Educational Studies and In-Service Training)]. [See PERSIANIS, P. K., (1978), "Values Underlying the 1976-1977 Educational Reform in Greece", op. cit., *ibid*, p. 51.] There were also two more laws: Law No. 682/1978 "On private education" and Law No. 815/1978 "On some problems of the organisation and operation of higher education". Laws 186/1975 and 309/1976 were accepted nearly unanimously by the political parties in Parliament and were welcomed by prominent intellectuals in the country. However, Law No. 815/1978 on the universities was passed with some dispute. [See MARKOPOULOS, A., (1986), *Politics and Education: the Democratization of the Greek Educational System*, op. cit., p. 166.]

Law No. 815/1978 was associated with a strong debate on the problem of the reorganisation of the Greek universities (1971-1981). There were several initiatives from the governments of the 'New Democracy' for the formation of committees to study and draw up draft laws for the universities. The formation of committees took place only after some sharpening of the crisis in the

University. The basic points of the various draft laws were about organisational problems within the University. A law was enacted that gave the PhD holders among ΕΔΠ (Educational Teaching Personnel) the possibility to teach and another law was enacted which had to do with the participation of ΕΔΠ and the students in the meetings of the Schools and the Councils (Senates) of the University. [See VRYCHEA, A., & GAVROGLOU, K., (1982), *Απόπειρες Μεταρρύθμισης της Ανώτατης Εκπαίδευσης 1911-1981 (Attempts of Reform of Higher Education 1911-1981)*, Thessaloniki, Εκδόσεις Σύγχρονα Θέματα (Contemporary Issues Publications), pp. 101-104.]

²⁷ VOROS, F. K., (1978), "Current Educational Reforms: an Overview", *Comparative Education Review: Symposium on Educational Reform in Greece*, Vol. 22, No. 1, February, pp. 7-9.

²⁸ BOUZAKIS, S., (1992), «Εκπαιδευτικές Μεταρρυθμίσεις στη Δεκαετία του '80: μια αναλυτική – ερμηνευτική προσέγγιση των νέων προσπαθειών και των νέων αδιεξόδων» ("Educational Reforms in the 80s: an analytical-interpretative approach to the new efforts and the new deadlocks"), in PYRGIOTAKIS, I. E., & KANAKIS, I. N., (eds), *Παγκόσμια Κρίση στην Εκπαίδευση (World Crisis in Education)*, Athens, Grigoris, p. 249.

²⁹ MARKOPOULOS, A., (1986), *Politics and Education: the Democratization of the Greek Educational System*, op. cit., p. 188.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 190.

³¹ PERSIANIS, P. K., (1978), "Values Underlying the 1976-1977 Educational Reform in Greece", op. cit., p. 56.

³² Ibid, pp. 56-58.

³³ Ibid, pp. 56-58.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 56.

³⁵ There was also an overall analysis of the reforms of the whole period that came from Brian Holmes in London University, writing as a foreign academic. Holmes was critical of the politics that initiated the education reforms and of the interventions of international organisations. He argued that during the whole 1956-77 period, there were certain continuities in the reform movement such as the push to expand education, especially technical and vocational education, the attempt to reorganise the structure of the educational system and the effort to reform the curriculum. Also, there was a consensus on the developmental value of education and this developmental goal - in its assumptions and implications - was within Western liberal democratic ideology. In educational policy and practice there was hardly any difference between the liberal centrist Papandreou of the mid-60s and the liberal conservative post-exile Karamanlis. The importance of schooling (especially

technical and vocational) in economic development was particularly stressed. This was based on the human capital theory and the manpower requirements approach associated with Harbison, the World Bank and the Mediterranean Regional Project. [See HOLMES, B., (1980), "The Politics of Education - The Case of Greece", in HOLMES, B., (ed), *Diversity and Unity in Education: A Comparative Analysis*, London, George Allen & Unwin, pp. 133-134.]

³⁶ Probably "normal" for semi-peripheral societies.

³⁷ PYRGIOTAKIS, I. E., (1991), «Η Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Κρίση: Μύθοι και Πραγματικότητες» ("The Greek Educational Crisis: Myths and Realities"), op. cit., p. 184.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 189.

³⁹ PESMAZOGLU, S., (1989), "Technical and Educational Assistance to Greece: a Case Study of Certain Post-War Realities and Mythologies", *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, Vol. 5, p. 44. An OECD report (1964), indicating this problem, was quoted by Pesmazoglou:

In the past, the deficiencies of the coordinating system were made more difficult by the fact that often the initiative for a particular technical assistance undertaking came not from the Greek Government, but from the technical assistance donor. Well intentioned international agencies and bilateral donors alike find it very tempting to prejudge requirements according to their own estimates of needs and in the light very often of their own particular forms of expertise and to come forward with offers of what they feel would be useful. (See *ibid*, p. 44.)

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 63.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 57.

⁴² Ibid, p. 62.

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 39-40.

⁴⁴ VERGIDIS, D., (1982), «Η Παρέμβαση των Διεθνών Οργανώσεων στην Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Πολιτική» ("The Intervention of International Organisations in Greek Educational Politics"), op. cit., p. 31.

⁴⁵ PERSIANIS, P. K., (1978), "Values Underlying the 1976-1977 Educational Reform in Greece", op. cit., p. 55. According to Persianis, this reform was a compromise between mass secondary education and the elitism brought about by aiming at high standards. The provisions which sought to maintain high standards were entrance examinations into the lyceums at the age of 15, the failing of students even in the gymnasiums where attendance was compulsory, selection for the universities on the basis of high performance in the lyceums, and the control of private education. (See *ibid*, p. 58.)

⁴⁶ ELIOU, M., (1978), "Those Whom Reform Forgot", *Comparative Education Review: Symposium on Educational Reform in Greece*, Vol. 22, No. 1, February, p. 60.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 60.

⁴⁸ KALAMATIANOU, A. G., KARMAS, C. A., & LIANOS, T. P., (1988), "Technical Higher Education in Greece", op. cit., p. 273.

⁴⁹ BOUZAKIS, S., (1992), «Εκπαιδευτικές Μεταρρυθμίσεις στη Δεκαετία του '80: μια αναλυτική – ερμηνευτική προσέγγιση των νέων προσπαθειών και των νέων αδιεξόδων» ("Educational Reforms in the 80s: an analytical-interpretative approach to the new efforts and the new deadlocks"), op. cit., p. 254.

⁵⁰ LALOUMI - VIDALI, E., (1988), *Social and Professional Foundations of Teacher Education in Greece: a Comparative Study of the Politics of the Reform of Pre-primary and Primary Teacher Education with Special Reference to the 1982 Law*, op. cit., pp. 83-84. The policy of higher education in Greece is based on a dual concept of education, which since 1983 has referred to two main types of state-provided tertiary institutions:

One type is represented by the universities and university-level establishments, which are known as 'higher education institutions' (AEIs). The other (non-university) type covers mainly the 'Technological Education Institutions' (TEIs). The AEIs have a longer tradition (the oldest one - the University of Athens - dates back to 1837); they include multi-department and multi-school comprehensive universities like the Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki; [See KAZAMIAS, A. & STARIDA, A., (1992), "Professionalisation or Vocationalisation in Greek Higher Education", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 27, Nos. 1/2, p. 101.]

Historically, among the types of institutions in post-secondary formal education are four-year universities and four-year university-level independent schools; three- and four-year TEI which were established in 1983, after the abolition of the Centres for Technical and Vocational Education [*Κέντρα Ανώτερης Τεχνικής και Επαγγελματικής Εκπαίδευσης (KATEE)*]; two-year primary school teacher training colleges, established in 1933 and abolished in 1985; instead, four-year courses for primary school and kindergarten teachers in universities; three-year academies of physical training established in 1932 (primarily to train secondary school teachers) and abolished in 1985; instead, in universities, four-year courses in Physical Education and Sports were established; three-year private schools of Nursing and Midwifery which were abolished in 1983 after the establishment of TEI; two-year public schools for the engineering trades (*Σχολές Υπομηχανικών*) were established in 1958 and were abolished in 1970 after the establishment of the KATEE; two- and three-year private technical/vocational schools (equivalent to KATEE) were abolished in 1983 after the establishment of the TEI. [See KALAMATIANOU, A. G., KARMAS, C. A., & LIANOS, T. P., (1988), "Technical Higher Education in Greece", op. cit., pp. 271-272.]

⁵¹ OECD, (1997), *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, Paris, OECD, p. 56. "It should be noted that there are no private universities or TEIs in Greece." (See *ibid*, p. 57.) Post-secondary formal education includes three types of institutions:

- (a) The four-year universities; all public by law, all functioning under the supervision of the Ministry of Education.
- (b) The three- to four- year Technological Educational Institutes (TEI); all public by law, all functioning under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and considered equivalent to the polytechnics in England or the Fachhochschulen in Germany.
- (c) The two- or three- year technical vocational or special professional schools; these are public or private establishments functioning under the supervision of the ministry other than the Ministry of Education or under the supervision of some autonomous public organisation. [See KARMAS, C. A., LIANOS, T. P., & KALAMATIANOU, A. G., (1988), "Greek Universities: an Overview", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 261.]

⁵² KARMAS, C. A., LIANOS, T. P., & KALAMATIANOU, A. G., (1988), "Greek Universities: an Overview", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 262-263. Until 1981, governments in power believed that they were giving better opportunities to graduates by restricting the number of new entrants. This policy created an undesirable situation, since a considerable number of young Greeks went abroad to study and some never returned. Yet, in 1981, there were drastic changes - which could be understood through the fundamental provisions in the 1983-87 Five-Year Plan - made by the new government on the supply side of higher education. (See *ibid*, pp. 262-263.)

⁵³ BOUZAKIS, S., (1992), «Εκπαιδευτικές Μεταρρυθμίσεις στη Δεκαετία του '80: μια αναλυτική – ερμηνευτική προσέγγιση των νέων προσπαθειών και των νέων αδιεξόδων» ("Educational Reforms in the 80s: an analytical-interpretative approach to the new efforts and the new deadlocks"), *op. cit.*, p. 256.

⁵⁴ KARMAS, C. A., LIANOS, T. P., & KALAMATIANOU, A. G., (1988), "Greek Universities: an Overview", *op. cit.*, p. 263. Historically, the first stage of the development of University Level Establishments extended from 1837 (when the University of Athens was founded) until the 1960s:

During this period there were three universities and six university schools all located either in Athens, Piraeus or Thessaloniki. The second stage, which is still continuing, is characterised by expansion, decentralisation and changes in the structure and organisation. During this period university level institutions have been established in Patras, Ioannina, Crete, Thrace, Ionian University, University of Aegean, University of Attica and University of Thessaly. [See LALOUMI - VIDALI, E., (1988), *Social and Professional Foundations of Teacher Education in Greece: a Comparative Study of the Politics of the Reform of Pre-primary and Primary Teacher Education with Special Reference to the 1982 Law*, *op. cit.*, p. 165.]

The National Technical University and the School of Fine Arts were founded in Athens almost simultaneously with the University of Athens but they were granted university status, the former in 1914 and the latter in 1930. The Athens School of Economic and Business Science and the Agricultural College of Athens were established in 1920. The University of Thessaloniki was founded in Northern Greece in 1925. The Panteios School of Political Science was established in Athens in 1936. In 1958, the Piraeus and Thessaloniki Schools of Industrial Studies were founded. Therefore, in the 1950s the system of university education in Greece included three universities and six university-level schools, all located in urban centres (Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki). Many Greek peasants, who placed a high value on the education of their children, saw the above cities as the best places to live, "so that the exodus of the population from the rural areas to the above cities, between 1950 and 1960, can be partially ascribed to the centralisation of the universities as well as other government services in the three big cities." [See SAITIS, C. A., (1988), "The Relationship between the State and the University in Greece", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 249.]

The second phase in the development of the Greek higher education system started in the 1960s. Then, the need for further economic and cultural development (especially in outlying areas), the social pressure for increasing access to higher education, and the demand to modernise the structure and organisation of the Greek universities led to a sequence of decisions. The main developments since then have been:

the creation of a series of new universities in the regions and attempts at further modernisation of the structure and organisation of the Greek universities. From 1964 to 1984 eight new universities - University of Patras (1964), University of Ioannina (1970), University of Thrace (1973), University of Crete (1973), Technical University of Crete (1977), University of the Aegean (1984), Ionian University (1984) and University of Thessaly (1984) - have been established, so bringing the number of higher education institutions in Greece to a total of seventeen. (See *ibid*, p. 249.)

⁵⁵ BOUZAKIS, S., (1992), «Εκπαιδευτικές Μεταρρυθμίσεις στη Δεκαετία του '80: μια αναλυτική – ερμηνευτική προσέγγιση των νέων προσπαθειών και των νέων αδιεξόδων» ("Educational Reforms in the 80s: an analytical-interpretative approach to the new efforts and the new deadlocks"), *op. cit.*, p. 251.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 252. Among the steps taken were the abolition of the entrance examinations to the lyceums, the post-lyceum preparatory centres for entrance to the universities, compensatory education, and changes in the system of assessment. (See *ibid*, p. 252.)

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 253.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 253.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 255.

⁶⁰ OECD, (1997), *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, op. cit., p. 135.

⁶¹ BOUZAKIS, S., (1992), «Εκπαιδευτικές Μεταρρυθμίσεις στη Δεκαετία του '80: μια αναλυτική – ερμηνευτική προσέγγιση των νέων προσπαθειών και των νέων αδιεξόδων» (“Educational Reforms in the 80s: an analytical-interpretative approach to the new efforts and the new deadlocks”), op. cit., p. 256.

⁶² Ibid, p. 257.

⁶³ OECD, (1997), *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

⁶⁴ Kladis, D., & Panousis, Y., (1993), *Ο Νόμος Πλαίσιο για τη Δομή και Λειτουργία των Α.Ε.Ι. (όπως τροποποιήθηκε με το ν. 2083/92)* [Law for the Structure and Function of A.E.I. (as transformed with Law 2083/92)], Athens - Komotini, Sakkoulas, p. 9.

⁶⁵ OECD, (1997), *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, op. cit., p. 56.

⁶⁶ Ibid, pp. 60-61.

⁶⁷ PESMAZOGLU, S., (1994), “Government, Ideology and the University Curriculum in Greece”, *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 292.

⁶⁸ OECD, (1997), *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, op. cit., p. 61. This law had introduced innovations such as the provision for the establishment of Advisory Services at the Ministry of Education to offer TEI advisory support. These services were the Council for Technological Education (Συμβούλιο Τεχνολογικής Εκπαίδευσης – ΣΤΕ) as well as the Institute for Technological Education (Ινστιτούτο Τεχνολογικής Έρευνας - ΙΤΕ). Additionally, there were Regional Technological Councils, having as their role to facilitate the formation of links between the TEI and the productive units, for economic and any other support. (See *ibid*, p. 61.)

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 61. Not only did the law on AEI remain virtually unchanged, but also the law on TEI was not changed apart from minor changes in 1996. Within Law 2327/95, changes concerned the role of practical exercises in the TEI. [For more information, see Journal of the Government of Greek Democracy (Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας), *Νόμος υπ' Αριθμόν 2327 (Law under the Number 2327)*, Τεύχος Πρώτο (First Volume), Αριθμός Φύλλου 156 (Issue Number 156), 31 July 1995, pp. 5012-5013.]

⁷⁰ OECD, (1997), *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, op. cit., p. 118.

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 116.

⁷² Ibid, p. 121.

⁷³ Ibid, pp. 183-184.

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp. 183-184.

⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 209-210. Also, as of September 1996 (with effect from June 1999), there was a radical change in the philosophy of the Greek Education system. It was expressed by the introduction of a programme leading to the establishment of a *National Lyceum Leaving Certificate*, replacing two existing examinations: the school-leaving and entrance examinations into tertiary level institutions. Among other innovations was the creation of the *Centre for Educational Research* and the *Hellenic Open University*. (See *ibid*, pp. 208-209.)

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 139. These figures should be interpreted with caution - they include a portion (30-40%) of registered but "inactive" students. (See *ibid*, p. 139.) While the term "student" refers to anyone who has entered a higher education institution and has not obtained a degree yet, the term "active student" refers to anyone who has been to the institution for the period required by the programme. (See *ibid*, p. 108.)

⁷⁷ KARMAS, C. A., LIANOS, T. P., & KALAMATIANOU, A. G., (1988), "Greek Universities: an Overview", *op. cit.*, p. 263. The numbers of university places remained constant during the period 1974-81 and expanded between 1981 and 1986. The supply of Technological Education places increased rapidly during both periods: from 4,000 admissions in 1975, it climbed to 9,300 in 1981 and to 21,200 in 1986. However, there was a stabilisation in the following years for both the TEI and the universities. [See KALAMATIANOU, A. G., KARMAS, C. A., & LIANOS, T. P., (1988), "Technical Higher Education in Greece", *op. cit.*, p. 276.]

⁷⁸ OECD, (1997), *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-110.

⁷⁹ See Figure 7.9. *Number of Students in AEI and TEI*, in OECD, (1997), *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

⁸⁰ KARMAS, C. A., LIANOS, T. P., & KALAMATIANOU, A. G., (1988), "Greek Universities: an Overview", *op. cit.*, p. 263.

⁸¹ Ministry of National Education and Religion, TEI Special Service - Department of Programmes and Studies (Υπουργείο Εθνικής Παιδείας και Θρησκευμάτων, Ειδική Υπηρεσία Τ.Ε.Ι. – Τμήμα Προγραμμάτων και Σπουδών), (1988), *Οδηγός για το Σπουδαστή Τ.Ε.Ι. (Guide for the Student of T.E.I.)*, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁸² Ibid, p. 86.

⁸³ Ibid, p. 87.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 87. In addition, the Ministry stated that the quickly changing technology and the organisation of the work place demanded flexible occupational articulation and convertible knowledge. The increasing demands for the qualitative qualifications of labour were: a) mobility, d) adaptation to the quickly changing technological, economic and social conditions, and c) ability for concentration, composition and co-operation. It was estimated that the above processes could lead to the formation of a new division of labour, or a new articulation of occupations which would have as its basic characteristics greater flexibility, horizontal and vertical mobility and adaptability. Therefore, the educational system, in its contents and its forms, should be adapted to the above demands. (See *ibid*, p. 87.)

⁸⁵ Ibid, pp. 87-88.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 89.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 90.

⁸⁸ Ibid, pp. 89-90.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 94.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 88.

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 93. The organisation and function of the TEI was based on the same foundations that were laid for the 'highest educational institutions' [*Ανώτατα Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα (ΑΕΙ)*]. The Prime Minister argued that with law 1404/83 for the TEI, the government had made a peaceful revolution in the area of higher education. (See *ibid*, p. 93.)

⁹² Ibid, pp. 85-86.

⁹³ Ibid, p. 93.

⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 86-87.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 88.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 88. The strong demand for higher education was finding an outlet abroad. For instance, between 1970 and 1982, the number of Greek students in foreign universities was the largest in the world (after Hong Kong) in terms of the ratio of students studying abroad relative to domestic enrolment. [See OECD, (1997), *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Greece*, op. cit., p. 121.]

⁹⁷ Ministry of National Education and Religion, TEI Special Service - Department of Programmes and Studies (Υπουργείο Εθνικής Παιδείας και Θρησκευμάτων, Ειδική Υπηρεσία Τ.Ε.Ι. – Τμήμα Προγραμμάτων και Σπουδών), (1988), *Οδηγός για το Σπουδαστή Τ.Ε.Ι. (Guide for the Student of T.E.I.)*, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 92.

⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 92-93.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 93.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, pp. 88-89.

¹⁰² Journal of the Government of Greek Democracy (Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας), *Νόμος υπ' Αριθμόν 1404 (Law under the Number 1404)*, Τεύχος Πρώτο (First Volume), Αριθμός Φύλλου 173 (Issue Number 173), 24 November 1983, p. 2561.

¹⁰³ Also, according to Law No. 1404/1983, Chapter First / Article 1. (*Κεφάλαιο Πρώτο / Άρθρο 1*), the supervision of the TEI was by the Minister of National Education and Religion, according to the statements of the law. (See *ibid*, p. 2561.)

¹⁰⁴ Ministry of National Education and Religion, TEI Special Service - Department of Programmes and Studies (Υπουργείο Εθνικής Παιδείας και Θρησκευμάτων, Ειδική Υπηρεσία Τ.Ε.Ι. – Τμήμα Προγραμμάτων και Σπουδών), (1988), *Οδηγός για το Σπουδαστή Τ.Ε.Ι. (Guide for the Student of T.E.I.)*, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁰⁵ Journal of the Government of Greek Democracy (Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας), *Νόμος υπ' Αριθμόν 1404 (Law under the Number 1404)*, *op. cit.*, p. 2561.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 2561.

¹⁰⁷ Journal of the Government of Greek Democracy (Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας), *Νόμος υπ' Αριθμόν 1268 (Law under the Number 1268)*, Τεύχος Πρώτο (First Volume), Αριθμός Φύλλου 87 (Issue Number 87), 16 July 1982, p. 677.

¹⁰⁸ Journal of the Government of Greek Democracy (Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας), *Νόμος υπ' Αριθμόν 1404 (Law under the Number 1404)*, *op. cit.*, p. 2575.

¹⁰⁹ KALAMATIANOU, A. G., KARMAS, C. A., & LIANOS, T. P., (1988), "Technical Higher Education in Greece", *op. cit.*, p. 276.

¹¹⁰ See Department of Publishing T.E.I. of Athens, (ed), *Technological Educational Institution of Athens*, Athens, Lichnos Ltd Graphic Arts Publications. (Without date, but taken from the Institution itself by the author of this thesis in 1995.)

¹¹¹ KALAMATIANOU A. G., KARMAS, C. A., & LIANOS, T. P., (1988), "Technical Higher Education in Greece", *op. cit.*, p. 276. Enrolment in the first

year of each department of the universities was possible only after participation in highly competitive nation-wide examinations known as the General Examinations. The General Examinations were administered by the Ministry of Education and were offered once per year (each June). Participants outnumbered the secondary education graduates of the same year since those who had failed to enter a university department in previous years or those who had entered the university, but not the department of their first choice, usually sat the General examinations again. [See KARMAS, C. A., LIANOS, T. P., & KALAMATIANOU, A. G., (1988), "Greek Universities: an Overview", op. cit., pp. 261-262.]

¹¹² Journal of the Government of Greek Democracy (Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας), *Νόμος υπ' Αριθμόν 1268 (Law under the Number 1268)*, op. cit., p. 687.

¹¹³ KALAMATIANOU A. G., KARMAS, C. A., & LIANOS, T. P., (1988), "Technical Higher Education in Greece", op. cit., p. 273. As will be later argued in more detail, the most important differences between the TEI and the University level establishments derived from their educational objectives:

The TEIs aim to provide education in the classroom and in the real world (laboratories, business, experimental fields, organisations and other public and private establishments linked with the TEIs) for technologists - i.e. persons who will be able as professionals to apply new and old technologies for the benefit of the economy and consequently for the benefit of the local and national population. ULIs, by contrast, aim to produce, through instruction in the classroom and through research in the laboratory, graduates who are expected to promote the arts and the sciences for the benefit of the economy, society and humanity at large. (See *ibid*, pp. 273-274.)

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 274.

¹¹⁵ BOUZAKIS, S., (1992), «Εκπαιδευτικές Μεταρρυθμίσεις στη Δεκαετία του '80: μια αναλυτική – ερμηνευτική προσέγγιση των νέων προσπαθειών και των νέων αδιεξόδων» ("Educational Reforms in the 80s: an analytical-interpretative approach to the new efforts and the new deadlocks"), op. cit., p. 242.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 250.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 244.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 254. Another characteristic of this unbalanced development was the over-concentration in the two big urban centres, Athens and Thessaloniki. (See *ibid*, p. 254.)

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 257-258.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 259-260.

¹²¹ PSACHAROPOULOS, G., (1988), "Efficiency and Equity in Greek Higher Education", *Minerva*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Summer, pp. 128-132.

¹²² TSOUKALAS, C., (1996), "Education in Greece: an Ideological Critique", *Synthesis: Review of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 36.

¹²³ Ibid, p. 36. For instance, on the needs of education and the professions in Greece, for '1992' (used as shorthand for the transformations that are associated with the Single Market Act), Psacharopoulos argued:

I predict that 1992 will bring the end of the state monopoly in higher education, and the Constitution will be revised to allow private universities to operate. Since professional people would be able to move more freely if the present restrictions were lifted, labour could be employed where its productivity is highest. The civil service will no longer be able to cushion both students and graduates, and a meritocracy will increasingly replace *katohirosi* (a Greek word referring to the vested interests of a particular group of people). [See PSACHAROPOULOS, G., (1990), "Education and the Professions in Greece", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 61.]

¹²⁴ PESMAZOGLU, S., (1994), "Government, Ideology and the University Curriculum in Greece", op. cit., p. 291.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FRENCH REFORMS

3.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

In this chapter, the higher education reforms – with special reference to the non-university sector – in France are described, starting from the late 1960s up to the 1990s. The role of the state and its rationale for its policies is identified in the successive reforms and laws and these are located within contemporaneous politics. The major debates by academics are also presented.

The analysis is broken up into two periods: the 1960s-1970s and the 1980s-1990s. The differentiation between the *IUT* (*Instituts Universitaires de Technologie*) and the rest of the University occurs within the first period, when the *IUT* were created as a form of technological education within higher education. The arguments in this chapter are that during the 1960s-1970s, the interrelated issues of 'equity' and 'efficiency' were dominant in official rationales. The creation of the *IUT* was part of the reconstruction of higher education as a response to these two priorities:

- 'Equity' was in terms of the expansion of the higher education system and social mobility and the partial integration of the *IUT* into the University. The social demand approach to educational planning was dominant.
- 'Efficiency' meant providing the right kind of higher education to respond to 'the economy' through practical orientation of the *IUT*, and relieving the overcrowded universities. Thus, the differentiation between the *IUT* and the rest of the University was promoted.

Overall, during the 1980s-1990s, both themes 'equity' and 'efficiency', were prominent:

- equity was evident in the increase of the student numbers.
- however, the efficiency project was changed in a major way: there was a shift from a concern for 'the economy' to a perception of 'the market'.

To expand and test these arguments, the reforms of the first period, the 1960s-1970s period, are reviewed.

3.2 THE 1960s–1970s: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS

There were a number of major issues that underlined the rationale for the introduction of the *IUT*.

- Efficiency was a theme in that *IUT*, created in 1966, would train graduates for the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy. The *IUT* were to remedy the disadvantages of the earlier institutions and to be more attractive to students, as the *IUT* would now belong to higher education. This would relieve the overcrowding of universities and the high drop out rate among undergraduates. Thus, the differentiation between the universities and the *IUT* was emphasised. Overall, the *IUT* would be the short cycle form of higher education, with the long form being formed by the universities and the top institutions in the higher education hierarchy, namely, the *Grandes Écoles*. In other words, as in Greece, the internal ‘harmonisation’ of the university sector was an aspiration, in the name of efficiency.
- The issue of equity became apparent with the 1968 *Loi d’Orientation*, which followed from the events of May 1968. In general, there would be open admission to the universities (the *UER - Unités d’Enseignement et de Recherche*), within a social demand approach to educational planning. After the 1968 reform, the *IUT* were within the *UER*, although their role and relationship within the *UER* had later to be clarified.

The social and historical location of the *IUT* within the structure of the higher education system was tricky. In France the universities do not represent the pinnacle of the educational structure. The pinnacle is occupied by the *Grandes Écoles* for which entrance is competitive and has to be prepared for in classes continuing for two to three years after successful completion of the

Baccalauréat. The *Grandes Écoles* produce top ranking technologists, engineers, administrators and other specialists. According to specialism, some of the *Grandes Écoles* are subsidised by the Ministry of Education, or by other Ministries, Chambers of Commerce and private organisations.¹

The separation of the two systems (the universities and the *Grandes Écoles*) corresponded to the general principles of French education, that is, free education for everybody (the legacy of the French Revolution) and selection for the political, economic and intellectual elites (the heritage of Napoleonic meritocracy).² Therefore, in the two-tier French higher education system, the *Grandes Écoles* had traditionally trained the top-engineers, managers and administrators that the economy required. On the other hand, the University prepared students for research, teaching and the legal and medical professions. A vocational element had always existed in university courses, and this was true in the faculties of law, medicine and pharmacy, where professionals trained future practitioners. The faculties of arts and sciences educated their students to become teachers and researchers.³

By the 1980s, the structure of the higher education system in France was that after the *Baccalauréat*, higher education courses could be classified as either short or long. The long form, leading to a first degree and beyond, took place in universities⁴, higher specialist schools and the *Grandes Écoles*, while the *Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUT)* were the short form of higher education.⁵

The creation of the *IUT* was one of the major innovations of the higher education reform that Christian Fouchet, the Minister of Education (1962-67), implemented in 1966.⁶ As defined in the founding decree of January 1966, the mission of *IUT* was to train skilled, middle-level graduates to assume "technical functions in production, applied research and the services."⁷ Thus, in 1966, the French government established the *IUT* as two-year institutions for training upper-level technicians for a variety of industrial, administrative and service positions.⁸

The designers of the *IUT* assumed from the outset that the new institutions would have to be autonomous in relation to both the technical *lycées* and the faculties. Moreover, the presence of employers and union representatives showed the desire to ensure good relations between the *IUT* and the business world.⁹ There was also a claim that *IUT* would attract 25% of university enrolments.¹⁰

The steadily increasing need for qualified personnel of intermediate level led to the creation of the *IUT*, also as an effort to get over the disadvantages of the higher technician sections. Thus, provision was made for a policy of co-ordination, through the setting-up of *IUT* and the closing down of the higher technician sections, to facilitate the transition.¹¹

Although the main forms of short-cycle higher education in France, before 1966, were centred on the *IUT*, the science faculties also offered preparatory courses leading to the *Diplôme d' Études Supérieures Techniques (DEST)*. The technical *lycées* provided post-Baccalauréat classes for higher technicians leading to the *Brevet de Technicien Supérieur (BTS)*.¹² Thus, the *IUT* (as university institutes) were set up to bridge a serious gap that the earlier introduction of the *DEST* in some science faculties and the *Instituts Nationaux de Sciences Appliquées (INSA)* had not succeeded in filling.¹³ In contrast to the higher technician sections, the *IUT* would give student status to all persons attending their courses. Although they were designed to train technicians for the secondary and tertiary sectors, they would give less specialised training than the higher technician sections.¹⁴

Overall, the classic problem of the provision of university-level training for higher technicians was the aim of the establishment of the *IUT*.¹⁵ Since the production of higher technicians in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy had not been undertaken by the faculties, the state decided to set up the *IUT* which were to be 'parallel to', but 'outside' them. In fact:

This "stratification" policy consisted of duplicating the faculties by university institutes which were intended to make good their deficiencies. It resulted in the gradual emergence of a second university system, parallel to but more flexible than the traditional system, and separate from and in fact fairly independent of the faculties.¹⁶

As indicated earlier, the second major theme was the 'harmonisation' version of efficiency. The traditional universities were very overcrowded at the time when the *IUT* were created, while the dropout rate among undergraduates was very high. This was caused by a marked increase in the number of pupils passing the *Baccalauréat*, which gave automatic entrance to University. However, the initial success at entry did not mean that all these *bacheliers* were necessarily suited to degree work, particularly in view of the impersonal way that subjects were traditionally taught in French universities and the low ratio of lecturers to students. A shorter, more vocationally oriented course - provided in the new *IUT* - could well prove more suitable for such people. Also, the *IUT* would fulfil the demand for technical training for middle management in all sectors of industry.¹⁷

Thus, the *IUT* like the *TEI* in Greece were established partly to improve technical efficiency in the national economy and partly to deflect from university courses people who, despite possession of the *Baccalauréat*, were not considered to be wholly suited to the demands of a French academic degree course.¹⁸

Within the framework of the 1966 reform, the university offerings had been divided into three cycles, in order to accommodate both the masses of students and to achieve the goal of training researchers. Thus, the old *année propédeutique* was replaced by the first two-year cycle with a diploma in university studies in letters, sciences, economics or law. The second cycle in letters and sciences was divided between a *licence* and a more advanced *maîtrise*. At the level of *maîtrise*, the paths to teaching and research were separated. Finally, the third cycle was reserved for advanced training in research. However, the changes in the first two cycles, by heightening student insecurity, probably helped to bring on the "events of May" in 1968.¹⁹

The events of May 1968 affected the organisation of the French University system. The protest by the university students was against the unsatisfactory nature of university teaching, the government and the structure of bourgeois society in France.²⁰ After this crisis, many new universities were established following the splitting of large universities in the major cities.²¹

Thus, the reform of the *IUT* was not merely an 'academic' issue or even just an equity and efficiency issue. It was very much a domestic political issue.

During the summer of 1968, there was a complex issue of what status to give to the various categories of 'non-university' institutions from the *Grandes Écoles* to the *IUT* and in September, the issue came to a head in heated debates within the French Cabinet when the draft of the Orientation Act was adopted to be submitted to parliament. Edgar Faure (the Minister of Education at that time) advocated an extensive application of the law. The version he presented to the Cabinet, would, in principle, have permitted bringing the *Grandes Écoles*, which belonged to other ministries, under the Act.²² In the end, the Cabinet reached a three-fold compromise:

the *grandes écoles* under ministries other than education were explicitly placed beyond the pale of the legislation; institutions within the jurisdiction of the education ministry but independent of the universities could be individually brought under the act by decree; and finally, the university-attached institutes and schools, most notably the *IUTs* and the *ENSI*, would continue within the universities, although the applicability of the legislation to them was to be limited by government decrees.²³

Thus, the 1968 reform did not involve the *Grandes Écoles*, but the other end of the status hierarchy: the *Instituts Universitaires de Technologie*. Although, formally they were part of the universities, they were planned to be administered separately. However, the *Loi d'Orientation* of 1968 made them less independent than was initially envisioned.²⁴

Indeed, although in 1966 the *IUT* had been placed formally within the universities - as *Instituts d'Université*, analogous to the engineering schools

(*ENSI*) and other institutes - and pursued their activities in relative independence from their universities, the situation changed after the events of May 1968.²⁵ According to their initial statute (Decree of 7th January 1966), the *IUT* were originally set up as university institutes. Yet, the Decree of 20th January 1969, which amended this Decree, established them as *UER*.²⁶

Thus, the *Loi d'Orientation* of Edgar Faure in 1968, was a solution to a political crisis: it was necessary to pacify discontented elements in the University without also antagonising other powerful vested interests.²⁷ Under the banner of 'pluri-disciplinarity', the faculties and the intellectual rigidities of the old regime were swept away, to be replaced by department-like *Unités d'Enseignement et de Recherche (UER)*.²⁸ The Faure Act provided for extensive changes in university administrative structures, the most significant of which was the formation of universities as substantial administrative entities, in place of the traditional faculties.²⁹

These *UER* were assembled into self-governing universities with elected presidents, under the long-sought principle of 'autonomy'. 'Participation' was an arrangement favoured in some form by everybody: the reform coalition, students, assistants, and President de Gaulle. Participation was supposed to abolish the autocracy of professors and assure that the new institutions would be responsive and adaptable to evolving needs. The ultimate goal of the new organisation would be functional diversification, leaving each university with its distinctive research specialities and curricula. In theory, this would contribute to the reconciliation of the imperatives of research with the needs of mass higher education.³⁰

The Orientation Act of higher education made it possible in theory to integrate the two systems (the faculties and university institutes) by abolishing and dividing up the faculties. In practice, the two old systems of faculties and university institutes could be integrated only gradually. Some universities still retained relics of this "double sector". This fact was largely

due to the statutes given in 1969 to most of the old university institutes converted into *UER*, first and foremost of which were the *IUT*.³¹

The *IUT* were not autonomous establishments in relation to the universities. The Decree of 20th January 1969 left the possibility open of making the *IUT* public establishments of a scientific and cultural nature attached to the universities. The *IUT* (as *UER*) were subject to protectionist provisions, which gave them a unique position within the universities. Additionally, the curricula of the *IUT* and their corresponding internal structure were laid down by Decree of the Ministry of Education. Thus, *a priori* state control continued to exist.³²

Overall, the 1968 *Loi d'Orientation* aimed to reform only the university system and kept the *Grandes Écoles* out of its purview.³³ Autonomy, multidisciplinary and extended participation were the main issues of the reform of that period and they resulted in a patchwork of establishments.³⁴ In addition, the major overhaul of the French universities that took place in 1968 implied virtually no change in the area of quantitative planning.³⁵ In general, manpower planning was of limited importance in France, given the dominance of open admission to higher education and the consequent reliance on private demand.³⁶ Moreover, in addition to the fact that the *Grandes Écoles* were almost entirely outside the reform process, no *numerus clausus* was adopted in the university sector.³⁷

Within this very complicated struggle, the issues of equity and efficiency re-emerged in fresh form and again in a struggle over institutional forms. These issues were extremely complex in the national political debate. The apparently simple agendas of equity and efficiency became badly tangled in major struggles about the definition of the higher education system. Although the *IUT* were established within the *UER* in order to serve 'equity' purposes, in the end, the issue of 'efficiency' prevailed. This was identified in the differentiation between the *IUT* and the rest of the University.

3.2.1 Structural Inheritance: Differentiation Between the *Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUT)* and the Rest of the University

The purpose of this sub-section is to suggest that 'efficiency' purposes were served by the special status of the *IUT* within the *UER*. Within this logic, the *IUT* introduced innovations – in terms of fields of study, qualifications of teaching staff, etc. - which stressed their practical orientation. Unlike the universities, the *IUT* would be selective, and with tight state control. The innovations were aiming to increase the number of students. However, the *IUT* failed to attract the number of students they wanted and most of their graduates saw them as a first step before University studies.

At the sub-university level, the intra-cabinet compromise permitted the *IUT* to become units of teaching and research within the University, but with a special status. The cabinet majority insisted on limiting the potential influence of the newly democratised decision-making organs on such units, particularly to ensure that they maintained selective admission policies. Moreover, the *IUT*'s allotments of capital, and operating and personnel budgets, were to come directly from the Ministry. The university budget was to be distributed to the regular *UER* by the council.³⁸ Thus, the *IUT*'s position was independent within the universities while the influence of the Ministry, especially in finance and instructional programmes, continued to be strong. Moreover, the *IUT* was not a research institution and thus, the allocation of research funds was made to the University as part of its research budget.³⁹

Within this administrative structure, efforts were made by the *IUT* to introduce innovations in order to increase the number of students choosing short-cycle higher education. The innovations included employing a third of the teachers with vocational experience in such areas as industry, management, and computer science. The instruction focused strongly on practical learning, even on manual work as well as on theoretical instruction; provision was made for a lot of practical work and in the second year a period in industry was compulsory. Attendance at all classes and practical work was

compulsory, and work was done in small groups. Also, the final examination was replaced by continuous assessment.⁴⁰

Thus, although the *IUT* had been partly integrated with the universities, their pragmatic and vocational orientation as well as their school-like methods were quite alien to the university system and in some ways very similar to those of the *Grandes Écoles*.⁴¹ Grading and assessment were continuous throughout the year and this was an innovation, which in principle had been applied to the universities by the 1968 Orientation Act. Therefore, the director of the *IUT* and the other instructors awarded the *Diplôme Universitaire de Technologie (DUT)* not through a final examination but rather on the basis of an overall evaluation at the end of the second year. The *IUT* were organised into subject departments whose curricula were determined nationally, although 20% of class time was reserved for adaptations to local requirements.⁴² The staff of the *IUT* had teaching tasks shared between teaching personnel from secondary education (the technical *lycées*), higher education and the relevant professions.⁴³

Specialisms in the *IUT* included the applied scientific techniques needed for industry, communications, commerce, social work and administration.⁴⁴ There were seventeen types of departments, eight serving the tertiary sector of the economy and nine serving the secondary or industrial sector. The most popular subjects were electronics, mechanics and civil construction.⁴⁵ The courses lasted a minimum of two years and led to the *DUT*. Each *IUT* was attached to its appropriate local university and holders of the *DUT* could transfer to a university, with exemption from one or two years of the normal degree-course.⁴⁶ Indeed, students who opted for an *IUT* course would not be obliged to stop their training at the end of the short cycle. Various bridges to long-cycle higher education would enable some of the students to continue their studies in other *UER* at the second-cycle level.⁴⁷

For their part, universities in France, as in other countries, offered degree courses in a wide variety of subjects. Some of them could be described as

'technological' and all had 'vocational' significance. They were open to holders of the *Baccalauréat* or of a qualification officially recognised as its equivalent. Mature students without the *Baccalauréat* could also enter the university through a special entrance examination.⁴⁸ For the student who stayed in the degree course, there were two 'cycles' at undergraduate level and a third cycle for those who aspired to a doctorate. Each of these cycles represented approximately two years of study. The high drop-out rate for 1st and 2nd year undergraduates (about 45%) was also due to the fact that there was no selection for entry to French universities provided that the students had passed the *Baccalauréat* in any of its branches. In fact, selection took place during the first two years at university since some students failed their preliminary examinations, some withdrew from the course and some changed courses.⁴⁹

In contrast with the rest of the University the *IUT* were selective. However, unlike the universities and the *Grandes Écoles*, they did not pose the *Baccalauréat* as a formal condition for entry.⁵⁰ Selectivity was often spurred by an active desire on the part of the *IUT* to maintain high standards and the market value of their diplomas as well as to enhance their status relative to the rest of the University and the *Grandes Écoles*. Academic achievement in relevant school subjects was the major criterion for admission. Factors such as motivation and range and depth of ability often played a role as well. *IUT* departments commonly accepted twice as many applications as there were places, and even then empty places remained, a factor which contributed to the uncertainty of any attempt to determine the real demand for *IUT* places or to plan their development more comprehensively.⁵¹ Overall, the *IUT* were planned to enrol a substantial minority of non-*bacheliers*, but few in that category were admitted (e.g. in 1972 they constituted as little as 5% of the student body).⁵²

In the end, the *IUT* fell far short of the goal of fully half the total enrolment of the first two years of university and roughly 25% of the total number of university students. By the autumn of 1972, instead of the projected

enrolment of 160,000, the *IUT* enrolled only 35,000 students, which amounted to just 11.8% of enrolments in the first two years of university and 4.8% of the total university enrolment.⁵³

Overall, then, the *IUT* failed to attract a substantial number of students away from long-cycle education and their creation did not alter the curve of university expansion. Although they were originally designed as vocationally oriented Short Cycle Institutions, the *IUT*, in fact, became for a notable proportion of students a first stage of higher studies.⁵⁴

Although the basic objective of the *IUT* had been to provide terminal training in preparation for employment, the most able graduates tended to go on to further study - the percentage of these students was higher than the percentage the planners had envisaged when the *IUT* were established. The *IUT* had been diverted from their main aim of providing vocational training. Those engaged in further study attended a range of institutions (one third were in university departments, and a slightly larger number were in engineering schools and comparable institutions).⁵⁵

In the late 1970s, universities accounted for the majority of post-secondary enrolments, and within them the distribution among the various disciplines was uneven. Arts and human sciences accounted for almost one third of the students. Law and economics accounted for 23%, medicine and dentistry for 19%, science for 18% and pharmacy for 4% respectively. In general, the university was criticised for not being vocationally oriented and for turning out graduates who after long-cycle studies swelled the ranks of the unemployed. This reproach applied particularly to arts and human sciences, law and economics.⁵⁶

Thus, the place and role of the *IUT* within the *UER* was ambiguous. The *IUT* were supposed to broaden higher education studies in the name of relevance to the economy, but in practice they used selective criteria, violating the original idea of equity.

This remarkably complex set of issues, which the French State was struggling to define and control, was reflected in the debates of the time. The academics were among the major analysts but French industry and business also contributed.

3.2.2 Major Debates

The purpose of this sub-section is to argue that:

- Most of the debates among academics promoted the idea of the distinctive role of the *IUT* within the *UER*. Thus, their proposals served both versions of the efficiency project: a response to the economy and the relief of the pressure of enrolments on the universities.
- The economic version of the 'efficiency' project was promoted by the business world: the *IUT* were supported as more 'efficient' because of their practical orientation. Thus, the co-operation of the *IUT* with the more theoretical universities was considered to be undesirable. In contrast, the leftist organisations wanted the co-operation.
- The academic argument on the equity issue was that in comparison to the universities, the *IUT* were creating some social mobility.
- Finally, the failure of the *IUT* to attract a considerable number of students was attributed to the fact that the University was open while the *IUT* were selective.

Quermonne for example was optimistic about the *IUT*. He suggested that the old "peaceful co-existence" of the *IUT* with the other *UER* might give way to active co-operation, heralding the beginning of a process of integration.⁵⁷ This implied the promoting of technology to be among the objectives of university education and research.⁵⁸

The *IUT*, according to Quermonne, could exert considerable influence on the development of the structures and aims of the interdisciplinary *UER* and the universities. Their influence had been perceptible and could be seen in the external membership of university councils, in the recruitment of associated

or fee-paid teachers from industry and in the practice of active and audio-visual teaching methods. The *IUT* could also benefit from the university tradition of permanent teaching staff, strict scientific method and the link between teaching and research. The result would be true symbiosis and the *IUT* would be able to achieve their aims completely.⁵⁹

Van de Graaff too argued that the most practical alternative for the *IUT* would be to maintain and strengthen their position within the universities. He suggested that the *IUT* should strive for full status either by maintaining their distinctive technological and vocational role, or by simply trying to emulate the rest of the University. The more defensive option would be to strengthen the *IUT*'s original mission in stressing their role as technological institutes.⁶⁰ Quermonne also claimed that the *IUT* could retain their specific character, with their task being to provide short-cycle courses for higher technicians for the secondary and tertiary sectors. He stressed the equity argument. The *IUT* could also add other tasks to this initial activity, the most important of which would be further education for adults already in employment.⁶¹

Additionally, the *IUT* students would not find the door to further study closed since adequate bridges would enable those with the necessary ability to go on to appropriate second-cycle courses. At the same time, the *IUT* could offer one-year courses for students who had begun long cycles but wished to change over to work for a *DUT* (*Diplôme Universitaire de Technologie*). The *IUT* themselves could find support in the universities, instead of forming a cluster of small establishments subject to the uncertainties of local politics or private pressures.⁶²

However, opponents of the *IUT* criticised them for their intentions to select and for their allegedly narrow orientation to the manpower demands of the economy. The leftist organisations of university teachers and students feared that the "*IUT*'s pragmatic outlook would constitute a formidable barrier to any meaningful co-operation between them and the more theoretically-

minded university faculties.”⁶³ In contrast, proponents of the *IUT* supported their pragmatic, vocational orientation. They hoped that the *IUT* would attract a substantial number of *Baccalauréat* holders away from the faculties, thus reducing the pressure of enrolments. The warmest support for the *IUT* was from industry and commerce, which looked forward to the output of middle-level technicians.⁶⁴

Later on, the interest groups shifted their position on the *IUT*. Employers’ groups, who complained that *IUT* standards had dropped and that there was less emphasis on their practical/vocational aims, sometimes manifested hostility to the *IUT* and their graduates. This was considered to be due to theoretical preoccupations resulting from the closer links with the universities since 1968. In fact, such views fed on the antagonism which large sectors of French business had always felt for the university, which was seen as left wing and opposed to free enterprise. On the other hand, critics of the *IUT* from the left argued in exactly the opposite fashion. They supported the *IUT* as providing a vocationally oriented option desired by students, but emphasised that they could not remain a dead end. They suggested that the *IUT*’s specialisation should be tempered by greater integration with the University and the progressive development of more extensive technological instruction and research in the University. These divergent views suggested that if the *IUT* were to adapt mainly to local demands for narrow technical training, they would in practice have to accept sub-university status.⁶⁵

In the end, as Van de Graaff argues, the *IUT* demonstrated the utility of this incrementalist strategy of innovation. Their political and administrative position was subtly balanced between the major forces of central and local government, employers and trade unions, and traditional academics of the right and left. This position enabled them to assert their role effectively and to perform functions beyond their primary one of vocational training, such as fostering a modest degree of social mobility and academic flexibility in a hierarchical and inflexible system.⁶⁶

Van de Graaff highlighted the issues by pointing out that although the primary official motivation in founding the *IUT* was economic, they appeared in practice to be providing a distinct channel of upward mobility for a markedly higher proportion of lower class youth than any other sector of higher education.⁶⁷ Moreover, though they had their share of institutional rivals and political opponents, they were a relatively successful innovation, in a society that was notorious for its hostility to innovations.⁶⁸ In addition, students' attitudes reflected a clear willingness to assess their experience in a concrete and constructive manner and indeed to view the *IUT* as smaller versions of the *Grandes Écoles*.⁶⁹

Cibois *et al* made an approximately similar point by stressing that among the *Grandes Écoles*, the Universities and the *IUT*, the least 'democratic' of the three were the *Grandes Écoles* where father's occupation was a strong indicator of admission. University recruitment was more 'democratic' than the *Écoles des Hautes Études Commerciales* (and the *Grandes Écoles* in general) and *IUT* recruitment was even more 'democratic' than the Universities.⁷⁰

In general, as Geiger has suggested, the root problem of the French path to mass higher education was that of diversification and orientation and University reformers had been struggling with it, since the 1960s. However, these efforts had been widely derided as insufficient, or had been identified as part of a conspiracy to maintain existing class relations.⁷¹

Finally, Van de Graaff argued that the failure of the *IUT* to attract the number of students they wanted was because as long as the faculties remained open, there was no real means apart from persuasion to get students to enter the *IUT*. The fact that the *IUT* were selective was another factor that served to keep their numbers down as well.⁷²

Thus, by the end of the 1970s, the *IUT* had failed to attract a considerable number of students, who instead preferred the universities. However, the *IUT* proved to be more successful during the 1980s-1990s, when the issue of

‘efficiency’ mostly meant increasing the ‘vocational’ element of higher education to respond to the needs of the ‘market’. Overall, the themes of equity and efficiency went on dominating the policy agenda during the following period.

3.3 THE 1980s–1990s: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS

- It will be suggested that in the early 1980s, the coming to power of a socialist government placed emphasis on democratisation and participation. The ‘equity’ aspect was still quite powerful - there should be a dramatic increase of students passing the *Baccalauréat*, which gave automatic entrance to University. However, this was for ‘efficiency’ purposes: the economy needed more and more qualified graduates.
- Secondly, it will be suggested that the efficiency project had already been explicit in the 1984 Guideline Law, which provided for an extension of the research base and its linking with industry, regionalisation, autonomy and excellence, and ‘vocationalisation’ of higher education. Themes such as regionalisation and vocationalisation were interlinked. Higher education would respond to regional development and decentralisation by being increasingly ‘vocationalised’: short-cycle courses (such as the *IUT*) were expanded, and a two-track system within the University (e.g. the *DEUST*) was created.
- Thirdly and importantly, it will be argued that during the second half of the 1980s, the efficiency project was changed in a major way: the state was gradually introducing the ‘market’ as the main framework to which higher education should respond.
- Finally, the efficiency project was becoming even more intense towards the end of the 1980s - beginning of the 1990s, with the shortage of engineering and business studies graduates. Thus, more vocationally/professionally oriented courses were created within higher

education and more and more students were accepted. The role of the *IUT* in producing the necessary graduates and in relieving universities from large numbers of students was again emphasised. Additionally, the link between higher education and the private sector was put forward.

Higher education, highly politicised, was the arena where the two ideologies of dirigisme and liberalism, and of control and competition, were debated.⁷³ In 1981, the return of the first left-wing coalition in the history of the Fifth Republic, brought a government which was publicly committed in higher education to the twin slogans of 'democratisation' and 'participation'. At the same time, it was committed to extending the research base, reforming undergraduate and doctoral level studies, opening the University to its region and strengthening links with industry. It was also committed to the introduction of broad ranging restructuring of governance and management systems at the level of the individual university.⁷⁴

All these issues posed fundamental questions to do with the relationship between higher education and the state, the links between research and teaching, the notion of autonomy, research and industry linkages, and the perennial tension between excellence and social equality in access to higher education.⁷⁵ One tentative solution was the 1984 Guideline Law. According to this Law, every university should "enhance scientific and cultural development of the nation and its citizens, contribute to the employment policy, and regional development, help to reduce social and cultural inequalities". It should also provide more opportunities for vocational/professional studies.⁷⁶

Neave has argued that during the 1980s reforms, the rhetorical balance between the twin imperatives of efficiency and equality varied.⁷⁷

The issue of massive expansion of the higher education system had been visible since the early 1980s. Both Left and Right in France agreed on the need for massive expansion in the proportion of the age group reaching the

Baccalauréat. Overall, higher education policy in France rested upon the conviction that not enough students continued beyond post-secondary education, that the country should invest more in higher education, and that a sustained effort was required to develop a mass system of higher education.⁷⁸

One of the specific factors in the way French higher education functioned was the relatively low proportion of students graduating within the two years needed to complete first-cycle studies. There was also a marked move by students away from continuing study into the second cycle (*Maîtrise*, etc.).⁷⁹ Thus, from 1983, the new political motto in education was that 80% of the relevant age group should reach the level of *Baccalauréat* within the following fifteen years. In fact, the 80% goal for the year 2,000 implied that, even if the level of *Baccalauréat* did not open automatic access to universities, some 40-55% of the age group would be likely to be enrolled in the near future.⁸⁰

With the aim of 80% graduation in the *Baccalauréat*, the universities would have to cope not only with an increasing number of students, but also with a far more diverse student body. That was because it was the technological and vocational streams in the secondary schools that were expected to produce more and more students passing the *Baccalauréat*.⁸¹

However, the massive increases in student numbers were occurring at a time when there were still major operational problems, such as the high failure rate at the end of the first cycle (*DEUG*). Other problems were estimated to be the rigid syllabuses offering an education that was too theoretical and narrow, as well as poorly matched with the demands of the job market. As a result, many students faced difficulties in finding employment. In addition, there was no management system in most universities that would make it possible to set clear goals and evaluate the results.⁸²

During the 1980s, another dominant issue was that of regional development. Overall, since the reforms of 1982 and 1986, France had gradually been adapting to the implications of decentralisation. Essentially, the reforms

involved giving the Regions full administrative power as well as greater legitimacy through direct elections to the Regional Councils.⁸³ On the political level, a range of economic measures often accompanied such a 'rise of regional power', at this time overshadowed by a concern about unemployment and local development.⁸⁴

At national level, regional development had been a constant theme, amongst the various political parties. It was backed not only by the Socialist administration between 1981 and 1985 but also by the right-wing coalition that followed and soon departed. The dimensions to this redefinition of the University's mission were:

first, the need to provide a more solid research base for French industry at the regional level; second, to ensure that the need for a trained workforce is met by closer liaison at this level; third, to provide facilities for updating the skills in local industry; and, finally, to avoid further overcrowding in those centres where higher education exists already, it will be necessary to build elsewhere.⁸⁵

Indeed, close attention to the French arrangements was justified by another rationale, that is, major changes in the relationship between University and industry were becoming apparent and as a result, there were changes in the institutional location of basic research. In certain instances, the rise of the industry-based fundamental research (especially in computer science and biotechnology) had led to the development of a research training system beyond academe.⁸⁶

Within the wider political framework of decentralisation during the mid-1980s, higher education rapidly became involved in these changes.⁸⁷ The issues of decentralisation and regional development pointed towards the need to revise the internal management structures at institutional level to permit the individual institutions the flexibility required to meeting the above four priorities.⁸⁸

During the same time period, both the French university world and foreign observers made the point that much could be done to improve the 'throughput' efficiency of the university by developing more short course provision.⁸⁹

The growing wish to expand short-cycle courses in the university sector was parallel to a tendency to create a two-track system within the first cycle. The first two years of undergraduate study led to either the *Diplôme d' Études Universitaires Générales* (DEUG) or, since 1985, to the *Diplôme d' Études Universitaires Scientifiques et Techniques* (DEUST).⁹⁰ The DEUST tended to be more narrowly defined and it led directly to employment in the tertiary or the industrial sectors of the economy. Therefore, it was intended for students who did not wish to continue beyond the first cycle.⁹¹

Overall, then, higher education was required to provide new skills in order to fill the needs of the production sector, and access to higher education increased job chances.⁹² This took place in a fresh context.

During this period, the suggestion that central government should be more 'modest' in its scope and open the way for more initiatives to be taken at the level of individual organisations was gradually making itself felt and higher education was not exempt from this pressure.⁹³ The first area of disagreement appeared to be on the precise role that ought to be assumed by central administration in shaping, moulding and generally co-ordinating the future profile of the higher education system. For the Socialist Party, central intervention had always served as a powerful lever for democratising higher education.⁹⁴

Thus, a study group, set up in October 1986 under the aegis of the *Collège de France*, took the view that as demands made by society, industry and the economy assumed ever greater complexity, the type of co-ordination carried out by centrally based administration was too rigid and incapable of mastering the key issues with any degree of precision. Moreover, the central point in the credo of the right-wing pressure group (*Group d' Étude pour la*

Rénovation de l' Université Française), was a reduction of the role of the state in higher education and its replacement by the operation of the market as the instrument for shaping that institution.⁹⁵

In this area, nothing happened between 1986 and 1988, but new moves were made in 1988/1989, aiming to set up contractual agreements widely between the state and the universities.⁹⁶ In addition, the changes made in the Ministry of Education in 1988 were significant. The *Direction de la Programmation et du Développement Universitaire* (DPDU) was created, which was made up of four sub-departments dealing with building and equipment of campuses, programming and contracts. The DPDU was charged especially with forecasting and developing new management methods, establishments and libraries. The role of the DPDU (*Direction de la Programmation et du Développement Universitaire*) was also estimated to be about new arrangements intended to help in tackling two high-priority needs:

- (i) to give greater autonomy to individual institutions by broadening the scope of their contractual relationships with the Ministry, and (ii) to put great stress on turning out more PhDs, as the best way of ensuring replacement of teachers and researchers reaching retirement age and of providing for the expansion of teaching staff needed to cope with increased student numbers.⁹⁷

Overall, the way higher education developed had implications for the secondary and the tertiary sectors of the national economy. The number of students following engineering courses had increased far less rapidly than the rest of the university population.⁹⁸ However, an official enquiry, conducted in 1989 by the Commission of Enquiry into Higher Education and the state of the economy (*Haut Comité Économie Éducation*) reckoned that the outflow of graduates from the engineering schools was only half of the country's needs (approximately 14,000 per year). In addition, France faced a shortage in business studies graduates. There was also a shortfall of some 120,000 people, both men and women, needed in the tertiary sector.⁹⁹

The shortage of qualified engineers and technicians (for example in mechanics) identified in 1988, also explained why the French engineering

industry was not very competitive.¹⁰⁰ This shortage threatened to hinder economic growth, as international competition became even fiercer. It was tackled through a number of measures. These were the creation of the *Instituts Universitaires Professionalises (IUP)* to provide a vocational course in the universities, the establishment of *Nouvelles Formations d' Ingénieurs (NFI)* offering a new approach to training engineers, and a 50% increase in the numbers of engineers trained by the *Grandes Écoles* in three years.¹⁰¹

In 1991, new vocationally oriented university courses that were created under the title *Instituts Universitaires Professionalises (IUP)* were aiming at training 'master engineers' in three years. What set them apart from other options was that they selected their students not immediately after the *Baccalauréat*, but one year later. Students could apply for an *IUP* if they wanted to change course after a year at an *IUT*, at university, or in preparing for the entrance examinations for the *Grandes Écoles*. The *IUP* together with the *NFI* (the new university engineering courses) were running on the basis of alternation between work placements and academic courses and lasted a total of five years for applicants admitted directly after the *Baccalauréat*. For those with a *DUT*, *BTS* or *DEUST* and a minimum of five years of professional experience, the course lasted only two years.¹⁰²

Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, France was engaged in reviewing the structure, duration and content of its courses from undergraduate through to research degree level, perhaps more than any other European country.¹⁰³ There were several reasons behind this effort such as the need to reduce the level of student failure and to come to grips with the growth in the area of 'professional training' which was likely to take place over the following two decades. Other reasons were the need to put in place a diploma structure more in keeping with the diversity of abilities and skills that further expansion was likely to bring into higher education and finally, the need to create a closer symbiosis between research, the University and industry.¹⁰⁴

Matching the education provided with the demands of the job market meant instituting regular contacts with employers, setting up specialist agencies dealing with training and employment, as well as finding ways of assessing the supply of training and the demand for qualifications. To this end, an annual conference on education and employment was established by the government and was first held in 1991. The conference offered an opportunity of consulting employers' representatives about future needs and possible ways of modifying higher education courses in line with each sector's requirements. Additionally, a team was established within the Ministry of Education to guide and encourage initiatives relating to the vocationalisation of higher education. In the universities, careers services were going to be established to provide information to students about jobs as well as information to employers looking for qualified staff.¹⁰⁵

However, vocationalisation and expansion were interlinked. By the early 1990s, nine out of ten secondary school graduates with the *Baccalauréat* continued into higher education of some sort. The 'open' university sector was under pressure at initial entry into the 'first cycle' as well as later for the second cycle (*licence, maîtrise*). This was due to the fact that most students who completed the first cycle successfully by obtaining the *DEUG* (*Diplôme d'Études Universitaires Générales*) intended to pursue their studies in the second cycle since the *DEUG* was not supposed to lead to employment. Student numbers in the universities rose by 24% in the second half of the 1980s, and they increased particularly sharply in 1989 and 1990.¹⁰⁶ At the beginning of the 1990s, in the structure of qualifications, all was not well with the first cycle. Graduates holding the *DEUG* were approximately 25,000 in humanities and social sciences. 20,000 were in law and economics, and 15,000 in science. Additionally, some 22,000 students from the University Institutes of Technology obtained a *Diplôme Universitaire de Technologie* (*DUT*).¹⁰⁷

In this context, 'vocationalisation' was part of the plan for reorganising higher education announced in June 1991. A number of changes took place that meant both reorganising the kind of higher education on offer by seeking

closer links with employment policies, and also ensuring closer integration of higher education (especially the universities) into the economy at the national as well as the European level. The partnership with the private sector was supposed to cover teaching and research, and firms would be more actively involved in the universities.¹⁰⁸

The measures taken by the central policy-making and administrative authorities related to the following areas:

increasing the number of places available in higher education, especially the technology courses; establishing agencies to co-ordinate university-industry collaboration, as well as the committees planning higher education and training for the Ministry and university careers/employment services; and the introduction of new vocational university courses aimed primarily at producing more qualified engineers.¹⁰⁹

The total capacity of the higher education system should increase *and* the distribution of students among the various first-year options should change.¹¹⁰

The government hoped to raise the proportion of students entering the first year of technology courses (*IUT*, *STS* - '*sections de techniciens supérieurs*', the post-*Baccalauréat* courses for higher level technicians taught in *lycées*) and the 'preparatory classes' for those attempting to enter the *Grandes Écoles* to 50% from the current 39%. This was a policy aiming at reducing the pressure on the first year of traditional undergraduate courses and the proportion with the *Baccalauréat* taking that route was expected to fall from 52% to 40%. Such redistribution would also mean creating new *IUT* and increasing the numbers of places, possibly by a more intensive use of their current capacity.¹¹¹

So, although the equity aspect was quite powerful during this period, the efficiency project was becoming particularly intense. The role of vocationally oriented courses, such as the *IUT*, within higher education was emphasised. These courses were considered to be more relevant to the needs of the market. Indeed, the 'efficiency' project had changed in comparison to the previous period: there was a shift in concern from the needs of the economy to the

market. Associated with this change was the increasing 'vocationalisation' of higher education. Other accompanying and anticipated themes were those of autonomy and regionalisation.

Most of the debates by academics addressed the tensions over equity and efficiency. Particularly, the academics were critical of the increasing vocationalisation of higher education.

3.3.1 Major Debates

- The debates offered a re-evaluation of the non-university sector. Some analysts supported the expansion of the range of courses. Others argued that expansion was much more important than modifying the system in the form of introducing more vocationally oriented courses; however, 'quality' was equally important. In contrast, some analysts were against the expansion; they supported 'vocationalisation' mainly for 'efficiency' purposes, albeit with emphasis on general education.

For instance, Bienaymé suggested that, no doubt, the shortage of engineers in the late 1980s should be remedied. Yet, this shortage could not be blamed totally on the education system since career prospects available to specialists in mechanical engineering were less attractive than finance, electronic software or management data-processing.¹¹² The author also argued that:

Insofar as higher education is increasingly in demand because it offers better employment opportunities, the State is going to have to introduce a much wider variety into post-secondary education. By addressing itself to individuals from different backgrounds and of different abilities, higher education will put to the test a new qualitative change. In this context:

- co-ordination with secondary education will have to be strengthened, indeed secured;
- *premier* cycle output must be improved;
- staffing must be diversified and increased;
- methods of funding must be made more flexible and diversified.¹¹³

Neave argued that the development of more short course provision (such as the *IUT*) was not likely to solve the problem that the demands placed on higher education for highly qualified manpower from commerce, industry,

research and education would exert in the future. Without an expansion of the numbers entering higher education, key sectors of the nation's economy would be competing with one another (e.g., industry and commerce would be bidding for that type of workforce which was also required by the education and training systems to the mutual detriment of all parties).¹¹⁴ In short, the author continued, it might have been possible to maintain some form of short-term efficiency by placing heavy emphasis on directing existing student flows into areas perceived as crucial for industry. However, in the long run, such a policy would be likely to give rise to an even more dysfunctional situation:

Without quality, policies based solely on equality serve simply to remove temporarily large numbers of young people from the labour market. And without equality, the resultant 'stream of excellence' is not likely to be sufficient to supply all the foreseeable needs of a changing economy. For reasons as much pragmatic as ideological, French higher education - exceptional though it might be in the present climate - stands by the view that quality and equality are, like the Republic, if not one then certainly indivisible.¹¹⁵

From a completely different point of view, Lamoure *et al* argued that in the short run - unless one accepted the risk of causing upheaval in the universities - the goal of democratisation of higher education could no longer be set in purely quantitative terms (a matter of broadening access so as to increase numbers).¹¹⁶

On the contrary, the democratisation of higher education should involve modifying the system as a whole. Thus, the system would deal with a more varied public and would satisfy the demand from young people and their parents, who expected the reward for continuing in education after the *Baccalauréat* to be the acquisition of a recognised qualification which would offer better chances of finding a job.¹¹⁷

The reform announced in 1991, the authors argued, was making vocational training an integral part of the goals of university education and was in itself bringing about changes in the scope of vocationally oriented education. The university sector would have many opportunities to forge a variety of links

with the private sector, through its contribution to continuing education, its joint research contracts with industry and the provision of vocationally oriented courses. The implementation of changes would also reinforce the modifications and radical shifts which the University needed to undertake in order to move away from its traditional role which directs it to offer theoretical professional training only for teachers, lawyers, doctors and researchers.¹¹⁸

In general, all the measures for increasing the vocational courses in higher education had the goal of increasing the element of preparation for working life in higher education, integrating the education system into the government's economic and social policies, and spreading the burden of funding among the various partners involved. This range of measures also suggested that major changes in higher education were under way. In particular, Lamoure *et al* argued, new forms of university-industry co-operation that would get away from the traditional relationships, in which the universities and the professional schools had clearly defined spheres of action, needed to be found.¹¹⁹

Finally, Lamoure *et al* claimed that greater vocationalisation was necessary and desirable but on the condition that the public authorities would remain guarantors of the general balance between concern with the firms' needs for trained manpower (short or medium term) and the potential for conducting basic research (the long term). The other condition was that this vocationalisation would not be understood merely and narrowly as preparing students for employment. Thus, they argued that:

As we reach the end of the century, technological progress and more generally economic development and the international division of labour make it impossible to identify and define precisely - in quantitative and qualitative terms - the numbers of jobs and types of qualification likely to be required in future. Moreover, in order to avoid falling into the trap of matching training to jobs, which past experience has shown to be senseless, university education - whether vocationally oriented or not - must keep the emphasis on general culture and versatility that has allowed it so far more or less to satisfy most of society's needs for highly qualified personnel.¹²⁰

Overall, during the 1980s-1990s period, the two interrelated issues of 'efficiency' and 'equity' were still dominant. However, the issue of 'efficiency' had shifted from 'the economy' to 'the market'. The 'vocationalisation' of higher education was increasing as a response to 'the market', and thus the *IUT* were promoted. Both themes of expansion and vocationalisation were debated.

3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To sum up, the *IUT* were created in the late 1960s to serve efficiency purposes. The *IUT* would train the necessary personnel for the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, at the same time as relieving universities from large numbers of students. The *IUT* were to remedy the disadvantages of the earlier inefficient institutions. They were to be more attractive to students, since they belonged to higher education, even more so, after their unique position within the universities after the 1968 reform, when the *IUT* were within the newly established self-governing universities, namely the *UER*.

Equity purposes had been served since 1966, when the *IUT* were expected to give an answer to the demand for higher education. However, after the 1968 reform, 'equity' purposes were stronger, especially due to the fact that the *IUT* would be within the *UER*. The *UER* addressed the main issues of the 1968 reform, such as 'autonomy', 'multidisciplinarity' and extended 'participation'. Overall, the social demand approach to educational planning was dominant.

After the 1968 reform, the role of the *IUT* within the *UER* was debatable. For efficiency purposes, it was argued that this role should be to have the *IUT* strengthen their distinctive profile, being influenced by but also influencing the rest of the University. The *IUT* had a special status within the *UER*, in terms of admission policies and Ministry influences. The *IUT* particularly stressed their practical and vocational orientation as responding better to the economy, particularly local industry demands. The *IUT* were supported by the business world, while leftist organisations were quite critical of them.

Finally, the 'equity' issue was highlighted in the arguments about the *IUT* forging a certain degree of social mobility.

Nevertheless, by the mid-1970s, the *IUT* had failed to attract the aspired number of students, while their students saw them as a first step before university study. At the same time, towards the end of this period, universities were criticised for turning out more and more unemployed graduates.

Yet, surprisingly, the *IUT* became more effective vehicles for achieving equity and efficiency goals during the next period: the 1980s-1990s. This was because of the rise of the 'market' as the main framework shaping the profile of the higher education system. The *IUT* were representing a form of 'vocationalising' higher education to respond to the needs of the 'market'. In fact, the 'efficiency' project had changed in a major way: the concern of the state for 'the economy', during the 1960s-1970s, had shifted to the concern for 'the market', during the 1980s-1990s.

During the 1980s-1990s, both themes of equity and efficiency were dominant in the official rationale. From the early 1980s, the socialist government, which came to power, placed emphasis on democratisation and participation. The equity aspect was quite powerful, since there should be a dramatic increase of students passing the *Baccalauréat*, thus having automatic entrance to University. However, this was for efficiency purposes, since the economy needed more and more qualified graduates.

The efficiency project had become evident in the 1984 Guideline Law, which provided for issues such as an extension of the research base and its linking with industry, regionalisation, higher education autonomy and excellence, and 'vocationalisation' of higher education. The themes of regionalisation and vocationalisation were interrelated: the higher education system would respond to regional development and decentralisation by being increasingly 'vocationalised'. Thus, short-cycle courses (such as those offered in the *IUT*)

were expanded. In addition, there were other measures in the rest of the higher education system: e.g. a two-track system within the University (e.g. the *DEUST*) was created.

Associated with the above developments was that particularly during the second half of the 1980s, the efficiency project was changed in a major way: the state was gradually introducing the 'market' as the main framework to which higher education should respond. 'Vocationalisation', especially prominent during the early 1990s, meant increasing the utilitarian aspect of higher education to respond to the market.

In this sense, the efficiency project was becoming particularly intense towards the end of the 1980s - beginning of the 1990s, when there was a shortage of engineering and business studies graduates. More vocationally/professionally oriented courses were created within higher education and more and more students were accepted. Thus, the issues of equity and efficiency were interrelated. The role of the *IUT* in producing the necessary graduates and in relieving universities from large numbers of students was again emphasised. Additionally, the link between higher education and the private sector was put forward. Finally, there was scepticism by contemporary analysts on whether the expansion of higher education should be set in simply quantitative terms or whether it should be set also with modifying the system as a whole.

Therefore, social pressures (especially students' protests) for increasing access to higher education led to the reforms, which placed the *IUT* within the *UER*, in the late 1960s. However, the reforms failed, in terms of students' preferences, by the end of the 1970s. This was not due to the social importance of the University in France. In France the prestigious *Grandes Écoles* were at the top of the status hierarchy in the French higher education system. Furthermore, the *IUT* resembled the *Grandes Écoles* in that they offered more school-like teaching approaches and they were selective. However, it was mostly this selective characteristic, which contributed to their

failure, in an era dominated by the emphasis on equality and extended participation in the higher education system. In addition, the *IUT* were within the University, which remained open, albeit with the possession of the *Baccalauréat* as prerequisite for entry. However, during the second period, the 1980s-1980s, the market was the reason why these institutions were particularly successful. The state and its concern for the economy had been replaced by the market, as the framework shaping both higher education and student preferences. Even the political agenda of equity purposes was subjugated to the principle of efficiency and response to the market.

ENDNOTES

¹ DUNDAS-GRANT, V., (1985), "The Organisation of Vocational / Technical / Technological Education in France", *Comparative Education*, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 266. The *Grandes Écoles* were a diverse set of institutions often highly selective, administered by different ministries and offering professional training of a specialised nature. The integration of the *Grandes Écoles* with the university has been a standing issue during the entire post-World War II period. However, little by way of integration had actually been accomplished. [See PREMFOR, R., (1983), *The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective: France, Sweden, United Kingdom*, Stockholm, Rune Premfors 1980, pp. 137-138.] The future needs for the (mostly) elite professions trained in the *Grandes Écoles* had typically been determined in a fairly decentralised bargaining process between government and professional networks and not as part of a central scheme for manpower planning. [See PREMFOR, R. I. T., (1982), *How Much Higher Education is Enough?: Public Policy in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom*, Higher Education Research Group; Institution for Social and Policy Studies; Yale University, New Haven, p. 7.]

² RIGHTER, I., (1988), "Selection and Reform in Higher Education in Western Europe", *Comparative Education*, Vol. 24, No. 1, p. 58.

³ LAMOURE, J., & LAMOURE RONTPOULOU, J., (1992), "The Vocationalisation of Higher Education in France: Continuity and Change", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 27, Nos 1/2, p. 45.

⁴ However, as will be later argued, the universities also provided short-cycle courses, such as the *IUT* courses (since the *IUT* belonged to the *UER*).

⁵ DUNDAS-GRANT, V., (1985), "The Organisation of Vocational / Technical / Technological Education in France", op. cit., p. 265. The higher specialist schools were catering for a variety of professions such as administration, commerce, engineering, architecture, etc. and they accepted students after the *Baccalauréat* on a competitive basis. (See *ibid*, p. 266.) All the professional courses shared a certain number of features: extremely selective admission, more teaching than in the standard university courses and work experience and courses partly taught by people employed in firms, as a regular component of courses. All the courses were very strict in their selection of students and there were on average five applicants for every place on *MST*, *MSG* or *ENSI* courses and almost ten for every place at the *IUT* or specialised university engineering courses (*FUI*). In fact, the selection had to be strict due to the small number of places available compared with the demand. [See LAMOURE, J., & LAMOURE RONTPOULOU, J., (1992), "The Vocationalisation of Higher Education in France: Continuity and Change", op. cit., pp. 45-46.] The number of class hours was much higher in all the vocationally oriented courses than in the traditional universities. Class attendance was only part of the students' workload since they should also spend time on their individual projects and working in firms:

A substantial component of the teaching involves 'directed study' and practicals, again probably twice as much as in standard courses. These sessions give students opportunities for working in small groups, for case study and experimentation, which is a fundamental preparation for professional practice. The more practical character of the vocationally oriented courses is clear from the requirement that students must undertake an independent project, either alone or in a small group. This is a piece of applied research, and is often linked to a request from a firm and relates to a real need. (See *ibid*, p. 47.)

The vocationalisation of these courses helped students to find employment afterwards and, for some qualifications, there were more job-offers than graduates every year. The time taken to find a job was generally shorter (for a comparable length of course) than for a standard university course, and the starting salaries were higher. These favourable circumstances were connected with the 'vocational' character of the education and the periods of work experience, which encouraged greater contact between students and employers. The on-the-job training provided employers with a special opportunity to assess and even hire professional course graduates. (See *ibid*, p. 47.)

⁶ GEIGER, R. L., (1982), *Two Paths to Mass Higher Education: Issues and Outcomes in Belgium and France* (Yale Higher Education Research Group Working Paper), Higher Education Research Group, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, New Haven, pp. 9-10.

⁷ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", *Higher Education*, Vol. 5, p. 195.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 190.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 192. Among the twenty members of the Commission to establish the IUT there were four main groups: six members of the administration (all but one connected with the Ministry of Education); four University academics who were all scientists (as against seven professors on the parent committee, including four from the faculty of letters); six spokesmen from the *Grandes Écoles* and analogous institutions, mainly technologically oriented; four interest group representatives, including one trade unionist and three employers. (See *ibid*, pp. 191-192.)

¹⁰ GEIGER, R. L., (1982), *Two Paths to Mass Higher Education: Issues and Outcomes in Belgium and France*, op. cit., p. 10. In considering the magnitude of the crisis facing French higher education, Geiger estimated that the Fouchet reforms were rather minor adjustments that safely ignored entrenched interests. The reforms also manifested an unambiguous recognition that mass higher education required diversification of institutional structures. (See *ibid*, p. 10.)

¹¹ CIBOIS, P., & MARKIEWICZ - LAGNEAU, J., (1976), *Students in Short-Cycle Higher Education: France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia*, Paris, OECD, p. 63.

¹² QUERMONE, J-L., (1973), "Place and Role of University Institutes of Technology (IUT) in the New French Universities", in OECD, *Short-Cycle Higher Education; a Search for Identity*, Paris, OECD, p. 215. In addition, the law faculties offered students not holding the *Baccalauréat* a two-year course called the *capacité en droit*. This had been continued by their successors, the *Unités d'Enseignement et de Recherche* (UER). (See *ibid*, p. 215.)

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 225.

¹⁴ CIBOIS, P., & MARKIEWICZ - LAGNEAU, J., (1976), *Students in Short-Cycle Higher Education: France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 63.

¹⁵ QUERMONE, J-L., (1973), "Place and Role of University Institutes of Technology (IUT) in the New French Universities", in OECD, *Short-Cycle Higher Education: a Search for Identity*, op. cit., p. 225.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 225.

¹⁷ DUNDAS-GRANT, V. H., (1985), "The Organisation of Vocational / Technical / Technological Education in France", op. cit., p. 265.

¹⁸ DUNDAS-GRANT, V. H., (1987), "Technical Education as Organised Nationally in France", *The Vocational Aspect of Education*, Volume XXXIX, No. 103, p. 57.

¹⁹ GEIGER, R. L., (1982), *Two Paths to Mass Higher Education: Issues and Outcomes in Belgium and France*, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

²⁰ DUNDAS-GRANT, V., (1985), "The Organisation of Vocational / Technical / Technological Education in France", op. cit., p. 265.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 265. Until 1985, there were 78 universities in France, the latest being at Le Havre. (See *ibid*, p. 265.)

²² VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", op. cit., p. 202.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 202.

²⁴ PREMFOR, R., (1983), *The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective: France, Sweden, United Kingdom*, Stockholm, Rune Premfors 1980, p. 138.

²⁵ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", op. cit., p. 202.

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- ²⁶ QUERMONNE, J-L., (1973), "Place and Role of University Institutes of Technology (IUT) in the New French Universities", op. cit., p. 219.
- ²⁷ GEIGER, R. L., (1982), *Two Paths to Mass Higher Education: Issues and Outcomes in Belgium and France*, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
- ²⁸ Ibid, pp. 11-12.
- ²⁹ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", op. cit., pp. 203-204.
- ³⁰ GEIGER, R. L., (1982), *Two Paths to Mass Higher Education: Issues and Outcomes in Belgium and France*, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
- ³¹ QUERMONNE, J-L., (1973), "Place and Role of University Institutes of Technology (IUT) in the New French Universities", p. 226.
- ³² Ibid, p. 219.
- ³³ BIENAYMÉ, A., (1989), *An Essay for the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Higher Education: the French Higher Education*, Paris, Garland Publishing, p. 11.
- ³⁴ GEIGER, R. L., (1982), *Two Paths to Mass Higher Education: Issues and Outcomes in Belgium and France*, op. cit., p. 13.
- ³⁵ PREMFOR, R. I. T., (1982), *How Much Higher Education is Enough?: Public Policy in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom*, Higher Education Research Group; Institution for Social and Policy Studies; Yale University, New Haven, pp. 7-8.
- ³⁶ PREMFOR, R., (1983), *The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective; France, Sweden, United Kingdom*, op. cit., p. 102.
- ³⁷ PREMFOR, R. I. T., (1982), *How Much Higher Education is Enough?: Public Policy in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom*, op. cit., pp. 7-8. In the post-1968 period no major change occurred, though a number of small measures were beginning to constitute a trend, such as the adoption of a *numerus clausus* for medical education in 1971, and for pharmacy, as well as some minor areas later. Also, an alleged effort was made by the government to force institutions to restrict admissions through a financial squeeze. (See *ibid*, pp. 7-8.)
- ³⁸ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", op. cit., pp. 203-204.

³⁹ Ibid, pp. 204-205. The way in which budget was then distributed to the UER, where the IUT personnel were carrying out research, could substantially affect their situation. In general, the outside representatives in the IUT council played a rather modest role in its affairs. A common theme of negotiation between University and the IUT was the treatment of research funds for the university personnel teaching in the IUT. (See *ibid*, pp. 204-205.)

⁴⁰ CIBOIS, P., & MARKIEWICZ - LAGNEAU, J., (1976), *Students in Short-Cycle Higher Education: France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁴¹ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", *op. cit.*, p. 190.

⁴² Ibid, p. 195.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 200. However, in practice this three-way division was not really maintained and the IUT generally appeared to be understaffed. A large proportion of instruction was given by secondary or higher education personnel under temporary contract. (See *ibid*, p. 200.)

⁴⁴ DUNDAS-GRANT, V. H., (1987), "Technical Education as Organised Nationally in France", *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁴⁵ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", *op. cit.*, p. 195. [See PREMFOR, R., (1983), *The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective: France, Sweden, United Kingdom*, *op. cit.*, p. 138.]

⁴⁶ DUNDAS-GRANT, V. H., (1987), "Technical Education as Organised Nationally in France", *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁴⁷ QUERMONNE, J-L., (1973), "Place and Role of University Institutes of Technology (IUT) in the New French Universities", *op. cit.*, pp. 226-227.

⁴⁸ DUNDAS-GRANT, V., (1985), "The Organisation of Vocational / Technical / Technological Education in France", *op. cit.*, p. 265.

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp. 265-266. The proportion of students who received the D.E.S.S. had significantly grown during the 1980s. The D.E.S.S. were professional degrees awarded five years after the *Baccalauréat*, while the D.E.A. had a more theoretical and academic focus. [See BIENAYMÉ, A., (1989), *An Essay for the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Higher Education: the French Higher Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.]

⁵⁰ PREMFOR, R., (1983), *The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective: France, Sweden, United Kingdom*, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

⁵¹ VAN DE GRAAFF, J., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", *op. cit.*, p. 196.

⁵² PREMFORs, R., (1983), *The Politics of Higher Education in a Comparative Perspective: France, Sweden, United Kingdom*, op. cit., p. 175.

⁵³ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", op. cit., pp. 193-194. Moreover,

In the final versions of the reforms, the government decided against any widespread introduction of selection and instead placed more emphasis on orientation and guidance - mainly in the final, three-year stage of secondary education - together with a diversification of opportunities in higher education through the IUTs. ... The IUTs represented the only important selective element of the reforms as a whole; they were to admit students only up to their prescribed capacity, on an assessment of their overall record (*dossier*). (See *ibid*, p. 192.)

⁵⁴ CIBOIS, P., & MARKIEWICZ - LAGNEAU, J., (1976), *Students in Short-Cycle Higher Education: France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia*, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

⁵⁵ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", op. cit., p. 198.

⁵⁶ CIBOIS, P., & MARKIEWICZ - LAGNEAU, J., (1976), *Students in Short-Cycle Higher Education: France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 57.

⁵⁷ QUERMONNE, J-L., (1973), "Place and Role of University Institutes of Technology (IUT) in the New French Universities", op. cit., p. 225.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 228.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 228.

⁶⁰ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", op. cit., p. 207. Van de Graaff also cites Quermonne who strongly underlined the IUT's special character by claiming that their part "can and must be decisive if the new universities are to ... help to create a modern culture based on the necessary alliance of science and technique, general training and technological know-how" (See *ibid*, p. 207.)

⁶¹ QUERMONNE, J-L., (1973), "Place and Role of University Institutes of Technology (IUT) in the New French Universities", op. cit., pp. 228-229.

⁶² *Ibid*, pp. 228-229.

⁶³ VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", op. cit., p. 193.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 193.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 206.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 208. Van de Graaff argues that the case of the *IUT* reminds us that it is politics, not planning, which ultimately determines the fate of most institutional innovations. (See *ibid*, p. 208.)

⁶⁷ The *IUT* did recruit a higher proportion of students from working class families than the universities. They actually tended to recruit the less able *bacheliers* from the upper classes and the most able students from the lower classes. (See *ibid*, pp. 197-198.)

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 190.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 200. There was evidence that students evaluated the *IUT* experience much as policy-makers wanted them to:

.. The most frequent reason cited by the *IUT* students themselves for attending the *IUT* is the short duration of studies; over 80 percent of the students say that this played some role in their choice. Other factors frequently mentioned are the advantages in finding a job and pursuing a future career, as well as the *IUT*'s intensive teaching methods... (See *ibid*, pp. 198-200.)

⁷⁰ CIBOIS, P., & MARKIEWICZ - LAGNEAU, J., (1976), *Students in Short-Cycle Higher Education: France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 71. In addition, Cibois *et al* pointed out that:

If the categories are regrouped as upper class (professional and managerial workers), middle class (self-employed in industry and commerce, clerical workers) and lower class (industrial workers, agricultural workers, and miscellaneous) we find that, of ten university or *IUT* students:

- 5 from the upper class background are at the university, compared with 3 at the *IUT*;

- 2 from the middle class background are at the university, compared with 2 at the *IUT*;

3 from the lower class background are at the university, compared with 5 at the *IUT*. (See *ibid*, p. 72.)

⁷¹ GEIGER, R., L., (1982), *Two Paths to Mass Higher Education: Issues and Outcomes in Belgium and France*, op. cit., p. 14.

⁷² VAN DE GRAAFF, J. H., (1976), "The Politics of Innovation in French Higher Education: the University Institutes of Technology", op. cit., pp. 193-194.

⁷³ NEAVE, G., (1991), "The Reform of French Higher Education, or the Ox and the Toad: a Fabulous Tale", in NEAVE, G., & VAN VUGHT, F. A., (eds), *Prometheus Bound: the Changing Relationship between Government and Higher Education in Western Europe*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, p. 66.

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp. 68-69.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 65. In the 1980s, the attention of the governments in Western Europe toward both advanced student training and the organisation of research was in part a reflection of the drive to reinforce government (or public) control over three overlapping areas: efficiency, evaluation, and accountability. The rise of the so-called 'Evaluative State' was a phenomenon broadly shared across Western European countries. [See NEAVE, G., (1993), "Séparation de Corps: The Training of Advanced Students and the Organization of Research in France", in CLARK, B. R., (ed), *The Research Foundations of Graduate Education: Germany, Britain, France, United States, Japan*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - Oxford, University of California Press, p. 159.]

⁷⁶ BIENAYMÉ, A., (1989), *An Essay for the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Higher Education: the French Higher Education*, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

⁷⁷ NEAVE, G., (1991), "The Reform of French Higher Education, or the Ox and the Toad: a Fabulous Tale", op. cit., pp. 68-69.

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 67-68.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 69.

⁸⁰ BIENAYMÉ, A., (1989), *An Essay for the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Higher Education: the French Higher Education*, op. cit., pp. 17-18. Moreover, concerning the impact of 'mass education', Bienaymé argued that:

The gradual implementation of the decision in 1985 to set the target that 80% of each age-group should reach the baccalauréat has led to an enormous rise in the numbers obtaining the qualification in the last five years (413,430 passes in 1991, i.e. roughly 50% of the age-group, compared with 225,780 (26.4%) in 1980 and 257,825 in 1985 (30.2%). [See LAMOURE, J., & LAMOURE RONTPOULOU, J., (1992), "The Vocationalisation of Higher Education in France: Continuity and Change", op. cit., pp. 47-48.]

⁸¹ LAMOURE, J., & LAMOURE RONTPOULOU, J., (1992), "The Vocationalisation of Higher Education in France: Continuity and Change", op. cit., p. 48. The way the universities would cope with this new clientele was not clear, but the 80% target also meant that additional resources would have to be allocated to the universities. Between 1984 and 1992, the higher education budget rose by 90.5% (in absolute terms) and its share of GDP increased from 0.43% to 0.50%. (See *ibid*, p. 48.)

⁸² Ibid, p. 48.

⁸³ GUIN, J., (1990), "The Reawakening of Higher Education in France", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 126. In addition, considerable executive powers were transferred from the Prefects to the elected Presidents of the Regional Councils and similarly, the regional authorities were given

greater financial backing. The removal of central supervision gave the regions a feeling of autonomy. At the same time, the various new bodies tried to co-ordinate their activities with one another and forged direct links with European Community agencies, with the calculated risk of disregarding the central government. (See *ibid*, pp. 126-127.)

The relationship between universities and Regions had been governed by the arrangements under the National Plan for contracts between the State and Regions (under the Ninth National Plan, such contracts had been quite limited in higher education). The contracts agreed in 1989 under the Tenth Plan offered a much more precise idea of the new position. The Plan contained several schemes considered to be in the general interest and funding was given for four years. (See *ibid*, p. 127.)

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 127.

⁸⁵ NEAVE, G., (1991), "The Reform of French Higher Education, or the Ox and the Toad: a Fabulous Tale", *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁸⁶ NEAVE, G., (1993), "Séparation de Corps: The Training of Advanced Students and the Organization of Research in France", in CLARK, B. R., (ed), *The Research Foundations of Graduate Education: Germany, Britain, France, United States, Japan*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - Oxford, University of California Press, p. 160. A recent report from the *Organisation pour la Coopération et Développement Économique* (OCDE) noted:

The role of universities is fundamental and strategic research is threatened ... by the growing tendency to create self-standing research institutions which are not regulated by the limitations imposed by the traditional statute of university teachers and by the rule of tenure. (See *ibid*, p. 160.)

⁸⁷ GUIN, J., (1990), "The Reawakening of Higher Education in France", *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁸⁸ NEAVE, G., (1991), "The Reform of French Higher Education, or the Ox and the Toad: a Fabulous Tale", *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 69-70. Another alternative was proposed by the Commission set up to make proposals for 'Tomorrow's University' (*Demain l' Université*). The commission suggested the creation of a species of 'Junior College' (*collège universitaire*) to bring together all short-course teaching, first-cycle provision both in the universities and across the *Instituts Universitaires de Technologie* (IUT). (See *ibid*, pp. 69-70.)

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 76.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 76. Guin argues that during the 1980s, the type of education and training offered hardly changed. The major reforms were the creation of the DEUG with various passing grades, of four-year programmes leading to a

master's degree (especially in science and technology), as well as the reform of the postgraduate studies and qualifications [*Diplôme d' Études Approfondies (DEA)* and *Diplôme d'Études Supérieures Spécialisées (DEES)*] which were dated back to the 1970s. In the 1980s, the main effort had been directed towards altering the *DEUG* in order to reduce the failure rates and the only significant changes related not to nationally recognised diplomas but to the creation of two kinds of very specialised qualifications:

(i) the *Diplôme d' Études Universitaires Scientifiques et Techniques (DEUST)*, geared largely to those who coped poorly with the first cycle, offering instead a two-year vocational course rather than a *DEUG* unsuitable to these students' abilities;

(ii) the *Magistère*, intended as a professional qualification for more able students entering their third year of higher education and offering a three-year course combining *Licence* (bachelor's degree), master's and a postgraduate year. [See GUIN, J., (1990), "The Reawakening of Higher Education in France", op. cit., p. 133.]

⁹² BIENAYMÉ, A., (1989), *An Essay for the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Higher Education: the French Higher Education*, op. cit., p. 15.

⁹³ NEAVE, G., (1991), "The Reform of French Higher Education, or the Ox and the Toad: a Fabulous Tale", op. cit., p. 66. The *Comité National d' Évaluation des Universités* (appointed directly at the level of the President of the Republic and not at the level of the Ministry of Education) had been of great help in order to:

- Provide universities with sound advice, guidance and a new taste for self-assessment.
- Provide the administration and newspapers with deeper and thoughtful insights into the specific needs of each university.
- Convey the idea that more autonomy could be granted to universities with the safeguard of an overall assessment procedure. [See BIENAYMÉ, A., (1989), *An Essay for the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Higher Education: the French Higher Education*, op. cit., pp. 23-24.]

⁹⁴ NEAVE, G., (1991), "The Reform of French Higher Education, or the Ox and the Toad: a Fabulous Tale", op. cit., p. 70.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 70.

⁹⁶ GUIN, J., (1990), "The Reawakening of Higher Education in France", op. cit., p. 141.

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 129.

⁹⁸ DURAND - PRINBORGNE, C., (1992), "France", in CLARK, B., & NEAVE, G., (eds), *The Encyclopedia of Higher Education: National Systems of Higher Education*, Vol. 1, Oxford, Pergamon Press, p. 219.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 219.

¹⁰⁰ BIENAYMÉ, A., (1988), "Two Million Students in the Year 2000: what does France want from higher education?", *CRE-action*, No. 81, p. 40.

¹⁰¹ LAMOURE, J., & LAMOURE RONTOPOULOU, J., (1992), "The Vocationalisation of Higher Education in France: Continuity and Change", op. cit., p. 50. Also, one of the measures for making up the shortfall of qualified engineers was to increase the numbers graduating from the *Grandes Écoles* by diversifying the ways in which students were recruited and not relying exclusively on the *classes préparatoires*. (See *ibid*, p. 52.)

¹⁰² *Ibid*, pp. 50-51.

¹⁰³ NEAVE, G., (1991), "The Reform of French Higher Education, or the Ox and the Toad: a Fabulous Tale", op. cit., pp. 75-76.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 75-76.

¹⁰⁵ LAMOURE, J., & LAMOURE RONTOPOULOU, J., (1992), "The Vocationalisation of Higher Education in France: Continuity and Change", op. cit., pp. 49-50.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 48.

¹⁰⁷ DURAND - PRINBORGNE, C., (1992), "France", op. cit., pp. 221-222.

¹⁰⁸ LAMOURE, J., & LAMOURE RONTOPOULOU, J., (1992), "The Vocationalisation of Higher Education in France: Continuity and Change", op. cit., p. 49.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p. 49.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 49.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 49.

¹¹² BIENAYMÉ, A., (1988), "Two Million Students in the Year 2000: what does France want from higher education?", op. cit., p. 40.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, p. 47.

¹¹⁴ NEAVE, G., (1991), "The Reform of French Higher Education, or the Ox and the Toad: a Fabulous Tale", op. cit., pp. 69-70.

¹¹⁵ See *ibid*, p. 70.

¹¹⁶ LAMOURE, J., & LAMOURE RONTOPOULOU, J., (1992), "The Vocationalisation of Higher Education in France: Continuity and Change", op. cit., p. 48.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 48.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. 49. For many years, the relations between universities and firms were distant and coloured by mutual distrust. The university courses were seen as mainly geared to employment in the public sector, while firms hired their managers and engineers from the *Grandes Écoles*. In the course of the 1960s, this situation began to change under pressure from several factors. The rise in student numbers, the shrinking number of jobs available in the public sector, problems of graduate unemployment and the desire of the government to bring the public and the private sectors closer together gave the stimulus needed to make university teaching more vocational. (See *ibid*, p. 45.)

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p. 52.

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 53.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE (WEST) GERMAN REFORMS

4.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

In this chapter, the higher education reforms – with special reference to the non-university sector – in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are described, starting from the late 1960s up to the 1990s. The role of the state and its rationale for its policies is identified in the successive reforms and laws and these are located within contemporaneous politics. The major debates by academics are also identified. The analysis is broken up into two periods: the 1960s-1970s and the 1980s-1990s. It is in the first period that the differentiation between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities is located, since it was then the *Fachhochschulen* were created.

The arguments in this chapter are that during the 1960s-1970s period, the interrelated issues of 'equity' and 'efficiency' were dominant in official rationales. The creation of the *Fachhochschulen* was part of the reconstruction of higher education as a response to these two priorities.

- However, the definition of 'equity' was in terms of the expansion of the higher education system and social mobility, and in the location of the *Fachhochschulen* in higher education. At the beginning, the social demand approach was dominant. Later on, there was emphasis on quantitative and structural planning.
- 'Efficiency' meant providing the right kind of higher education to respond to the economy through practical orientation, and relieving the overcrowded universities. The differentiation between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities was thus promoted.

During the 1980s-1990s, it will be suggested that the efficiency project changed in a major way: there was a shift from a concern for 'the economy' to a perception of 'the market'. The *Fachhochschulen* were responding to the market. The vocationalisation trend was associated not only with the market, but also

with the issues of quality, institutional autonomy, regionalisation and the links with industries.

To expand and test these arguments the reforms of the first period, the 1960s-1970s, are reviewed.

4.2 THE 1960s-1970s: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS

This section will address a number of major issues that underlined the rationale for the introduction of the *Fachhochschulen*.

- First, the issue of 'equity' was that individual demand for education had to be met and therefore the higher education system was expanded. However, the social demand approach to educational planning that prevailed at the beginning was succeeded by a manpower planning approach.
- Second, the strong governmental role in higher education was part of the efficiency project. Higher education was considered to be crucial for economic growth and emphasis was placed on a practical orientation. However, expansion could not be just extension of the existing institutional infrastructure. For the above reasons, the government looked for structural models in higher education, which stressed greater educational opportunity and practical orientation, particularly important in a political context that stressed response of the higher education system to the needs of the FRG, as an advanced industrialised country. The other version of the efficiency project meant relieving universities from large numbers of students. Thus, the former engineering schools and higher vocational schools were upgraded to *Fachhochschulen* in 1971. In relation to the universities, the *Fachhochschulen* would have the advantages of shorter duration, a more structured teaching approach, job relevance, responding better to regional demands, and alleviate unequal educational opportunity.

- Nevertheless, during the same time period, the equity project became stronger in the attempts for 'comprehensivisation', realised in the creation of the *Gesamthochschulen*. These were to combine the more practical orientation of the *Fachhochschulen* with the more theoretical orientation of the universities. The 1976 reform recognised the *Gesamthochschulen* as the future model for higher education. This reform - partly an outcome of the student protests in the late 1960s - emphasised the unity of the higher education system as well as its practical/professional competence. In the end, 'comprehensivisation' failed partly due to conflicting goals and partly because of the nature of the German higher education system, emphasising specialisation in spite of the rhetoric about research-orientation. Finally, during this period, a *numerus clausus* was introduced in several fields and governmental control decreased.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, in each decade after World War II, the number of students almost doubled.¹ The increase in demand for higher education meant that German universities developed into *Massenuniversitäten* (mass universities).²

Within this framework, the government in the Federal Republic of Germany assumed a much stronger role of co-ordination and supervision of the higher education system during the 1960s and 1970s than in the 1950s.³ The Humboldtian idea of the University had strongly emphasised academic freedom and university autonomy.⁴ However, during the 1960s and 1970s, the 'balance of power' shifted towards government following three closely interlinked changes:

First, government set up grand planning mechanisms to provide the necessary external conditions for higher education by acting strategically and with long-term perspectives. Second, the net of laws, decrees and administrative supervision became more tightly knit. Third, previously disentangled zones of state control and university autonomy were blurred by changes of higher education administration (for example the changing function of the rectors or presidents) and by the establishment of various mechanisms of formal communication and negotiation.⁵

The increase in government power over higher education was due to the growing importance of knowledge for economic growth, for social problem solving, and for the growing training function of higher education. There was a widely shared belief about the necessity and potential for quantitative and structural planning.⁶

There was also a debate surrounding the *Bildungskatastrophe* (educational catastrophe), that is, the fact that the German education system in general and higher education in particular were no longer suitable to cater for the needs of an advanced industrialised country like the FRG. This debate led to calls for more *Praxisorientierung* (practical orientation) and greater educational opportunity.⁷ The major proposals discussed and, to some extent, implemented were:

- a. the establishment of a variety of types of institutions,
- b. the establishment of a comprehensive model of higher education,
- c. the introduction of short-cycle courses at universities alongside long courses,
- d. the diversification or hierarchization of universities,
- e. the establishment of a sequential system of courses.⁸

Overall, in the post-war period, higher education policy in the Federal Republic of Germany had opted for a unitary system. From this period until the 1960s, emphasis was placed on blurring the existing institutional differences. After the mid-sixties, educational planners and scholars discussed the need to restructure higher education, in the face of an increased student population (both at institutional level and course patterns). Also, debates at the international level influenced the long-standing debate on structural issues within the country.⁹ Thus, the new policies led to a nationwide coordination of educational planning, the foundation of new universities with the aim of providing a broad local and regional range of higher education institutions. From 1970 onwards, the new policies led to a diversification of institutional types.¹⁰ The strong governmental role was also justified by problems of unit costs, changing employment prospects of the spiraling numbers of graduates as well as the repercussions of higher education structures on equality of opportunity.¹¹

The traditional universities, organised according to the needs of only about 5% of the respective age cohorts, turned out to be unable to cope with the increasing demand for larger student numbers. Consequently, new forms of advanced professional training were established.¹² It was within this context that the former engineering schools and higher vocational schools were upgraded to *Fachhochschulen* in 1971. In addition, debates about the concept of the comprehensive university (*Gesamthochschule*) took place, and there were continuous governmental measures to increase the share of students taking relatively short course programmes.¹³

The treaty between the German states in 1968 to upgrade the former engineering schools, and higher vocational schools, to *Fachhochschulen* in 1971, was a first step taken towards a diversified system. One of the reasons why this decision was taken was to raise the standard and reputation of these institutions and to ensure the international recognition of their graduates.¹⁴

There were also a number of other reasons why the *Länder*¹⁵ decided to set up the *Fachhochschulen*. The *Massenuniversitäten* were as a rule supposed to provide 4-5 year courses while courses at *Fachhochschulen* were intended to be of shorter duration than university courses in similar fields. The *Fachhochschulen* were expected to adopt a more structured teaching approach in contrast to the "take it or leave it" attitude displayed by university teachers which was regarded as a major factor contributing to high failure and drop out rates and students' propensity to extend their period of studies.¹⁶

University courses in some applied subjects like Business Studies or Engineering had been subject to the criticism that their syllabuses were far too theoretical in content and lacking in *Praxisorientierung* (practical orientation). The *Fachhochschulen* were planned to be designed in such a way as to be more practice and job relevant. Universities, in admitting students to courses, tended to favour applicants usually coming from a specific social stratum. The *Fachhochschulen* were to cater more specifically for students with the *Fachabitur*

or *Fachhochschulreife* and they were meant to alleviate inequality of opportunity in higher education, especially as they were likely to be more attractive to mature students and were intended to make a transfer to university education possible at a later stage. Finally, the *Fachhochschulen* were supposed to be well suited to respond to regional demand for study places and for graduates.¹⁷

Moreover, as already pointed out, since about the mid 1960s the continuous increase of the number of students at institutions of higher education was expected to lead to a qualitative change in the higher education system of the Federal Republic of Germany. It seemed to be impossible to provide study opportunities for all students in the same way it had been in the past but expansion by lowering standards seemed to be an unacceptable concept. Within this context, what became very popular was a model of integration in higher education. In each region, the institutions of higher education were to be merged into one comprehensive university, the *Gesamthochschule*.¹⁸

The introduction of the *Gesamthochschulen* as a model of comprehensive higher education was intended to strengthen the equity aspect of the reforms of this period. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was an agreement upon the concept of comprehensive higher education: all universities and *Fachhochschulen* should be institutionally merged into *Gesamthochschulen*. The major proponents of this type of higher education suggested that both students from the academic secondary education track and students eligible for vocational colleges should attend courses jointly at comprehensive universities.¹⁹ These comprehensive universities combined the more practice-oriented tasks of *Fachhochschulen* with the more theory-oriented tasks of universities.²⁰

Indeed, the tasks of the comprehensive universities were to create a link between the research orientation of the universities and the vocational orientation of the non-university institutions of higher learning. They were to increase considerably the possibilities for transfer between courses of study. They were to bring the non-university sector into closer contact with research.

They were to utilise higher education resources better and they were to make non-university level study more attractive.²¹

Two models of the so-called *Integrierte Gesamthochschulen* were finally realised: the “consecutive model” and the “Y-model”. In the “consecutive model”, both groups of students took part in a joint programme up to the first degree which was at least equivalent to a vocational college degree although somewhat closer to the university programme. Then, the students would continue their studies up to the second level (equivalent to the university degree). The “Y-model” allowed students to take part in a joint introductory programme of at least one-year, and then split into short-cycle and long-cycle programmes.²²

The student protests of the late 1960s had actually contributed to the change of higher education policies, before the new conceptions had started to become effective. Students had criticised the lack of social and political relevance in course programmes as well as in teaching and research. They had also criticised the bias in favour of “capitalist interests”, and had questioned the dominating influence of the professoriate regarding the internal organisation of academic life. These protests led to a short but intensive phase of reforms in the higher education system, which were accompanied by a series of legal acts and organisational changes. The latter included the right of all groups beyond the professoriate to represent their interests in the self-governing bodies of the institutions.²³

Thus, a Framework Act for Higher Education was debated and finally passed in 1976. Its aim was to guarantee the basic unity of the higher education system and to prescribe a framework for the higher education policies of the *Länder*. By the mid-1970s, a serious economic depression led to a reduction in funds for education (including higher education).²⁴

Government initiatives in higher education had already run into crisis in the early 1970s. There was a failure to agree on long-term education goals within the Federal-State Commission for Educational Planning. The ability of

government to draw up grand plans, to operationalise and to finally reach desired goals was open to question. The reform goals, which were formulated during the 1970s lost ground. However, this did not immediately diminish governmental power over higher education. In contrast, courts and government administration became more powerful and the Framework Act for Higher Education 1976 was enacted. The Act was seen as a compromise between the various concepts under discussion, while from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s a period of sorting out took place.²⁵

Disappointment over the lack of impact of political programmes and of forward planning as well as lack of political consensus led to stagnation and finally, from 1975, to a process of rethinking. In this process, governments set more modest aims for higher education policy and planning and in most *Länder*, the ministries in charge of higher education were reorganised again. Higher education planning departments, established alongside those of routine administration in the late 1960s or early 1970s, were dissolved in most cases by the late 1970s.²⁶

The study reform movement of the 1970s signified a change in quality criteria for university studies since the quality of a programme of studies was increasingly judged on the basis of the practical professional competence it conveyed. The first federal higher education law of 1976 reflected such a tendency since it explicitly stated that federal higher education institutions had to prepare students for professional practice.²⁷

In addition, according to the 1976 Framework Act the comprehensive university was the preferred future model for higher education. However, the reform did not succeed. Not a single comprehensive university was established after the enactment of this legislation. Also, not a single comprehensive university incorporated a previously established university. Rather, university faculty and resources were added to already existing teacher training colleges and *Fachhochschulen*.²⁸

The failure of comprehensive universities to become the model of higher education was because of a superficial compromise between conflicting goals. Some proponents favoured an integrated model, which was a new synthesis between the research-oriented university and the vocationally oriented *Fachhochschulen*. Such a model was supposed to reduce institutional and programme hierarchy. Other proponents considered comprehensive universities as a tool to make short-cycle higher education more stable and more attractive. But, proponents of the latter concept soon withdrew their support. The reasons were that doubts began to grow about the capability of comprehensive universities to take over such a "cooling out" function, and that there was a strong resistance of universities against such a merger.²⁹

Also, the characteristics of the German higher education system had a considerable impact on the structural policy. Higher education in Germany placed great emphasis on specialisation and the promotion of specific skills. In spite of the rhetoric about research-orientation, universities stressed preparation for a career. Other potential educational goals of cultivating the personality and fostering non-cognitive socialisation had not been highly regarded. Finally, the universities were considered to be more or less equal in standard, and higher educational policy aimed at retaining homogeneity of institutions.³⁰

As a result, as Teichler argues, the expansion of higher education was not that easily implemented in Germany. In other countries, expansion had to do with the extension of the bottom of the system as well as with a gradual process of adjustment to the changing job prospects of graduates. However, in Germany, an overall strategy to cope with the changing conditions was more likely to occur than a pragmatic and gradual adjustment to the changing conditions. Thus, the traditional concepts of higher education led to the preservation of a small elitist system, or even to integrated approaches; but not to a pronounced institutional hierarchy.³¹

In addition, what also became a very controversial issue because of its dramatic effect on the education system was that of *numerus clausus*. The competition in secondary schools had grown to such a degree that it was considered to be detrimental to both the educational process and to the development of personality. Up to the sixties, successful secondary school students used to choose a variety of fields of study. From the mid-sixties until the mid-seventies (when the medical as well as other fields introduced a *numerus clausus*) more and more students achieving high grade points turned to *numerus clausus* fields. Moreover, mobility from the one university to another became more and more complicated, and there were controversial debates on the issue of manpower planning.³²

Within this very complicated struggle, the issues of equity and efficiency re-emerged in fresh form and again in a struggle over institutional forms. As in France, these issues were extremely complex in the national political debate. As in France, apparently simple agendas of equity and efficiency became badly tangled in major struggles about the definition of the higher education system. The failure of the *Gesamthochschule* to prevail as a model of higher education was evidence that the 'efficiency' purposes were stronger than the 'equity' ones. The *Fachhochschulen* expressed a 'hierarchised' higher education system to respond to both versions of the efficiency project. The differentiation between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities was promoted.

4.2.1 Structural Inheritance: Differentiation Between the *Fachhochschulen* and the Universities

- In this sub-section, it will be argued that at both federal and state level the general intention of higher education policy had been to treat all universities or all *Fachhochschulen* as more or less equal. However, for 'efficiency' reasons, the differentiation between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities was promoted. The *Fachhochschulen* had the advantage of being of shorter duration, especially important in view of the long periods of study in the German Research University. In contrast to the more theoretical universities, the *Fachhochschulen* stressed a practical orientation,

which was evident in their mission, admission policies, fields of study, qualifications of teaching staff, and curricula. The governance of the *Fachhochschulen* stressed their response to regional needs. For the above reasons, the *Fachhochschulen* were successful both in terms of students' preferences and labour market demand.

All universities or all *Fachhochschulen* would have the same entrance qualifications, the same standards for exams, the same curricula, the same level of funding, the same regulations governing appointments and promotions, the same salary scales, the same organisational structures, and the same basic conditions for research, teaching and studying. Such policies were aiming at making higher education institutions more alike, especially in respect to quality, but they prevented neither the development of differences nor the perpetuation of traditional profiles. What was standing behind this general tendency, was the idea of equal chances for all qualified students to attend a high-quality university not too far away from their home as well as of broadening access to higher education institutions without creating first-class institutions for higher and lower class students.³³

Hochschule was the general term used to describe any institution involved in higher education.³⁴ The common objective of all *Hochschulen* was to cultivate and develop science and art through research, teaching and study and thus, adhere to the Humboldtian ideals of the unity of *Lehre* and *Forschung* (education and research).³⁵ At the same time, the *Hochschulen* were supposed to provide practical training for those professions requiring the application of particular scientific methods or artistic creativity.³⁶

Nevertheless, there was a differentiation between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities. The universities were known as *Wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen*. This was a term usually denoting those institutions of higher education whose courses were reckoned to be on a par with those of university standard. The *Wissenschaftliche Hochschulen* accounted for three-quarters of all students in higher education and awarded two thirds of the degrees.³⁷ The *Fachhochschulen*

were those higher education institutions remaining outside, and provided shorter courses, of between three and four years duration. These courses covered fields such as Engineering, Business Administration and Social Work.³⁸

Clearly, the German Research University system did not provide for any kind of internal differentiation. The only differentiation the concept seemed to accept was the distinction between Research University and Non-Research University, that is, the distinction between the University and the *Fachhochschule*.³⁹

The two classical functions of German universities - research on the one hand, and teaching and studies, on the other - continued to play a central role in the functions accorded to higher education in the Federal Republic. The Higher Education Framework Act (*Hochschulrahmengesetz - HRG*) had re-emphasised these functions, supplementing them with reference to an explicit connection between academic training and professional practice.⁴⁰

Thus, according to their specific functions, the higher education institutions should foster and develop the sciences and arts through research, teaching, and studies. They should prepare students for occupations requiring the application of scientific findings and methods or creative ability in the artistic fields. The purpose of research at higher education institutions should be gaining scientific knowledge and laying the scientific foundations for furthering the advancement of teaching and studies. According to the function of the higher education institution concerned, research could cover any scientific field as well as the practical application of scientific findings. The purpose of teaching and study would be to prepare students for a certain profession, imparting to them the particular knowledge, skills and methods required to enable them to perform scientific or artistic work and to act responsibly in a free, democratic, and social state governed by law.⁴¹

In German universities, there was virtually no separate level of graduate education, since clear patterns of course work toward doctoral programmes

hardly existed. The duration of most academic programmes was more than six years. The same applied to degrees in different fields, including professional areas. Those candidates who worked toward a doctorate took part in research activities in their departments by means of part-time employment as research or teaching assistants.⁴²

The overwhelming majority of first-degree students were more or less left to themselves during the course of their studies and they often had difficulty in getting to know their professors or participating in research activities. In addition, students had problems of orientation in a system that had little curricular organisation, thereby following the Humboldtian principles of freedom of teaching and of freedom of learning. A curricular pattern, which was disorganised due to overloading courses and programmes with new and recent research orientations of professors, had contributed to excessively long periods of study. There was neither systematic guidance of undergraduate teaching nor clear and purposeful research orientation.⁴³

With respect to the *admission policies*, theoretically, the *Abitur* (the basic qualification for entry into higher education)⁴⁴ allowed students to choose their subject and their institution of higher education. However, the high level of demand for university places inevitably imposed some constraints on students' freedom of choice. In the so-called *numerus clausus* disciplines (medicine, pharmacy, dentistry and veterinary medicine), for a number of years, places had to be allocated according to the students' performance in the *Abitur*. For other subjects, the *Zentrale Vergabestelle für Studienplätze* (Central Admissions Agency) took steps to ensure a more balanced distribution of student numbers than free choice of subject area and university would lead to. In allocating university places, allowance was also made for students seeking transfer from *Fachhochschulen*.⁴⁵

The *Fachabitur* was an alternative qualification, which enabled students to seek admission to a university or other institution of higher education and it tended to be conferred by secondary schools with a more vocational bias. The

Fachabitur allowed entry only to specific fields of study. It would entitle a student to enroll on university level courses in Commerce/Business Studies/Economics, but not in other subject areas.⁴⁶ The above were also the major fields of study in the *Fachhochschulen*.

The points system that was used to decide entry to the *Fachhochschulen* was based on the students' achievement in the *Abitur* or *Fachabitur*, with credit for periods of waiting and other special circumstances.⁴⁷ Entry to the *Fachhochschulen* was predominantly regionally based with many students applying to institutions within 50 kilometres of their home. Yet, there were cases where students moved further afield in order to follow a particular course of study.⁴⁸

With respect to the *fields of study*, there was no such thing as a typical *Fachhochschule*. *Fachhochschulen* offered highly practice-related courses of a scientific or artistic nature.⁴⁹ The main subject areas that prospective students could choose from, if they considered enrolling for a course at a *Fachhochschule*, were the following (listed in descending order of importance): a) Engineering, b) Commerce/Economics, c) Social Studies, d) Public Administration, e) Industrial Design, f) Agriculture/Nutrition and g) Informatics/Mathematics. Engineering courses represented about 50% of the total work covered by the *Fachhochschule* in the FRG.⁵⁰

The academic year was composed of two semesters and all courses were semester-based. Courses were usually planned to last for seven or eight semesters although regulations concerning the total length of studies at a *Fachhochschule* varied in the individual *Länder*. A typical course consisted of four semesters of basic studies, followed by two semesters covering two main subjects and then a seventh semester when the special topic was completed which, in some cases, could be done in industries.⁵¹ In laboratory work, students worked in groups of three or four. Examinations played a very important role in the assessment of students and all subjects had examinations

at the end of the semester. However, marks from coursework did not usually contribute to the assessment of students.⁵²

The practical orientation of the *Fachhochschulen* was also seen in the qualifications of their staff. The *teaching staff* in *Fachhochschulen* should be academically well qualified, like their counterparts in universities, and they normally held doctorates. Although university professors should have attained the *venia legendi* (Habilitation), *Fachhochschulen* professors did not need be *habilitiert*. However, they should be able to demonstrate that they had had at least 5 years' professional experience in their *Fachrichtung* and not less than 3 years outside higher education, i.e. as a practicing accountant, economist, engineer, etc. There were also different expectations about the balance between teaching and research. University teachers were very much expected to carry out research; they were in a way obliged to embark on research activity. *Fachhochschulen* professors were encouraged to devote time to research and consultancy, but in fact, they were only merely entitled to do research.⁵³

Finally, the fact that the *Fachhochschulen* were regional was evident in the *governance* policies. New regulations had established the *Fachhochschulen* as public law entities. They had the right to autonomy within their sphere of activity and this gave them the same legal status with that of the universities. The *Länder*, however, still retained certain rights of decision and supervision and the *Fachhochschulen* were restricted in the courses they could offer.⁵⁴ The *Fachhochschulen* were headed by a president or a rector and did not have governing bodies. The president or rector was answerable to the senator (an official of the *Land*). Any new academic programme had to be the subject of consultation with industry and then approved by the senator before being offered. Moreover, all member groups in the *Fachhochschulen* - professors, students and other personnel - had representation on decision-making bodies.⁵⁵

Thus, in comparing the *Fachhochschulen* to the universities, there were a number of differences. University courses were of longer duration than courses at *Fachhochschulen*. Although a longer period of study did not necessarily suggest

a higher standard in the final degree, there was agreement among educationalists and employers that the educational attainment level of a diploma awarded by a *Fachhochschule* was not as high as that conferred by a university level institution. Teaching staff at universities tended to be academically better qualified than lecturers at *Fachhochschulen*, although the latter usually had more practice-related experience. The *Fachhochschulen* also lay greater stress on teaching performance than universities.⁵⁶

Universities tended to offer the full range of academic disciplines and were entitled to award degrees, doctorates and the *venia legendi* (Habilitation). *Fachhochschulen*, as non-university level institutions, offered courses in very similar disciplines to those courses students could pursue at universities.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the *Fachhochschulen* offered a more restricted choice of *Fachrichtungen* than Universities.⁵⁸

The courses designed by the *Fachhochschulen* were more *praxisorientiert* than programmes of study, in similar fields on offer by the universities.⁵⁹ Course programmes at *Fachhochschulen* were meant to be application oriented while course programmes at universities were considered to be research-oriented. *Fachhochschulen* were generally assumed to serve a terminal pre-career function and only few advanced courses were provided for those having been granted a *Fachhochschule* degree. *Fachhochschule* graduates were not entitled to become doctoral candidates.⁶⁰

So, the fact that the *Fachhochschulen* were characterised by a disciplinary concentration in the fields of engineering, business studies and social work partly explained the popularity of the *Fachhochschulen* graduates with industry. The success of the *Fachhochschulen* was the larger practical and vocational orientation, together with more flexibility in relation to the expectations of the labour market and industry.⁶¹

In fact, there were more students wishing to enter the *Fachhochschulen* than places available.⁶² The emphasis on practical and vocational aspects was

attractive to both students and employers. Sometimes, students had to wait several years before obtaining a place on the course of their choice and this was due to entry restrictions.⁶³

Finally, after an agreement by the Federal and *Länder* governments of 1977 to maintain the policy of open access to all higher education institutions, student numbers continued to rise and higher education institutions were led to a process of rethinking their roles and functional contributions to society. Through organisational measures and a policy of greater public accountability, as well as responsiveness to the expectations of the labour market, the *Fachhochschulen* were in a better position than the universities to demonstrate their social relevance and importance.⁶⁴

Overall, in contrast to what happened in France during this time period, in Germany, the *Fachhochschulen* were successful in attracting students. That was because the practical orientation of the *Fachhochschulen* was a response to the debate about the educational catastrophe, which was strong in German society. Furthermore, during the late 1960s, the students themselves had asked for greater social relevance in course programmes. The cultural importance of the Research University in Germany was still very strong, thus unable to respond to the so-called *Bildungskatastrophe*. Thus, the *Fachhochschulen* were successful in responding to the efficiency project because they were practically oriented and because they were regional. However, the equity project was not given that much importance, as was also evident from the failure of the *Gesamthochschulen*, which were serving equity purposes even better than the *Fachhochschulen*. The debates among academics concentrated mostly on the relationship between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities.

4.2.2 Major Debates

- The purpose of this sub-section is to describe several debates, mainly by academics, during this period. First, there were arguments that the *Fachhochschulen* were creating social mobility. Secondly, however, most of the debates focussed on the relationship between the *Fachhochschulen* and the

universities. Some debates were about blurring the differences, while others stressed the distinctive role of the *Fachhochschulen*.

As far as the equity issue is concerned, Gellert *et al* have illustrated that the *Fachhochschulen* had been a major vehicle to increase educational opportunities for larger proportions of the population, not least by easing the access through a slightly less difficult secondary qualification.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, the differentiation between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities, for 'efficiency' purposes, was central in the academic debates. There were continuous debates focusing on which would be the most satisfactory policy to follow on the relationship between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities. One fundamental question was whether the programmes of vocational institutions should remain very distinct from university programmes, or whether the gap between the two should be narrowed.⁶⁶

Politicians and the academic community widely recognised the importance and attractiveness and the specific competitive advantages of the *Fachhochschulen* within the German higher education system. From this appreciation of the *Fachhochschul* sector, two different sets of propositions and claims were derived. One set of recommendations and policy statements tended to blur the differences between universities and *Fachhochschulen*. In addition, they tended to give the *Fachhochschulen* a larger share of the research money available (at least for applied research) and the right to award doctoral degrees and finally to prolong the standard length of *Fachhochschul* studies in order to converge with university standards.⁶⁷

The other set of recommendations and policy statements stressed the distinctive role of the *Fachhochschulen*, such as their teaching expertise and applied and vocationally oriented teaching as well as their more structured curricula. According to this view, the *Fachhochschulen* should participate equally in the resources for higher education or even deserve a greater share of funds. This policy aimed at the extension of the quantitative dimensions of this sector or, at

least, at the alleviation of the much heavier teaching burden compared with the universities.⁶⁸

The success of the *Fachhochschulen*, in terms of both individual and labour market demands, continued during the next period. During the 1980s-1990s, the issues raised were an extension of the issues of the previous period. However, new issues came forward, such as efficiency, quality and the increasing 'vocationalisation' of higher education to respond to the needs of the 'market'. Within this context, the *Fachhochschulen* continued to play an important role in the German higher education system.

4.3 THE 1980s-1990s: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS

- During the 1980s-1990s, the *Fachhochschulen* were successful in terms of both student and employment system demand. Compared to the universities, the *Fachhochschulen* were estimated to be both 'efficient' and 'effective', thus contributing to 'quality'. Given the excess of graduates, the debate about 'equity' diminished.
- Among the major issues raised were efficiency, competition, differentiation and institutional autonomy, and were made explicit in the 1985 Framework Act for Higher Education. According to this Act, the *Gesamthochschulen* were no more expected to be the general model for higher education, despite their success in reducing inequality of opportunity. The issue of 'efficiency' prevailed and 'hierarchisation' was promoted. The failure of the *Gesamthochschulen* was partly due to the strong vertical differentiation of the German higher education system and partly due to the neo-conservative governments' demands on opening higher education to market forces.
- Indeed, the contact between higher education and industry was getting closer, which meant that different forms and content in higher education courses and greater flexibility were expected to meet the challenges from the

rapid rate of technological progress. Also, the role of the central government decreased.

- During the 1990s, there was no longer a lack of graduates. This intensified the call for 'quality', which was related to the issues of 'autonomy', 'effectiveness' and 'efficiency' of the higher education system. In parallel to these themes, the 'vocational' element of higher education was increasing. The *Fachhochschulen* were still more successful than the universities in meeting individual and labour market demand.
- Finally, the unification with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), during the early 1990s, had consequences for the unified higher education system, since it reinforced all the above choices. 'Differentiation' as well as the concept of the German Research University went on being promoted.

Because of the previously mentioned organisational features, the *Fachhochschulen* had proved to be a successful competitor with the traditional universities since the increase in student numbers had actually been bigger than at universities, since the 1960s.⁶⁹ Also for students, "to study at a *Fachhochschule* instead of enrolling at a university for those having the general *Abitur* degree seemed to be becoming increasingly attractive: in 1987 50% of the *Fachhochschul* freshmen held the *Abitur* degree, compared with 36% in 1981 ...".⁷⁰

However, whereas 30% of students studied at *Fachhochschulen* with their shorter programmes of study, 70% were at universities in long-term 'scientific' courses taking six to seven years for graduation and leading to a degree on a master's level. It was generally agreed that this relation (of 30 to 70) was about the opposite of what the employment system needed. Moreover, university studies with their strong teaching/research nexus were so much more expensive than studies at *Fachhochschulen* (where professors taught more than twice as many hours as university professors and most got paid less). The above situation was not seen as 'bad quality' in the system as a whole but as the wrong kind of quality at too high a price.⁷¹

Overall, the German higher education institutions went through a difficult period during the 1980s as a result of economic problems, which had occurred in the wake of the oil-crisis in the second half of the 1970s. The government was forced to cut public expenditure and education was a victim. As a result, the expansion of the higher education system slowed down.⁷²

During the 1980s, the stagnation of personnel and material resources took place alongside a continuous growth of enrollments as well as a substantial increase in the average duration of studies. These were the most obvious indicators that various problems of higher education were tending to intensify: higher education faced a decline of quality since the available time for research was reduced and conditions for study had worsened.⁷³

The policy of “opening up higher education” was successful, although it remained a controversial topic during the 1980s. Regarding the debates on quantitative developments, proposals (clearly rested on structural concepts) in the 1980s were introduced on how to avoid further substantial increases in the number of students without introducing additional restrictions to admissions.⁷⁴

In the 1980s, there were a number of modifications envisaged to the higher education system in West Germany. These modifications were more efficiency, competition and differentiation as well as the introduction of institutional autonomy to the system of higher learning. The success of the project was dependent on the degree of co-operation of all those involved (the universities and *Fachhochschulen*, the federal and *Länder* governments, academic and research organisations, and the public). However, to a large extent, this success was also dependent on the new conservative government’s determination not to abuse the policy instruments in higher education to enforce its own tendencies about restrictive measures in social policy.⁷⁵

A competitive and differentiated system of higher education, Gellert argued, should show its efficiency not only in the quality of its research and teaching,

but also in its normative capacities for social justice and democracy. "Although the results of the policies of higher education may include differences in quality and prestige, the policies themselves must not serve particularistic interests, either inside or outside the universities."⁷⁶

In the revised version of the Framework Act for Higher Education from 1985, the *Gesamthochschulen* were not conceived of any more as the model of the future. Rather, the *Gesamthochschulen* were conceived as a special type of university besides the two major types, the University (without such integrated components) and the *Fachhochschule*.⁷⁷ In considering their original goals, the comprehensive universities were successful in reducing inequality of opportunity as well as in increasing the permeability of the system. The share of students from a blue-collar background finally getting a university-level degree was higher than in other universities. What research also indicated was that students entering integrated courses with prerequisites other than the *Abitur* were almost as successful as those who had passed the *Abitur* exam were.⁷⁸

However, the reasons that inhibited the *Gesamthochschulen* from being totally successful in achieving their goals were attributable more to factors inherent in the nature of the larger society than in the institutions themselves.⁷⁹ Among the powerful factors which frustrated the attempt to bring about 'comprehensivisation' was that the German higher education system as a whole exhibited a pattern of strong vertical differentiation with the universities occupying the topmost position in the prestige hierarchy, whereas other institutions such as polytechnics were perceived as subordinate. Another factor was that Germany, just as Great Britain, was faced with the challenge of responding to the demands of neo-conservative governments insisting on opening education to market forces.⁸⁰ As Pritchard has suggested, the application of a marketing ethos was in contrast to the critical functions of the *Gesamthochschulen* and their emphasis on the search for truth as their primary duty.⁸¹

Moreover, the debate on the issue of 'hierarchisation' of universities focused on differences in quality and prestige rather than any genuine diversity of goals, that is, it would be more precise to name the goal of these proposals, 'hierarchisation' rather than 'diversification'.⁸² In fact, the Federal Republic of Germany did not go very far towards the direction of a diversified system. In the end, it ended as a mix of comprehensive, elitist, diversified and stratified approaches, while the latest policies showed no sign of reaching a consistent model of any kind.⁸³

In addition, although the 1985 Framework Act for Higher Education had formulated common tasks for all institutions of higher education, at the same time, the Act acknowledged the right of the individual *Länder* to define different tasks for the institutional types. The Act also emphasised the different curricular patterns of universities and *Fachhochschulen*.⁸⁴ The 1985 Framework Act for Higher Education was revised, strengthening again the position of the professors in the self-governing bodies of the higher education institutions, restructuring career paths for young academics, and legalising additional grounds for temporary contracts.⁸⁵

During this period, the government began to urge higher education to become more entrepreneurial and more competitive than in the past. The government was no longer acting as the major agency defining societal demands to which higher education should respond. It rather suggested that the higher education institutions should compete for students, take an interest in the employment successes of their graduates, in the reputation of their departments, and in gaining extra research funds.⁸⁶

The contact between higher education and industry was getting closer and there was concern on how to keep pace with the rapid rate of technological progress. Thus, alternatives to traditional forms of higher education courses as well as on innovative and more flexible programmes were considered. Also, emphasis was placed on maintaining and improving the quality of the core or

basic studies to have equilibrium between the principles of introduction to an academic discipline, and the preparation for a job.⁸⁷

Since 1992, the quality debate in German higher education policy was gaining momentum. In state ministries and in higher education committees, the quality issue was associated with worries about the efficiency and effectiveness of the higher education system.⁸⁸ Since there was no longer a lack of graduates except for a very few fields, increasingly, higher education should prove its quality and its value to the nation or to society at large.⁸⁹

In July 1992, the Rectors' Conference decided on a 'Concept for the Development of Higher Education in Germany', focussing on the improvement of the quality of research and teaching. The improvement of the sagging student-teacher ratio should be a major responsibility of governments, as the main prerequisite of better quality of teaching. The Rectors also charted the course for a reform of the system of studies, devolved to the responsibilities of the institutions themselves. Deregulation, more institutional autonomy and a system of evaluating and monitoring quality and performance were particularly stressed.⁹⁰ In general, during the early 1990s, in German higher education policy debates, the issues were clearly quality, performance, effectiveness and efficiency.⁹¹

Within this context, there existed an implicit general trend towards a more vocationally or professionally oriented conception of advanced learning.⁹² According to Gellert *et al*, the continuing attractiveness of the *Fachhochschulen* was largely due to their public image of pursuing the right kind of aims and purposes in a rapidly changing environment. Thus, the attractiveness of the *Fachhochschulen* in contrast to the University was still gaining ground not only in terms of student demand but also with regard to the expectations of the labour market. For the 1990s, Gellert *et al* estimated that the vocationalisation of the German higher education system was likely to continue, insofar as the process of differentiation continued and ever larger shares of public resources went into practically oriented professional training.⁹³

At the beginning of the 1990s, the developments described above were supplemented by a specific and unique internal process, with the integration of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), including its higher education system, into the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, one could see a dual development of seemingly antagonistic forces - of differentiation and integration - within the same system.⁹⁴

The unification of the two systems formally began in September 1990. Then, in the former GDR, the former rules and laws for higher education were replaced by a decree for higher education, which for a period of transition (until 31 June 1991) served as a legal basis for the activities inside higher education. Higher education laws should have passed the parliaments of the 'new *Länder*' by October 1993. By 1992, it was possible to be seen that the new laws would be more or less identical with the existing laws of the Federal Republic and its *Länder*, since all of them were based on the Federal Framework Law for Higher Education (HRG) of 1985.⁹⁵

Although the reunification of the two systems was a process which affected primarily the eastern part of the unified system, it also had consequences for the 'bigger part' of the system:

The GDR had a genuinely centralised, homogeneous and rigidly administered system of higher education, which did not differentiate between university and non-university sectors. The institutions differed with respect to the number of programmes they offered, concerning goals and missions, and even in terms of their names, but they required identical entry qualifications and conferred the same kind of grades.⁹⁶

The Treaty on German Unity (*Einheitsvertrag*) contained procedures for the reorganisation and restructuring of East German society and the 'Science Council' (*Wissenschaftsrat*)⁹⁷ was mandated to be in charge of reorganising and restructuring the higher education system of the former GDR. The Council had been commissioned for the provision of the necessary data and information for the decisions to be made in all of the 'new *Länder*'. The creation of democratic and efficient institutions of higher education and the care for the people

working in these institutions were identified as the most urgent problems.⁹⁸ The Science Council also stated that the West German Research system (including higher education) should take reunification as a chance to restructure and reorganise itself. It also stated that the building of a unified research system should be more than just unthinking transfer from West to East.⁹⁹

Thus, the federal organisation of higher education in the Federal Republic of Germany seemed to have a stabilising impact on the *status quo* with regard to (lack of) institutional autonomy as well as external evaluation of higher education. Rather than providing new influences, the political and economic breakdown in East Germany tended to strengthen existing structures in West Germany. The concept of the German Research University had succeeded in surviving.¹⁰⁰

As already argued, even before Unification, from policy statements and practical reform efforts taken together, there seemed to exist a prevailing consensus among politicians and the academic community to maintain and promote the German model of the Research University. In this model, teachers and researchers as well as basic research and the advancement of knowledge would take place under the same roof as teaching.¹⁰¹

So, the importance of the equity aspect was diminished, during this period, because no longer was there a need for graduates. The efficiency project was dominant. The role of the *Fachhochschulen*, as an expression of a 'hierarchised' higher education system with emphasis on 'vocationalisation' was becoming very important. Both versions of 'efficiency' would be so met. The vocational aspect of the *Fachhochschulen* was relevant to the needs of the market. Thus, as in the case of France, so in Germany, the 'efficiency' project had changed in comparison to the previous period: there was a shift in concern from the needs of the economy to the market. Together with increasing 'vocationalisation', other accompanying and anticipated themes were those of regionalisation, 'quality', institutional 'autonomy', 'effectiveness' and 'efficiency'. With

unification with the former GDR, the above issues were reinforced: differentiation and the German Research University were promoted. A number of debates, by several academics, addressed most of the above issues.

4.3.1 Major Debates

- There were several debates about the reforms of this period, focusing on the issue of 'differentiation': one of the two versions of the efficiency project. In particular, there were debates about the balance between research and teaching, the transition from elite to mass higher education and the changing role of higher education. Within this framework, the role of the *Fachhochschul* sector and its consequences for the university sector was considered to be important. It was argued that its role was to protect the traditional concepts of unity of teaching and research within the University. In this way, the integration of the East German institutions of higher education into the overall framework would also be more easily accommodated.

Frackman argued that the concept of the German Research University and the so-called 'unity of research and teaching' might imply more than just having both activities under one roof. One might consider teaching rather as a scientific discourse that includes research results in teaching and involves students in research processes. One might also assume a prevailing scientific and research-oriented motivation on the part of the students. As a structural issue, the teaching function of the German Research University might have been undermined by problems such as student numbers, teaching overload, and 'tunneling policies'. Given the growing proportion of the age-group which was being prepared for work by higher education institutions a standard question would arise: "how would higher education and higher education policy meet the challenges of the transition from elite to mass higher education?". For the case of Germany, one should look at the conflict or tensions between perhaps changing expectations of higher education and the concept of the German Research University. Moreover, three aspects of the issue would have to be considered. These aspects would be first, the changing

role of higher education as preparation for employment, second, the shift in the motivation of students and their expectations of higher education, and finally, the role of the *Fachhochschul* sector and the consequences of this role for the university sector.¹⁰²

In the end, as Gellert *et al* argued, there was a major danger, which the process of differentiation and the more vocationally oriented curricular development was bringing about for the whole system of higher education in Germany. This was that to the extent that not only alternative sectors in higher education but also the universities were redefining their tasks and purposes towards narrowing professional needs the traditional concepts of unity of teaching and research would be jeopardised.¹⁰³

On the need for a functionally differentiated higher education system, Gellert *et al* argued that above all, this would mean that the functional separation of research-oriented training in universities and the more practical professional training (although based on scientific and theoretical knowledge) at *Fachhochschulen* was of vital importance. However, this distinction could only be kept alive, if the imminent tendencies of 'academic drift' at *Fachhochschulen* – tendencies, which were natural in a system that was so heavily dominated by the research paradigm – were kept under control by organisational and administrative measures. Above all, those measures would include a positive conceptualisation of the teaching function at *Fachhochschulen*, which would enable them to enter a productive competition with the universities. Moreover, in a perspective of two clearly separated, functionally viable segments of higher education, the integration of the East German institutions of higher education into the overall framework could be more easily accommodated. In the end, only if a convincing functional alternative to the university sector could be offered to other forms of higher education, would institutions like the new *Fachhochschulen* in the Eastern *Länder* be able to develop a sound and stable profile as well as a self-identity.¹⁰⁴

In short, more efforts had been made on the part of higher education institutions to raise research funds from external sources and to play an active role in the transfer of knowledge to economy and society. However, these efforts had reinforced concern about the role of basic research, the critical function of the University as well as the vitality of those disciplines, which were not in any position to “sell” their knowledge to society. Institutional patterns of the higher education system continued to be under discussion. Many debates focussed on the role of the *Fachhochschulen* (although they were assumed to have become a permanent component of the higher education system). However, the position of the *Fachhochschulen* vis-à-vis the universities remained controversial. Some of their representatives expected better status for the *Fachhochschulen* in the near future because of increased permeability between the *Fachhochschulen* and universities, while others suggested the establishment of advanced professional programmes in order to underscore career prospects within a clearly defined framework.¹⁰⁵

Evidently, during the second period, the *Fachhochschulen* went on being promoted, within the framework of a higher education system urged to be more ‘vocational’ to respond to the needs of the ‘market’. During the 1960s-1970s, the first version of the tension over efficiency was response of the higher education system to the needs of a loosely planned economy. In contrast, during the 1980s-1990s, the issue of efficiency meant reduction of the role of the state and introduction of the ‘market’, as the main framework shaping the future of the higher education system. The concern of the state shifted from ‘the economy’ to ‘the market’. In addition, in the German context of a ‘hierarchised’ higher education system, the *Fachhochschulen* were contributing to efficiency and effectiveness, as well as quality, thus protecting the notion of the German Research University. Furthermore, the theme of ‘equity’ was hardly discussed because there was no longer a lack of graduates. The choices pursued during this period were reinforced by the unification of the former GDR. Finally, most of the debates stressed the importance of the *Fachhochschulen* in contributing to the ‘efficiency’ project.

4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To sum up, in the Federal Republic of Germany, during the 1960s-1970s, there was strong governmental influence over higher education. The higher education system was expanded to respond to both individual and labour market demands. The creation of the *Fachhochschulen* in the early 1970s, was an expression of the reconstruction of the higher education system to meet these two priorities. Also, the *Fachhochschulen* – as an upgrading of the earlier institutions – were expected to relieve the universities from the burden of large numbers of students and to alleviate ‘inequalities of educational opportunity’.

So, ‘equity’ purposes were served by the expansion of the higher education system, an increase in social mobility, and in the location of the *Fachhochschulen* within higher education. ‘Efficiency’ was the provision of the right kind of higher education to respond to ‘the economy’ through practical orientation. The other version of ‘efficiency’ was the relief of the overcrowded universities: the unity of the higher education system expressed by the *Fachhochschulen*’s belonging to higher education was contributing towards this goal.

In the same time period, the creation of the *Gesamthochschulen* was a bold attempt for ‘integration’ and the 1976 reform recognised them as the future model for higher education. The 1976 reform – partly an outcome of the student protests in the late 1960s – placed emphasis on the unity and the practical/professional competence of the higher education system. Although the *Gesamthochschulen* served ‘equity’ purposes better, these institutions failed. This failure was partly due to conflicting goals and partly due to the nature of the German higher education system, which emphasised specialisation despite its research orientation. The differentiation between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities was promoted, accompanied by debates on what should be the relationship between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities. From the late 1970s onwards, the *Fachhochschulen* were established as a stable part of the higher education system. At the end of the 1970s, a *numerus clausus* was introduced in several fields and governmental control had started decreasing.

Overall, for 'efficiency' purposes, the differentiation between the university and the non-university sector was promoted. The *Fachhochschulen* differed from the universities in terms of organisational and functional characteristics, within the framework of the 'unity' of higher education – mainly seen in the issue of 'autonomy' for all institutions of higher education. The practical and professional competence of the *Fachhochschulen* was particularly emphasised, seen in their mission, their admission policies, their fields of study, their teaching staff, their curricula, and their governance. They particularly stressed the shorter duration of studies, the more structured teaching approach, their being more practice and job relevant and their response to regional demand. They had more links with industries, while the employment system clearly needed more and more *Fachhochschulen* graduates. Thus, the *Fachhochschulen* appeared to be in a better position than the universities to demonstrate their relevance to individual and labour market demand.

The success of the *Fachhochschulen* was mainly due to their practical orientation. The latter had been particularly emphasised in the debate about 'the educational catastrophe'. Also, during the late 1960s, the students' protests were about greater social relevance in course programmes. The importance of the German Research University was very strong and thus unable to respond to the *Bildungskatastrophe*. This role was devolved to the more practically oriented *Fachhochschulen*.

During the 1980s, the problem of avoiding further substantial increases in the number of students without introducing additional restrictions to admissions was raised. Thus, the issue of 'equity' was becoming less strong. The *Fachhochschulen* were successful in terms of both social and labour market demand. They were considered to be efficient and effective, thus contributing to 'quality'. The 1985 Framework Act for Higher Education formulated common tasks for all institutions of higher education, but abandoned the idea of the *Gesamthochschulen* – however successful they had been in reducing inequality of opportunity - being the future model of higher education. The failure of the *Gesamthochschulen* was in the context of the neo-conservative

governments' plan for opening higher education to market forces and in the strong vertical differentiation of the German higher education system.

During the whole of the 1980s-1990s period, the major issues raised were more efficiency, competition and differentiation as well as the introduction of institutional autonomy in higher education. Another issue raised was 'quality', related to the fact that no longer was there a lack of graduates. The government was urging higher education to become more entrepreneurial and more competitive than in the past, while the contact between higher education and industry was getting closer. Thus, there was an explicit trend towards more 'vocationalisation' in higher education: the *Fachhochschulen* were expressing this trend. In fact, the *Fachhochschulen* were part of the 'vocationalisation' of higher education as a response to the market.

The theme of efficiency was quite prominent, during the second period. However, compared to the previous period (the 1960s-1970s), the tension over 'efficiency' had changed in a major way. From the emphasis placed on the quantitative and structural planning and the concern on the needs of a loosely planned 'economy' (as was the case during the 1960s-1970s), during the 1980s-1990s, the 'market' was replacing the state in shaping higher education.

Also, during the 1980s-1990s, the *Fachhochschulen* proved to be a successful innovation and a successful competitor with the universities, with respect to both individual and employment demand. The differentiation between the *Fachhochschulen* and the universities went on being promoted. All the issues raised during this period, as well as the promotion of the Research University, were present also with the integration of the former German Democratic Republic, including its higher education system, into the Federal Republic of Germany. That the 'differentiation' between the *Fachhochschul* sector and the universities was promoted rested on the idea that the *Fachhochschulen* could protect the traditional concepts of unity of teaching and research within the University.

In Germany, the Humboldtian principle of the Research University was very important. The Humboldtian University determined its relationship to the state and to society freely and independently and took the search for truth as its main duty. Thus, it was not responding to the demands of the economy. This role was successfully played by the *Fachhochschulen*, and this explains the popularity of these institutions in terms of employment, and consequently individual, demand. Furthermore, the shorter duration of studies and the more structured curricula of the *Fachhochschulen* were major advantages in view of the long periods of study and loose curricula of the universities.

The *Fachhochschulen* were successful also because they were regional, a point particularly important in view of the Federal government's restricted power as compared to the powers of the central governments in Greece and France. The fact that the *Fachhochschulen* were regional also explains their success during the second period, with the introduction of the market (especially regional) as the main framework to which higher education should respond.

However, during the 1980s-1990s, the *Fachhochschulen* were promoted not only because they were responding to the needs of the market better than the universities, but also because they were seen as protecting, in this way, the German notion of the Research University with its free and undistracted search for truth. Thus, the cultural importance of the University in Germany was massive. The unification with the former German Democratic Republic reinforced the emphasis placed on the protection of the Research University. This was one more affirmation of the cultural importance of the University in Germany, since in the former German Democratic Republic, the tradition of the higher education system was that higher education should be geared towards the needs of a tightly planned economy.

ENDNOTES

¹ TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, New York - Kassel, Werkstattberichte-Band 16, p. 24.

² HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, (Number Twelve), Further Education Staff College, Bristol, p. 7. The fact that the German universities developed into *Massenuniversitäten* (mass universities) implied that it proved increasingly difficult to facilitate personal contact between students and staff. From the end of the 1960s onwards, in the university sector, the *Ordinären* (full professors) had had to surrender much of their control over examinations, syllabus content, teaching methods and research as the universities changed from *Ordinärenuniversitäten* to *Gruppenuniversitäten* (group universities). In these 'group universities', students, academic assistants and other employees were involved in decision making. (See *ibid*, p. 7.)

³ TEICHLER, U., (1991), "The Federal Republic of Germany", in NEAVE, G., & VAN VUGHT, F. A., (eds), *Prometheus Bound: The Changing Relationship Between Government and Higher Education in Western Europe*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, p. 30.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 29.

⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 44-45.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 45. In the end, the relatively high degree of 'autonomy' had not always led to the best solutions. For instance, Teichler has suggested that state influence on curricula should free students from the arbitrariness of professors, from a growing workload following the knowledge 'explosion', and from the irrelevance of curricula for future occupations. He also suggested that state influence on curricula should provide a degree of homogeneity in higher education, thus facilitating student mobility between institutions and assuring the credibility of credentials. (See *ibid*, p. 45.)

⁷ HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, (Number Twelve), *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁸ TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 31.

¹⁰ KEHM, B., & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", in CLARK, B., & NEAVE, G. R., (eds), *The Encyclopedia of Higher Education: National Systems of Higher Education*, Vol. 1, Oxford, Pergamon Press, p. 241.

¹¹ TEICHLER, U., (1991), "The Federal Republic of Germany", op. cit., p. 34.

¹² GELLERT, C., & RAU, E., (1992), "Diversification and Integration: the Vocationalisation of the German Higher Education System", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 27, Nos. 1/2, p. 90. *Fachhochschulen*, the new higher education institutions, were created through an upgrading of engineering schools and schools of higher vocational training. [See KEHM, B., & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", op. cit., p. 241.] In fact,

From the end of the last century technical teaching institutes (*Technische Lehranstalten*) provided scientific technical training. They were renamed *Ingenieurschulen* in 1938 and developed into *Fachhochschulen* offering courses in engineering, economics, social work and design in the early 1970s as the result of an agreement between the *Länder* in 1968. Many *Fachhochschulen* celebrated 20 years of existence as higher education institutions in 1991. [See HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE, (1992), *Aspects of Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Fachhochschulen*, London, HMSO, p. 1.]

¹³ TEICHLER, U., (1991), "The Federal Republic of Germany", op. cit., p. 34.

¹⁴ TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, op. cit., p. 32.

¹⁵ The Federal Republic of Germany is one of the most densely populated countries in Europe. It has relatively few raw materials and therefore, it concentrates on a highly developed and export oriented industrial sector. [See KEHM, B., & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", op. cit., p. 241.] As 'West Germany', the country consisted of 11 *Länder*. The whole educational system has a federalist pattern. The *Länder* are responsible under the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) for all institutions of education including higher education. However, the *Bund* and the *Länder* collaborate in developing and expanding the higher education sector. With the aid of the *Ständige Konferenz der Kulturlminister* (Standing Conference of Education Ministers) attempts have been made for the coordination of areas of higher education. [See HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., p. 5.] The Federal Government has legislative powers to provide a framework for education. The Government is also responsible for negotiating with the *Länder* on issues affecting the entire population of the country as well as for student support, international exchange programmes and the promotion of scientific research in universities and research institutes. [See HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE, (1992), *Aspects of Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Fachhochschulen*, London, HMSO, p. 1.] Overall, a trust between the state and higher education (acting as partners) characterises the system:

The *Länder* take care of financing and the general structure of the system. It is the responsibility of the individual researcher (rather than the institution) to take care of the advancement and transfer of knowledge. The guaranteed principle of 'freedom of research and teaching' implies a 'self-steering' and 'self-evaluating' system in higher education. The individual researchers are

(tenured) civil servants of their *Länder*. [See FRACKMAN, E., (1990), "Resistance to Change or No Need for Change? The Survival of German Higher Education in the 1990s", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 188.]

¹⁶ HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 8

¹⁸ TEICHLER, U., (1988), *Changing Patterns of the Higher Education System: the Experience of Three Decades*, London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, pp. 38-39.

¹⁹ TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, op. cit., p. 33.

²⁰ KEHM, B., & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", op. cit., p. 241. Also, the number of comprehensive universities established, merged partially with teacher-training colleges, if the latter had not been granted university status. (See *ibid*, p. 241.)

²¹ TEICHLER, U., (1988), *Changing Patterns of the Higher Education System: The Experience of Three Decades*, op. cit., p. 39. There were five aims of the *Gesamthochschulen*. The first aim was "organisational merger". The essential principles involved in the amalgamation of institutions, were: (a) autonomy, (b) merger of institutions, (c) merger of subject areas, and (d) merger of staff. The second aim was "social justice". The *Gesamthochschulen* were intended to increase equality of educational opportunity in two major ways. The first was *regionalisation*, which meant making education available in previously disadvantaged regions. The second theme was *broader access*, by making university-level courses available to students who lacked the *Abitur* (the traditional matriculation qualification). The third aim was "compensatory education": bridging courses (*Bruckenkurse*) could be offered to students who were in the *Integrierte Studiengänge*, but who did not have *Abitur*. The fourth aim was "promotion of applied and vocational studies". The *Gesamthochschulen* should contribute to the overcoming of the dichotomy between theory and practice. Since professional activity in the world of work demanded flexibility and the ability to develop one's work independently, Pritchard suggested that practice *and* theory should both be consciously embodied in higher education, even if the emphasis varied from course to course. The final aim would be the creation of new degree courses with flexibility of transfer between types. [See PRITCHARD, R. M. O., (1990), *The End of Elitism?: The Democratisation of the West German University System*, New Oxford – Oxford - Munich, Berg, pp. 111-112.]

²² TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

²³ KEHM, B., & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", op. cit., pp. 241-242.

²⁴ Ibid, pp. 241-242.

²⁵ TEICHLER, U., (1991), "The Federal Republic of Germany", op. cit., p. 45.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 38. In 1977, a moratorium was somehow reached between the government and higher education, altering both the conditions of higher education and the relationship between the two bodies:

Contrary to earlier agreements by which a period of quantitative expansion was to be followed by qualitative reform, the policy of 'opening up higher education' came as a truce of non-reforms and as an armistice in the battle between government and higher education. (See *ibid*, pp. 38-39.)

²⁷ DE RUDDER, H., (1994), "The Quality Issue in German Higher Education Policy", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 209.

²⁸ TEICHLER, U., (1988), *Changing Patterns of the Higher Education System: The Experience of Three Decades*, op. cit., pp. 40-41. In the 1970s, only 11 comprehensive universities were founded, none of which incorporated a previously existing university. Six of these institutions established integrated courses: five, the Y-model, and one, the consecutive model. The number of students enrolling at comprehensive universities remained at about 6-7 %. [See TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, op. cit., p. 34.]

²⁹ TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, op. cit., p. 34.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 24. As Teichler argued, the national discussions about the structural policy of higher education were not confined to thinking thoroughly about the merits and demerits of models, which were being discussed at the international level. Within individual countries, traditions exerted a heavy influence on the higher education systems. (See *ibid*, p. 27.)

³¹ Ibid, p. 24.

³² Ibid, p. 27.

³³ DE RUDDER, H., (1994), "The Quality Issue in German Higher Education Policy", op. cit., pp. 203-204.

³⁴ The *Hochschulen* covered the following categories:

- a. **Universitäten** (universities) including **Technische Universitäten / Hochschulen** (technical universities), **Medizinische Hochschulen** (Medical Colleges), **Theologische and Kirchliche Hochschulen** (theological colleges).
- b. **Fachhochschulen** (Polytechnics).

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- c. **Pädagogische Hochschulen** or **Erziehungswissenschaftliche Hochschulen** (colleges of education).
 - d. **Kunsthochschulen** and **Musikhochschulen** (colleges of art and colleges of music).
 - e. **Gesamthochschulen** (comprehensive universities). [See HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., p. 5.]

³⁵ In 1810, Wilhelm von Humboldt founded the University of Berlin, which was of great importance for the German system of higher education. Humboldt's ideas regarding the unity of research and teaching, the freedom of the arts and sciences, and the autonomy of university research and teaching programs, became an integral part of higher education policy. [See KEHM, B., & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", op. cit., p. 240.]

Humboldt believed that a rational development of state and society was possible only with the assistance of rational and knowledgeable citizens. He was influenced by the idealist philosophers (the philosophy of Idealism stemmed from Kant), who maintained that the world could be deduced from an a priori conceptualisation of reality and believed in a dualism of being and man (object and subject). In this respect:

Theoretical understanding of the world could only be found in universal or "absolute" knowledge. According to the Idealists, the task of philosophy was to discover and to analyze this "truth as such." Consequently, all *Wissenschaft* (academic learning and research) was defined by the idealists as philosophy. The conceptualised *Wissenschaft* was the moral and practical duty to organize reality according to absolute knowledge; the place where this knowledge would be discovered was the university. [See GELLERT, C., (1993), "The German Model of Research and Advanced Education", in CLARK, B. R., (ed), *The Research Foundations of Graduate Education: Germany, Britain, France, United States, Japan*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - Oxford, University of California Press, pp. 6-7.]

The University still had to train future civil servants, teachers and doctors but this training was to be in an apparently neutral process of searching for truth. The eighteenth-century system of academics and vocational schools was primarily meant to meet the administrative needs of an absolutist bureaucracy. In contrast, the Humboldtian University was to determine its relationship to the state and society freely and independently. There existed a fundamental difference between a practical, vocational education and a general education based on pure *Wissenschaft*. General education would strengthen, ennoble and direct man, while specialist education would only provide him with skills for practical application. (See *ibid*, p. 7.)

The new University was to give primary importance to general education, the "pure idea of science". Therefore, the universities had to be reformed in such a way that students and professors could pursue "truth as such" and consequently be able to reorganise state and society on these rational principles. Humboldt called this educational programme *Bildung durch Wissenschaft*

(education through science) and this necessitated a different understanding of the role of teachers and students. (See *ibid*, p. 7.) Humboldt himself wrote that the relationship between student and teacher would be changing since both of them were at the University for the sake of science and scholarship:

Since the search for truth was not to be restricted by considerations of time, immediate occupational purposes, or state control, professors as well as students had to be enabled to teach and learn what interested them. This led to the principle of unity of research and teaching for the professors, since the contents of teaching were to be direct reflections of the continuous search for objective knowledge. A corresponding principle applied to students: "Freedom of learning" allowed them to select freely from what was offered in various disciplines, to change universities whenever they liked, and to take their final exams when they felt ready for them. (See *ibid*, p. 8.)

³⁶ HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., pp. 5-7.

³⁷ NEAVE, G., (1986), *European University Systems* (Part I), CRE-Information (No 75 – 3rd Quarter), Genève, p. 47.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 47. Universities were part of a wide and varied system of higher education which also comprised *Fachhochschulen*, *Gesamthochschulen*, together with other establishments specialising in teacher education (since the 1960s, most colleges of education had been merged with universities), or music or the plastic arts, for example. (See *ibid*, p. 47.)

³⁹ FRACKMAN, E., (1990), "Resistance to Change or no Need for Change? The Survival of German Higher Education in the 1990s", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 195.

⁴⁰ PEISERT, H., & FRAMHEIM, G., (1990), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany*, CEPES / UNESCO, Bucharest, p. 10.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 10.

⁴² GELLERT, C., (1993), "The German Model of Research and Advanced Education", in CLARK, B. R., (ed), *The Research Foundations of Graduate Education: Germany, Britain, France, United States, Japan*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - Oxford, University of California Press, pp. 32-33. Research and teaching might be fairly well integrated in the university sector of the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, the overwhelming majority of first-degree students were more or less left to themselves during the course of their studies and they often had difficulty in getting to know their professors or participating in research activities. In addition, students had problems of orientation in a system that had little curricular organisation, as it followed the Humboldtian principles of freedom of teaching and of freedom of learning. A curricular pattern, which was disorganised due to the overloading of courses and programmes with new and recent research orientations of professors, had contributed to excessively

long periods of study. There was neither systematic guidance of undergraduate teaching nor clear and purposeful research orientation. During the early 1990s, demands had increased to shorten the normal course length by limiting it and to add a graduate level of training for those who were specially interested in, and could qualify for, an academic career. However, such suggestions had little effect. In a limited way, some universities had begun to take up organisational recommendations of the *Wissenschaftsrat* (Academic Council) to introduce the so-called *Graduiertenkollegs*, special doctoral programs that also included a clearly structured course pattern. (See *ibid*, p. 33.)

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 33. On the question of to what extent the principle of the 'unity of research and teaching' was a realistic reflection of the research and teaching process at contemporary German universities, Gellert argued that this appeared to be a mythological remnant from an earlier historical period. In the early nineteenth century, this conception was intended to serve as a political instrument against the suppressive dominance of the absolutist state. However, in contemporary times, it seemed that it did not serve any explicit political programmes or any practical curricular measure. In reality, the Humboldtian principle had been superseded by a development toward a functional segregation between undergraduate and graduate teaching. But German universities had difficulty accepting this fact, because, through their lobbying organisations (like the Rectors' Conference), the professoriate insisted that the principle of a unity of research and teaching was necessary as a general model of university instruction. In this way, they secured for themselves maximum freedom of action as well as the least possible obligation to engage in such activities as the development of binding curricular patterns. Nevertheless, the trend in the day-to-day routines of teaching and learning did move in the direction of more stable and clearer organisational features. Finally, the self-image of the German University was clearly characterised by a considerable cultural lag. [See GELLERT, C., (1993), "The Conditions of Research Training in Contemporary German Universities", in CLARK, B. R., (ed), *The Research Foundations of Graduate Education: Germany, Britain, France, United States, Japan*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - Oxford, University of California Press, pp. 63-64.]

⁴⁴ The *Abitur*, as the basic qualification for entry into higher education, was a school-leaving certificate qualifying for studies at a university or other institution of higher education. Students acquired it after successful completion of written and oral examinations at a *Gymnasium* (grammar school) after 13 years of schooling. [See HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.]

⁴⁵ HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7. *Numerus clausus* did not necessarily reduce the total enrollment at institutions of higher education since some applicants who were not admitted chose other subjects as a temporary measure during their waiting time. Others gave up hope and turned to other fields of study, while few of those striving for *numerus clausus* fields gave up studying altogether. Such a situation affected only the

pattern of fields of study. Teichler suggested that only if a total *numerus clausus* policy had been developed for all major fields, would it have to be considered as a mechanism for controlling the overall enrollment. [See TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, op. cit., p. 28.]

⁴⁶ HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., p. 6. In addition, students following a final examination after 12 years of schooling at a Fachhochschule (Senior Technical College) acquired the Fachhochschulreife (Higher School Certificate granting admission to a Polytechnic). (See *ibid*, p. 6.)

⁴⁷ HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE, (1992), *Aspects of Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Fachhochschulen*, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 7. Links with schools and universities were weak. In fact, there was competition to get on to most courses and the *Fachhochschulen* did not handle recruitment. Therefore, they saw no need for marketing or visits to schools. Moreover, there was some resentment towards the universities, which were seen as obdurate in their intention to retain their privileged position in the German higher education system. However, there were examples of co-operation. Also, many of the *Fachhochschulen* were developing international links through involvement in European Community initiatives. As an example, *Fachhochschule* Bremen had developed a joint course in engineering with Middlesex Polytechnic, which also involved students in exchanges. [See HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., p. 14.]

⁴⁹ HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE, (1992), *Aspects of Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Fachhochschulen*, op. cit., pp. 1-2. In 1992, there were 97 *Fachhochschulen*, each with its own profile. Some concentrated on one particular discipline and, as a result, they might be quite small. However, the largest one which was in Cologne, had about 20,000 students in over 22 departments. (See *ibid*, pp. 1-2.)

⁵⁰ HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

⁵¹ HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE, (1992), *Aspects of Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Fachhochschulen*, op. cit., p. 3. The way contact with industry was maintained was through the industrial placements of students as well as through consultancies. The level of these activities and the strength of the links varied. While students were in industrial placements they were visited by an appropriate professor and therefore, links were established. Consultancies were undertaken by members of staff. Much of this work was taking place as a result of individual arrangements. [See HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., p. 14.] Also, in continuing education, the relations between universities, *Gesamthochschulen* and

Fachhochschulen on the one hand, and industry on the other, were extremely complex and there were many models of co-operation or interaction in this field. [See VAN LANDSBERG, G., (1987), "Higher Education and Industry in the Federal Republic of Germany", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 33.]

⁵² HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 9.

⁵⁴ The *Länder* usually made the decisions based on strictly applied rules of selection and the *Fachhochschulen* played little or no role in the recruitment and selection of their students. [See HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE, (1992), *Aspects of Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Fachhochschulen*, op. cit., p. 6.]

⁵⁵ HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE, (1992), *Aspects of Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Fachhochschulen*, op. cit., p. 2. In addition, each department had its own departmental committee. Curriculum development and quality control rested at this level. The individual professor was the key instrument to assure and maintain the quality of courses in the *Fachhochschulen*. Finally, the *Land* was responsible for the types of courses offered and their basic frameworks. (See *ibid*, p. 11.)

⁵⁶ HEIDENSOHN, K., (1985), *Studies in Vocational Education and Training in the Federal Republic of Germany: Fachhochschulen and Polytechnics*, op. cit., p. 10.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 5. There were 229 *Hochschulen* in the FDR (1985) with a total student population of approximately 1.2 million. About 69% of the students pursued courses within the university sector, 21% were students at *Fachhochschulen* and 7% of them were enrolled in *Gesamthochschulen*. (See *ibid*, p. 6.)

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 10.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 10.

⁶⁰ TEICHLER, U., (1990), *The First Years of Study at Fachhochschulen and Universities in the Federal Republic of Germany*, Kassel, Werkstattberichte-Band 28, pp. 19-20.

⁶¹ GELLERT, C., & RAU, E., (1992), "Diversification and Integration: the Vocationalisation of the German Higher Education System", op. cit., pp. 90-97.

⁶² HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE, (1992), *Aspects of Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Fachhochschulen*, op. cit., p. 6. A commission set up in 1988 by the *Land* reported that between 1975 and 1985, in the *Fachhochschulen* of Baden-Württemberg, the number of new entrants, students and graduates had almost doubled. The conclusions of the commission were

that the attraction of this form of higher education was in the short duration of studies, the rigorously organised courses, the good career prospects for graduates, the smaller scale of the *Fachhochschulen* (as opposed to universities) which enabled students to obtain a better overall perspective, and the pronounced regional distribution of the *Fachhochschulen* in Baden-Wurttemberg. (See *ibid*, p. 6.)

⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 6.

⁶⁴ GELLERT, C., & RAU, E., (1992), "Diversification and Integration: the Vocationalisation of the German Higher Education System", *op. cit.*, p. 91.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 90.

⁶⁶ TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁶⁷ FRACKMAN, E., (1990), "Resistance to Change or no Need for Change? The Survival of German Higher Education in the 1990s", *op. cit.*, p. 194.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 194.

⁶⁹ GELLERT, C., & RAU, E., (1992), "Diversification and Integration: the Vocationalisation of the German Higher Education System", *op. cit.*, p. 91.

⁷⁰ FRACKMAN, E., (1990), "Resistance to Change or no Need for Change? The Survival of German Higher Education in the 1990s", *op. cit.*, p. 194.

⁷¹ DE RUDDER, H., (1994), "The Quality Issue in German Higher Education Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 213.

⁷² GELLERT, C., & RAU, E., (1992), "Diversification and Integration: the Vocationalisation of the German Higher Education System", *op. cit.*, p. 91.

⁷³ KEHM, B. & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", *op. cit.*, p. 258.

⁷⁴ TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁷⁵ GELLERT, C., (1984), "Politics and Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 19, No 2, pp. 228-229.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 229.

⁷⁷ TEICHLER, U., (1988), *Changing Patterns of the Higher Education System: The Experience of Three Decades*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 42. The *Gesamthochschulen* had made strenuous attempts to live up to the comprehensive ideal, which inspired the 1976 Federal Framework Act. As Teichler argues,

Their outstanding successes have been achieved under the rubrics of 'social justice' and 'applied and vocational studies'. They have been creative in curricular terms; they are popular with their students; they have no difficulty in recruiting; they have served their regions well, and have done much to democratise access to higher education. [See PRITCHARD, R. M. O., (1990), *The End of Elitism?: The Democratisation of the West German University System*, New Oxford – Oxford - Munich, Berg, p. 209.]

But although all of this constituted a considerable achievement, unfortunately, their development had been stunted by the way in which the law had operated to perpetuate status differentials between the academic staff from different backgrounds. (See *ibid*, p. 209.)

⁷⁹ PRITCHARD, R. M. O., (1990), *The End of Elitism?: The Democratisation of the West German University System*, New Oxford – Oxford - Munich, Berg, p. 213.

⁸⁰ Ibid, pp. xvi-xvii. The principles of competition and vocationalism were generalised throughout the education system and the introduction of market forces into higher education represented a major break with European educational tradition bringing it closer to the American model:

In Darwinian terms, market forces apparently ensure the survival of the fittest (or most popular) institutions and individuals. They are, however, useless for promoting the social purposes of education such as leveling out patterns of discrimination or promoting access from underprivileged groups. The harsh effect of market-based policies in education is intensified by conservative neglect of social welfare. (See *ibid*, p. 210.)

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 212.

⁸² TEICHLER, U., (1986), *Higher Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Developments and Recent Trends*, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

⁸³ Ibid, pp. 41-43. Teichler argues that the Federal Republic of Germany did not go very far towards the direction of a diversified system. Although diversification was intended to open up higher education to a variety of talents and to lower the minimum standards significantly, the general view of the need for certain minimum standards for access to higher education leading to any sector of the higher education system remained strong. The comprehensive universities lost their popularity because they did not pacify status conflicts, but allowed latent conflicts to manifest themselves. Comprehensive universities did not work as a "cooling out" device, but allowed many young people without *Abitur* to qualify for university degrees. In the end, the concept faced problems because efforts in higher education, and on the labour market in general, to retain clear-cut differences proved to be much stronger than what was expected. (See *ibid*, pp. 41-43.) Therefore, under these conditions, the

major success of comprehensive or diversified models tended to be overlooked. Students who were qualified for vocational colleges were almost as equally successful as students with *Abitur* were. (See *ibid*, p. 40.)

⁸⁴ KEHM, B., & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", *op. cit.*, p. 242.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 241-242.

⁸⁶ TEICHLER, U., (1991), "The Federal Republic of Germany", *op. cit.*, p. 46. The nation-wide study reform commissions acting as means of organised communication and negotiation between government and higher education (centred on curricular innovation) were the major reform experiment of the Framework Act but they gained little support and were discontinued. (See *ibid*, p. 44.) The relationship between government and higher education was shaped by a governmental position that was weaker than it had been in the 1970s, although stronger than around 1960. From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, governmental influence diminished slightly in the curriculum area. It hardly changed in organisation and administrative issues but it increased in the area of research priorities. (See *ibid*, pp. 45-46.)

⁸⁷ VAN LANDSBERG, G., (1987), "Higher Education and Industry in the Federal Republic of Germany", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 31-36, pp. 35-36. However, there was reluctance on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany to undertake a substantial reshaping of higher education. The experience of a high degree of experimentation in higher education in the 1960s-1970s still reinforced a widespread skepticism in the 1990s regarding the structure of the system. Also, as student numbers continued to grow beyond the years 1986 to 1988, initially predicted to be the peak years of enrolment, the rationale for the freeze of the controversies about the functions, structures and governance of higher education was still relevant. [See KEHM, B., & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", *op. cit.*, p. 259.]

⁸⁸ DE RUDDER, H., (1994), "The Quality Issue in German Higher Education Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 212.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 216.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 213.

⁹² GELLERT, C., & RAU, E., (1992), "Diversification and Integration: the Vocationalisation of the German Higher Education System", *op. cit.*, p. 89. According to Gellert *et al*, the reasons for the 'vocationalisation' trend were related to the quantitative expansion:

A general trend in Germany towards greater accountability, vocationalisation and professionalisation in higher education goes back to the early 1960s,

when the expansionist phase was sparked off by increasing demands from the labour market and the economy, as well as by social and political considerations. (See *ibid*, pp. 89-90.)

⁹³ *Ibid*, p. 91.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 89.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 94-95.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 93. From a historical point of view, the higher education system of the GDR went through three developmental stages. Directly after the Second World War, it started with an 'anti-fascist democratic renewal'. In the early 1950s, a rough replica of the Soviet system was brought about by radical changes. Around the late 1960s and 1970s, a number of reforms brought significant changes in the higher education system. The role of higher education in relation to central planning was strengthened. The reform of studies was towards productivity and efficiency, with emphasis on the practical requirements of the economy and the labour market. Similar goals were formulated for science and research. Nevertheless, in the early 1970s, the conception of the 'scientific-technical' revolution and the view of the role of science and research in Communist society changed. Information and control became important aspects of planning and developing the productivity of business and industry. Thus, economics and social sciences were upgraded. Since the mid 1970s, higher education policies aimed to overcome the rather limited range of studies and research towards purely functional requirements. Higher education was no longer seen only as training for a job and the ideas of Humboldt became relevant again. (See *ibid*, p. 94.)

⁹⁷ The Science Council (*Wissenschaftsrat*) was established in 1957 by an administrative agreement between the Federal and the *Länder* governments. Its proposals had been the most important guidelines for the work of the *Bund-Länder* Planning Committee for Tertiary Education Facilities in which,

the representatives of the Federal and *Länder* governments have been making decisions on their shared investments in new buildings and equipment for higher education institutions since 1971. Although formally an advisory body, the close institutional co-operation of representatives of the Federal and *Länder* governments on the one hand and representatives of the academic community on the other allowed the *Wissenschaftsrat* to become a politically very influential organ. [See HÜFNER, K., (1987), "Differentiation and Competition in Higher Education: Recent Trends in the Federal Republic of Germany", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 137.]

⁹⁸ GELLERT, C., & RAU, E., (1992), "Diversification and Integration: the Vocationalisation of the German Higher Education System", *op. cit.*, p. 95. A number of evaluation committees were put together and sent on visits to the different institutions for the evaluation of the people, their products and their future prospects in science and research. Furthermore, expert commissions for each *Land* had been established. These commissions controlled the re-

organisation or closure of institutions, the development of new programmes, as well as the installation of committees, for the appointment of faculty at the reformed institutions of higher education. (See *ibid*, p. 95.)

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 96. Moreover, Gellert *et al* have argued that:

Much of what is happening as a consequence of reunification shows that there are few constructive concepts around. Rather, it seems that institutions try to keep their assets, to defend what they have and hope to gain some ground. Under circumstances like these, it is impossible to predict the development of higher education in a unified Germany, especially in its eastern part. This skepticism is based on the inflexibility, lack of creativity and institutional inertia in both parts of Germany. (See *ibid*, p. 97.)

¹⁰⁰ FRACKMAN, E., (1990), "Resistance to Change or no Need for Change? The Survival of German Higher Education in the 1990s", *op. cit.*, p. 200.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 192. With regard to the issue of whether the German Research University was at stake, Frackman argued that:

Research universities with dwindling research activities and dwindling attractiveness for research money is a perspective that seems to threaten the higher education community as well as politicians even more than student protests and a 'tunnel through the hump' which, if not ending now, hopefully will emerge into the light in a couple of years from now. (See *ibid*, p. 191.)

¹⁰² *Ibid*, p. 192.

¹⁰³ GELLERT, C., & RAU, E., (1992), "Diversification and Integration: the Vocationalisation of the German Higher Education System", *op. cit.*, p. 98. In addition Gellert *et al* suggested that,

A system of higher education which is predominantly engaged in professional training in order to meet the expectations from industry and the labour market leaves less and less room for non-directed and purpose-free discovery of knowledge or intellectual curiosity, which have always been the bases of advances in research and scholarship. If Germany does not wish to let its system of higher education go in the direction of the Napoleonic system of France, with a clear separation between teaching institutions (universities and Grandes Écoles) and research centres (primarily the CNRS), her authorities and academics will have to make sure that a functionally differentiated higher education system will be retained. (See *ibid*, p. 98.)

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 98-99.

¹⁰⁵ KEHM, B. & TEICHLER, U., (1992), "Federal Republic of Germany", *op. cit.*, p. 258.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SIMILARITIES AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GREECE AND, FRANCE AND GERMANY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will offer an initial interpretation of the major similarities and differences between the Greek, French and German higher education reforms. The identification of the similarities and differences stretches across time - the Greek reforms took place ten or more years after these of France and Germany. In the analysis in this chapter, this difference is simply noted. Its fuller significance will be reviewed in Part II.

At first, this chapter will set out to show the similarities.

5.2 THE SIMILARITIES

What is striking is that in an initial 'reading' of the 1980s-1990s Greek reforms, these appear to be like the French and German reforms of the 1960s-1970s. In all these three countries, the creation of the non-university sector was part of the reconstruction of higher education as a response to tensions between 'equity' and 'efficiency'.

Thus, the first major similarity in the reforms of the non-university sector concerned 'equity'. 'Equity' was seen in terms of the expansion of the higher education system to respond to strong social demand for higher education and social mobility, and the provision of new technological institutions in higher education. The social demand approach to educational planning was dominant (although Germany later on adopted quantitative and structural planning).

In Greece, in particular, the equality of educational opportunity argument was intensely used and there was a significant increase in the number of places for technological higher education. In addition, in the rest of the higher education system, a broader range of programmes was offered compared with the

previous period. The upgrading of higher technical education - with the introduction of the *TEI* - was accompanied by statements about the social prestige of technical/vocational education and the contribution of the *TEI* to 'equality of thought and action'. The 'equity' policies of this period were within the framework of the judgement by the government that education should be a basic area of activity in the constitution of a state concerned with the well being of its citizens.

The second major similarity concerned 'efficiency'. One version of 'efficiency' meant providing the right *kind* of higher education: the non-university sector was expected to respond to the needs of the economy. Thus, emphasis was placed on the vocational orientation of the non-university sector and its response to local, regional and industrial demands. The practical orientation of the institutions of the non-university sector could be seen in their mission statements, their teaching approaches, the qualifications of the staff, the specialisms on offer, and the requirements for admission. The Greek government, in particular, pointed out that employment options should be based on the distinction between the theoretically minded university graduates and their more practically oriented *TEI* counterparts.

The other version of 'efficiency' meant that this new type of higher education would relieve the overcrowded universities by absorbing powerful social demands for higher education. The non-university sector was expected to be more successful than the earlier technical/vocational institutions. The major advantage of this new type of higher education - compared to the earlier institutions - would be that it would belong to higher education. In France and Germany, in particular, other expected advantages of this sector of higher education were the shorter duration of studies and a more structured approach to teaching. Overall, in all three countries, the unity of the higher education system was promoted and was mainly realised in the context of 'autonomy' and self-government for all institutions of higher education. Nevertheless, there were struggles in all three systems over the differentiation between the non-university sector of higher education and the universities.

5.3 THE DIFFERENCES

The reforms in Greece during the 1960s-1970s highlighted the importance attached to vocational education and the earlier institutions, the *KATEE*, were introduced as a form of post-secondary technical education, not within higher education.

The *KATEE* were introduced during the dictatorship under the influence of international organisations – which stressed the ‘efficiency’ project. During the 1960s-1970s, for the case of Greece, this project meant ‘modernisation’ and ‘economic development’. Within this cultural framing, the education system itself was to be modernised and a special emphasis was placed on higher technical education within a human capital approach.

In most of the general Greek educational reforms of this period, the goal of equity was also central. This was identified in the expansion of the education system and in the increase of education expenditure during the 1960s. Thus, the efforts for equality of educational opportunity concentrated on the input aspects of educational provision. In the 1970s reforms, the democratisation of education was also expected to contribute to the democratisation of Greek society, after the experience of a seven-year dictatorship. However, the issue of equity did not penetrate all aspects of the education system. For example, there was a restriction on the number of students entering the higher education system. This situation was reversed during the 1980s-1990s.

The issues of ‘modernisation’ and economic development - and the tensions over equity – that preoccupied the Greek reforms during the 1960s-1970s went on dominating the higher education reform agenda during the 1980s-1990s.

The dominance of the issues of modernisation and economic development, in the Greek reforms of the 1980s, constitutes a major difference with the reforms in France and Germany of the 1960s-1970s. These issues were part of the tension over efficiency in the case of Greece. In the early 1980s, the introduction

of the *TEI* within higher education was within the context of ideas about the modernisation of the higher education system to respond to the economic development of the country.

The government of this period also aimed at the modernisation of the education system as part of more general social transformations which would also contribute to modernisation and economic development. Such aspirations were reinforced by the high esteem education had in Greek society.

Within the logic of modernisation, 'international experience' was particularly stressed and Greece adopted one of the models for higher education suggested by UNESCO.

Apart from the issues of modernisation and economic development in the Greek reforms of the early 1980s, emphasis was also placed on one more major aim. The *TEI* were to contribute to the 'self-reliant' and overall development of the country, through the creation of an indigenous science and technology infrastructure. The new institutions were also expected to co-ordinate their objectives with those of the *AEI* for the creation of 'self-reliant' development. The co-ordination was through the special emphasis on the practical and applied orientation of the *TEI* towards productive applications and applied research.

Another difference is that, during the 1960s-1970s, in both France and Germany, there were attempts at integration of institutions within higher education. The *IUT* were to be within the *UER* as part of the University, while in Germany the creation of the *Gesamthochschulen* was a bold attempt at integration. The *Gesamthochschulen* were also expected to serve equity purposes better than the *Fachhochschulen*. However, the *Gesamthochschulen* failed to become a generalised model of higher education. In Greece, during the 1980s-1990s, no attempts at integration took place. In all these three countries, a sharp distinction between the university and the non-university sector prevailed.

Another difference arises from the fact that the success of the *Fachhochschulen* and the *IUT*, at least in terms of labour demand, by the end of the 1960s-1970s period was not matched by the Greek *TEI* in the 1980s. In Greece, the economy was not really in need of *TEI* graduates and thus, the theme of equity prevailed. In contrast, in both France and Germany, the issues of 'equity' and 'efficiency' were interdependent. The economy needed more and more vocationally qualified graduates while, at the same time, there was strong social demand for higher education, which could not be met by the traditional universities. Towards the end of the 1970s, the *Fachhochschulen* had strong links with industry, and the employment system needed more and more *Fachhochschulen* graduates. The *Fachhochschulen* were also more competent than the universities in terms of both individual and labour market demand. However, in France, by the mid-1970s, the *IUT* had failed to attract the number of students they wanted. At the same time, towards the end of this period, universities were criticised for turning out more and more unemployed graduates. Yet, surprisingly, during the 1980s-1990s, the *IUT* became more successful. This was due to the acceptance of the principle that the 'market' should be the main framework for shaping the profile of the higher education system: the *IUT* were actually a way of 'vocationalising' higher education to respond to the needs of the market.

The last difference links with the broader comparative proposition that the issue of efficiency that dominated the higher education policies in the 1980s-1990s in France and Germany was not raised in the Greek policies and debates in a major way.

Thus, in the 1980s-1990s reforms in France and Germany tensions over equity and efficiency were still important, though in Germany there was no longer a lack of graduates. In both these western European countries, the non-university sector was responding successfully to the efficiency project. Compared to the previous period (the 1960s-1970s), the efficiency project changed: the shift to the concept of the market was a move away from a loosely planned economy and away from the centrality of the role of the state in shaping higher education.

Thus, in France and Germany, the non-university sector was promoted to respond to the market. Since it was estimated that the non-university sector of higher education was responding better than the universities to the market, the functional differentiation of the higher education system – that is, the distinction between the university and the non-university sector – was promoted. Other accompanying themes were quality (in the case of Germany) or excellence (in the case of France), institutional autonomy, regionalisation and links with industries, and an increase of the student numbers (in the case of France). The non-university sector was to relieve universities from large numbers of students – as in the previous period – thus contributing to the other version of the efficiency project.

In France, 'vocationalisation' was especially prominent during the early 1990s, when more and more qualified engineers and business studies graduates were needed. In Germany, the *Fachhochschulen* proved to be a successful innovation and a successful competitor with the universities in terms of both individual and employment demand. The failure of the *Gesamthochschulen* was due to the neo-conservative governments' plan for opening higher education to market forces and to the strong vertical differentiation of the German higher education system. The 'hierarchisation' of the higher education system, which the *Fachhochschulen* were expressing, as well as the promotion of the German Research University (with its emphasis on the unity of research and teaching) were present also during the integration of the former German Democratic Republic (including its higher education system) into the Federal Republic of Germany, in the early 1990s. The promotion of the 'differentiation' between the *Fachhochschul* sector and the universities rested on the idea that the *Fachhochschulen* could protect the traditional concepts of unity of teaching and research within the University: an addition to the second version of efficiency in the case of Germany.

The themes of vocationalisation and market responsiveness, in France and Germany of the 1980s-1990s, were not identified in the Greek context. In the

universities, a number of laws succeeded each other with minor modifications until the early 1990s, but the initial law (1268/82) dominated. This law had introduced a number of innovations such as the abolition of the Chair system. The law on the *TEI* (1404/83) remained virtually unchanged. The initial 1980s reforms were not followed by further substantial changes during the rest of the 1980s-1990s period. What dominated those changes, which did occur, was the theme of power and control. In addition, there was no quality assessment procedure at the national level for the higher education system, as was the case in the other two European countries. Furthermore, the issue of 'modernisation' re-entered the scene with the prospect of Greece's joining the European Union on equal terms. Towards the end of the 1990s, the Greek policies went on promoting the non-university sector of the higher education system, as France and Germany. However, this Greek policy choice was in the context of increasing unemployment, particularly for *TEI* graduates. Such a policy mostly aimed at the expansion of the higher education system to meet social demand and to avoid further increases in the number of Greek students studying abroad.

Finally, in comparing the Greek to the French and German debates, there is only one similarity. In all the countries, the academics were stressing the social mobility the non-university sector was offering.

However, a number of differences can be noticed. The Greek debates were more critical about the issue of equity, emphasising its weakness in delivery and emphasising that it was blurring the issue of 'class'. Furthermore, the Greek debates were more politically concerned and pointed to the wider social formation in which the reforms were taking place. Starting from the 1960s-1970s, the debates criticised the international influences in a context of dependence, the efforts for modernisation without industrial development, and that the predecessors to the *TEI* were established during the dictatorship. During the 1980s-1990s, the academics were arguing that the failure of the reforms of this period was due to the nature of the Greek State, and that the modernisation efforts were taking place in the context of a dormant labour

market. However, most of the debates concerned the education system, in general, without specific reference to issues of higher education and the non-university sector in particular. Nevertheless the point was made that the major issues that were dominant in discussions of higher education in other European countries were missing in Greek debates.

In contrast, the academic debates in France and Germany were about higher education including the internal aspects of higher education. Specifically, in the 1960s-1970s, the debates were about the differentiation between the university and the non-university sector. In the 1980s-1990s, the differentiation between the university and the non-university sector went on dominating the academic debates, along with further issues, such as quality; and expansion in the case of France, and in the case of Germany protection of the Research University.

5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Overall then, this chapter has identified a pattern in the similarities and differences. In all three countries the creation of the non-university sector was a response to 'equity' and the two versions of 'efficiency'. The particular details which emerged in the full analysis in Chapters Two, Three and Four, modify the initial suggestion in the Introduction to the thesis that there were startling similarities between the countries.

However, this was partly the point of doing the full analysis with clear conceptual apparatuses (the aims and purposes of the state, the politics, etc.) within which the description was located within two different time periods. The full analysis has modified the simplicity of the opening proposition in Chapter One that the pattern of reforms were dramatically alike.

The major similarities were 'equity' and 'efficiency'. 'Equity' was about the expansion of the higher education system to respond to strong social demand for higher education, social mobility, and the provision of new technological institutions within higher education. The notion of 'efficiency' had a two-fold meaning. The first meaning of 'efficiency' was that the non-university sector of

higher education would be the right type of higher education to respond successfully to the needs of the economy. Within this logic, emphasis was placed on the vocational orientation of this new type of higher education institutions. The other version of 'efficiency' was that this new type of higher education would relieve the overcrowded universities by absorbing powerful social demands. The unity of the higher education system was emphasised.

Indeed, it is also important – in terms of the work of Part II of the thesis – to stress identifiable differences which can be summed up from the work of the last 150 or so pages.

The Greek reforms are different in the following ways. First, there was a particular emphasis placed on economic development and modernisation. Second, there was a special emphasis placed on 'international experience'. Third, emphasis was also placed on self-reliant development, through the creation of an indigenous science and technology infrastructure. Fourth, in Greece, there were no attempts at institutional integration in higher education. Fifth, the success of the *Fachhochschulen* and the *IUT* was not matched by the Greek *TEI*. Finally, the emphasis on the vocationalisation of higher education policies as a response to the market, that was evident in the 1980s-1990s French and German reforms, was not visible in the Greek policies and debates.

Why do these patterns of similarities exist – and what explains the difference of the Greek case? In other words at this point in the thesis the "problem" which is being investigated changes shape.

The first Part of this thesis (Chapters Two, Three, and Four) has been a form of pedagogic description – if not following then at least empathetic to or understandable within a Beredayian methodology.

The "results" of this analysis are the 'similarities' and the 'differences' listed above. These "results" are in classical comparative form, as if the task of

comparative education is to list similarities and differences between the educational systems of different countries.

And yet the initial unease identified in Chapter One remains: are the 'similarities' in the patterns of reform in the three countries deeply rooted in similar contexts? The initial and obvious answer is 'no'. The similarities seem unlikely to be deeply rooted. These three countries differ markedly in their historical heritage and in their cultural, political, social and economic contexts. The Greek State only began to take shape a few years after the Greek revolution (1821-1929). In modern times, what makes Greece markedly different from France and Germany is its socio-economic context: the position of Greece in the modern world-system.

Within this context, the "similarities" and the "differences" between the higher education patterns in Greece and the other two European countries, as these have been identified in this chapter, will be the starting point of a different interpretation in Part II. This new interpretation will go beyond the theme of pedagogical description and will take account of the socio-economic context of Greece: what the previous analysis neglected.

Thus, the current Chapter is not simply the end of Part I. From now on, the propositions of Chapter Five become the central problematique of the thesis. Within Part II, the similarities and the differences will be re-interpreted on the basis of a theoretical perspective: 'world systems analysis'. 'World systems analysis' has introduced the concept of the 'semi-periphery'. Thus, within Part II, the thesis will elaborate a theory of the 'semi-periphery', will view Greece as a semi-peripheral society within Southern Europe, and will offer a reinterpretation of the non-university sector of higher education in Greece.

However, the analysis will not be based only on 'world systems' theory. The definition of Greece as a European 'semi-periphery' is not simple. It will be theoretically explored and thus, within Chapter Six, two theoretical perspectives on the concept of the 'semi-periphery' will be elaborated. The first

perspective places emphasis on the economic and international dimension. The second perspective emphasises the political element.

In the end, a synthesis of both of them will be suggested: a number of abstract propositions for the definition of Greece as a European 'semi-periphery'. The suggested synthesis will be applied in Chapter Seven, where Greece will be fully presented as a 'European' semi-periphery and mainly as part of the southern European semi-peripheral zone. Chapter Eight will offer a re-interpretation of the similarities and differences, as a conclusion.

PART II

CHAPTER SIX

ON A THEORY OF THE SEMI-PERIPHERY

6.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

This chapter will explore two theoretical perspectives on the semi-periphery. The first perspective is that of Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems analysis¹, which is primarily economic. (See Appendix Two for more detail on the historical context, the theoretical heritage and the methodology of world systems analysis.) The other theoretical perspective is that of Nicos Mouzelis, who emphasises the 'political'.

This chapter will show that both approaches are useful in studying semi-peripheral societies. Wallerstein's approach points to economic and international relations and its neo-Marxist origin permits the study of macro-historical transformations. However, world systems analysis neglects, or does not sufficiently explain, the special nature of the State in semi-peripheral societies. This neglected theme, in the world systems perspective, is treated by Mouzelis. He interprets the State as an important actor within semi-peripheral societies, within the framework of historical sociology.

Thus, in the end, the thesis will attempt a synthesis of these two theoretical perspectives. This synthesis will be utilised and extended in Chapter Seven of the thesis, in its application to a definition of Greece as a European semi-periphery.

6.2 THE THEORETICAL UNIVERSE OF WALLERSTEIN'S 'WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS'

This section will present Wallerstein's definition of capitalism, and his views on the dominance of the most advanced capitalist economies in the world-system. His theorisation of capitalism – related to the issues of cyclical rhythms and secular trends – led to the concept of the semi-periphery. Wallerstein used the term "unequal exchange", the idea that 'core-type' activities and 'peripheral-

type' activities are unequally distributed across the world system, as one of the basic features of the semi-periphery. The other feature of the semi-periphery is "the role of the state in the process of peripheralisation": the capacity of the state to develop external links with core capital. At the end of the section, the concept of 'semi-periphery' will be defined according to the perspective of world systems analysis.

6.2.1 On the Definition of Capitalism

According to world systems analysis, the defining feature of capitalism is the nature of competition within it. The most advanced capitalist economies are dominant in the world-system. Within this context, development / underdevelopment are viewed in the context of the movements of capital, determined by the rate of profit, the cyclical rhythms and the secular trends of the world capitalist system.

Wallerstein defines capitalism as: "a system based on competition between free producers using free labour with free commodities, 'free' meaning its availability for sale and purchase on a market."² Constraints on such freedoms mean that a zone or an enterprise is 'less capitalist'.³ Wallerstein suggests that this 'combination' or mixture of the so-called free and the non-free is itself the defining feature of capitalism as a historical system.⁴ In Wallerstein's view, the modern world system is marked by the dominance of the world market by the most advanced capitalist economies. Therefore,

systematic explanations of development and underdevelopment (as well as attempts to break out of the latter and overcome dependency along socialist lines) must be viewed in the context of the movements, and consequences thereof, of capital, determined by the rate of profit, the cyclic fluctuations and secular tendencies of world capitalism, and the competition among core states for control of the world political economy. While these factors are central to the development of countries and regions in the world economy, they are, in turn, shaped by the contradictory forces endemic to capitalism - principally the struggle of classes within states and on a global scale.⁵

Wallerstein continues:

The cyclical rhythms are the things that more or less seem to repeat themselves over time. The secular trends are those processes which are in some sense linear. ... They go on side by side simultaneously, which is very important. ... There has also been a long history of *observation* that there are "expansions" and "contractions" in the world economy in one form or another.⁶

The "cyclical rhythms" and the "secular trends" are linked to a basic contradiction of the system, world-system supply and world-system demand. The pattern of the cyclical rhythm is related to world effective demand and, at any given point, it is at a certain level. The secular trends of the world-system are expansion (meaning that more and more producers are producing more and more, finally exceeding world effective demand), proletarianisation, commodification, mechanisation, and political organisation. Systemic secular trends are defined in terms of percentages and that is why they cannot go on forever.⁷ Finally, to the question of what are the dynamics of the contradictions of the system Wallerstein answers:

The dynamics are that the cyclical rhythms, which are the consequence of the structure of capitalism as a system - (i.e., anarchic production and socially determined demand), as mechanisms to resolve the regular mini-crises that this creates, force secular transformations of the system, which are the secular trends that are asymptotic and which, when they reach a certain level, make the system unfunctional, because it would be impossible at that point to have the further continuing of accumulation of capital. You could only cut into the effective distribution of the surplus, which would push logically into an egalitarian route.⁸

The above theorisation on capitalism - with the accompanying and interrelated issues of the cyclical rhythms and secular trends - is associated, in Wallerstein's view, with the issue of productivity and unequal exchange. Together with the role of the state in the process of peripheralisation, productivity and unequal exchange constitute the main features of the concept of the semi-periphery.

6.2.2 Productivity and Unequal Exchange

World systems analysis uses the term unequal exchange to explain that 'core-type' and 'peripheral-type' activities are unequally distributed across the world-system. Usually, a mixture of core and peripheral activities defines the

position of a state in the interstate system: if the vast majority of activities are 'core' activities, then one may speak of a 'core' state.

In using the concept of unequal exchange, Wallerstein begins by suggesting that if one starts with core and periphery, there should be some kind of related set of production processes, which are unequal, that is, between their products there is unequal exchange. Moreover, trade within a capitalist world-system is inherently unequal, and unequal exchange refers to something over and above the fact that there is a transfer of surplus value from a direct producer to another person who, by one legal means or another, obtains that surplus.⁹ Therefore, Wallerstein, by borrowing Emmanuel's theorisation, explains:

if there are two *pairs* of producers and receivers of surplus-value, Emmanuel is arguing that the receiver of one pair acquires part of the surplus-value of *the other pair*. This is, of course, not given at the expense of the producer of the second pair, because he has already given up his surplus-value, but rather is given up at the expense of that receiver. This relationship is what we are talking about when we refer to core-periphery ... unequal exchange is over and above the simple transfer of surplus-value from the direct producer to the person who immediately receives it.¹⁰

Trade within states (as well as trade between rural and urban areas) is also a trade of unequal exchange. The core-periphery relationship actually indicates the degree to which surplus-value is unevenly distributed in the direction of the core. Moreover, the "degree to which the economic relationship is core-peripheralised is the degree to which there is an increasingly unequal distribution of the surplus value between two different bourgeoisies."¹¹

Wallerstein¹² indicates that there is a pattern in how unequal exchange relates to states, in which core-type activities and peripheral-type activities are unequally geographically distributed across the world-system and within segments of the world system. There are concentrations of core-like activities within particular areas. Since state lines are drawn arbitrarily and are constantly redrawn, calculations can be made of the sum of the nature of activities within the state boundaries. What will be discovered, if this is done, is that areas normally referred to as peripheral areas are areas where the vast majority of activity would in fact come into the category of peripheral activity.

However, areas having many core activities do not necessarily have core activities as the majority of activities. Core states tend to have peripheral activities as well.¹³

The idea that there is a mixture of 'core' and 'peripheral' activities within states leads to the definition of the concept of the semi-periphery.

6.2.3 The Concept of the Semi-Periphery

The semi-periphery, according to world systems analysis, is a state with a roughly even balance of core-type and peripheral-type activities. A semi-peripheral state also contributes to the stability of the world capitalist system.

According to Wallerstein, the semi-periphery is not an economic activity since an economic activity is a dyadic relationship of unequal exchange between a pair of objects that are exchanged in the division of labour.¹⁴ Instead,

Semiperipheral seems to be almost by definition an adjective you apply to states as opposed to core and periphery. A semiperipheral state appears to be a state which has a roughly even balance of core-like and peripheral-like activity. This has, of course, important political consequences. The model of a semiperipheral state is the one that exports the peripheral products to core countries and core products to peripheral areas of the world-system and does both in roughly equivalent degrees.¹⁵

Wallerstein finds the world too complicated to be classified as a bimodal system, with cores and peripheries only. Instead, the world is trimodal, with cores, semiperipheries and peripheries. There are two reasons that the present capitalist system needs a semiperipheral sector. First, a polarised world-system can lead to acute disintegration. Second, individual capitalists must be able to transfer capital from a declining leading sector to a rising sector in order to survive the effects of cyclical shifts in the loci of the leading sectors.¹⁶

In other words, the exploitative processes that operate through the world-economy always operate in a three-tiered format and the reason is that in any situation of inequality, three tiers are more stable than two tiers of confrontation. "Those at the top will always manoeuvre for the 'creation' of a

three-tier structure whereas those at the bottom will emphasise the two tiers of 'them and us'."17

Finally, a semi-peripheral state in the world-system has - according to time and place - a different structural content as well as a different social meaning:

Under certain circumstances it is the expression of "anti-systemic" thrusts. But in others it serves primarily to recuperate such thrusts and further to stabilize the system. In itself, it is neither good nor bad; it is. But if we want to analyze the meaning of political responses to socio-economic realities, we cannot afford to dispense with the concept of the semiperipheral state, since it is a critical device in the functioning of the capitalist world economy.¹⁸

As already argued, apart from the core - periphery unequal exchange, the other distinctive feature of the semi-periphery is the role of the state in the process of peripheralisation. The state has a direct and immediate interest in controlling the domestic market.¹⁹

6.2.4 The State and its Role in the Process of Peripheralisation

Wallerstein suggests that peripheralisation, as a process, refers to two things: extensive and intensive:

Intensive refers to the degree to which, once you have a dyadic relationship between a core process and peripheral process, it might tilt in a more unequal direction. We would call that a deepening of peripheralisation, and surely that happens all the time. But extensive refers to the inclusion of a unit, or an area which was not previously involved at all, into the functioning world-economy.²⁰

Thus, part of the process of peripheralisation is the process of expansion. For example, the peripheralisation of India was a transition from being an external arena to being a peripheral area within the world capitalist system.²¹

According to Wallerstein, a theoretical problem thus arises, which is the way "the process of *peripheralisation* in relationship to states" is formulated, taking into consideration that the states have momentarily and temporarily differential amounts of core - peripheral activities located within them. Therefore, they

have different kinds of politics (and thus, they might be defined as core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral states).²²

Arrighi and Drangel (who also belong to the world systems analysis school) argue that the competitive struggle among capitalist enterprises has been closely interrelated with the formation of states (formally sovereign territorial jurisdictions). Within world systems theory, a multiplicity of such states had been integral to the formation of the world economy, and almost all commodity chains of any importance had traversed their boundaries.²³ Moreover,

As each state has formal jurisdiction over the movement of commodities, assets, labor-power, and entrepreneurial energies across and within its frontiers, each state can affect to some degree the modalities by which the social division of labour operates. By restricting or enhancing the freedom of undertaking or entering specific economic activities, states can upgrade some activities to core status and downgrade others to peripheral status - they then can, that is, affect the very core-peripheral structure of the world-economy. ... in a capitalist world-economy divided into a multiplicity of state jurisdictions, and continuously subject to the endogenous shocks of innovations in production functions, the power of each state apparatus to shape core-peripheral relations is always limited by the power of other states to do the same and, above all, by the competitive pressures continuously generated by economic innovations.²⁴

Therefore, states can be involved in a zero-sum game analogous to the one played out among capitalist enterprises.²⁵ Capitalist enterprises are not usually involved in a single activity. On the contrary, they pool different activities within their organisational domains and therefore, a mixture of core and peripheral activities characterises them. Each capitalist enterprise is always and simultaneously involved in responding to the pressures created by other enterprises. This means that it is moving out of (or transforming) the activities in which the competitive pressure is high or increasing, and entering activities in which the competitive pressure is low or decreasing. This is a process of a zero-sum game. Moreover, each capitalist enterprise generates competing pressures through innovations.²⁶

Profit-oriented innovations are the fundamental impulse that generates and sustains competitive pressures in a capitalist economy. They are defined as the setting up, widening, deepening, and restructuring of commodity chains (the

setting up of a new production function). Therefore, innovations include the introduction of new methods of production, new commodities, new sources of supply, new trade routes and markets, and new forms of organisation. Moreover,

The intrusion of these innovations “incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure *from within*, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” ... In Schumpeter’s view, this process of “creative destruction” is the essence of capitalism.²⁷

Apart from being the most important immediate source of gains, the intrusion of these innovations also indirectly produces - through the process it sets going - most of the situations from which windfall gains and losses arise and in which speculative operations acquire significant scope. At the same time, it causes disequilibria and cutthroat competition. It makes pre-existing productive combinations obsolete and inflicts widespread losses.²⁸

Although states can be involved in a zero-sum game, analogous to the one played out among capitalist enterprises, they have radically different ends and means, since states are not profit-maximising units. The primary function of states is the reproduction of their monopoly of the legitimate use of violence over a given territory against challenges from other states and from their own subjects.²⁹ States, therefore, pursue legitimacy and use force in such a pursuit. They also strive to upgrade (or to prevent the downgrading of) their mix of core-peripheral activities. An important ingredient in the struggle for legitimacy and power among states and between states and their subjects is always their capacity to bring (cumulating) economic command to bear upon (non-cumulating) political command. But the difficulty is that economic command is largely dependent upon an innovative participation in the world division of labour, and capitalist enterprises have progressively become the specialised agencies of such participation. Therefore, the problem of upgrading a state’s mix of core-peripheral activities is largely a problem of being able to attract and develop organic links with “core” capital.³⁰

Core activities will tend to cluster in a relatively small group of enterprises, which is called "core capital". Its obverse is called "peripheral capital" and it is the necessarily much larger group of enterprises on whose domain of activities the pressure of competition is shifted. However, "The clustering of core and peripheral activities into two different groups of enterprises does not in and by itself produce a similar polarization of the space of the world-economy into core and peripheral zones."³¹

For core capital, the main advantage of operating in a core zone is the proximity to the large and stable markets afforded by the high rewards that accrue to core activities. But the more core capital crowds into a specific core locale, the more the disadvantages associated with higher rents and/or wages are likely to outstrip the advantages associated with proximity to high revenues. Such disadvantages trigger a relocation of core capital toward peripheral locations. If factors other than the profit-maximising activities of capitalist enterprises did not exist, the polarisation of the space of the world-economy into core and peripheral zones would be extremely volatile.³²

Nevertheless, core states have a much greater capability than peripheral states to retain or attract core capital. This is due to their capability (and a corresponding incapability of peripheral states) first, to control access to the most remunerative outlets of all major commodity chains, second, to provide the services and infrastructure required by core-like activities, and third, to create a political climate favourable to capitalist enterprises. Thus, core states control the revenue advantages of core locations and peripheral states control the cost advantages of peripheral locations. Yet, peripheral states cannot use this control to compete effectively with core states in attracting core capital for two main reasons. The first reason is that the cost advantage of peripheral locations is far more "dependent" on a free access to the revenue advantages of core locations than the latter are dependent on a free access to the former. The second reason is that high costs are not an obstacle but an incentive to the continuous stream of innovations that is required to reproduce the zone's core status.³³

Moreover, in the environment typical of the peripheral zone (characterised by fragmented and discontinuous markets, inefficient infrastructure and services, as well as a political climate often unfavourable to capitalist entrepreneurship), high costs are powerless in sustaining innovations, while low costs simply provide an incentive to organise peripheral activities. Thus, it follows that over time,

core states and core capital tend to develop a symbiotic relationship that increases each other's capability to consolidate and reproduce their association with predominantly core-like activities. The obverse of this tendency is the endemic inability of peripheral states to escape their association with predominantly peripheral activities. Taken together, the two tendencies imply a stable if not growing polarization of the space of the world-economy into a peripheral and a core zone.³⁴

The above argument also applies to all those states that happen to have a jurisdiction over a more or less even mix of core-peripheral activities (semiperipheral states). These states are subject to the same polarising tendencies that continuously reproduce the core and peripheral zones of the world-economy. However, the more or less even mix of core-peripheral activities that fall under the semiperipheral states' jurisdiction, offers them the chance to resist peripheralisation by exploiting their revenue advantage vis-à-vis core states. They may do this in a number of ways, but semiperipheral states normally manage to counteract the peripheralising tendencies of the world-economy by selectively exploiting them.³⁵

Thus, the thesis interprets the concept of the semi-periphery, according to Wallerstein, as follows. Core-type activities and peripheral-type activities are unequally distributed across the world-system, and within state boundaries. A semi-peripheral state is a state with a roughly even balance of core-type and peripheral-type activities. A semi-peripheral state tries to move towards the direction of the core, or at least to prevent its downgrading to having a mix of more peripheral than core activities. This is a process dependent upon its ability to attract core capital and aims at the avoidance of 'intensive' peripheralisation. The capacity of states to upgrade their core-activities is

restricted by the capacity of other states to do so: a process of a zero-sum game. Finally, semi-peripheral states contribute to the stability of the world-system.

From the above definition, it becomes evident that although Wallerstein's approach is economic, he also considers the role of the state in semi-peripheral societies. However, his approach to the role of the state is restricted to the international and economic dimension. Wallerstein points to the ability of states to attract core capital, which is dependent on the capacity of other states to do so. Wallerstein neglects the special nature of the state in a semi-peripheral society and how it can be an obstacle to the developmental process. This issue is treated by Mouzelis, in his emphasis on the role of the political, that is the state, in peripheral capitalism.

6.3 MOUZELIS' EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM

This section will show that Mouzelis' approach concentrates on the State as an actor, and is particularly useful for the study of societies which experienced late-modernisation and, unlike the West, had a weak civil society. Mouzelis points to Marxism's holism and its usefulness for a macro-comparative historical study of social formations. However, Mouzelis does not accept the Marxist theory of the capitalist state because it excludes the investigation of cases where the holders of the means of domination have the upper hand over the holders of the means of production, as happens in the capitalist periphery. Thus, Mouzelis calls for a non-reductionist Marxist theory, which is a post-Marxist approach. This tries to avoid economism without falling into the compartmentalisation of the political and economic spheres.

Mouzelis' emphasis on the State belongs to 'grand' historical sociology, within a wider trend in sociological theory, followed by other scholars, such as Theda Skocpol, Barrington Moore, Michael Mann, and John Hall³⁶. For instance, Skocpol (a historically oriented sociologist³⁷) advocates "bringing the State back in" to contemporary sociological thought. She points out that since the mid-

1970s, an upsurge of interest in “the State” has occurred in comparative social science studies, which have considered States as important actors and probed how States affect political and social processes through their policies and their patterned relationships with social groups.³⁸

Like Mouzelis, as will be later argued, Skocpol differentiates this approach from the neo-Marxist debates (from the mid-1960s onwards) on alternative understandings of the socioeconomic functions performed by the “capitalist state”. Some of these debates saw the state as an instrument of class rule, others saw it as an objective guarantor of production relations or economic accumulation, and still others as an arena for political class struggles. The society-centered assumptions of the neo-Marxist writers – like Wallerstein on *The Modern World System*³⁹ - led them to argue that states are shaped by classes or class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of production.⁴⁰ Thus, many possible forms of autonomous state action were ruled out, by definition.⁴¹ Furthermore,

Neo-Marxist theorists have too often sought to generalize – often in extremely abstract ways about features or functions shared by *all* states within a mode of production, a phase of capitalist accumulation, or a position in the world-capitalist system. This makes it difficult to assign causal weight to variations in state structures and activities across nations and short time periods, thereby undercutting the usefulness of some Neo-Marxist schemes for comparative research.⁴²

The neo-Marxist’s “relative autonomy”⁴³ of the state is not the same as Skocpol’s “state autonomy”. The latter means that states - conceived as organisations claiming control over territories and people - may formulate and pursue goals that do not simply reflect the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society. Moreover,

Unless such an independent goal formulation occurs, there is little need to talk about states as important actors. Pursuing matters further, one may then explore the “capacities” of states to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances.⁴⁴

Mouzelis has associated so-called “state autonomy” with the specific case of Greece.⁴⁵ In his theorisation, emphasis is placed on the nature of the State in

peripheral societies and on the fact that the State is an important actor influencing their developmental process.

Mouzelis argues that the 'political' obstacles are not those of imperialism or of a dominant capitalist class preventing socialist transformation. They do not entail, as suggested by Frank's early work⁴⁶, opting out of the world capitalist system, or changing the capitalist relations of production in any given country. "Solving the political problem demands changes in the relations of domination, changes in the way the State apparatus is organized and controlled."⁴⁷

The special emphasis on the importance on the State in the process of the development of societies is within Mouzelis' basic aim to show that the sociology of development will have to take into account the fundamental importance of the State in late-modern societies. The developmental process of these societies was not characterised by those productive processes which, in the West, led to the birth and development of social classes, able to function as mechanisms of empowerment of civil society.⁴⁸ Thus, Mouzelis continues:

(a) that some of the present difficulties experienced by the sociology of development can be overcome by a macro comparative historical focus on the qualitative differences between the long term development of the capitalist centre and periphery, as well as on the strikingly different developmental trajectories to be seen within the third world; (b) that Marxism in general, and the dependency approach in particular, although more suitable than alternative paradigms for such a historical comparative task, present certain limitations that can only be dealt with by the creation of new tools for the study of the non-economic spheres (particularly the political).⁴⁹

Mouzelis suggests that what can revitalise the sociology of development are historical investigations, which do not shy away from bold comparisons or from looking at *longue durée* transformations.⁵⁰ He argues that Marxism presents two fundamental advantages over other approaches. Firstly, unlike neo-classical economic theory, which views phenomena in a compartmentalised manner, Marxism allows a far more holistic examination of social formations.⁵¹ Secondly, Marxism can also suggest useful ways of looking at societies from the point of both agency and institutional structure, unlike other paradigms. Collective agents in the Marxist paradigm do not operate in an institutional

vacuum. They are both producers and products of their social world. Also, the notion of relations of production and the Marxist distinction between class locations and class practices can operate as an effective bridge between a system and an action approach. The Marxist paradigm provides the theoretical means for looking at societies both in terms of actors' goals and strategies and in terms of systemic wholes and their reproduction requirements. This balanced action/structure holism is indispensable for the study of development.⁵²

Despite these advantages, Mouzelis argues that Marxism's economic reductionism constitutes the major weakness of the Marxian paradigm. Present day Marxist theories have put forward two equally unsatisfactory views of the economy-polity relationship. According to the first view, political phenomena are explained in terms of either the reproductive requirements of capital, or the interests and projects of the economically dominant classes. The second view stresses the relative 'autonomy' of the political sphere but without using specific tools for the study of the political. So, this view continues to be defined in class/economic terms. Consequently, what is usually called the Marxist theory of the capitalist state is not a theory of the state *per se*, but "a theory of how the state contributes or fails to contribute to the reproduction requirements of capitalism".⁵³ In this respect,

if the state in the capitalist formations is defined as an instrument of the economically dominant classes, or as performing the functions of capital, this automatically rules out of court the investigation of cases where the holders of the means of domination/coercion have the upper hand over the holders of the means of production, or cases where state policies hinder rather than promote the enlarged reproduction of capitalism.⁵⁴

But, cases of this kind are all too common in the capitalist periphery. In the capitalist periphery, civil society in general and classes in particular are weakly organised and very often, the reproductive requirements of the polity are quite incompatible with those of the economy. Thus, the reproductive requirements of the economy often give way to the reproductive requirements of the polity.⁵⁵

The Marxist position is that the nature of the dominant classes is highly relevant for understanding the malfunctioning of the State in the countries of the

parliamentary semi-periphery⁵⁶. However, Mouzelis holds that although class is relevant and the State quite obviously is not classless, the malfunctionings are not class-specific. In fact, they continue to operate whatever the class composition or the origin of the ruling elites. "In other words, whatever the social background of politico-military elites, once in control of the State, they tend to promote the interests they perceive as closely associated with their own politically dominant position, rather than those of the class they are supposedly 'representing'."⁵⁷

Therefore, given that Marxist political theory does not take into consideration this issue, in many third world countries the role of the State in 'restricting' capitalism has hardly been considered. In fact,

The marked persistence of pre-capitalist or non-capitalist forms has been explained at one time or another in terms of the interests of metropolitan capital ... in terms of indigenous capital profiting in various ways from the persistence of non-capitalist forms ..., or in terms of the nature of pre-capitalist economies What has not been given any serious thought is the extent to which at least the internal obstacles to the expanded reproduction of capital in the third world are more *political* than economic.⁵⁸

The same neglect has been accorded to the fact that the way in which the Third World State is organised and the way it intervenes in the economy more often undermines than encourages capitalist expansion. The South East Asian countries, however, succeeded in their late-late capitalist development due to the atypical structure of their states. In these cases, the State was remarkably capable of massive and selective intervention in the economy without undermining private initiative.⁵⁹

Overall, the weakness of Marxist theory to take seriously into account the polity - which may have a dynamic which cannot be derived from the economy, and which cannot be properly analysed by the use of economic/class categories - is particularly limiting in the analysis of peripheral capitalism. In peripheral capitalism, all too often, struggles over the means of domination and coercion - rather than struggles over the means of production - are central in understanding overall societal transformations.⁶⁰

Mouzelis concludes by arguing that a non-reductionist Marxist theory of the polity is possible if it creates conceptual tools, which:

- (i) try to deal with the non-economic institutional spheres in a way that does not build into their very definition (and hence exclude from empirical investigations) the type of relationship they are supposed to have with the economy;
- (ii) try to avoid economism without falling into the compartmentalisation of the political and economic spheres to be found in neo-classical economics and in non-Marxist political science, i.e. without abandoning fundamental features of the Marxist paradigm such as its holistic, political economy orientation and its agency-structure synthesis.⁶¹

In other words, Mouzelis' approach is a post-Marxist theorisation, and is different from the kind of post-Marxism that rejects outright everything related to Marx. He suggests that insofar as sociological theory is concerned, it is time to assess the conceptual tools that Marxism is offering for studying macro-historical transformations, by using as the main criterion their heuristic utility⁶² rather than their contribution to the salvation or damnation of the modern world. Thus, his position on Marxism is entirely pragmatic in the methodological, heuristic sense. Marxism, from the way it is used by certain writers, in their analyses of long-term societal transformations, still provides very useful tools for the examination of how whole societies are constituted, persist, and change. Still, what Mouzelis advocates, is "a theoretically worked out synthesis of Marx's balanced agency/system holism with Weber's anti-economistic orientation to the study of political domination."⁶³

6.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: A SYNTHESIS OF THE TWO APPROACHES

What this chapter has done, so far, is to present two different approaches in comparative and historical sociology. The first approach is Wallerstein's world systems analysis, which emphasises the economic. The second approach comes from Mouzelis and places emphasis on the political, that is, the special role the State plays in peripheral capitalism.

It was argued that Wallerstein's world systems theory places emphasis on the dominance of the most advanced capitalist economies in the world-system. Development/underdevelopment are viewed in the context of the movements of capital, determined by the rate of profit, the cyclical rhythms and the secular trends of world capitalism and unequal exchange. The latter is associated with the fact that core-type activities and peripheral-type activities are unequally distributed across the world-system, and within state boundaries.

According to the world systems analysis perspective, a semi-peripheral state is a state with a roughly even balance of core-type and peripheral-type activities. A semi-peripheral state tries to move towards the direction of the core (by attracting core capital), or at least to prevent its downgrading to having a mix of more peripheral than core activities, thus avoiding 'intensive' peripheralisation.

In Wallerstein's theoretical perspective, the state goes on being defined in economic and international terms: emphasis is placed on the ability of states to attract core capital and the limits placed on this activity by the ability of other states so to do also. Wallerstein neglects the nature of the state in a semi-peripheral society and *the way* it can be an obstacle to a less dependent developmental process. This is treated by Mouzelis' emphasis on the role of the political in peripheral capitalism: the State is a crucial actor, within semi-peripheral societies, which most often hinders their developmental process. In Mouzelis' argument, state policies may hinder capitalist expansion. Such cases are common in the capitalist periphery, where civil society and classes are weakly organised and the reproductive requirements of the polity are often quite incompatible with those of the economy. In such cases, the economy gives way to the polity. The way the State is organised and intervenes in the economy, more often undermines than encourages capitalist expansion.

Overall, these are both remarkable theories. They are both trying to rethink – in the *longue durée* – some of the major assumptions of Western Social Science, including Marxism itself. Both theories offer insight into the structuring of international political and economic relations – and the importance of the

domestic political configuration of States. However, as indicated, the theories tend to pull in different directions, Wallerstein being impressive on the economic and the international and Mouzelis being impressive on the political.

The need for and the possibility for a synthesis have been suggested by Evans *et al.* As they have argued:

the time has come to move beyond highly speculative theoretical debates about whether the "modern state" or the "state in capitalism" has an independent impact on the course of social change. Heuristically, at least, it is fruitful to assume both that states are potentially autonomous and, conversely, that socioeconomic relations influence and limit state structures and activities.⁶⁴

It is not of course the work of this thesis to provide such a synthesis. This thesis is about higher education and higher education comparatively considered. Nevertheless – to this purpose – it is possible to abstract from Wallerstein and Mouzelis an approximate synthesis of abstract propositions which are operationally useful.

Such a synthesis must meet a number of criteria. It must be biased toward the analysis of the semi-periphery, as ultimately what has to be comparatively explained is the difference in core and semi-periphery higher education patterns in (France and Germany and) Greece. And the synthesis must rebalance the economic motifs (of Wallerstein) with the political motifs (of Mouzelis). The synthesis must be abstract enough to cover several possible cases but be simple enough, operationally, to be applied in the remaining chapters of the thesis. Finally, the synthesis must be able to be tested with socio-economic and politico-economic descriptions (the work of Chapter Seven) and be able to be linked to comparative educational 'similarities and differences' (the work of Chapter Eight).

The contextualised synthesis which is suggested is as follows. It is suggested that in terms of international economic relations, core states needed Greece to play an intermediate role in the world-system for the stability of the world economy, within a zero-sum game rationale: other countries could play the

peripheral role that Greece had been playing so far. Thus, the Greek semi-peripheral state emphasised two major themes: economic development and modernisation. In the 1960s, Greece was already playing a semi-peripheral role in the world-economy. The idea of 'unequal exchange' - that the semi-peripheral state is characterised by a mixture of core and peripheral activities - was seen in the particular emphasis Greece placed on the two major themes: economic development and modernisation were seen as necessary for Greece to catch up with the core.

The Greek semi-peripheral state should be characterised by the use of foreign capital - invested in the industrial sector - with low investments in manufacturing and agriculture. The ability of the state to attract 'core' capital, thus upgrading its 'core' activities, may be seen in the establishment of multinational firms and in the entrance of foreign capital. Foreign investment should be important for the Greek economy, to the extent that this investment was concentrated on strategic industrial sectors. The attraction of 'core' capital would upgrade Greece's core activities, albeit in a dependent way. One of the 'peripheral' characteristics of Greece was that national capital was small and weak, and directed towards traditional areas of production. Thus, there was a dualistic pattern in industry. Other 'peripheral' activities were technological transfer, emigration and tourism - all being part of the 'internationalisation' process. There was also a shift from agriculture to industry and the services - accompanied by the subsequent overexpansion of the services sector and an overexpansion of the housing sector - as well as an increase of the 'informal' economy.

Agricultural investment was state-financed, while agrarian capital went to the towns to be invested in property. The decline in agricultural production as well as the so-called transnationalisation process led to a very unbalanced pattern of development, with high levels of regional disparities, and the 'deformation' of regional development. By the early 1980s, the 'outward-looking industrialisation' led to the increasing dependency of the economy on imported

capital and technology. Greece was in a phase of de-industrialisation, before having reached the stage of industrial maturity.

All the above issues – in terms of international economic relations – were taking place in the context of a changing political system. Historically, among the major characteristics of the political system had been class domination, strong right wing groups, anti-communism, and political co-optation rather than mass political mobilisation. In the early 1960s, a Centrist Party came to power, which was succeeded by a dictatorship (1967-1974). After the dictatorship fell in 1974, a Conservative Party came to power, which emphasised democratisation. The 'socialist-inspired' party that came to power in 1981 advocated socialist transformation of the Greek economy (while still supporting private initiative) and society, regional development and self-reliance.

In 1981, a crucial external actor for the Greek economy was the EEC (European Economic Community). Membership in the EEC – which had created a European doctrine about regional imbalance – meant radical policies of industrial restructuring. However, exports to the EEC fell and imports increased. The agricultural balance of payments with the EEC showed a substantial deficit. Problems in the manufacturing sectors were accentuated. This situation continued throughout the 1980s and by the early 1990s, when the European Community was creating difficulties for the country in adapting to a dynamic, competitive and changing international environment.

In domestic political terms, the state of the economy and the difficulty of Greece in adapting to the European Community (later, European Union) on equal terms, during the 1980s-1990s, were due to the nature of the Greek State. The State was hindering a kind of development that would not be based on attracting foreign capital but on the ability of the country to develop indigenously in order to advance its core activities as being part of a strong association (the EEC) in the world economy.

Historically, while Greece was still a peripheral society in the world economy, there had been a relative devaluation of political rule over the economy and the State was relegated to the role of supplementing rather than replacing the market. The economic functions of the State assisted the development of capitalism in Greece after 1922, for the country's inclusion in the world-system. The State had played a determining role and had a greater degree of autonomy in relation to civil society, due to the relatively weak organisation of capitalists and workers. Greece was a '*late-late*' *industrialising capitalist society with early and persistent quasi-parliamentary politics*, but state-led industrialisation had generated state dependent industrial classes – a semi-peripheral phenomenon.

Given the Greek State's historical roots to the Ottoman rule, non-state interests were despotically controlled from above. Thus, the Greek State acquired patrimonial, authoritarian and particularistic features, which resulted in the gradual and systematic dominance of the logic of the party over the logic of the market.

Due to the "late-late" industrialisation of Greece, the only chance for the integration of the country into the world economy in a more self-reliant way would be from the top, that is, from the State. However, the State was unable to intervene flexibly for the modernisation of agriculture, its strong linkage with industries and the creation of an industrial sector well articulated with the rest parts of the economy.

Thus, the State was an obstacle to the modernisation process and the rationalisation of the Greek society, economy and polity. As a result, the State apparatus was over-expanded and there was intensity of clientelistic characteristics and 'corruption'. In sum, the more the State failed to modernise agriculture, the more it acquired characteristics hindering its own and the economy's rationalisation. Thus, the rigid, over-politicised and particularistic semi-peripheral State contributed to the peripheral status of Greece in the world economy and in the European Union.

It will be the work of the subsequent chapter to contextualise these points more fully before attention returns to the specific theme of interpreting Greek higher education.

ENDNOTES

¹ The theoretical heritage of world systems analysis is traced back to the neo-Marxist literature on development and the French *Annales* school and is presented in detail in Appendix Two of this thesis. This Appendix also refers to the remaining six common assumptions, which Wallerstein felt uncomfortable with (his views on capitalism is one of the seven). These assumptions were on 'social science disciplines', on 'history and social science', on the 'unit of analysis: society versus historical system', on 'progress', on the 'role of the revolutions', and finally, on 'science'. [See SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, Newbury Park - London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, pp. 171-180.]

² Most liberals and Marxists of the last 150 years or so had regarded the picture of 'competitive capitalism' as an accurate description of the capitalist norm which had largely reflected an idealised portrait of what was thought to be the exemplar of the norm. The norm was England after the 'Industrial Revolution' where proletarian workers (essentially landless, toolless urban workers) laboured in factories owned by bourgeois entrepreneurs (essentially private owners of the capital stock of these factories). The owner purchased the labour-power of (paid wages to) the workers, who were primarily adult males, and in order to survive, had no alternative than to seek wage-work. Although not all work situations were like this, both liberals and Marxists had tended to regard any situation that varied from this model as less capitalist to the extent that it varied. [See WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", in GIDDENS, A., & TURNER, J. H., (eds), *Social Theory Today*, Cambridge - Oxford, Polity Press, pp. 318-320.]

In addition, Wallerstein made a distinction between productive and unproductive labour. "The situation of free labourers working for wages in the enterprises of free producers is a minority situation in the modern world. This is certainly true if our unit of analysis is the world economy." If researchers had adopted this new definition of capitalism there would emerge new research questions, such as "search for structures that maintain the stability of a particular combination as well as the examination of the underlying pressures that may transform the combination over time." [See SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, op. cit., p. 179.]

³ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", in GIDDENS, A., & TURNER, J. H., (eds), *Social Theory Today*, Cambridge - Oxford, Polity Press, p. 318. This was essentially the view of Adam Smith, who also thought of the capitalist system as the only system consonant with 'human nature'. Karl Marx, in characterising the system, put emphasis on the importance of free labour. Although he thought of the capitalist system as neither eternally natural, nor desirable, he regarded it as a normal stage in humanity's historical development. (See *ibid*, p. 318.) Laclau summarises a theoretical model in the terms of the famous law formulated by Marx:

The process of capital accumulation – which is the fundamental motor force of the ensemble of the capitalist system – depends on the rate of profit. Now the rate of profit is in its turn determined by the rate of surplus-value and the organic composition of capital. A rise in the organic composition of capital is a condition for capitalist expansion, since technological progress is what permits the reconstitution of the reserve army of labour and the maintenance of the low level of wages. But unless a rise in the organic composition of capital is linked to a more than proportional increase in the rate of surplus value, it will necessarily produce a decline in the rate of profit. This tendency is partially compensated by capital movements from industries with a high organic composition to those with a low organic composition: from this there emerges an average rate of profit which is always higher in value terms than the corresponding rate of profit in the technologically more advanced industries. Nevertheless, since a growing augmentation in the organic composition of the total capital is inherent in capitalist expansion, in the long term there can only be a permanent tendency for the rate of profit to decline. [See LACLAU, E., (1977), *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism - Fascism - Populism*, London, Verso, p. 38.]

The above schema also describes the dominant tendencies at work in a free competitive capitalism. In this schema, the key to a sustained process of accumulation is the expansion, in any sector of the system, of productive units in which either low technology or super-exploitation of labour makes it possible to counteract the depressive effect on the rate of profit of the increasing organic composition of capital in the dynamic or advanced industries. The enterprises in the peripheral areas are in an ideal position to play this role. (See *ibid*, p. 38.)

⁴ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", *op. cit.*, p. 320. In addition,

Capitalism as a distinct mode of production is generally described as having the essential characteristics of contradictory classes of free labor and free capital in the relations of production, and increasing relative surplus value expropriation in the forces of production." [See BOSWELL, T. E., (1989), "The Utility of World-System Theory for Explaining Social Revolutions: A Comparison of Skocpol and Lenin", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 80.]

However, according to Boswell, Brenner's argument is that Wallerstein considers only free capital and commodity exchange expanded to a world level as the key characteristics of capitalism. Free labour is not an essential feature of capitalism in Wallerstein's theory. This theory has four crucial deficiencies:

- (1) it ignores the role of class struggle in producing free labor and free capital;
- (2) it fails to recognize the necessity of free labor in order for free capital to be put to the most profitable use;
- (3) it has no mechanism for requiring technical innovation and increasing relative surplus value expropriation (as opposed to absolute surplus value expropriation); and, therefore,
- (4) class structure and differential productivity are not seen as determining unequal exchange but as being determined by it. (See *ibid*, p. 80.)

⁵ MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (1989), "Introduction", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 4.

⁶ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and Interpretative Issues", in HOPKINS, T. K., & WALLERSTEIN, I., (eds), *World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology*, Beverly Hills - London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 101.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 101-102. In addition, according to Wallerstein,

Once the question is opened up, there are no simple answers. We discover that the proportions of the mixes are uneven, spatially and temporally. We may then search for structures that maintain the stability of any particular mix of mixes (the cyclical trends again) as well as for underlying pressures that may be transforming, over time, the mix of mixes (the secular trends). The anomalies now become not exceptions to be explained away but patterns to be analysed, so inverting the psychology of the scientific effort. [See WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", op. cit., p. 320.]

⁸ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and Interpretative Issues", op. cit., p. 102.

⁹ Ibid, p. 92. Moreover, Laclau's criticism of 'world - system' theory is that it confuses the two concepts of the capitalist mode of production and participation in a world capitalist economic system. "A capitalist economy consists of separate spheres of production and exchange. This is the distinction that Marx made between the sphere of capital and the sphere of money." In fact, the difference with the Smithian economics is that the latter recognises only the sphere of exchange. In the Marxist approach, the central dynamic is the class struggle (in the sphere of production). In the sphere of production, surplus value is expropriated, while in the sphere of exchange, surplus value is realised. "The differential rates of exploitation in production create the unequal consequences of the exchange of equal values." The capitalist world - system can be considered the world sphere of exchange. A variety of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production enter into the world-system, which is dominated by capitalist production. The world - system perspective, so constructed, has a viable method of analysis, and the debate over production versus exchange determination can be put aside. [See BOSWELL, T. E., (1989), "The Utility of World-System Theory for Explaining Social Revolutions: A Comparison of Skocpol and Lenin", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 81-83.]

¹⁰ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and Interpretative Issues", op. cit., p. 92. Emmanuel has introduced the concept of 'unequal exchange'. [For more information, see EMMANUEL, A., (1972), *Unequal Exchange: a Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, New York - London, Monthly Review Press.]

¹¹ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and Interpretative Issues", op. cit., p. 93.

¹² In explaining the world-system perspective, Wallerstein begins with the terms core and periphery. These two terms are nouns, but they can also be adjectives. However, as soon as one thinks of them as adjectives, one wonders what nouns the adjectives get attached to. One may talk of core areas or core zones, peripheral areas and peripheral zones, core processes and peripheral processes, core products and peripheral products. And perhaps one of the most important confusions is that one may talk of core states and peripheral states. There lies behind this a theoretical problem which one has to wrestle with, and to which Wallerstein does not have any easy answers. This theoretical problem derives from the lack of total coincidence between the state boundaries and the economic processes. If one starts with the framework of a single division of labour, within which there are multiple economic processes and multiple states, then one has to worry about the lack of total coincidence. There is interaction and interrelationship between the core processes and the states in which these core processes are located as well as the fact of multiple layers of coreness and peripherality. All these get at the fact that there exist sets of dyadic relationships, within dyadic relationships and overlapping dyadic relationships, which are difficult to sort out in the actual analysis. (See *ibid*, pp. 91-92.)

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 93.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 93.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 93.

¹⁶ SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, Newbury Park - London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, pp. 180-181. In addition,

Lenin's insights on revolution can be incorporated into a reconceptualisation of the concepts of core, semiperiphery, and periphery in world-system theory. This would be an expansion of the theory in order to take economic and political dependency as intercausal but relatively autonomous variables in the world formation. [See BOSWELL, T. E., (1989), "The Utility of World-System Theory for Explaining Social Revolutions: A Comparison of Skocpol and Lenin", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 88.]

Lenin characterised the relations between nations according to their political as well as economic dependency. His typology consisted of great powers, semicolonies and colonies and its hierarchy was based on the degree of independence. (See *ibid*, p. 85.)

¹⁷ TAYLOR, P. J., (1989), *Political Geography: World - Economy, Nation - State and Locality*, New York, Longman Scientific & Technical, p. 10. According to

modernisation theory, intermediate positions of states are temporary because they are *transitional* (to modernity). Dependency theory holds that intermediate positions are temporary again, but this is because they are *residual*, that is, the polarising tendencies of the world-economy will ultimately pull states in intermediate positions toward the centre or toward the periphery. [See ARRIGHI, G., & DRANGEL, J., (1986), "The Stratification of the World-Economy: an Exploration of the Semiperipheral Zone", *Review*, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 10.]

The elaborations of dependency theory, according to Arrighi *et al*, contain two main short-comings. First, they are too narrowly focused on the "dependent" or "subordinate" state epitomised by certain Latin American countries. This focus leaves out of consideration some of the most significant instances of intermediate socio-economic status, such as the USSR. It may also lead someone to include among intermediate states countries (such as Canada) which have attained core status but present features of "structural dependency". Second, they focus on individual states as they come to occupy intermediate positions, or as they experience "dependent development". But, what is found to be true for individual states may not be true for groups of states. Wallerstein's concept of 'semi-periphery' was introduced to avoid these shortcomings. Wallerstein follows dependency theory in assuming a world-economy structured in core-periphery relations. These relations do not link national or regional economies (as in dependency theory), but economic activities structured in commodity chains that cut across state boundaries. (See *ibid*, p. 11.) Therefore,

Core activities are those that command a large share of the total surplus produced within a commodity chain and peripheral activities are those that command little or no such surplus. All states enclose within their boundaries both core and peripheral activities. Some (core states) enclose predominantly core activities and some (peripheral states) enclose predominantly peripheral activities. ... The legitimacy and stability of this highly unequal and polarizing system are buttressed by the existence of semi-peripheral states defined as those that enclose within their boundaries a more or less even mix of core-peripheral activities. ... These assumptions hold for groups of states (core, semiperipheral, peripheral) not for individual states ... (See *ibid*, pp. 11-12.)

The problem of identifying a semiperipheral zone has no easy solution and, for Arrighi *et al*, Wallerstein's suggestions are not very helpful. Thus, the authors use the term 'semi-periphery' exclusively to refer to a position in relation to the world division of labour and never to refer to a position in the interstate system. (See *ibid*, p. 13.)

The dichotomy core-periphery, through which world-systems theory defines the structure of the world-economy, is meant to specify the unequal distribution of rewards among the various activities that constitute the single overarching division of labour defining and bounding the world-economy. These activities are assumed to be integrated in commodity chains that can be analyzed from two distinct points of view. The first is that typical of classical economics as

well as of its Marxian critique and focuses on the distribution of the total product among labour incomes, property incomes, and a residual that can be referred to as "pure profit" or entrepreneurial income. The second is that typical to world-systems theory and focuses on the distribution of the total product not among factors of production, but among the various nodes of commodity chain ("economic activities"). Each of these nodes consists of a combination of different factors of production. (See *ibid*, p. 17.)

Finally, Arrighi *et al* argue that no particular activity (whether defined in terms of its output or of the technique used) is inherently core-like or periphery-like. It can become at a particular point in time core-like or periphery-like, but has that characteristic for a limited period. Yet, at any given time, there are always some products and techniques that are core-like and others that are periphery-like. (See *ibid*, p. 18.)

¹⁸ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe", in ARRIGHI, G., (ed), *Semiperipheral Development: the Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, Beverly Hills – London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 39. Also, according to Arrighi, 'semi-peripherality' not always and everywhere means the same thing:

Its meaning varies in time and space according to the cycles of the interstate system and the trends of the world economy, on the one hand, and to the position in the interstate system and the type of state-capital relations a given national locale inherits from previous history, on the other. [See ARRIGHI, G., (1985), "Introduction", in ARRIGHI, G., (ed), *Semiperipheral Development: The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, Beverly Hills – London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 26.]

¹⁹ SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, op. cit., p. 181.

²⁰ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and Interpretative Issues", op. cit., p. 99.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 99.

²² *Ibid*, p. 94. Apart from the "process of peripheralisation in relationship to states", world systems analysis has dealt with a second theoretical problem which has to do with the issue of "class struggle or class structure". Wallerstein thinks that the one insight that Marx had most clearly and most correctly about class relations and capitalism was that there is a process of polarisation, a process of creation of two classes. Over historical time there has in fact been an increasing polarisation as a consequence of two processes in capitalism: proletarianisation and bourgeoisification. "That is the essence of the capital - labor relationship." Moreover,

If you take the ideal-type of proletarian, and most Marxists are very Weberian in the way they use ideal-types, he is the image of the 1820-1830 English factory worker straight from the rural areas, who, one generation back, has been pushed off the land, who has no other source of income, who is living in

a miserable hovel, who is working 16-18 hours a day, and who is receiving through the iron law of wages the minimum wage it takes to reproduce him. (See *ibid*, p. 95.)

However, according to Wallerstein, a large portion of the workforce of the world, are part-life-time proletarian households or incomplete proletarians. "The largest bulk of workers do not receive their entire lifetime income from the employer. They also receive money from two other possible sources. One is the work that they themselves do; for example, the wife cooks." And there is also a gift income, e.g. the parent who supports his children. (See *ibid*, p. 95.)

If the capitalist world-system is a system of polarisation of classes (proletarianisation on the one hand, and bourgeoisification on the other), then there are two kinds of politics. There are the politics *between* these two emerging groups, and the politics *within* those groups. In fact, 95% of the conflicts within the world are *within* classes. Finally, any large-scale battle mixes the two. (See *ibid*, p. 98.)

²³ ARRIGHI, G., & DRANGEL, J., (1986), "The Stratification of the World-Economy: an Exploration of the Semiperipheral Zone", *Review*, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 22.

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 22-23.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 23.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 20.

²⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 18-19.

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 18-19. Cassell argues that Schumpeter used this conceptualisation to explicate the alternation of long phases of economic "prosperity" and "depression", the so-called A- and B- phases:

By assuming that revolutions in production functions occur in discrete rushes, which are separate from each other by spans of comparative quiet, he divided the incessant working of the process of creative destruction into two phases - the phase of revolution proper and the phase of absorption of the results of the revolution:" (See *ibid*, pp. 19-20.)

Just as Schumpeter assumed that profit-oriented innovations and their effects cluster in time, so Arrighi *et al* assume that they cluster in space. (See *ibid*, pp. 19-20.) Moreover, Giddens argued that innovations in coordinating time and space have played a major part in the extraordinary leaps in productivity and quality that have been witnessed this century. 'Mass' and so called 'lean' production (including the 'just in time' method) are cases in point. In addition, having the resources to traverse specific time-space paths is of the highest consequence, both for the structuration of organisations and for the individual actors. [See CASSELL, P., (1993), (ed), *The Giddens Reader*, London, Macmillan, pp. 18-19.]

²⁹ It may be noted that this proposition offered by the neo-Marxists writers, Arrighi and Drangel, draws heavily upon the classical formulation of Max Weber on the role of the State.

³⁰ ARRIGHI, G., & DRANGEL, J., (1986), "The Stratification of the World-Economy: an Exploration of the Semiperipheral Zone", op. cit., pp. 23-24.

³¹ Ibid, p. 21.

³² Ibid, pp. 21-22.

³³ Ibid, pp. 26.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 26.

³⁵ Ibid, pp. 26-27. Arrighi *et al* continue:

states are not passive recipients of mixes of core-peripheral activities. Although all of them strive to upgrade or at least to prevent the downgrading of the mix that falls under their jurisdiction, the capability actually to succeed in the endeavor is not equally distributed among all states. It varies discontinuously with the weight of core-like activities in the mix that already falls under a state jurisdiction. (See *ibid*, p. 28.)

³⁶ MOUZELIS, N., (1994), "In Defence of 'Grand' Historical Sociology", *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, p. 31.

³⁷ As Skocpol argues, historical sociological studies have some or all of the following characteristics:

Most basically, they ask questions about social structures or processes understood to be concretely situated in time and space. Second, they address processes over time, and take temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes. Third, most historical sociological analyses attend to the interplay of meaningful actions and structural contexts, in order to make sense of the unfolding of unintended as well as intended outcomes in individual lives and social transformations. Finally, historical sociological studies highlight the *particular* and varying features of specific kinds of social structures and patterns of change. [See SKOCPOL, T., (1984), "Sociology's Historical Imagination", in SKOCPOL, T., (ed), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 1.]

Historically oriented sociologists are also interested in social and cultural differences along with temporal processes and contexts. They see groups or organisations as having chosen, or stumbled into varying paths in the past. "Earlier "choices", in turn, both limit and open up alternative possibilities for further change, leading toward no predetermined end." (See *ibid*, pp. 1-2.)

³⁸ SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", in EVANS, P. B., RUESCHEMEYER, D., & SKOCPOL, T., (eds), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 3. For instance, Theda Skocpol considers "state/society" as the basic unit of analysis in explaining social revolutions. Thus, she defines social revolutions as "rapid basic transformations of a society's state and class structures", accompanied and in part carried through by class - based (especially of peasants) revolts from below. Her argument is that revolutionary situations developed due to the emergence of politico - military crises of state and class domination. Furthermore, transnational relations contributed to the emergence of all social - revolutionary crises and invariably helped to shape both revolutionary struggles and outcomes. [See KANDAL, T. R., (1989), "Marx and Engels on International Relations, Revolution, and Counterrevolution", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 26.]

³⁹ See SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", op. cit., p. 32.

⁴⁰ However, Wallerstein's world - system model neglects the relative autonomy of states and state relations and focuses too much on (market) relations of exchange, to the exclusion of the relations of production and the conflict of classes. [See MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (1989), "Introduction", op. cit., p. 9.]

⁴¹ SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", op. cit., p. 5. Overall, Skocpol faults: a) Wallerstein for the economic reductionism of his approach to the system of international states, and b) classical Marxism for its theoretical reductionism of state structures to class relations. Karl Marx had put forward a powerful but abstract and general theory of those major changes in history that proceed by social revolutions in modes of production, with their transformations of social relations, political and legal institutions, structures of perception, culture, forms of consciousness, and ideologies. Yet, Marx had left out altogether (except by inference) the trans- and international contexts of revolutions. [See KANDAL, T. R., (1989), "Marx and Engels on International Relations, Revolution, and Counterrevolution", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 27.]

⁴² SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", op. cit., p. 5. Wallerstein and Skocpol are different in that Wallerstein points to a world-economy approach to states while Skocpol points to nation-states. The latter are organisations geared to maintain control of home territories and populations and to undertake military competition with other states in the international system. For Skocpol, the international system "represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality - *interdependent* in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it." [See KANDAL, T. R., (1989), "Marx and Engels on International Relations, Revolution, and Counterrevolution", in MARTIN, M.

T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 26.] Overall, Skocpol criticises world - system theory for its economic reductionism and argues that the state is relatively autonomous from the economy and capitalist class, for organisational as well as structural reasons. "While the state must maintain the economic vitality of the nation, and thus the general vitality of capitalists in a capitalist economy, it is structurally autonomous from particular capitalists." If there is this relative autonomy of the state, then the conception of world relations is analogous to the concept of a social formation. The social formation contains within it a variety of modes of production, but usually one is dominant. "The dominant mode structures the overall character of the ensemble of economic, political, and ideological relations, but the economy, state, and ideology are relatively autonomous from the dominant class (Althusser, 1971; Poulantzas 1973, 1978)". The "world formation" incorporates the concrete manifestations of modes of production, the world market and the interstate relations as components of a single world unit of analysis. Wallerstein's theory contains no analysis of the state or relative autonomy of state action, while for Skocpol, "The concepts of core, semiperiphery, and periphery can be reconceptualised to take into account the relative autonomy of the state. To be sure, political power and economic power are causally interrelated, but one cannot be reduced to the other." [See BOSWELL, T. E., (1989), "The Utility of World-System Theory for Explaining Social Revolutions: A Comparison of Skocpol and Lenin", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), (1989), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 83-84.]

⁴³ According to Skocpol, Nicos Poulantzas' *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1973) represents an important neo-Marxist theory of state autonomy. However, she argues that Poulantzas' approach is very frustrating because he simply posits the "relative autonomy of the capitalist state" as a necessary feature of the capitalist mode as such:

Poulantzas insists that the state is "relatively autonomous" regardless of varying empirical ties between state organizations and the capitalist class, and at the same time he posits that the state must invariably function to stabilize the capitalist system as a whole. [See SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", op. cit., pp. 32-33.]

⁴⁴ SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", op. cit., p. 9. Overall, Skocpol put forward two alternative but complementary analytical strategies about bringing the state back in to a prominent place in comparative and historical studies of change, politics, and policy making. Thus, one strategy is to view states as organisations through which official collectivities may pursue distinctive goals, realising them more or less effectively given the available state resources in relation to social settings. The other strategy is to view states more as configurations of organisation and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and classes in society. (See *ibid*, pp. 27-28.)

⁴⁵ Mouzelis' thesis is, as will be later argued, that the main reason for the failure of the Greek development plan was the nature of the Greek state. He argues that the development of the administrative mechanisms of the state (the 'political technology') and of the methods of control of these mechanisms (the 'relations of domination') systematically led to situations where the 'specific' dominated over the 'general' and the 'political' dominated over the 'economic'. [See MOUZELIS, N., (1993), «Πολιτικό Σύστημα και Εκσυγχρονισμός» ("Political System and Modernisation"), in TSOUKALIS, L., (ed), *Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα: η Πρόκληση της Προσαρμογής* (Greece in the European Community: The Challenge of Adaptation), Athens, Papazisis, p. 298.] [For more information on the relationship between the 'economic' and the 'political', see MOUZELIS, N. P., (1986), *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*, London, Macmillan, pp. 199-206.]

⁴⁶ For more information on Frank's work, see FRANK, A. G., (1975), *On Capitalist Development*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁴⁷ MOUZELIS, N., (1994), "The State in Late Development: Historical and Comparative Perspectives", in BOOTH, D., (ed), *Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice*, Essex, Longman Scientific & Technical, p. 145.

⁴⁸ DIAMANTOUROS, N. I., (1993), «Τα Διλήμματα του Εκσυγχρονισμού» ("The Dilemmas of Modernisation"), in TSOUKALIS, L., (ed), *Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα: η Πρόκληση της Προσαρμογής* (Greece in the European Union: the Challenge of Adaptation), Athens, Papazisis, pp. 311-312. The basic reason that the importance of the state in the process of development has been downgraded in Marxist thought, is the reduction of all the phenomena of social change to the key-word of 'class' (to which an absolutely economico-productive context is attached). In addition, Mouzelis' realisation about the possibility of different reactions of the state leading to different developmental paths rejects the evolutionary conception of the developmental process. (See *ibid*, p. 312.)

⁴⁹ MOUZELIS, N., (1988), "Sociology of Development: Reflections on the Present Crisis", *Sociology*, Vol. 22, No. 1, February, p. 23.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 40. Before reaching this conclusion, Mouzelis presents the neo-Marxists' early critique of evolutionist/modernisation theories which was based on two arguments:

The first of these arguments concerns the well known anti-evolutionist stand of that they proceed along a course which, in several fundamental ways, is qualitative differences between first and third world development, the diffusionist model of modernisation theory must be rejected and replaced by a historically oriented, holistic political economy approach; the diffusion of capital, technology and culture from the capitalist centre to the periphery should not be conceived of as an ahistorical, 'disembodied' process taking place in a vacuum. Instead it must be seen as occurring within a concrete,

historically evolving context of domination/subordination on both the national and international level. (See *ibid*, pp. 23-24.)

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 35.

⁵² *Ibid*, pp. 35-36. It is only possible to deal with change and development by seriously taking classes into account as relatively autonomous agents, able to contribute to both the change and the stability of a social system. One cannot solve the problem of transition in a strictly structuralist perspective because it is impossible to explain change, the transformation of structures by pointing to yet more structures. Marx's changing methodology, in his analysis of primitive accumulation, may have had to do more with the nature of problem in hand, than with a theoretical failing. For when examining the functioning and reproduction of a mode of production with its dominance already established, the 'system (structure) – practice' relationship is more crucial. In such a case, the 'social machine' seems to function and reproduce itself no matter what are the intentions and wishes of those who are at its base. Consequently, it makes some sense to speak of 'trends' or even 'tendential laws' of the system. [See MOUZELIS, N. P., (1978), *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, London, Macmillan, p. 53.]

However, when examining situations where the old structures and modes of production are disintegrating, while the new ones have not yet been institutionalised, it does make more sense to put stronger emphasis on the opposite perspective, that is, on the 'practice – structure' relationship. In this way, one can see how collective actors, when given greater structural indeterminacy (greater 'room for manoeuvre'), have more opportunities to shape institutions according to their conflicting interests and ideologies. Thus, actors are not so much the puppets of the system as rather its creators. Therefore, concepts like choice, strategy, and class struggle are more relevant than those of 'laws', overdetermination, or structural causality:

This is not to deny, of course, that in all cases a social formation should be seen from the point of view of both structures and practices, i.e. it should be seen how its institutional structures impose constraints on specific actors, and how these actors either accept or try to overcome such constraints. (See *ibid*, p. 53.)

However, the so-called 'practice – structure' relationship found in Mouzelis' work is different from Giddens' work on 'structuration theory'. Giddens sees 'structure' as the medium for 'action'. [See CASSELL, P., (1993), (ed), *The Giddens Reader*, London, Macmillan, pp. 10-13.] In contrast, Mouzelis emphasises the distinction between what he calls 'system (structure)' and 'practice'. Indeed, at a later piece of work, Mouzelis uses the concepts of: a) subject-object duality and dualism, b) system-social integration, and c) social hierarchies, and then, he concentrates on how his four-fold subject-object typology can be useful in studying linkages between micro and macro social systems and actors, while avoiding both a reductive and reifying treatment of the social world. [See MOUZELIS, N. P., (1991), *Back to Sociological Theory: the Construction of Social Orders*, London, Macmillan, pp. 6-7.] On the basis of the

first concept, Mouzelis argues that the major difficulty with Giddens' notion of duality of structure is that the agency-structure relationship it implies by no means exhausts the type of orientations actors can and have vis-à-vis rules and resources. (See *ibid*, p. 27.) Finally, Mouzelis points out to a recurrent theme in all of Giddens' writings: the idea that structures not merely constrain but also enable, and that structural sociology has systematically neglected this second feature. However,

Critics have on the whole accepted the usefulness of this point, but have noted that, by conflating subject and object and insisting that structure is not external to the subject, structuration theory fails to take into account the fact the structures create variable degrees of freedom and constraint for individual actors. (See *ibid*, pp. 41-42.)

⁵³ MOUZELIS, N., (1988), "Sociology of Development: Reflections on the Present Crisis", *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 37-38.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 38.

⁵⁶ As will be argued, within Chapter Seven of the thesis, 'parliamentary semi-periphery' is the term Mouzelis uses for referring to Greece, as well as to the northern Balkan and the Latin American societies.

⁵⁷ MOUZELIS, N., (1994), "The State in Late Development: Historical and Comparative Perspectives", *op. cit.*, p. 145. In that sense, Mouzelis argues that neither the abolition of the dominant relations of production (as the northern Balkan experience has clearly demonstrated) nor a change from a conservative-upper class to a 'progressive'/working class government (as the rule of Papandreou's socialist party in post-dictatorial Greece has shown) will necessary lead to *state rationalization*. The type of *state rationalization* implies both improvements in administrative efficiency as well as the demise of anti-developmental relations of domination, which is the make-or-break factor for all late developers. (See *ibid*, p. 145.)

⁵⁸ MOUZELIS, N., (1988), "Sociology of Development: Reflections on the Present Crisis", *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 38.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 39. Such a neglect of the political, Mouzelis also argues, explains why Wallerstein's work focuses on first rather than third world trajectories. (See *ibid*, p. 39.)

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 40. In conclusion, the key concepts in the field of Marxist-oriented sociology of development theory, such as dependency and dependent development, make sense only in a first-third world comparative framework. Thus, for clarifying the meaning of the concepts as well as for advancing the debate on their logical and theoretical status, one needs to adopt "a historically

oriented macro comparative approach, focusing on the major differences as well as interconnections between the capitalist trajectories of the centre and the periphery." (See *ibid*, p. 39.)

⁶² In theoretical pragmatism, what really matters is heuristic utility: "the ability of a conceptual framework satisfactorily to solve methodologically and theoretically recalcitrant social-science issues, as well as to assist in the empirical investigation of concrete problem areas." Consequently, theoretical pragmatism is critical of the philosophical, epistemological turn in the contemporary social sciences. [See MOUZELIS, N. P., (1990), *Post Marxist Alternatives: the Construction of Social Orders*, London, Macmillan, p. 3.] Mouzelis argues that one of the main tasks of modern sociological theory, as a sub-discipline of sociology, would be the construction of conceptual tools (Generalities II) designed so as to solve puzzles, raise interesting questions and more generally, prepare the ground for the empirical investigation of the constitution, reproduction and transformation of social systems (micro, meso, and macro). Thus, he excludes from sociological theory proper any 'untranslated' philosophical discourses on perennial ontological / epistemological issues, as well as attempts to construct general 'laws' (Generalities III) or contextless, universal generalisations, which invariably end up being wrong and/or trivial. Moreover, he argues that another major task of sociological theory would be the construction of a set of tools, capable to combat both the established compartmentalisation of social-science paradigms as well as the postmodern abolition of boundaries between them:

By maintaining a specific logic and orientation, sociological theory should provide a set of conceptual tools that can operate as a theoretical *lingua franca*, as a flexible vocabulary with no foundationalist pretensions, which can help sociologists establish bridges between their own and other disciplines as well as between competing sociological paradigms. [See MOUZELIS, N., (1996), "After Postmodernism: a Reply to Gregor McLennan", *Sociology*, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 134.]

In other words, sociological theory should not aim at the establishment of a kind of monolithic paradigmatic unity. On the contrary, it should strengthen the present pluralism by removing the obstacles that hinder the open-ended communication between the differentiated subdisciplines or paradigms. Boundaries and distinctions should not be rejected. However, sociological theory should make sure that boundaries are not turned into impregnable barriers, and distinctions into dichotomic essences. (See *ibid*, p. 134.)

⁶³ MOUZELIS, N. P., (1990), *Post Marxist Alternatives: the Construction of Social Orders*, London, Macmillan, pp. 2-3. Skocpol argues that according to Max Weber states are compulsory associations, which claim control over territories and the people within them. However, the administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organisations are at the core of the states and thus, states should be considered as more than the "government". In fact, the above characteristics of the states attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well. "These organizations are variably structured in

different countries, and they may be embedded in some sort of constitutional-representative system of parliamentary decision making and electoral contests for key executive and legislative posts." [See SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", op. cit., p. 7.]

⁶⁴ See EVANS, P. B., RUESCHEMEYER, D., & SKOCPOL, T., (eds), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. viii.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CASE OF GREECE AS A EUROPEAN SEMI-PERIPHERY

7.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

This chapter will present the case of Greece as a European semi-periphery, mainly within the Southern European semi-peripheral zone. This presentation will be historical and comparative and will be around four major themes. The first theme is about the international relations and the type of economic development. The second theme is about the nature of the political system. The third theme is about the role of Northern Europe and the European Economic Community. Finally, the fourth theme is about the State as an important actor *within* Greece as a semi-peripheral society.

7.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE TYPE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

This chapter will follow the approximate and contextualised synthesis of abstract propositions that was indicated at the end of the previous chapter. Thus, this section will argue that in terms of international economic relations, in the 1960s, Greece – like the other countries of the southern European semi-peripheral zone - was already a semi-peripheral society in the world system, serving some of the interests of core states. Within this context, Greece was emphasising economic development and modernisation. During the 1960s-1970s, foreign capital was invested in strategic industrial sectors, and multinational firms were established. National capital was small, weak, and orientated towards traditional areas of production. Thus, there was a dual industrial sector.

Apart from the influx of foreign capital, the so-called ‘internationalisation’ process included technological transfer, emigration and tourism. In addition, there was a shift from agriculture to industry and the services sector, the latter being overexpanded. As a consequence, there was overexpansion of the housing sector and an increase of the ‘informal’ economy.

State-financed agricultural production was declining and agrarian capital was invested in property in the towns. The pattern of development was very unbalanced, characterised by high levels of regional disparities and the 'deformation' of regional development. By the early 1980s, the 'outward-looking industrialisation' had led to the increasing dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology and Greece was in a phase of de-industrialisation, before having been industrially mature.

At first, in locating Greece within the southern European semi-peripheral zone, two questions will be asked. Firstly, where do the states of Southern Europe lie in terms of mixes of relational links in the multiple commodity chains of the world-economy?¹ Secondly, are there significant differences among semi-peripheral zones? In each case, the answer must be located in the political ideological arena and not in the economic processes:

The economic processes provide our underlying data. Because of the spatial hierarchization inherent in capitalism as a world-system, we get different political processes at the state level. If the concept of semiperiphery has any utility it lies primarily in isolating a zone of political analysis.²

Thus, Southern Europe constitutes a distinct region within Europe with Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy sharing a number of common features. These countries have their specific 'Mediterranean' features within the European whole:

There is the late development of capitalism in these countries in the contemporary period, and, above all, the particular forms it has assumed, which were such that until quite recently they were classified among the underdeveloped countries of the world. There is also a certain weakness of civil society, based as it is on persistent regional imbalances and the survival of traditional family and other solidarity networks. Again, there is the recent past of fascist or conservative dictatorship and, paradoxically, the relatively high profile of the left in the current political system. Finally, there is an undeniable cultural originality, the most visible expression of which is the still very strong impact of religion.³

If looked at in terms of its rhythm, the development of capitalism in this region was greater than in the more advanced areas of the world. Firstly, it was

occurring along with the conservation of 'archaic' structures of production and labour - especially in agriculture but also in industry - in both the countryside and the towns. Secondly, the development of capitalism was occurring in the context of a growing integration of these countries' economies into the world capitalist system, and particularly its European pole.⁴

However, since 1815 (and until the 1960s), the zone of the southern European states had at no point been the locus of the most advanced sectors of world production in terms of technology, productive capacity, or focal point of accumulation of capital. For most of that time, the governments and capitalist strata in the core countries tried to expand the amount of unequal exchange in which this zone was involved, that is, to peripheralise still further its economic processes to the advantage of these core countries.⁵ This had taken multiple classical forms such as:

external investments, comparatively lower wage levels for salaried work, use of this zone as a labor reserve area, fiscal extraction via indebtedness, mechanisms, and technological (and ideological) dependence. Viewed from the core, the great need was to restructure production processes in the various countries (or to intensify processes already begun in previous centuries) so that they performed the role of low-cost producers in the division of labor in the world-economy.⁶

In order to ensure the optimal flows of the factors of production, "modernised" state structures were needed. These structures would have adequate bureaucracies and weak political superstructures that could oversee the creation of a relevant economic infrastructure, create (where necessary) personnel training systems and guarantee conditions of order (against potential labour unrest). In the mid-nineteenth century and after, the model for these state structures would be the liberal constitutional one. This would have defined boundaries and a relatively efficacious state-oriented national culture and linguistic unity. Many persons saw direct personal advantage in pursuing such a model. However, there was resistance. "Conservative" forces felt that they risked being swept away in the reconstruction of the political systems. Their political efforts slowed down the pace of peripheralisation. In addition,

there were local capitalist strata who envisaged the role of the state as serving them against the interests of the core states and strata.⁷

In Greece, in particular, the capitalist mode of production had dominated after 1922. What provided some of the basic preconditions for the development of capitalism in the Greek social formation were: territorial and population growth, the influx of foreign capital, the development of an extensive transport system and the creation of a unified internal market, and the establishment of an institutional framework facilitating state intervention in the economy.⁸ However,

the manner in which these preconditions were created (the impetus originated mainly from the outside and serving foreign diaspora interests) presaged the kind of peripheral, underdeveloped capitalism which in fact did flourish in the next period - a capitalism radically different from and much less autonomous than that of the West.⁹

With the Asia Minor disaster (in 1922), in a period of sharpened social conflicts, political instability, military intervention in politics and authoritarian government (Metaxas' regime 1936), minimal attention was paid to the issues of economic and political modernisation. Greece was led into a civil war in the late 1940s by both internal conflicts and external political factors. During the civil war, the left-wing and radical forces (the major resistance force against the German occupation) were destroyed completely. Assisted by the USA, the victorious right-wing forces imposed a semi-parliamentary system. "At the same time, a set of rules known as *parasynagma* (parallel constitution), greatly restricted the activities of the left, while anticommunism became an official ideology of the ruling political groups."¹⁰

In all the southern countries, the effects of World War II led to the political, economic and military unification of the countries of the West under the aegis of the United States. This unification made economic autarky in the framework of capitalism impossible. The Soviet Union emerged as a superpower. Simultaneously, the expansion of international exchanges and investment increasingly led to the establishment of an international division of labour. This

came to impose itself on all nations and disrupted the coherence of national economies (where they existed).¹¹ Thus, the United States was quick to construct a new order, especially through the European Recovery Programme:

The ERP consisted of unilateral transfers of the international currency (dollar) to European countries, which allowed them to purchase American Exports. ... European economies were allowed to run trade deficits in order to set the American economy and thus the world economy on a growth course.¹²

In the era of its hegemony, the U.S. insisted on the end of all economic autarkic tendencies, the reopening of the economies of the southern European societies to core interests (to the extent they had been closed), and the further development of their structured participation in the world-economy's division of labour. "This translated itself in terms of economic "development" and "modernisation"."¹³

Greece, in particular, during the postwar years, had witnessed rapid rates of growth but this growth had not altered either the peripheral character of the Greek economy or the peculiar nature of Greek capitalism.¹⁴ However, the year 1953 was a turning point in the postwar development of the Greek economy. The Conservative Government, led by Alexander Papagos, introduced policy measures, which seriously aimed to promote economic growth and to advance industrialisation of the Greek economy. Among these measures was a devaluation of the Greek drachma for attracting foreign capital. Moreover,

In terms of economic philosophy, the government professed strong attachment to the principles of liberal economy, free enterprise and a free market economy, a philosophy consistent with its anticommunist political ideology and the prevalence of American influences.¹⁵

The United States came to be directly involved in the construction of social balances in all the southern European countries, by the attempt to influence the internal politics of these countries and through the shaping of their economies in a capitalist direction. The long-run goal was the prevention of the political division of the world economy. "While most of Europe came under the program of economic reconstruction and political molding ... American

leverage was stronger in the case of Southern Europe, simply because of the greater economic needs of the countries involved."¹⁶

In the southern countries, the pace of economic "development" and "modernisation" was at first slow but became quite rapid by the 1960s. The difference with the era before 1914 was that the economic integration of the world had deepened considerably. Many more zones could then play the peripheral roles that had been assigned to Southern Europe in the nineteenth century, from the point of view of the core countries. Part of the problem of the core zones was to maintain a sufficient demographic weight in the world system. So, the core zones tried to expand the intermediate sector.¹⁷

Suddenly, it became of interest to the core states to have Southern Europe play a strong semi-peripheral role in the world economy, especially if they were closely linked to the core in both political and ideological terms. For this, there were two mechanisms: NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC).¹⁸

For the southern European countries, the economic orientation began to shift from American influences. They extricated themselves to varying degrees from the privileged relationship with the United States and entered into a new one with Northern Europe. Through its legislation on labour mobility and trade, the EEC gradually became the most important force shaping the economies of the southern countries.¹⁹

However, since Greece joined in the EEC in 1981, the thesis will present this issue later on in the analysis. What will at this point be explored is the so-called 'internationalisation' process.

In Williams' view, the periods of autarky in Spain, Portugal and Greece had been important for general recovery. Yet, they were restrictive to growth and international agencies (e.g. IMF, O.E.C.D.) pressed for the 'opening' of these

economies. 'Internationalisation' meant foreign investment and technological transfer, emigration and tourism.²⁰

The central feature of Southern Europe as a semi-periphery of the world economy was the lack of effective local control over the use of resources. Decisions were taken in the core and multinationals were established.²¹ Smaller economies, such as Portugal and Greece, were potentially in positions of greater dependency since limited internal markets and, perhaps, lack of natural resources, were restrictive for their scope for alternative strategies.²²

For the specific case of Greece, national capital was always about short-term solutions since this capital was small and mainly orientated towards commerce and services. Therefore, foreign capital was the only possible agent of industrialisation and establishing the political system.²³

The inability of capitalism in the countries of Southern Europe to ensure economic and social reproduction on the basis of internal resources had been indicated by the size of these transfer incomes. Their amount, having been reduced by the economic crisis, had posed the choice between reducing investment or developing exports. Since the 1950s, foreign investment had been very important in the economies of Southern Europe. To the extent that foreign capital in Southern Europe was concentrated in industrial sectors (often strategic ones) and in large firms dominating an environment of small units, its influence on the economy was great.²⁴

In Greece specifically, for the period 1966-1977, investment rates were quite high. In the period 1951-1975, 30.6% of total investment (or 43.3% of private investment) was absorbed by the housing sector. Only 14.1% of total investment were absorbed by the manufacturing sector and 11.3% by agriculture (the remainder being in infrastructure, energy and transport). Investment in manufacturing, as a percentage of GDP, was the lowest among all OECD countries during the 1960-1976 period.²⁵ Consequently, the bulk of foreign capital inflow to Greece (1953-1979) was invested in the industrial

sector. Foreign capital was concentrated in some of the strategic advanced technology sectors such as chemicals, plastics, petroleum products and base metals. During the 1960s, multinational firms were the main exporters of nontraditional products.²⁶

Moreover, after 1973, foreign capital, by establishing itself in Greece, had been trying to find access to the new markets of the Arab world and Africa. In addition, due to the fact that the Greek market was relatively small, the big foreign firms had been export orientated. The transnationalisation process within TNCs (Transnational Corporations) had been integrating the Greek economy into the internationalised production system.²⁷

Between 1960 and 1978, the pattern of exports changed radically (the exports of industrial goods changed from 3.7% in 1960 to 59.0% in 1978). The Greek process of industrialisation had been characterised by an important inflow of foreign capital and of technology since there was none to speak of in the country.²⁸

In the southern countries, the low cost of labour was also an important precondition for rapid industrialisation.²⁹ In Western Europe, capitalism proliferated through new technology and cheap immigrant labour from the Mediterranean countries³⁰:

External, essentially US aid, income from tourism, principally west and north European, and remittances from workers who have emigrated to France, Germany and the Benelux countries consistently represented a very important element in keeping the balance of payments in equilibrium and shoring-up the import capacity of the countries of the region.³¹

In Greece in particular, apart from the fact that industrial growth was based on capital which had to be imported, the labour that was leaving agriculture was encouraged to seek employment in Western Europe, principally West Germany.³²

As far as the development of agriculture is concerned, in the southern countries, agricultural investment was state-financed, while agrarian capital fled to the towns to be invested in property. But, even there, agriculture experienced enormous technological and social changes. A trend towards clear-cut specialisation had gradually been becoming apparent, aiming at keeping food prices low and at developing profitable crops (fruit and vegetables) and meat production for the local market.³³ Thus, in Southern Europe, agriculture continued to be marked by a great heterogeneity of production systems. Despite the development agriculture had experienced, it remained the "poor relative" of growth.³⁴

Trade with the EEC was usually in surplus for agricultural products and in deficit for industrial products. However, the structure of external trade had changed since 1960. Specialisation in primary exports (basically agricultural products) had given way to a specialisation in exports of industrial products, consumer and intermediate goods. For instance, in the late 1970s, textiles and clothing represented almost half the industrial exports of Greece and Portugal. Greece's industrial exports were most concentrated on non-durable consumer goods and the range of industrial activities was the smallest. In general, the structure of industrial production in Southern Europe continued to be dominated by intermediate goods industries.³⁵

Apart from the *decline in agricultural production*, but with substantial farming sectors, another characteristic of the southern countries was the *dualistic nature of industry* - with small and internationally not competitive enterprises alongside a few large enterprises.³⁶

For the specific case of Greece, during this period,

Greek industrial structure is characterized by fragmentation, with small and medium-sized, family-owned units being dominant except in the tobacco and chemicals sector. ... Alongside this fragmented traditional industrial sector there exists a technologically advanced sector based on, or controlled by, foreign capital.³⁷

Moreover, in Greece, indigenous capital was directed to traditional areas of production.³⁸

In the southern countries, urban economic activity continued to be based on small artisan or family units and a large private services sector as well as an inflated administration. These particular forms of capitalist development were illustrated by the strong expansion of the 'informal economy' (the activity of undeclared economic agents or the production of undeclared goods and services by officially registered economic agents).³⁹ The development of the 'informal economy' reflected the conservation or extension of archaic forms of production in the towns and countryside, not very favourable to the expression of collective solidarities and a modern class-consciousness.⁴⁰

What also accompanied the rise of the informal sector was the existence of a large services sector.⁴¹ That was because urban industrial development was rapid, but not enough to provide jobs for the quantity of manpower released by the agricultural sector.⁴²

Another characteristic of the southern countries was *high levels of regional disparities*. The process of uneven regional development was linked to these four countries' dependency status.⁴³

In Greece, in particular, foreign capital was established as it had been established in other countries. For instance, it was established in the region of Athens, where infrastructure was available, for the production of consumer and durable goods. Its choice for other locations was according to criteria such as accessibility to raw materials (bauxite by Pechiney), labour supply and incentives (this is the case of those foreign firms, who chose the industrial parts of Greece, like Patras and Kavalla) and monopolistic position (the Esso Pappas project in Thessalonika or the long discussed but not realised project at Pylos in the Peloponnese).⁴⁴

Some foreign firms, profiting from the incentives given by the Greek government, had chosen the industrial parks near many urban centres. In fact, Greek industry had developed according to the laws governing its integration into the international division of labour, in particular undertaking the role Western European capital had ascribed to it. All the features of the transnationalisation process were present in the Greek case. In general, the regional pattern of development did not seem to have been greatly influenced by the internationalisation of the Greek productive system through foreign capital. Foreign capital established itself mainly where Greek capital had created favourable conditions for its valorisation and in this sense, it contributed to an increase of regional inequalities. It chose other locations outside the two big industrial areas only in very special cases but without having any important effect in reducing existing regional inequalities.⁴⁵

Thus, the economic strategy pursued since the mid-1950s led to a very unbalanced pattern of development and as the OECD observed, the whole growth of the Greek economy took place in Athens and Thessaloniki, and the greater part in the area of Athens. Demographic changes were indicative of the gravity of the problem caused by this pattern of development, since there was an over-concentration in the above two cities.⁴⁶

Athens was the most extreme case of urban-industrial concentration, although the trend was a general one.⁴⁷ Statistical data from 1974 makes it clear that the main regional problems of Greece were:

- (a) over-concentration of population and economic activity in the capital of the country (the so-called syndrome of 'hypercephalic Athens');
- (b) a second industrial centre in the north of the country (the district of Thessalonika), which lags behind in relation to the first;
- (c) the maintenance of the mainly agricultural character of the economic structure of the rest of the regions and districts;
- (d) great inequality expressed in income and welfare between the inhabitants of greater Athens, Thessalonika, some other urban centres on the one hand - and the inhabitants in the other parts of the country on the other.⁴⁸

The so-called "deformation of regional development" meant that some regional imbalances had reached a level, which was seen as critical or unacceptable for

social, political, environmental, military or even cultural and ecological reasons. In Greece, the deformation of regional development lay in the big contradiction of concentrating almost 43% of the population and producing almost 50% of GNP in the two areas of Greater Athens and Thessaloniki. The overconcentration in the two big urban areas created big social and political problems: pollution and environmental damage, the high social cost of infrastructure, the low quality of life, and internal migration.⁴⁹

At the same time, the other regions of the country experienced a steady stagnation, remained agricultural and they lacked the necessary human potential to develop. Athens was exploiting the rest of the country, in the sense that the development of the latter was dependent on conditions created by Athens. The pattern of core and periphery adequately explained the relation between Athens and Thessaloniki as well as the relation between Athens and the rest of the regions. The unrest of the population in the underdeveloped regions becoming conscious of being economically and culturally discriminated against would be the breaking point in making the situation socially and politically unacceptable.⁵⁰

In the southern countries, post-war economic development was characterised not only by high growth rates, the flourishing of manufactures, the shift from agriculture to industry and services, but also by tourism.⁵¹

For the particular case of Greece, until 1981 the strategy pursued by all governments to promote outward looking industrialisation, which resulted in increasing the dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology and in the establishment of import substitution industries, gave rise to a serious balance of payments problem. The economic policy-makers tried to solve these problems by encouraging emigration as well as by promoting tourism.⁵²

Also for the rest of the southern countries, numerous studies had shown that external investment rarely had a positive impact on the industrial integration, employment, income or technological level of the countries concerned. This

situation was in spite of the fact that state policies had systematically encouraged the inflow of foreign capital, notably in industry. In contrast, this investment had greatly contributed to an imbalance in the balance of payments.⁵³

In Greece, a product of an economic policy of developing tourism and, to a lesser extent, shipping was that in the post-junta period (1974-1981), there had been an over-expansion of the housing sector, accompanied by parallel expansion of the services sector.⁵⁴

By the early 1970s, growth in Southern Europe was already slowing down in response to the reduced growth of the world economy. Investment fell, inflation rose and unemployment increased.⁵⁵ In Greece, in the early 1980s, the economy was in serious structural crisis which manifested itself in persistently high rates of inflation, a widening deficit in the balance of payments, rising unemployment and stagnation in productive investment. In 1985, the economic predicament was primarily due to structural weaknesses, which were the direct result of the economic strategy since the early 1950s.⁵⁶

Up to the early 1980s, Greece was in a peculiar phase of de-industrialisation before even reaching the stage of industrial maturity. Receipts from tourism, emigration and shipping generated consumption patterns, which were not commensurate with domestic productive capacities and had the consequent effect of increasing imports.⁵⁷ The industrial and agricultural sectors illustrated the structural weaknesses of the economy and the failures of economic strategy. Industry contributed 32% of GDP and agriculture contributed only 16%. In both the agricultural and industrial sectors, productivity was substantially lower than in the EEC as a whole, due to a failure to channel sufficient resources into these sectors.⁵⁸ Finally, small units in industry and agriculture increased the level of self - employment in the economy. This was related to the so-called 'informal economy', as argued before, which in Greece was estimated to have generated a total income equal to 25% of the GDP at factor cost.⁵⁹

All the previously analysed themes were taking place in the context of a changing political system.

7.3 THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

This section will argue that historically, right wing groups had dominated the political system. Since the early 1960s, there were shifts from a Centrist Party, to a seven-year dictatorship (1967-1974), to a Conservative Party, to a 'Socialist-inspired' Party.

In the southern countries, the actual mode whereby dictatorial regimes were established varied considerably. Major characteristics were class domination, right wing groups, ruling class, anti-communism, and political co-option rather than mass political mobilisation. Economic policies provided a stable context for private capital accumulation with state support in the forms of protectionism. The dictatorial regimes lacked broad social bases and in the end, they contributed to their own downfalls.⁶⁰

However, the "crisis of the dictatorship" produced a new convergence: a convergence towards parliamentary regimes and neo-liberal policies.⁶¹ According to Troumbour, Kurth has explained the new configuration of forces that allowed the Greek and Italian departure from Iberian patterns of dictatorial rule:

While the U.S. State Department may well have taken a sympathetic view towards the renewal of right-authoritarian order if the Communist Party had been able to prevail at the ballot box (Italy, 1948) or on the battlefield (Greek civil war, 1946-49), parliamentarism in these two countries attained hegemony, despite frequent adverse assaults: in Greece during the 1950s, the existence of hundreds of political prisoners, Communist and otherwise, the continued employment of police and paramilitary repression, and from 1967-74 the rise of the Colonels who predicated their usurpation on the need for a purification and "rebirth" designed to facilitate the eventual restoration of democracy; in Italy, the persistence of clientelism and gangrenous growths of corruption, and in the 1970s the flourishing of extraparliamentary enterprises on both the far right and far left dedicated to tactics of terror.⁶²

Indeed, for the specific case of Greece, until the early 1960s, the political system of the 1950s with its attachment to the principles of a liberal economy lasted virtually unchanged. However, by that time, as a result of the processes of economic development, urbanisation and the expansion of educational services, a new middle class emerged, which began to press for political participation, institutional changes in the balance of power and a wider share in the fruits of economic growth. In alliance with the disgruntled sections of the peasantry, this class brought to power the Centre Union Party, in 1963. This party began to apply a cautious policy of liberalisation.⁶³

In 1965, the King dismissed the Centre Union (*Ενωσις Κέντρου*) and installed a 'puppet' government. By the beginning of 1967, the Centre Union was transformed into a more radical political force under the influence of Andreas Papandreou. Given the prospect of the Centre Union coming to power, the military imposed a dictatorial regime. It has been argued that military intervention was a reaction to the modernisation process. Intellectuals and students were the most effective resistance to the regime. In July 1974, the dictatorship collapsed.⁶⁴

The fact that Greece entered the 1970s under an oppressive military dictatorship was why, in the 1970s, Greece stressed democratisation of its political system whereas in the 1950s and 1960s, it had been preoccupied with economic growth.⁶⁵ The experience of the seven-year military dictatorship made it clear that political modernisation was a political necessity as well as the only way to accommodate social and economic pressures. The Conservative Party (New Democracy) adopted a modernising ideological posture termed 'radical liberalism'. This Party remained in power from November 1974 to October 1981 and it can be said that it contributed to the demilitarisation and democratisation of the political system.⁶⁶ However, the New Democracy Party was gradually becoming more conservative in outlook, and had to devote considerable energy and resources to foreign policy issues.⁶⁷

Later on, the political-economic convergence in Southern Europe became stronger and more clearly defined by the formation of socialist-led governments. Yet, that convergence, as Arrighi argues, should be understood in very broad terms. The socialist-led or socialist-inspired governments of Southern Europe had quite different programmes, ideologies, and life chances.⁶⁸

The social-democratic regimes came of age in Southern Europe at a time when the northern European "wind" - with Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and the crisis of the Liberal-Social Democratic alliance in West Germany - was being weakened, and while Reagan's United States had turned to a more assertive foreign policy.⁶⁹ Moreover,

the social-democratic wave seemed to show a momentum of its own, which in country after country produced Socialist-inspired (Greece), Socialist (Spain), or Socialist-led (Portugal and Italy) governments. This momentum can be traced to two main factors: the increased social and economic power of labor in Southern European national locales and the growing impact of world depression on the region.⁷⁰

Arrighi *et al* have argued that the deepening of the world depression had brought a change in the balance of social forces to the fore, by intensifying competition within and across national borders. In country after country, labour-repressive policies to enhance accumulation had lost their previous legitimacy and it was in this context that social-democratic regimes had been established in Southern Europe. These social-democratic regimes had a variety of programmes with one common denominator: political power to "socialist" parties, in exchange for labour acceptance of the imperatives of accumulation in a capitalist world economy.⁷¹

In Greece, in particular, in 1974, a new party was established (by Andreas Papandreou), the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which came to advocate that Greece needed changes in the parochial (local) structure of its socioeconomic system.⁷² In the election of October 1981, this party came to power and advocated radical change in Greece's socio-economic structure as

well as in its external relations. It has been argued that this party was a party of 'rural protest', because of its widespread support among the rural population:

The Party claims to represent the nonprivileged strata which comprise practically the whole Greek population save the economic oligarchy. It is indicative that PASOK does not call itself a party but a 'movement' based on Marxist methodology and theory, whilst resolutely rejecting 'the bureaucratic state socialism of the Eastern block'. Seen from this basic ideological posture, PASOK seems more to resemble the Populist Movements of the Third World than the socialist or social-democratic parties of Europe. (Mouzelis 1978b)⁷³

During the stagnation of the world-economy, the realisation that Southern Europe was a semiperipheral zone indicated all the ambiguities of its ever-closer integration into the common market. The dilemmas of PASOK government illustrated the general issue:

With the combination of the "crisis" plus the intermediate economic role Greece had already developed within the world economy - in Greece's case, in particular, its role in world transport - the conditions were ripe for the coming to power of PASOK, which offered a quintessential program of the partisans of a semiperipheral state: more independence of action vis-à-vis the core, with its correlate, diplomatic openings to the periphery and to the U.S.S.R.; vigorous reassertion of national interests vis-à-vis Turkey; national political reconciliation (for example, return of those in exile because of the Civil War, and improvements in internal social distribution mechanisms); and an expanded higher education system.⁷⁴

In the field of foreign policy, at the beginning, PASOK aimed at the removal of American bases from Greek soil; the complete withdrawal of Greece from NATO; the withdrawal from the EEC following a referendum; and finally the strengthening of Greece's relations with the Balkan, Arab and Mediterranean countries.⁷⁵ However, in foreign policy, this party had to abandon some of the radical theses it advocated while in opposition and it was becoming evident that Greece would remain in western networks, including the EEC and NATO.⁷⁶

The fundamental principles of PASOK's economic policy were socialisation of some sectors of the economy while still supporting private initiative in other sectors (with special emphasis on 'small and medium sized business concerns' as well as the creation of 'agricultural industrial cooperatives of a new kind').⁷⁷

The economy was in urgent need of structural reforms, and thus, what was emphasised was:

development of some industrial sectors, promotion of regional development so as to arrest overconcentration of economic activities around Athens, curbing bureaucratic state intervention in the economy and reducing the dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology.⁷⁸

This political party was committed to the socialist transformation of the economy and had presented a draft five-year plan which provided for such reforms as well as for the socialisation (involving worker participation) of key sectors of the economy. However, implementation of such a plan appeared to be fraught with difficulties in the face of continuing economic stagnation and the resistance of well-entrenched interests.⁷⁹ As already indicated, PASOK had also attached a special importance to decentralisation and regional development.⁸⁰ However, as Nikolinakos argues, the Greek regional problem could not be solved without far-reaching decentralisation of the governmental and administrative apparatus and without a heavy programme of public investment in economic and social infrastructure in regions other than Athens and Thessaloniki.⁸¹

At the beginning of the 1980s, another change marked Greek politics: the accession of Greece to the European Economic Community. It will be argued that the EEC (later on, the European Community, and later on, the European Union) was one of the most important actors in the country's most recent international and economic relations.

7.4 NORTHERN EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

In terms of international economic relations, this section will argue that the European Economic Community (EEC) – which had initially pointed out the regional imbalance – was a crucial external actor for Greece. The country entered the EEC in 1981, and this meant radical policies of industrial restructuring. However, exports to the EEC fell and imports increased.

Furthermore, the agricultural balance of payments with the EEC decreased, while problems in the manufacturing sectors were stressed. Such a situation continued until the 1990s, when the European Community was creating difficulties for the adaptation of Greece.

Historically, the EEC and the Council of Europe, taking economic and political standpoints respectively, had created a European doctrine about regional imbalance. The 1955 Messina conference (which prepared the way for the EEC Treaty of Rome) called for the setting up of a European regional development fund. The Treaty of Rome included the removal of regional imbalances as one of the overall aims of the EEC, but only in its Preamble. What these political moves within the Council of Europe reflected was a concern with provincial autonomy and state decentralisation that had been growing in Western Europe since the end of the Second World War. In the 1960s, in all EEC countries, the concern burst forth in proposals for constitutional reform.⁸²

Since 1961, the increased co-operation between western European governments had emphasised two elements that were present already in national policies. First, the pooling of resources by European nations was estimated to lead to savings and greater potential all round. Second, there was a publicly expressed conviction that Europe was essentially democratic and thus deliberate steps should be taken for the just distribution of the new affluence, including a fair share for the poorer regions.⁸³

In the countries of Southern Europe, the continuation of the development model - marked by a strong dependence on the United States and major regional, social and sectoral imbalances - remained the only alternative choice to integration into the EEC. Membership of Europe helped Southern Europe to moderate its dependence on the United States and above all, to be part - even as a poor relative - of the world economy.⁸⁴

However, integration into the Common Market (especially for such countries as Greece and Portugal) made it more difficult to maintain traditional specialties

(e.g. shoes, clothes, furniture, textiles and spirits) while at the same time it created obstacles to the search for new industrial activities. Comparative advantage could no longer be based on the price of labour since the semi-industrialised countries of the Third World were more competitive for labour intensive products. Moreover, economic growth - despite its limits - led to the reduction of the structural surplus of manpower.⁸⁵

Membership of the EEC would make it vital to implement radical policies of industrial restructuring, despite the envisaged transitional measures. Yet, in a context where technological goods could be freely imported from the more advanced EEC countries, it was difficult to see how such restructuring policies could develop new and more dynamic branches of activity (especially for countries whose economic size was, after all, modest). Therefore, restructuring would mean modernisation of existing sectors with a view to improving the level of productivity. In addition, integration into the EEC threatened to penalise small and medium industrial firms since they would have much more difficulty in facing up to international competition. Finally, the experience of 'community development' augured rather badly for the prospects of reducing regional imbalances, not only in the countries of Southern Europe but also between these and their more advanced neighbours to the north.⁸⁶

The combination of all these factors in the medium term, Yachir has suggested, might have the consequence of accentuating the perverse forms (e.g. the informal economy) of the development of capitalism in those countries. The diversity of structures of production in all sectors of activity as well as the informal economy would have both to survive and to spread in order to enable the local economy and society to absorb the shock waves caused by abrupt exposure to external competition.⁸⁷

Greece was late in joining the EEC. The country became a full member of the EEC, on the 1st of January 1981, and accepted the so-called *acquis communautaire*, that is the whole body of policies and regulations that the EEC

had produced by that time.⁸⁸ Foreign affairs had been prominent especially in Greece, where the dominant policy was the accession to the EEC.⁸⁹

During the first two years after the accession, Greece made substantial gains out of the Community's budget. In 1981, Greece received 170,000,000 ECUs in 'net receipts', while in 1982, it received 630,000,000. The bulk of this money came from the Agricultural Fund (FEOGA). A smaller part came from the Regional Fund and only a tiny part came from the Social Fund. But, this budgetary gain was almost offset by the adverse impact of trade liberalisation on the balance of payments. In 1981, Greek exports to the EEC fell by 2.2%, while at the same time, imports from EEC countries increased by a staggering 37.5%. Consequently, the overall trade deficit with the Community countries doubled in 1981 to 2.5 billion dollars, while in the first 10 months of 1982 it reached 4.9 billion dollars.⁹⁰ Most pervasive has been the impact of Community membership on the agricultural balance of payments:

In 1981, for the first time, Greece's agricultural balance of payments with the EEC showed a substantial deficit. While in 1981 Greece had a surplus of 6.8 m. drachmas in the agricultural balance of payments with the Community, this was turned into a deficit of 10.9 m. drachmas in 1981, the first year of accession. Agricultural imports from EEC countries, which in 1980 were 9.5 percent of total imports, reached 16.6 percent in 1981.⁹¹

Such a dramatic deterioration in the Greek agricultural balance of payments was directly related to the operation of the rules of the EEC. These rules forced Greece to divert imports of agricultural products from low cost, third world countries to high cost, Community countries. At the same time, the more efficient Community farmers were enabled to increase exports of a number of items (including meat and dairy products), by the opening of the Greek market.⁹²

A number of the manufacturing sectors had shown that they were not prepared to face the competition of the most efficient Community manufacturers or to adjust smoothly to Community rules. Although Greek industry was not uncompetitive, EEC membership had accentuated existing problems. An increasing number of manufacturing establishments had already collapsed. The

worst affected enterprises were in traditional labour-intensive sectors (shoes, clothes, furniture, textiles and spirits). Imports of the above products from EEC countries (mainly Italy) increased by 200% in some cases, while exports either fell or stagnated. Greece, facing such a deteriorating situation, took drastic measures in January 1983. These measures were the devaluation of the drachma by 15.5% to improve the competitiveness of exports, and the attainment of permission from the Commission to impose import restrictions on a number of products. At the same time, the government entered into a dialogue with the Commission for a more thorough restructuring of Greece's relations with the European Economic Community.⁹³

The term 'adaptation' - when used in the case of Greece and the European Community - implies, as Tsoukalis has argued, a one-way relationship and an indirectly unequal one. Greece had entered into a wider space, the basic rules of which had been enacted several years before that by the founding members. The European adaptation had many dimensions, but the most obvious was the economic one.⁹⁴ The common (or internal) market was central in an effort for a combination of the mechanisms of market and state intervention. At the same time, the stabilising dimension of the Community's politics went on increasing. In the economic sector, the account of the first decade was especially disappointing with bad macroeconomic indicators. The pace of economic development was low, the productive investments were slowing down, inflation was high, and trade deficits were also big. The economic divergence of Greece from the other countries which were also members of the European Community was increasing, especially during the second half of the 1980s, when economic stabilisation was associated with investments in the rest of the countries of the Community. The gradual opening of the Greek market to European and international competition led to a rapid penetration of foreign commodities into the domestic market which only in a limited degree was counterbalanced by an equivalent increase in Greek exports.⁹⁵

The experience of the early 1990s pointed to the difficulties that the country had to face in order to adapt to a dynamic, competitive and continuously changing

international environment.⁹⁶ The rapid decrease of protection and the gradual integration of the Greek economy into the European and international division of labour imposed conditions of competition. At the same time, the State began losing more and more its ability to intervene.⁹⁷

The opening of the economy to international competition coincided with the failure of the State. This was due to an irrational effort for combination of the clientelistic system with expansion of the enterprising and social state. At the same time, the economic conditions had already been radically changed. Participation to the community system of decision making and the need for adaptation of the country to the international politico-economic conditions called for a modern and flexible public administration, which Greece did not have.⁹⁸ To a considerable degree, the European adaptation of the country was identified with the competitiveness in the economic life and with the modernisation of the State. Modernisation meant the strengthening of institutions, meritocracy, 'transparency' and stability of the rules that govern the function of the economy and the relationship between the citizens and the State. Modernisation also meant the strengthening of civil society so that the control - exercised upon it by the State and the political parties - would be decreased.⁹⁹

The nature and specific functioning of the Greek State will be further explored in the analysis.

7.5 THE STATE AS AN ACTOR *WITHIN* GREECE, AS A SEMI-PERIPHERAL SOCIETY

This section will argue that in domestic political terms, the state of the economy and the difficulty of Greece in adapting to the European Union (in 1992) were due to the nature of the Greek State.

Historically, while Greece was still a peripheral society, the State was supplementing the market, playing a determining role, because of its autonomy

in relation to civil society. The latter was weak due to the weak organisation of capitalists and workers: State-led industrialisation in Greece, as a 'late-late' industrialising capitalist society with early and persistent quasi-parliamentary politics, had generated State dependent industrial classes.

This weakness of civil society was because the Greek State had inherited its patrimonial, authoritarian/despotic and particularistic/personalistic features from the Ottoman rule. These features had led to the gradual and systematic dominance of the logic of the 'party' over the logic of the market. As a result, Greece failed to modernise agriculture and create an industrial sector well articulated with other parts of the economy: the only way for the integration of the country into the world economy in a more self-reliant way. A 'side-effect' was the over-expansion of the State apparatus and the intensity of clientelistic characteristics and corruption. Consequently, the more the State failed to modernise agriculture, the more it acquired characteristics which hindered the developmental process. Thus, whenever there was a challenge – i.e. the challenge of 1992 - the Greek State functioned in ways that perpetuated the semi-peripherality of Greece in the European Union and in the world. Finally, the State was active only over clientelism: it was actually reinforcing clientelism. The State appeared to be *inert* with respect to other aspects, i.e. cultural and social relations and occupational hierarchies.

After the Second World War, Greece, like the other southern countries, had moved towards a relative devaluation of political rule over the economy. States were relegated to the role of supplementing rather than replacing the market.¹⁰⁰

During the forty-year period, since 1922, with the dominance of the capitalist mode of production in the Greek social formation, the economy became dominant in relation to the political and ideological spheres. This dominance was reflected on the political and ideological levels of the social formation: the State acquired very important economic functions.¹⁰¹

The pervasive involvement of the State in the Greek economy - in spite of the ideological emphasis on the free economy - took the following forms. These forms were direct investment in infrastructure, incentives and aids to private industry, control of finance to the private sector through the banking system, and direct participation in the economy by means of setting up public enterprises and utilities. Political clientelism also played a major role in the formulation of economic policy decisions.¹⁰²

In the four southern European countries (namely, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal), unlike the advanced countries of Northern Europe, the State played a much more determining role in that the relatively weak organisation of capitalists and workers gave it a greater degree of autonomy in relation to civil society. This weakness of civil society was even more marked in Greece, Portugal and Turkey, where, the widening of political participation occurred in a context marked by a great weakness of the industrial proletariat. Modernisation had been achieved on the basis of the transformation of traditional networks of clientelism and, sometimes, the intervention of the army, and not through the development of powerful political and trade union organisations.¹⁰³

It has been argued that Greece can be characterised as a 'late-late' industrialising capitalist society with early and persistent quasi-parliamentary politics, like the northern Balkan societies as well as the Latin American societies.¹⁰⁴ The 'late-late' label - extensively used in development theory - aims at distinguishing the relatively late European industrialisers, Germany and France, from those semi-peripheral societies which only experienced large-scale industrialisation in the post-1929 period.¹⁰⁵

The Balkan and Latin America's southern-cone countries failed to use the resources generated by the export-oriented, nineteenth-century agrarian economies in order to modernise their agriculture or to create an industrial sector well articulated with the primary and tertiary sectors. The major reason for this failure is not to be seen in imperialist exploitation, the 'comprador'

nature of these countries' bourgeoisies, the malfunctioning of markets, or the lack of entrepreneurial skills and personalities.¹⁰⁶ Instead, it must be seen in the structure and functioning of their States:

Given the late-late character of their industrialization, their only chance of integrating their peripheral economies into the world system in a more self-centred manner was from above. The state would have had to intervene flexibly and selectively – not in order to destroy or supersede private initiative, but so as to bolster and direct it towards the modernization of agriculture and the creation of strong linkages between the countries' industries and their agricultural and mineral resources.¹⁰⁷

In the past, such strategic monitoring of development, the Balkan and Latin American States (and consequently, Greece) were unable to provide. Their inability to provide it even in the present was due to the persistence of their pre-independence patrimonial/despotic legacy, in the post-independence period. These States acquired enormous dimensions before the large-scale development of capitalist industry. In addition, as has already been indicated, the semi-periphery's State-led industrialisation generated State-dependent industrial classes. These were unable to check State authoritarianism and the particularistic/clientelistic or populist tendencies of the major political-military actors. As a result, the enormous State apparatuses were, and still are, controlled by parties of a predominantly clientelistic or populist character, whose interests of self-preservation and expansion systematically hinder the expanded reproduction of capitalism or the modernisation of non-economic institutional spheres. Thus, there is a prevailing relationship between the 'economic' and the 'political': wherever there is incompatibility between the two spheres, the logic of the latter systematically prevails over that of the former.¹⁰⁸

It has been suggested – rather dramatically – that “the state in the parliamentary semi-periphery resembles a colossus with feet of clay, a shapeless monstrosity incapable of reacting and adapting intelligently to a rapidly changing international environment.”¹⁰⁹ In the past, there were a number of challenges. Among them were the need to modernise agriculture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the need for effective import-

substitution industrialisation after the 1929 Depression, or the need for intelligent direction of multinational and indigenous capital in the post-war conditions of the new international division of labour. However, the rigid, over-politicised and particularistic semi-peripheral State contributed to the countries' peripheral status in the world economy and polity.¹¹⁰

As far as Greece specifically is concerned, the failure of the Greek development plan was due to the nature of the Greek State. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, Greece (as part of the Balkan societies) was a subjugated part of the patrimonial Ottoman Empire, and as such never experienced the absolutist past of western European societies. It acquired its political independence in the nineteenth century and immediately set about implementing western parliamentary forms of political rule. Although these forms were constantly malfunctioning and fragile, the parliamentary institutions evinced a surprising degree of resilience, surviving and functioning more or less intermittently from the second half of the nineteenth century until the 1960s and 1970s. The dictatorial regimes were not necessarily an obstacle to the coming to power of parliamentary democracy.¹¹¹

The patrimonial type of rule experienced during the pre-independence period by Greece (as well as the other Balkan societies) was hostile to the autonomous consolidation of *corps intermediaires* between the ruler and the ruled. The Ottoman Empire was not prepared to tolerate any political autonomy of merchants or aristocrats *vis-à-vis* the central authority of the ruler. Whatever associations or collective bodies represented, non-State interests were despotically controlled from above. The ruler was strong and so were the various officials manning the highly particularistic State apparatuses. This situation was of course in sharp contrast to the subtle rebalance of power between the ruler and the aristocracy, later the bourgeoisie, in western European absolutism.¹¹²

The authoritarian and despotic features of the patrimonial State in Greece did not disappear once Greece had acquired its political independence. Nor did

such features disappear when Greece adopted western parliamentary institutions during the second half of the nineteenth century. In fact, the nineteenth century parliamentary regimes in this semi-peripheral State were based on very restricted popular participation, and on an authoritarian particularistic State controlled by a handful of notable families who were able to keep the parliamentary system functioning stably by manipulating the electorate through legal and illegal means. However, with the fuller integration of Greece into the world economy, its restrictive parliamentary regimes began to weaken. Processes of market, state and city expansion undermined traditional merchantisms of political control and generated new political forces, which eventually challenged the oligarchic monopoly of State power.¹¹³

Since the demise of oligarchic parliamentarism occurred in a predominantly pre-industrial context, unlike in several western European countries, the opening-up of the political system was not marked by the active participation of the industrial classes (particularly by relatively autonomous working-class organisations). Instead, the new middle- and lower- class participants and their organisations were brought into the political arena in a more dependent/vertical manner. This type of vertical political inclusion, which has been called *incorporative*, neither eliminated the particularistic/personalistic features of parliamentary politics, nor managed to check the authoritarian/despotic tendencies of the State. When, after the 1929 Depression, industrial capitalism gained momentum in Greece, its timing and structure meant that it did not contribute to the weakening but rather to the transformation and reinforcement of these authoritarian structures inherited from the pre-independence era.¹¹⁴ Therefore, for Greece as a semi-peripheral society,

both the post-oligarchic broadening of political participation and the subsequent acceleration of the industrialisation process contributed, in different ways, to a polity with a highly unequal distribution of political power between rulers and ruled. This unequal distribution of power and the institutional structures associated with it constituted a negative legacy; it provided a very inadequate basis for dealing with the staggering problems that post-war semi-peripheral societies had to face once their economies were

becoming more industrialised and their politics more fully marked by high levels of mass participation.¹¹⁵

In addition, the logic of the 'party' systematically dominated over the logic of the market and other institutional domains as discussed before. Moreover, at the economic level, Greece failed to use the resources created from the export oriented agricultural economy of the nineteenth century in order to modernise its agriculture and create an industrial sector well articulated with the other parts of the economy.¹¹⁶

This failure was due to the structure of the State, which is the most important element for the understanding of the reason why some countries with late development - although having similar starting points and similar resources - presented such different achievements in the world economy. Those who were more successful had: a) a successful modernisation of agriculture, b) strong bonds between the primary and the secondary sectors, c) a relatively interventionary and efficient State for the success of a) and b). The failure of the efforts for modernisation of the agriculture and its efficient linkage with industry usually result in expansion of the State and intensity of clientelistic characteristics and 'corruption'. Therefore, the more the State fails to modernise agriculture, the more it acquires characteristics which hinder its own rationalisation as well as the rationalisation of the economy.¹¹⁷

The Greek State not only failed to modernise agriculture¹¹⁸, but created an evident 'disarticulation' of industry and its relation to agriculture.¹¹⁹ Moreover, due to the restricted capability of the Greek industry to absorb labour, the State bureaucracy was the main source of occupation for all those who were unable to work in agriculture and who did not want to or could not emigrate.¹²⁰

Overall, the reasons for this situation should be looked for in the structure and the functioning of the Greek State. Due to the "late-late" industrialisation of Greece, the only chance for the integration of the Greek economy into the world economy in a more self-reliant way would be from the top, that is, from the State. This kind of State would be able to intervene in a flexible way and

selectively not in order to destroy or by-pass private initiative, but in order to support it and direct it towards the modernisation of agriculture and the creation of strong bonds between agriculture and industry. However, the Greek State was and goes on being unable to offer such a strategic guidance. Its continued patrimonial/despotic characteristics, its control by parties of clientelistic and/or populist nature and its size, made it inflexible to respond and adapt to a rapidly changing international environment. There had been certain needs or challenges. Among them were the necessity of modernisation of the agriculture of the country during the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the need for industrialisation through the substitution of imports during the interwar period, and the challenge of 1992 (that is the prospect of Greece joining on equal terms in the European Union). However, the inflexible, overpoliticised and clientelistic Greek State contributed to the perpetuation of the semi-peripheral position of Greece in the world and in the European Union.¹²¹

7.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To sum up, Greece followed a similar path to the other countries of the southern European semi-peripheral zone. Thus, Greece had a peripheral status in the world-economy until the late 1950s - early 1960s. Until then, and after 1922, the capitalist mode of production had dominated thanks to territorial and population growth, the influx of foreign capital, the development of an extensive transport system, the creation of an internal market and the state intervention in the economy. After the civil war and during the post-war years, assisted by the USA, a semi-parliamentary system was created. Thus, since the early 1950s, policies were aiming to promote economic growth and to advance industrialisation of the Greek economy, by devaluating the Greek drachma for attracting foreign capital and by a strong attachment to the principles of liberal economy. Economic development and modernisation were emphasised.

In the 1960s Greece was already playing a semi-peripheral role in the world-economy. Until 1981, the 'outward-looking industrialisation' led to an

increasing dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology and in the establishment of import-substitution industries.

The bulk of foreign capital inflow to Greece (1953-1979) was invested in the strategic industrial sector, with low investment in manufacturing and agricultural production. Multinational firms, which had been export orientated given that the Greek market was small, were the main exporters of non-traditional products. Foreign capital was the only possible agent of industrialisation, and 'transnationalisation' process integrated the Greek economy into the internationalised production system. For its part, national capital had always pursued short-term solutions because it was small and weak. Indigenous capital was directed towards traditional areas of production. In this context, Greece exhibited a dualistic pattern of industry.

The influx of foreign capital was one of the aspects of the so-called 'internationalisation' process; the other aspects were technological transfer, emigration and tourism. The strategy of the entrance of foreign capital and technology gave rise to a serious balance of payments problems which was solved by the promotion of tourism and emigration. Labour leaving agriculture was seeking employment in Western Europe. There was a shift from agriculture to industry and the services sector, the latter being overexpanded. There was also overexpansion of the housing sector, particularly in the post-junta period.

Agricultural investment was state-financed, and agrarian capital was invested in property in the towns. The decline in agricultural production as well as the so-called transnationalisation process had led to a very unbalanced pattern of development, with high levels of regional disparities, and the 'deformation' of regional development. Foreign capital had established in Athens, where infrastructure was available for the production of consumer and durable goods. The economic strategy pursued since the mid-1950s led to a very unbalanced pattern of development: economic growth took place in Athens and secondly, Thessaloniki. By the early 1980s, the 'outward-looking industrialisation' had

led to the dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology. Greece was in a phase of de-industrialisation, without having been industrially mature.

By the early 1980s, the economy was in serious structural crisis with high rates of inflation, a widening deficit in the balance of payments, unemployment and stagnant productive investment. In addition, receipts from tourism, emigration and shipping had generated consumption patterns, which were not corresponding with domestic productive capacities. Consequently, imports were increased. The declining industrial and agricultural sectors illustrated the structural weaknesses of the economy and increased the level of the 'informal economy'.

The above processes took place within the context of an unstable political system. Historically, class domination, strong right wing groups, anti-communism, and the absence of mass political mobilisation had dominated the political system. In 1963, the Centre Union Party came to power to express a new middle class, which had emerged as a result of the processes of economic development, urbanisation and the expansion of educational services. During the 1967-1974 period, Greece was under a dictatorial government. That was why in the 1970s, the country emphasised democratisation of the political system, whereas in the 1950s and 1960s it was preoccupied with economic growth. From 1974 until 1981, a Conservative Party was in power. In 1981, a Socialist Party came to power and advocated changes in the Greek economy and society. These changes had to do with the socialisation of the key sectors of the economy (while still supporting private initiative), promotion of regional development, curbing bureaucratic state intervention in the economy, and reducing the dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology.

In 1981, the accession of Greece to the EEC – which had emphasised regional development - also had a considerable impact on the Greek economy: it meant radical policies of industrial restructuring. However, exports to the EEC fell, and imports from EEC countries increased dramatically. The agricultural

balance of payments with the EEC also showed a substantial deficit, due to the operation of the rules of the EEC. Membership had accentuated existing problems in the manufacturing sectors: an increasing number of manufacturing establishments collapsed. Thus, imports from other EEC countries increased, while exports either fell or stagnated. In 1983, Greek policies devaluated the drachma in order to improve the competitiveness of exports, and imposed import restrictions on a number of products. However, problems continued during the rest of the 1980s.

By the early 1990s, the country faced difficulties in trying to adapt to the European Union. This was mainly due to the nature of the State, with its clientelistic system and its expansion. The State was an obstacle to the modernisation of Greek society, and to the European 'adaptation' which could be through competitiveness in economic life and through the modernisation of the State.

Historically, the State had contributed to the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production and had acquired very important economic functions. These were direct investment in infrastructure, incentives and aids to private industry, control of finance to the private sector through the banking system, and direct participation in the economy by means of setting up public enterprises and utilities. Furthermore, political clientelism and the weakness of civil society played an important role in the expansion of the economic functions of the State, and in the over-staffing of state institutions.

The relative autonomy of the State in relation to civil society was due to the latter's weakness and the weak organisation of capitalists and workers: State-led industrialisation in Greece, as a 'late-late' industrialising capitalist society with early and persistent quasi-parliamentary politics, had generated State-dependent industrial classes.

This weakness of civil society was traced back to Greece's historical heritage. The country, having acquired its political independence in the nineteenth

century (until then, it was under the Ottoman rule), immediately set about implementing western parliamentary forms of political rule. However, the patrimonial type of rule was hostile to the autonomous consolidation of merchants or aristocrats *vis-à-vis* the central authority of the ruler. After Greece had acquired its political independence, the authoritarian and despotic features of the patrimonial State did not disappear. The nineteenth century western parliamentary regimes were based on restricted popular participation, in the context of an authoritarian State controlled by a number of notable families which were keeping the parliamentary system functioning stably by manipulating the electorate through various means.

When Greece was fully integrated into the world economy – through processes of market, state and city expansion – its restrictive parliamentary regimes weakened. However, the demise of oligarchic parliamentarism was not marked by the active participation of the industrial classes: the new middle- and lower-classes were brought into the political arena in a dependent way. As a result, these classes neither eliminated the particularistic features of parliamentary politics, nor did they check the authoritarian tendencies of the State. After the 1929 Depression, industrial capitalism gained momentum in the country. However, the authoritarian structures inherited from the pre-independence era continued. The polity was characterised by a highly unequal distribution of political power between rulers and ruled, as well as by the logic of the ‘party’ systematically dominating over the logic of the market.

Therefore, Greece’s failure to modernise its agriculture and create an industrial sector well articulated with the other parts of the economy was due to the structure of its State. Due to this failure, there was expansion of the State apparatus which was characterised by clientelistic characteristics and ‘corruption’. The restricted capability of Greek industry to absorb labour accentuated state bureaucracy: this was the main source of occupation for those who left agriculture and did not emigrate. Thus, the more the State failed to modernise agriculture, the more it acquired characteristics hindering its own and the economy’s rationalisation. Whenever there was a challenge – e.g. the

challenge of 1992 - the huge, inflexible, overpoliticised, patrimonial and clientelistic Greek State functioned in ways which perpetuated the semi-peripherality of Greece in the world and in the European Union.

It is against this lengthy analysis of Greece, as a European semi-periphery, that the apparent similarities and differences between the Greek and the French and German higher education reforms identified in Chapter Five are re-interpreted in the Conclusion to the thesis.

ENDNOTES

¹ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe", in ARRIGHI, G., (ed), *Semiperipheral Development: the Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, Beverly Hills – London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 35.

² Ibid, p. 36.

³ YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, Tokyo, The United Nations University and London and New Jersey, Zed Books Ltd., p. 25. In addition, each of these aspects (economic, political, social and cultural) affected the others in a multitude of ways. In many ways, countries such as Yugoslavia, Turkey and Albania belong to this group of nations because of their level of economic development, the impact of regional imbalances and their social characteristics. Yet, these countries cannot be included in the same category as Spain, Italy or Greece because they have not participated in the development of world capitalism in modern times. Greece represents an intermediate case between these two groups of countries, basically because of its long domination by the Ottoman Empire. This is a basic reason that it could be said that Greece represents a category of its own. In contrast, Portugal, Spain and Italy played a leading role in the development of capitalism. But, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece still remained behind the most advanced capitalist countries. (See *ibid*, pp. 25-26.)

⁴ Ibid, p. 27.

⁵ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe", *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁶ Ibid, p. 36.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 36-37. In viewing Southern Europe as a periphery in the world economy, three periods can be distinguished. The first one is the last third of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th (up to the outbreak of World War I), the second one is the inter-war period, and the third one is the period after World War II. [See ARRIGHI, G., KEYDER, C., & WALLERSTEIN, I., (1989), "Southern Europe in the World Economy in the Twentieth Century: Implications for Political and Social Transformations", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 409-417.]

The economic primacy of Great Britain (during the middle of the nineteenth century) had already begun its steady decline by the Great Depression in the last third of the nineteenth century. Germany and the United States eroded British competitive advantages in the world economy. Nonetheless, Great Britain still remained the most powerful country in the world system (through colonialism, gold standard and the centrality of London as a market). (See *ibid*, p. 409.) However,

This Pax Britannica nonetheless was eaten away by the increasing acute economic competition among the core powers, which finally resulted, after much delay and hesitation, in World War I. The single most important consequence of this breakdown of the adjustment mechanisms of the interstate system was the Russian revolution of October 1917, with its dramatic consequences in both the core and the periphery of the world-system. ... In the periphery, this political transformation of this most powerful of the peripheral states would signal the speeding up of the process of anti-imperialist revolt, which had already begun and would continue with such intensity throughout the twentieth century. (See *ibid*, pp. 409-410.)

During this period, there was no support within the core states for the ambition of those southern European elements wishing to strengthen their state structures. As a result, Southern Europe was left "behind". [See WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe", *op. cit.*, p. 37.]

The political development of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, in the interwar period, was a response to the fact of "having been left behind" and took primarily the form of fascism and corporatism. The fascist movement presented itself as a rejection of Anglo-American economic and cultural imperialism, a mode of catching up with the core countries, and a repudiation of the Third International alternative. The above developments took place at a time of world economic difficulties and involved some economic withdrawal and some economic realignment with German interests. What was crucial, within Southern Europe, was the internal *rapport de forces*. The strata seeking to benefit from a strong state were much stronger sociologically. At the same time, the efficacy of outside counter-pressure was much weaker due to the world economic difficulties. In addition, the fascist road would hold back the working-class pressure for a better internal division of rewards. (See *ibid*, p. 38.) Thus, a rhetoric of national solidarity became prevalent in the countries of Southern Europe:

The principal trait of this ideology was a fervent rejection of class divisions and of particularistic interests in favor of an idealized organic solidarity in the service of national power and, sometimes, national aggrandizement. In all of these regimes authoritarian polities attempted with varying degrees of success to establish state-society linkages of repressive corporatist character. [See ARRIGHI, G., (1985), "Introduction", in ARRIGHI, G., (ed), *Semiperipheral Development: the Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, Beverly Hills – London – New Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 11.]

At the level of economic policy, measures designed to "strengthen" the national economy matched attempts at corporatist institutionalisation and nationalism. There was also a general tendency towards a substitution of the state for market regulation. (See *ibid*, p. 11.) Moreover,

State responses had to involve a substantially greater degree of control and guidance over the market than had existed before, the main thrust being the coordination of the accumulation process under political tutelage. ... while the

nineteenth-century model took its blueprint from industrialization through the market (i.e., the British case), the model for the interwar period was inescapably the Soviet one. Depending on the levels of earlier development, northern Mediterranean countries pursued paths of "developmental dictatorship" defined within the Soviet paradigm and mostly in contradiction to it. [See ARRIGHI, G., KEYDER, C., & WALLERSTEIN, I., (1989), "Southern Europe in the World Economy in the Twentieth Century: Implications for Political and Social Transformations", op. cit., p. 411.]

⁸ MOUZELIS, N. P., (1978), *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, London, Macmillan, p. 21. After the 1929 Depression, industrial capitalism gained momentum in the country. [See MOUZELIS, N. P., (1986), *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*, London, Macmillan, p. xvii.]

⁹ MOUZELIS, N. P., (1978), *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁰ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", in WILLIAMS, A., (ed), *Southern Europe Transformed: Political and Economic Change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain*, London, Harper & Row Publishers, p. 35. Additionally, since 1829, two fundamental goals preoccupied the Greek state: *modernisation* and *national unification*. Modernisation in the form of westernisation became the cherished policy of intellectuals and Greeks of the *diaspora* but it could not successfully be carried out because of the nonexistence of capitalist conditions and the resistance by 'traditionalists'. National Unification (for almost a century: 1821- 1922) was associated with *Μεγάλη Ιδέα* (Great Idea), a policy dictated by the fact that the Greek state (established in 1829) incorporated only a tiny part of the state's territories. The prolonged process of unification prevented the political elites from channeling sufficient economic resources to the modernisation policy, as well as the building of strong and legitimate central political institutions. On the other hand, the unification policy forced Greece to rely heavily on the support of the major powers of the day. (See *ibid*, pp. 34-35.)

¹¹ YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, op. cit., p. 27.

¹² ARRIGHI, G., KEYDER, C., & WALLERSTEIN, I., (1989), "Southern Europe in the World Economy in the Twentieth Century: Implications for Political and Social Transformations", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 413.

¹³ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe", op. cit., p. 38.

¹⁴ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., p. 37.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 37.

¹⁶ ARRIGHI, G., KEYDER, C., & WALLERSTEIN, I., (1989), "Southern Europe in the World Economy in the Twentieth Century: Implications for Political and Social Transformations", op. cit., pp. 413-414.

¹⁷ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe", op. cit., p. 38.

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 38-39. As already argued, Southern Europe had been a theatre of core-power rivalry before the short-lived era of German domination. [See ARRIGHI, G., KEYDER, C., & WALLERSTEIN, I., (1989), "Southern Europe in the World Economy in the Twentieth Century: Implications for Political and Social Transformations", op. cit., p. 413.] In addition to the Depression, the emergence of Germany as an economic power willing politically to impose a division of labour on the rest of Europe was the second important world event. (See *ibid*, p. 412.) Continental Europe in 1939-45 was the economic (not the political) precursor of the system that followed. Germany was able to exert an effective control on the whole Southern Europe (except Portugal). The occupied and allied countries were harnessed to the German war economy by the German government and its corporations. Labour was imported from the periphery on a large scale. The system collapsed with the defeat of Germany, but with the revival of industrial output and a new phase of technological advance, something formally similar reappeared in the 1960s. [See SEERS, D., (1979), "The Periphery of Europe", in SEERS, D., SCHAFFER, B., & KILJUNEN, M. L., (eds), *Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core-Periphery Relations*, The Institute of Development Studies - Sussex, The Harvester Press, p. 22.] Moreover, the proximate causes of the explosion of migration and tourism, during the 1970s, had been a number of simultaneous trends. "The core's fast growth had its origins in national efforts, with US aid, to make good wartime destruction (in what was in fact the cockpit of the war)." (See *ibid*, p. 22.)

¹⁹ ARRIGHI, G., KEYDER, C., & WALLERSTEIN, I., (1989), "Southern Europe in the World Economy in the Twentieth Century: Implications for Political and Social Transformations", op. cit., pp. 413-414.

²⁰ WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", in WILLIAMS, A., (ed), *Southern Europe Transformed: Political and Economic Change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain*, London, Harper & Row Publishers, pp. 9-11.

²¹ Ibid, pp. 9-11.

²² Ibid, pp. 12-13.

²³ NIKOLINAKOS, M., (1985), "Transnationalization of Production, Location of Industry and the Deformation of Regional Development in Peripheral Countries: the Case of Greece", in HUDSON, R., & LEWIS, J., (eds), *Uneven Development in Southern Europe: Studies of Accumulation, Class, Migration and the*

State, London & New York, Methuen, pp. 203-204. Nikolinakos has argued that the Association Agreement with the EC in 1962 was the deliberate policy of the Greek bourgeoisie to lean on foreign capital in order to secure its immediate political survival as well as its long-term valorisation. (See *ibid*, p. 204.)

²⁴ YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

²⁵ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., p. 38.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 39.

²⁷ NIKOLINAKOS, M., (1985), "Transnationalization of Production, Location of Industry and the Deformation of Regional Development in Peripheral Countries: the Case of Greece", op. cit., p. 206.

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 202-203.

²⁹ WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", op. cit., pp. 8-9.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 5.

³¹ YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, op. cit., p. 32.

³² IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., p. 39.

³³ YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, op. cit., p. 28.

³⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 29-30.

³⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 33-34.

³⁶ WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", op. cit., pp. 14-15.

³⁷ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., p. 42.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 39.

³⁹ YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, op. cit., p. 30.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 31. The 'informal economy' masked the formation of a 'free' labour market outside regulation by the state and trade unions. It was hindering the self-organisation and autonomous expression of the workers in the social and

political sphere and it was promoting the survival of clientelist-type ties of personal dependence. (See *ibid*, p. 31.)

⁴¹ WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

⁴² YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, *op. cit.*, p. 30. In addition, apart from the development of part-time agriculture, there was a spread of part-time work (in the form of temporary work, half-time work and working at home) which had been encouraged by employers' strategies to decentralise industrial investment. (See *ibid*, pp. 30-31.)

⁴³ WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

⁴⁴ NIKOLINAKOS, M., (1985), "Transnationalization of Production, Location of Industry and the Deformation of Regional Development in Peripheral Countries: the Case of Greece", *op. cit.*, p. 204.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 206. The internationalisation process is the dominant feature of the present phase of development of the world capitalist system. In fact, free market forces have created the regional problem, which does not exist as a problem of 'crisis' in those countries where central planning is the main mechanism of the growth and development process. (See *ibid*, pp. 195-196.) Moreover, the internationalisation of production refers to at least the four following developments:

(a) The possibilities of new technologies nowadays enable mass production, which can be absorbed only by a market greater than the national one; the external markets have thus become a constituent part of the market of the individual firm or, to put it in another way, of the national market to which capital is directed. (b) Inputs, markets and decision-making have been internalized within Transnational Corporations (TNCs); this means that the production process itself has been transnationalized; TNCs operate as one incorporated unit, of which the subsidiaries constitute functional parts. (c) Investment has been inter- and transnationalized, thus transnationalizing the whole accumulation process itself. (d) The production process itself has been transnationalized from a technical point of view, in the sense that parts of a final product are produced in different countries. (See *ibid*, p. 196.)

Finally, the transnationalisation process is not a simple problem of industry location, but a functional aspect of the economic system, both on the national and world level. The above developments are conditioned to a great extent by fundamental changes of two important variables: science and consumption patterns. (See *ibid*, p. 196.)

⁴⁶ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁴⁷ HUDSON, R., & LEWIS, J., (1985), "Introduction: Recent Economic and Political Changes in Southern Europe", in HUDSON, R., & LEWIS, J., (eds),

Uneven Development in Southern Europe: Studies of Accumulation, Class, Migration and the State, London & New York, Methuen, p. 42.

⁴⁸ NIKOLINAKOS, M., (1985), "Transnationalization of Production, Location of Industry and the Deformation of Regional Development in Peripheral Countries: the Case of Greece", op. cit., pp. 201-202.

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp. 206-207.

⁵⁰ Ibid, pp. 206-207. In this sense, the model of economic development was both deformed and deforming: deformed because it was shaped according to the short-term interests of groups prevailing politically and deforming because of its effects. Agriculture was mainly used as a 'residual factor' and not as a strategic variable and it had never been reorganised and restructured in order to be made productive and effective. Moreover, the first instrument applied to get rid of the social pressures of the un- and under-employed was emigration, while the second one was industrialisation in the capital of the country to promote economic development, based on the rules of capitalist accumulation. Therefore, the agricultural problem was left to be solved by the indirect and direct effects of the above policies. "The regional concentration of population, industry and state activity around Athens was consequently a natural by-product of the above developments, a phenomenon similar to that observed in almost all developing countries." (See *ibid*, p. 204.)

⁵¹ WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", op. cit., pp. 8-9.

⁵² IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., p. 38.

⁵³ YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

⁵⁴ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., pp. 40-41.

⁵⁵ WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", op. cit., pp. 9-11.

⁵⁶ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., p. 41.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 41.

⁵⁸ Ibid, pp. 41-42.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 42.

⁶⁰ WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", op. cit., pp. 17-20.

⁶¹ ARRIGHI, G., (1985), "Introduction", in ARRIGHI, G., (ed), *Semiperipheral Development: the Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, Beverly Hills – London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 12.

⁶² TROUMBOUR, J., (1993), "Preface: Southern Europe - Past and Present", in KURTH, J., & PETRAS, J., (eds), *Mediterranean Paradoxes: the Politics and Social Structure of Southern Europe*, Oxford, Berg, p. 6.

⁶³ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., p. 36.

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 36-37. According to Williams, later on, the military handed over power to Karamanlis precisely in order to retain their dominant position. Moreover, the precise conditions under which dictatorial government came to an end were as varied as they had been during their initiation. [See WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", op. cit., p. 21.]

⁶⁵ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., pp. 33-34. Like other Mediterranean countries, Greece exhibited a dualistic socio-political formation with modern structures and institutions coexisting with traditional elements. (See *ibid*, p. 34.)

⁶⁶ Ibid, pp. 44-45. Greece still devoted a relatively low share of expenditure to social welfare while it devoted an extremely high proportion of its GNP to military expenditure. (See *ibid*, p. 44.)

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 46

⁶⁸ ARRIGHI, G., (1985), "Introduction", op. cit., p. 12.

⁶⁹ ARRIGHI, G., KEYDER, C., & WALLERSTEIN, I., (1989), "Southern Europe in the World Economy in the Twentieth Century: Implications for Political and Social Transformations", op. cit., p. 415.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 415.

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 416. However, according to Arrighi *et al*, the question is to what extent this exchange would be successfully implemented, and who would benefit most from it. (See *ibid*, p. 416.)

⁷² IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., pp. 44-45.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 49. The results of the 1981 election reflected important changes in the 'typology' and the structure of political forces in Greece: there was a party system made up of three parties corresponding to three distinct ideological and political positions. These parties were PASOK (the Socialist Party), ND (the Conservative Party) and KKE (the Communist Party). (See *ibid*, p. 49.)

⁷⁴ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe", op. cit., p. 39.

⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 49-50. As far as the changes in the political elite are concerned, there was a decline of traditional patterns of political recruitment as well as a decline of political family as an institution of political recruitment. (See ibid, pp. 50-52.) The shifts from dictatorial to democratic, and conservative to socialist governments were associated with changes in the political elites and in patronage / clientelism in these countries. PASOK in Greece represented a change in the system of political recruitment. [See WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", op. cit., p. 23.]

⁷⁶ IOAKIMIDIS, P.C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., pp. 58-59.

⁷⁷ Ibid, pp. 49-50. Greece belonged to the capitalist periphery, and this had stunted its capacity for self-sustained growth and had fostered exploitation. The resulting social structure required a small oligarchic elite, which acted as an agent for foreign interests. Thus, such dependency was antithetical to the end of self-sustained growth. (See ibid, pp. 49-50.)

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 59.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 59.

⁸⁰ NIKOLINAKOS, M., (1985), "Transnationalization of Production, Location of Industry and the Deformation of Regional Development in Peripheral Countries: the Case of Greece", op. cit., p. 208. The regional programme submitted to the EC authorities (Center of Planning and Economic Research, 1981) indicated the following basic objectives:

to reduce internal migration to the minimum necessary and to retain in every region a viable and adequate population; to improve the standard of living in the poorer areas and reduce regional, economic and social inequalities; to preserve a satisfactory level of employment in all regions; the continuation of substantial rates of development in all regions which have been growing at comparatively satisfactory rates; and the acceleration of development in areas with slow growth. (See ibid, p. 208.)

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 208.

⁸² DESPICHT, N., (1980), " 'Center' and 'Periphery' in Europe", in DE BANDT, J., MANDI, P., & SEERS, D., (eds), *European Studies in Development: New Trends in European Development Studies*, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, pp. 38-39.

⁸³ Ibid, pp. 40-41.

⁸⁴ YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, op. cit., p. 36. Yachir argues that:

Between dependence alone and dependence as part of a dynamic and powerful grouping, the choice has certainly been made easier by the desire to strengthen the newly acquired democracy and by the cultural proximity to northern Europe. But it has perhaps also been guided by the hope of a greater prosperity. How far increased prosperity may result from an improvement in productive performances in the framework of the Common Market or from a simple policy of social transfers within the EEC remains an open question: Canada or Puerto Rico? (See *ibid*, p. 37.)

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 35.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 35. Additionally, Yachir has suggested that:

In the countries of Southern Europe the reduction of external investment or its diversion towards low-wage areas, the halt to emigration, the fall-off in tourism and the contraction of external markets are exacerbating the slowing down of growth, and the inflation, unemployment and external indebtedness that arise from the contradictions of local capitalist development. Similarly, the impact of the restructuring called for by entry into the EEC is augmented by the deflationary policies implemented by left-wing governments in order to try and get out of the crisis. (See *ibid*, p. 36.)

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 36.

⁸⁸ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54. In 1975, Greece had opted for full membership. In 1979, the Act of Accession was signed. But, Greece appeared to be so anxious to join in the EEC that it did not raise some questions that might have delayed the negotiations. (See *ibid*, pp. 53-54.)

⁸⁹ WILLIAMS, A. M., (1984), "Introduction", *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁹⁰ IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 57.

⁹² *Ibid*, p. 57.

⁹³ *Ibid*, pp. 57-58.

⁹⁴ TSOUKALIS, L., (1993), «Εισαγωγή: Ευρωπαϊκή Προσαρμογή και Εθνικές Ιδιαιτερότητες» ("Introduction: European Adaptation and National Peculiarities), in TSOUKALIS, L., (ed), *Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα: Η Πρόκληση της Προσαρμογής* (Greece in the European Union: the Challenge of Adaptation), Athens, Papazisis, p. 19.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 20. Tsoukalis argues that to a certain degree, such a worsening of the trade balance, as a direct consequence of the accession, could not in itself

explain the negative performance of the Greek economy. It certainly needs a much more complicated explanation. A school of economists emphasises the importance of the structural factors in influencing crucially the economic development of a country in the framework of the common market. These factors are the initial level of industrialisation, the technological infrastructure, education, the size of the domestic market and the geographical position. Without underestimating their importance, they are not as crucial as a wrong economic policy or even a different behaviour in the microeconomic level. (See *ibid*, pp. 20-21.)

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 28. According to Tsoukalis, the failure of the country in such an effort would mean a rapid marginalisation of the country with unavoidable negative repercussions on the living conditions of the population as well as on the conservation and revival of the healthy elements of its social and cultural peculiarities. This would put at risk even its territorial integrity. (See *ibid*, p. 28.)

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 28-29.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 28-29. Diamantouros has also argued that the European Union was an external factor, crucial in the long-term process of the modernisation of societies, which like Greece had followed a route of late-development. [See DIAMANTOUROS, N. I., (1993), «Τα Διλήμματα του Εκσυγχρονισμού» ("The Dilemmas of Modernisation"), in TSOUKALIS, L., (ed), *Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα: η Πρόκληση της Προσαρμογής* (Greece in the European Union: the Challenge of Adaptation), Athens, Papazisis, p. 317.] Thus, on the one hand, there was a pressure upon Greece for a major modernisation, rationalisation and restructuring of the Greek society, economy and polity. On the other hand, the Greek state was unable to cope with structural changes coming from the challenge of the adaptation. (See *ibid*, p. 314.)

⁹⁹ TSOUKALIS, L., (1993), «Εισαγωγή: Ευρωπαϊκή Προσαρμογή και Εθνικές Ιδιαιτερότητες» ('Introduction: European Adaptation and National Peculiarities'), *op. cit.*, p. 29. A considerable resistance to the competition and modernisation comes from the non-competitive strata of society, which aim at the conservation of state protectionism, and the clientelistic system as a means for their own economic survival. (See *ibid*, p. 29.)

This last point is associated with a basic characteristic of modern Greek society, which has to do with the formation of two different and conflicting traditions. The first one is the "culture of underdog" which belongs to the oppressed who fear and detest the modern principles of organisation of societies (principles related to the capitalist organisation of the market, competitiveness, rationalism and globalisation, private rights, the faith in the institutions and so on) because such a developmental process makes them even more marginalised. The second one is the "modernising culture" which agrees to all the above principles of the 'age of enlightenment' and the 'industrial revolution'. The historical process of Greek society was characterised by the continuous conflict of these two cultural traditions, none of which managed to become 'hegemonic'.

Moreover, the "modernising culture" seems to gain ground due to the "challenge of adaptation" into the European Union. [See DIAMANTOUROS, N. I., (1993), «Τα Διλήμματα του Εκσυγχρονισμού» ("The Dilemmas of Modernisation"), in TSOUKALIS, L., (ed), *Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα: η Πρόκληση της Προσαρμογής* (Greece in the European Union: the Challenge of Adaptation), Athens, Papazisis, pp. 314-317.]

¹⁰⁰ ARRIGHI, G., (1985), "Introduction", op. cit., pp. 11-12.

¹⁰¹ MOUZELIS, N. P., (1978), *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, op. cit., p. 26. In addition, Mouzelis has argued that:

State intervention in the economy, in so far as it aims not at the destruction but at the buttressing of bourgeois interests, does not, of course, imply any weakening of capitalism (or the dominance of the political over the economic instance): on the contrary, it is one of the fundamental preconditions of fully developed capitalism; (See *ibid*, pp. 26-27.)

¹⁰² IOAKIMIDIS, P. C., (1984), "Greece: From Military Dictatorship to Socialism", op. cit., p. 38. Moreover, the political conflict, in contrast to the previous pre-capitalist periods, took a more directly class character. This means not that clientelism ceased to play an important role in Greek politics, or that the political parties lost entirely their personalistic character and started operating like the Western counterparts. It means that the greater involvement of the masses with politics (a concomitant of capitalist dominance) had consequences, which made the articulation between class locations and political practices more direct. These consequences were the emergence of a communist party organised along non-clientelistic, ideological principles, the gradual decline of clientelism in the large urban centres, the greater organisational cohesion of bourgeois parties on the national level, etc. [See MOUZELIS, N. P., (1978), *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, op. cit., p. 27.]

¹⁰³ YACHIR, F., (1989), *The Mediterranean: Between Autonomy and Dependency*, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

¹⁰⁴ MOUZELIS, N. P., (1986), *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*, London, Macmillan, p. xiv.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 224. Moreover, Mouzelis uses the term 'parliamentary semi-periphery':

as a kind of *shorthand*, as a convenient term for referring to a number of societies all of which, unlike most third-world countries, have experienced both advanced industrialisation *and* a long history of parliamentary-democratic rule. This combination of early and persistent parliamentarism and late industrialisation makes these countries quite comparable to western European societies. (See *ibid*, p. xv.)

The term 'parliamentary semi-periphery' does not imply an alternative theory of development/underdevelopment; neither does it operate as an exclusive category referring to a specific set of societies strictly different from the rest of the world. (See *ibid*, p. xiv.) Indeed, by using the centre-periphery terminology, Mouzelis does not imply acceptance of Wallerstein's views on capitalist development and on the specific mechanisms, which create centres, peripheries and semi-peripheries on the world-economy level. (See *ibid*, p. xiv.) The zero-sum relationship between the central, semi-peripheral and peripheral nations, is not convincing for the following reasons:

More often than not the proposition is simply advanced as an obvious feature of capitalist markets, without any systematic effort to provide the reasons or mechanisms which bring about such a zero-sum situation on the level of the world economy. But in any case, it is not clear why mechanisms of this sort need to be assumed. For it may be that the reason why the tripartite periphery/semi-periphery/centre structure is not pear-like (that is, the reason why it does not have a narrow base and a broad middle) has less to do with the world market and more with the internal organization of peripheral states. [See MOUZELIS, N., (1994), "The State in Late Development: Historical and Comparative Perspectives", in BOOTH, D., (ed), *Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice*, Essex, Longman Scientific & Technical, p. 146.]

¹⁰⁶ MOUZELIS, N., (1994), "The State in Late Development: Historical and Comparative Perspectives", in BOOTH, D., (ed), *Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice*, Essex, Longman Scientific & Technical, p. 142.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 142.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 142.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 141-142.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 141-142.

¹¹¹ MOUZELIS, N. P., (1986), *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*, op. cit., pp. xiii-xiv.

¹¹² *Ibid*, pp. xv-xvi.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, p. xvi.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, pp. xvi-xvii. Also, the clientelistic character of the politicisation of status apparatus in Greece was especially harmful due to the weakness of civil society. [See MOUZELIS, N., (1993), «Πολιτικό Σύστημα και Εκσυγχρονισμός» ("Political System and Modernisation"), in TSOUKALIS, L., (ed), *Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα: η Πρόκληση της Προσαρμογής* (Greece in the European Union: the Challenge of Adaptation), Athens, Papazisis, p. 302.]

¹¹⁵ MOUZELIS, N. P., (1986), *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*, op. cit., p. xvii.

¹¹⁶ MOUZELIS, N., (1993), «Πολιτικό Σύστημα και Εκσυγχρονισμός» ("Political System and Modernisation"), in TSOUKALIS, L., (ed), *Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα: η Πρόκληση της Προσαρμογής* (Greece in the European Union: the Challenge of Adaptation), Athens, Papazisis, p. 304.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 289-290.

¹¹⁸ For more information, see *ibid*, pp. 290-293.

¹¹⁹ See *ibid*, pp. 295-296. However, as was also earlier argued, at the economic level, despite its relatively late start and its failure to industrialise in the last century, Greece managed - through the development of its export sectors - first, to build up a significant economic infrastructure and then, to achieve an impressive degree of industrialisation during the inter-war and post-war years. [See MOUZELIS, N. P., (1986), *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*, op. cit., p. xiv.] During the 1960s and until the world economic crisis of 1974, some of the impasses that industrialisation in Greece had created, through the substitution of imports, were faced temporarily with the influx of multinational capital. This gave impetus to the investments in high technology sectors and to the exports of industrial goods. Yet, the continuing 'disarticulation' of the Greek economy ended the "economic miracle" of the 1960s. The economic crisis of 1974 and later on, the rise of PASOK to power, led to a reduction of foreign investments and to a weakness in indigenous industrial enterprises (private and state ones). [See MOUZELIS, N., (1993), «Πολιτικό Σύστημα και Εκσυγχρονισμός» ("Political System and Modernisation"), op. cit., p. 297.]

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 300.

¹²¹ Ibid, pp. 304-305. During the 1980s, the unfavourable position of the Greek agriculturists was reversed by PASOK, which used the allocations from the EEC for the benefit of the agriculturists. However, these allocations were allocated in such a way that led to individual enrichment. There were no structural changes that contributed to an increase in productivity. (See *ibid*, p. 293.)

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE CONCLUSIONS

The central purpose of this chapter is to re-analyse the Greek, and the French and German reforms – identified in Chapter Five - by taking into consideration the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece within Europe, as this was analysed in Chapters Six and Seven.

However, before proceeding to this re-analysis, a crucial difference will first be considered. This difference concerns the concept of 'time'.¹

As already argued, in both France and Germany the non-university sector was established within higher education during the 1960s-1970s period. In contrast, in Greece, the non-university sector was established within higher education at the beginning of the 1980s. Since the Greek reforms were apparently "lagging behind" by ten or more years, the 1980s-1990s Greek reforms were in Chapter Five compared to the 1960s-1970s reforms in France and Germany and a number of similarities and differences were identified. Thus, the Greek higher education reforms were 'behind' in chronological time and what is striking, in an initial interpretation of the 1980s-1990s Greek reforms, is that these appeared to be like the French and German reforms of the 1960s-1970s.

Within this chapter, a different aspect of the concept of 'time' can be discussed. The concept of 'time' can be taken as sociological rather than as chronological.² Sociologically, the concept of the 'semi-periphery' can help to explain the chronological lateness of the Greek reforms. And the concept of the semi-periphery can be used to re-analyse the similarities and differences, identified earlier in the two 'time' periods. 'Sociological time' is important in terms of when changes in higher education occurred *within the context* of broader economic, social and political factors as well as international pressures and foreign influences.

In all these three countries, the creation of the non-university sector was part of the reconstruction of higher education as a complex response to the tensions between 'equity' and 'efficiency'.

The first major similarity concerned the tension over 'equity'. The goal of equity had been central in the Greek context, since the 1960s-1970s reforms: there was expansion of the education system and education expenditure was increased. However, in the higher education system, the number of entering students was restricted. This situation was reversed during the Greek reforms of the 1980s-1990s. In the 1980s Greek reforms as well as in the French and German reforms of the 1960s-1970s equity was initially interpreted in terms of the expansion of the higher education system to respond to strong social demand for education as an avenue of social mobility, and in terms of the provision of new technological institutions in higher education.

The political climate in both France and Germany as 'core' countries, during the 1960s-1970s, was in favour of such reforms. In Germany there were calls for greater practical orientation, reinforced by student protests. In France, the events of May 1968 resulted in reforms which placed the *IUT* within *UER* (*Unités d'Enseignement et de Recherche*). In the early 1980s, in Greece, the equality of educational opportunity argument was intensely stressed and there was a significant increase of places in higher education, especially in technological higher education. Politically, in Greece as a semi-peripheral society, the 'equity' policies of this period were within the framework of the judgement by the government that education should be a basic area of activity in a State concerned with the well-being of its citizens. (These policies were also reinforced by the high esteem in which education was held among the Greeks.) Such emphasis on equity took place within a special political climate, typical of the semi-peripheral countries of Southern Europe: the coming to power of socialist governments. In Greece, a socialist-inspired government came to power in 1981, and placed emphasis on equality at all levels of social life, in parallel to the lines of the socialist transformation of the Greek economy which

(while still supporting private initiative) stressed regional development and self-reliance.

The Greek reforms of the 1970s should also be noted in political context: the predecessors to the *TEI* were introduced during the dictatorship. Again, this political climate in Greece was characteristic of the countries of the southern European semi-peripheral zone: they all experienced the rise of dictatorial governments. Historically, among the characteristics of the political system in the southern countries had been class domination, strong right wing groups, anti-communism, and political co-option rather than mass political mobilisation. In Greece, the experience of a seven-year dictatorship (1967-1974) was also the reason why during the 1970s Greek education reforms, the democratisation of education was also expected to contribute to the democratisation of the Greek society. Democratisation was a general theme emphasised by the Conservative Party, which came to power in 1974.

The second major similarity concerned efficiency in both core and semi-peripheral countries.

The first version of efficiency meant providing the right kind of higher education, for example in the non-university sector, to respond to the needs of the economy. Thus, in all three countries emphasis was placed on the practical orientation of the non-university sector and its response to local demands.

The second version of efficiency, in all three countries, meant that this new type of higher education would relieve the overcrowded universities by dealing with the strong social demand for higher education. The major advantage of this new type of higher education – compared to the earlier institutions – would be that it would belong to higher education. The unity of the higher education system was promoted – to be realised in the context of ‘autonomy’ and self-government for all higher education institutions – with a differentiation between the more theoretical universities and the more practically oriented non-university sector.

The tensions over equity and efficiency were interrelated in France and Germany, as core countries. The economy needed more and more vocationally qualified graduates while at the same time there was an increasing demand for higher education, which could not be met by the traditional universities. Thus, the non-university sector was part of the project of the expansion of higher education to meet the above priorities.

In the North Western European countries, the expansion of higher education was made possible by sound and flourishing economies. From the 1960s, these societies had high rates of economic growth and improvements in their overall standard of living. Rates of inflation and unemployment remained at a low level and steadily growing gross national products and trade surpluses enabled national governments to support the rapid growth of tertiary education.³ Furthermore, during the 1960s-1970s, in North Western Europe, there were a number of basic factors that propelled the expansion. These were the development of science, the need for qualified labour for economic growth, the close relationship between education and opportunity, and the increased wealth of society which permitted higher education to stress cultural enrichment or to be treated as a 'consumer good'.⁴

Overall, in both France and Germany, as core countries, it was expansion that affected the structures of higher education.⁵ Not only in France and Germany, but also in other North Western European countries, several models were elaborated, such as the "multipurpose" model, the "specialised" model, and the "binary" model.⁶

Thus, in the course of the 1960s and early 1970s, in North Western European countries, the mission conferred upon higher education had three main elements. First, to raise the general level of education amongst the population (the state investment in human capital). Second, to act as a vehicle for broadening equality of opportunity. Third, higher education was cast as an

extension of the welfare state⁷, by bringing forward talent, irrespective of social origin.⁸

Thus, in France and Germany as core countries, the initiatives for the expansion of higher education were underlined by human capital theory. The themes of economic development and social justice acted as an ideology for mass higher education⁹ in North Western Europe but within the frame of human capital theory. It was within this theory that the equality of educational opportunity argument was used: that the most efficient path to the national development of any society lay in the improvement of its human resources. Whether educational investment was worthwhile became a question for economists. Education was not to be viewed simply as a form of consumption but rather as a productive investment. Society would gain from the impact of the improved quality of the labour force upon productivity, no matter how these gains would be distributed.¹⁰ Thus, for human capital theorists, social inequality was considered to be bad because it would lead to a loss of talent. The theory suggested that reforms had to be made, aiming at social equality, so that the potentials of individuals for specialisation would not be lost.¹¹

The influence of human capital theory could be seen in the two arguments being used to sustain the expansion of higher education. The first argument was that of "social justice": removing artificial barriers in the educational system would create true equality in educational opportunity. This, in turn, would lead to the democratisation of access in higher education as well as to the preferred occupations for which education provided a preparation. The second argument was that of "economic development": it depicted higher education as a productive investment, which would contribute directly to economic growth (social return from the creation of human capital). The emphasis was often placed on technological advance and the need for a workforce which could adapt to changing conditions.¹² The arguments of "social justice" and "economic development" frame the themes of 'equity' and 'efficiency', as these were interpreted in the case of France and Germany. In contrast, in Greece, the

notion of economic development had a different meaning, compared to the other two European countries which were already economically developed.

For Greece, the concept of efficiency meant the contribution of the education system to 'economic development' and 'modernisation' within the context of the semi-peripherality of Greece in the early 1960s: economic development and modernisation were seen as necessary for Greece to catch up with the core. Within this context, from the 1960s-1970s special emphasis was placed on post-secondary technical/vocational education. This was promoted as part of the modernisation of the education system to contribute to the goals of economic development and modernisation - also within a human capital approach.

Furthermore, the promotion of post-secondary technical/vocational education came from outside of Greece through the influence and intervention of international organisations (OECD and the World Bank), within their own logic of economic development and modernisation. The predecessors of the *TEI* were introduced by these same agencies. This can be understood through one aspect of the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece: the use of foreign capital, which was concentrated on the strategic industrial sector, in the 1960s and 1970s. The ability of the State to attract 'core' capital in order to upgrade its 'core' activities - albeit in a dependent way - was seen in the establishment of multinational firms and in the entrance of foreign capital. This so-called 'internationalisation' process, which included foreign investment and technological transfer during the 1960s-1970s, was the reason why, at the beginning of the 1980s, with political change in Greece, the 'socialist inspired' government called for a less dependent, that is, a 'self-reliant' development.

This shift was an important reaction for higher education. The 1980s Greek higher education reforms stressed 'self-reliant development' which would be achieved through the creation of an indigenous science and technology infrastructure. For this, a special emphasis was placed on the practical and applied orientation of the *TEI*: these would be oriented towards productive applications and applied research. The *TEI* were also expected to co-ordinate

their objectives with those of the *AEI* towards the goal of 'self-reliant' development.

Thus, in contrast to France and Germany, where the respective technological institutions were responding to the needs of the economy, Greek higher education was expanded, and the *TEI* were promoted – but not to serve the needs of the *existing* economy. The introduction of the *TEI*, in the early 1980s, was the provision of 'mass' higher education that took place within the context of Greece as a semi-peripheral society during that period.

The *existing* economy of Greece was characterised by foreign capital concentrated on the industrial sector, with low investment in manufacturing and agriculture. National capital was small, weak, and directed towards traditional areas of production. There was a dualistic pattern in industry. The economy was characterised by technological transfer, emigration and tourism. There was also a shift from agriculture to industry and the services – accompanied by the subsequent overexpansion of the services sector and an overexpansion of the housing sector – as well as an increase of the 'informal' economy. Agricultural investment was state-financed, while agrarian capital was invested in property in the towns. The decline in agricultural production as well as the transnational investment process led to a very unbalanced pattern of development, with high levels of regional disparities, and the 'deformation' of regional development. By the early 1980s, 'outward-looking industrialisation' had led to the increasing dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology. Greece was in a phase of de-industrialisation, before having reached industrial maturity.

The introduction of the new technological institutions within higher education was irrelevant to this economy – unlike the articulation of the new higher education institutions in France and Germany with their economies. Nevertheless, within this context, the official themes of 'modernisation' and economic development went on dominating the Greek higher education reform agenda during the 1980s-1990s. In the early 1980s, the introduction of the *TEI*

within higher education was part of the modernisation of the education system to respond to the *expected* modernisation and economic development of the country, to compete on equal terms in the EEC. In 1981, accession to the EEC (European Economic Community) - a crucial external actor for the Greek society - had created a European doctrine about regional imbalance and this also brought radical policies of industrial restructuring.

Thus, the special emphasis on 'international experience' in the case of Greece can be understood through the expected need for modernisation and the hope of joining on equal terms in the EEC. The Greek government stressed the experience of other countries and adopted an international model of higher education suggested by UNESCO. Not only should the economy be restructured and modernised, but also higher education should be modernised for an 'external' reason - joining the EEC. However, the actual economic situation - as distinct from the *expected* economic situation - was that in the 1980s exports to the EEC fell and imports increased, while the agricultural balance of payments with the EEC showed a substantial deficit. Problems in the manufacturing sectors were accentuated. By the early 1990s, Greece was facing difficulties in adapting to the European Community (later, the European Union) on equal terms.

These problems were largely due to the nature of the Greek State. The patrimonial, authoritarian and particularistic features of the Greek State - inherited from Ottoman rule - resulted in the gradual and then systematic dominance of the logic of political party over the logic of the market. This was due to the weakness of civil society in Greece, where state-led industrialisation had generated state-dependent industrial classes - a semi-peripheral phenomenon. This weakness of civil society has continued: Greek civil society has not challenged the State which is not disturbing cultural and social relations or occupational hierarchies. On the contrary, the State is reinforcing clientelism.

Thus, the State was hindering a pattern of development that would not be based on attracting foreign capital but on the ability of the country to develop

indigenously in order to advance its core activities as part of a strong association (the EEC) in the world economy. Due to the "late-late" industrialisation of Greece, the only chance for the integration of the country into the world economy in a more self-reliant way would be from the State. However, the State was unable to intervene flexibly for the modernisation of agriculture, nor was it able to create strong linkages with industry, nor to create an industrial sector well articulated with the rest of the economy. The State apparatus was over-expanded and had clientelistic characteristics. The more the State failed to modernise agriculture, the more it acquired characteristics hindering its own and the economy's rationalisation.¹³

Within this context, the success of the *Fachhochschulen* and the *IUT* - at least in terms of labour demand by the end of the 1960s-1970s period - was not matched by the Greek *TEI* in the 1980s-1990s. The *TEI* did not respond to the economy nor did they resolve the interrelationship between equity and efficiency, as these were interpreted in the North Western European context. Instead, the *TEI* responded to concerns over equity, in terms of the expansion of the higher education system to satisfy social demand, and the relief of the overcrowded universities. The non-university sector was actually functioning as a 'breakwater' for the very strong social demand for higher education, an exceptional Greek phenomenon.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the stress on higher education to meet goals, such as 'self-reliant' economic development and modernisation, concealed the broader changes that should have been introduced in Greek society. Education was charged with changing society towards self-reliant development and modernisation - but in the absence of major structural changes in the economy and with the State continuing to be an obstacle to the developmental process.

Within this context, the introduction of the *TEI*, and the stress on the importance of 'science and technology' for self-reliant development was a dramatic strategy. It was judged that it was crucial that science and technology

should not be imported but should be produced within the country. It has been argued that in both developing and developed nations, science and technology are used as economic goods for the improvement and sustenance of national economies.¹⁴ The Greek government, by emphasising the production of science and technology within the country, wanted to lessen the dependency of the country on imported science and technology, a characteristic of semi-peripheral countries. This dramatic contribution was to be through the *TEI*'s special orientation towards applied research, in contrast to the more theoretical universities which were to pursue pure research.

However, seeing the relation of different institutions of higher education on the basis of different responsibilities in the productive sector is of no significance in the context of Greece as a semi-peripheral society. As indicated, the Greek State never succeeded in modernising agriculture and creating an industrial sector well articulated with the other parts of the economy. Nor in Greece were there many political possibilities for the integration of higher education institutions, as in the other two European countries during the 1960s-1970s. In France, the *IUT* were within the University (as part of the *UER*), while the *Gesamthochschulen* in Germany were an attempt at integration. The *Gesamthochschulen* also served equity purposes better than the *Fachhochschulen*. In the end, the *Gesamthochschulen* failed to prevail as a model of higher education partly due to the neo-conservative governments' plan for opening higher education to market forces and partly due to the strong vertical differentiation of the German higher education system. The point here is that attempts at 'integration', in these two countries, promoted the idea of the unity of the higher education system better than in the case of Greece, where no integration of any sort took place. The University continued to dominate – implicitly devaluing technological higher education.

Partly as a consequence of this cultural pattern and partly as a consequence of the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece the issue of 'efficiency' that dominated the higher education policies in France and Germany in the 1980s-1990s was not made visible in Greek policies and debates. The major laws introduced at the

beginning of the 1980s - Law 1268/82 on the universities and Law 1404/83 on the *TEI* – did not undergo any substantial changes in the rest of the 1980s and in the 1990s. Issues that had appeared in the higher education systems of the other two European countries, like those of quality control, did not appear in the context of Greece.

Efficiency for France and Germany, during the 1980s-1990s, meant the promotion of the non-university sector as part of the ‘vocationalisation’ of higher education to respond to the needs of the ‘market’. In both France and Germany, as ‘core’ countries, the non-university sector of higher education was successful in terms of both individual and employment demand. Furthermore, since it was estimated that the non-university sector of higher education was responding better than the universities to the market, the functional differentiation of the higher education system – that is, the distinction between the university and the non-university sector - was promoted. Other accompanying themes to the issue of ‘vocationalisation’ as a response to the ‘market’ were quality (in the case of Germany) or excellence (in the case of France), institutional autonomy, regionalisation and links with industries, and an increase of the student numbers (in the case of France). The non-university sector was also to relieve universities from large numbers of students – as in the previous period - thus contributing to the second version of the efficiency project. In the Federal Republic of Germany, in particular, the promotion of the ‘differentiation’ between the *Fachhochschul* sector and the universities (even after the unification with the former German Democratic Republic) aimed at the protection of the German Research University. This last issue was a contribution to the second version of efficiency, in the case of Germany.

However, in both France and Germany, as ‘core’ countries, the issue of efficiency had changed. There was a shift to the concept of the market, during the 1980s-1990s, away from a loosely planned economy and away from the centrality of the role of the state in shaping higher education, as was the case during the 1960s-1970s.

This promotion, during the 1980s-1990s, of the non-university sector - as part of the 'vocationalisation' of higher education to respond to the market - in both France and Germany as 'core' countries, can be explained through what has been described as the 'evaluative state'.

The 'evaluative state' emerged rapidly during the 1980s, because of structural change in the economy and in demography, and because of a shift in political and social principles.¹⁵ The 'evaluative state' made students and individuals more sensitive to 'the market', thus devolving the responsibility of preparing for such change on the individual. Those who did not make such adjustment would suffer the penalties of their wrong decision. The 'evaluative state' had also an indirect strategy, which involved a wide-ranging social mobilisation in order to meet the challenge of technological change, as well as to insert the necessary organisational rationality into those institutions central to the social adjustment that consolidates such change. Some interpreted this as the 'privatisation' of higher education and others gave this same phenomenon a more concrete expression by identifying new models of higher education.¹⁶

In Greece, as a semi-peripheral society, the policies used in the western European context – and in France and Germany specifically – did not become visible. In the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece one could not really talk about 'the market'. Even though in the early 1990s the aspiration of Greece to adapt to the European Union on equal terms made the pressure for modernisation even stronger and there is evidence that the promotion and expansion of the non-university sector was already under way, there were no explicit statements about the 'vocationalisation' of higher education *as a response to the 'market'*. In fact, in Greece as a semi-peripheral society, policies of promotion and expansion of the non-university sector aimed mostly at responding to strong social demand and at avoiding the exodus of the large number of Greek students to study abroad. The official policies had already argued so. Yet, such policy choices were in the context of increasing unemployment, particularly for TEI graduates, in the 'semi-peripheral' economy of Greece.

Furthermore, it should be noted that in the western European context of the 1980s-1990s the 'vocationalisation' of higher education to respond to the market was underlined by a neo-liberal theory of the state. The state was seen as the "invisible hand" of the market, which means that its proper role is to provide a legal framework in which the market can best maximise "benefits" to mankind.¹⁷ This neo-liberal theory of the state fits with human capital theory, which explains many aspects of individual behaviour in a labour market where education is important in allocating jobs and income.¹⁸

Within both the neo-liberal theory of the state and human capital theory the state is limited to providing education in response to price changes for educated labour. Individual investors and their families - the driving force behind the demand for education - respond to market forces, which influence the wages of more or less highly schooled labour. So, the "good" state provides the education demanded by such market forces. In this way, the state's role in providing education is assessed solely in terms of its meeting changing market conditions.¹⁹ Thus in late-modern educational systems of core countries, the project of education becomes the provision of services by the market to consumers who have the right to choose education, while the State frames a system which permits diversity, choice, freedom and consumer rationality. Persons build skill packages oriented towards the 'market' and towards higher education admission.²⁰

This kind of discourse is affecting the higher education patterns in North Western European countries, as core societies, in the 1990s. The rationale of the vocationalisation of higher education to respond to the needs of the market fits well with these countries' political economies. However, Greece is different: it is still characterised by a semi-peripheral economy and by a semi-peripheral State which is changing rather slowly. Policies stressing the promotion of the non-university sector as an expression of the 'vocationalisation' of higher education to respond to the needs of the market fit badly with the present economic, social and political context of Greece as a European semi-periphery.

It is probably the case, on the basis of the analysis in this thesis, that policies for the improvement of technological higher education in Greece should be indigenously generated.

This research has been in some ways inductive. As I have already argued, in the first instance my major aim was to interpret and analyse the higher education policy in Greece but my wish was to look at the issue comparatively. This led me to wide reading and, as a consequence, to the identification of some similarities in the higher education reform patterns of these three European countries. However, I found these similarities that I had identified puzzling - knowing the Greek socio-economic context. I started studying the sociological literature to understand better the status of Greece in the world-economy. Thus, I approached Greece as a European 'semi-periphery' through two theoretical perspectives: initially Wallerstein's 'world systems analysis' and then Mouzelis' emphasis on the role of the State as an actor within 'semi-peripheral' societies.

At the turning point in my research, these two different tasks (the empirical investigation and the theoretical framework) were informing each other. My work was not simply inductive; it underwent a parallel process of induction/deduction. That is, in the middle of the writing process I was thinking about which aspects of Greece - as a 'semi-peripheral' society - could explain the similarities and which aspects could explain the differences in the reform patterns of higher education.

The initial choice of world systems analysis was because its neo-Marxist origin could permit the study of Greece in its macro-historical transformation, as has already been demonstrated. This was particularly useful because the description and analysis in the first part of the thesis was set up also in historical perspective. Thus, the similarities and the differences in the higher education reform patterns could be analysed on the basis of the status of Greece in the world-economy at the particular moment in time that certain policies were introduced.

This same topic could have been approached otherwise. For instance, it could have been set up with the theoretical framework at the beginning for the establishment of a two-fold conceptual apparatus which would define certain characteristics of France and Germany as 'core' societies, and certain characteristics of Greece as a 'semi-peripheral' society. This two-fold conceptual apparatus could then have been directly used for the analysis and interpretation of the higher education reform patterns in these three countries. That is, the higher education reform patterns in Greece as a 'semi-peripheral' society could have been re-interpreted against the higher education reform patterns of two 'core' countries within Europe. The question of an ultimate convergence or divergence in the higher education patterns of 'core' and/or 'semi-periphery' would be raised.

The question of convergence or divergence in the higher education patterns of 'semi-peripheral' societies can be raised – but here it would perhaps be interesting to ask in future research: do the higher education patterns in other semi-peripheral societies correspond with the Greek case? Is the Greek pattern similar to Portugal, or Spain, or Italy? Are there patterns of convergence in the higher education systems of semi-peripheral societies? Can "my" theory of 'semi-peripheral' societies explain the possibility of a convergence? And if there is divergence, is world systems theory still useful as an analytical tool, or should other theoretical perspectives be considered?

These are all questions to be answered in possible future research concerning the higher education patterns in semi-peripheral societies. This research could use the theoretical framework of this thesis for the definitions of Greece, Portugal, Spain, or Italy as 'semi-peripheral' societies. Then, on the basis of the theory of 'semi-peripheral' societies the higher education reforms patterns in these countries would be analysed.

ENDNOTES

¹ For more information about the concept of time in sociological theory, see MARTINS, H., (1974), "Time and Theory in Sociology", in REX, J., (ed), *Approaches to Sociology: an Introduction to Major Trends in British Sociology*, London & Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 246-294.

² Time and space are not in themselves sociological variables. However, they are crucial dimensions of sociological accounts. For instance, in comparative sociology, temporal and spatial expressions of social structures and processes are central in attempts of understanding the broad types of social relationships people find themselves engaged. [See CROW, G., (1997), *Comparative Sociology and Social Theory: Beyond the Three Worlds*, London, Macmillan, p. 10.]

³ O.E.C.D., (1991), *Alternatives to Universities*, Paris, O.E.C.D., p. 13.

⁴ HERMANNNS, H., & TEICHLER, U., (1983), "Integration of Higher Education: Concepts and Models", in HERMANNNS, H., TEICHLER, U., & WASSER, H., (eds), *The Compleat University: Break from Tradition in Germany, Sweden and the U.S.A.*, Cambridge - Massachusetts, Schenkman Publishing Company, p. 2.

⁵ Ibid, p. 2. The increasing openness also led to a more diverse socialisation background of students. (See *ibid*, p. 2.)

⁶ An OECD study refers to these three kinds of models as "short-cycle" and/or non-university institutions. [See O.E.C.D., (1973), *Short-Cycle Higher Education: a Search for Identity*, Paris, O.E.C.D.] The multipurpose model followed the characteristics of the community colleges of North America, offering vocational courses and qualifications as well as the first two years of the four-year university first-degree (undergraduate) programmes and, increasingly, a wide range of continuing education. [See O.E.C.D., (1991), *Alternatives to Universities*, Paris, O.E.C.D., p. 12.] The "multipurpose" model fulfilled a number of functions: a) it provided a general form of post-secondary education for broad groups reaching this stage, b) it enabled the selection of students best fitted for long cycle higher education, c) it prepared these students for long-cycle education (propaedeutic function), d) it provided others with an opportunity of being trained for a profession in two years, and e) it met adult continuing requirements. The system accepted all students who had reached post-secondary level. [See CIBOIS, P., & MARKIEWICZ-LAGNEAU, J., (1976), *Students in Short Cycle Higher Education: France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia*, Paris, OECD, p. 18.]

The specialised model was the model of Continental Europe: institutions that offered shorter, mostly vocationally oriented courses in a limited number of areas, leading to below-first-degree-level qualifications. [See O.E.C.D., (1991), *Alternatives to Universities*, op. cit., p. 12.] In the specialised model, the Short Cycle Institutions merely completed the vocational training of students from the non-academic stream schools. This implied, unlike the multipurpose model, that a streaming process had already taken place during secondary

education. [See CIBOIS, P., & MARKIEWICZ-LAGNEAU, J., (1976), *Students in Short Cycle Higher Education: France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 18.] The situation in a particular country, more or less, closely approximated to a given model without always being absolutely identical. Until the early 1960s, the specialised model existed in nearly all continental European countries. However, in France, although such a model of vocational education was still to be found, the setting up of the University Institutes of Technology (IUTs) might be regarded as a first step towards the binary model. Moreover, in 1974, with the introduction of the *Diplôme d' Études Universitaires Générales* (DEUG), France might be claimed to be approaching the multipurpose model, since the relevant decree referred to three functions attributed to this latter model: general education, orientation, and training for direct entry into working life. (See *ibid*, p. 19.)

The binary model was typically represented by the British polytechnics, which offered courses and qualifications intended to be distinct from, but of a comparable level to, those in universities. [See O.E.C.D., (1991), *Alternatives to Universities*, op. cit., p. 12.] During a period of a world-wide expansion of higher education systems in response to student demand, binary systems of higher education were introduced in the latter half of the 1960s in the United Kingdom. A separate set of institutions was created alongside the universities, to fulfil purposes distinct from those identified as proper for universities. The focus for expansion shifted from the university to the non-university sector and the latter expanded quite rapidly from the late 1960s on into the 1970s. The reasons for the adoption of a binary system of higher education were twofold. First of all, economic factors were important since it was considered that the cost of expanding the university system to satisfy student demand would be prohibitive. Second, there was a strong ideological component. Universities were considered to be inappropriate institutions in which to educate a larger proportion of the population and the main argument was in essence for a new type of institution, which would be linked more closely to industry and commerce. [See DAVIES, S., (1992), "Binary Systems of Higher Education", in CLARK, B., & NEAVE, G., (eds), *The Encyclopedia of Higher Education*, Vol. 2, Oxford, Pergamon Press, pp. 1066-1067.] The "binary" model might be regarded as a compromise between the two previous systems. Standards of admission were less rigorous than for Long Cycle Higher Education, even if a long-cycle type of education was provided. Instruction was however vocationally oriented. In the end, there were two sectors of higher education, one more theoretical and traditional and the other more practical and innovative. [See CIBOIS, P., & MARKIEWICZ - LAGNEAU, J., (1976), *Students in Short Cycle Higher Education: France, Great Britain and Yugoslavia*, op. cit., pp. 18-19.]

⁷ According to T.H. Marshall's analysis, the welfare state expresses a principle of citizenship exercising increasing countervailing power against the force of class stratification. [See KARABEL, J., & HALSEY, A. H., (1977), "Educational Research: a Review and an Interpretation" in KARABEL, J., & HALSEY, A. H., (eds), *Power and Ideology in Education*, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 10.]

⁸ NEAVE, G., (1989), "Foundation or Roof? The Quantitative, Structural and Institutional Dimensions in the Study of Higher Education", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 214.

⁹ GEIGER, R. L., (1982), *Two Paths to Mass Higher Education: Issues and Outcomes in Belgium and France*, (Yale Higher Education Research Group Working Paper), Higher Education Research Group, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, New Haven, p. 4.

¹⁰ SCHULTZ, T. W., (1961), "Investment in Education", in HALSEY, A. H., FLOUD, J., & ANDERSON, C. A., (eds), *Education, Economy and Society*, New York, The Free Press, London, Collier – Macmillan, p. 52.

¹¹ O' DONNELL, M., (1981), *A New Introduction to Sociology*, London, Harrap, p. 254.

¹² GEIGER, R. L., (1982), *Two Paths to Mass Higher Education: Issues and Outcomes in Belgium and France*, op. cit., p. 4.

¹³ Overall then, it can be claimed that Greece as a semi-peripheral society was characterised by late modernisation and development, and by *unsuccessful* late modernisation.

In clarifying the concept of modernisation and how it is related to the case of Greece, modernisation has different meanings according to the theoretical contexts within which it functions. In exploring the concept, five distinctions can be made, which link this notion with theories that attempt to show how societies have become modern or are trying to do so. [See MOUZELIS, N., (1996), "The Concept of Modernisation: its Relevance for Greece", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 14, April, p. 215.] However, the argument that the problem of all the following theories of modernisation (whether neo-evolutionist, neo-Marxist, or eclectic) is that they are unacceptably Eurocentric, that is they always measure development and underdevelopment in terms of "what happened in the West", should be mentioned. In particular,

since the collapse of the communist regimes, the argument goes, Western capitalist societies have become the model, the ideal situation that alone provides us with the standards for assessing the success or failure of all late-developing countries. (See *ibid*, p. 225.)

Against the above argument, it has been argued that institutions such as:

the market on the economic level, bureaucracy (in the Weberian sense of the term) on the political level, and science on the cultural level, despite that fact that they developed in their fullest logic in nineteenth- and twentieth- century Europe, not only have their roots in a variety of civilizations but also have a universal dimension, universal in the sense that no complex society can avoid them without paying the price of huge dysfunctions. (See *ibid*, p. 225.)

So, the first distinction is that of the modern and the primitive, and how this links up with neo-evolutionist modernisation theories of development. (See *ibid*, p. 215.) According to social evolutionism, primitive societies have a low degree of social differentiation, while modern societies are characterised by a high degree of differentiation, not only on the level of social structure, but also on the cultural level. (See *ibid*, p. 216.) The so-called modernisation theorists of development - influenced by the functionalism and neo-evolutionism of Talcott Parsons - tried to analyse third-world development from the social differentiation point of view:

So modernization theories, which were quite fashionable in the 1950s and 1960s, argue that as soon as third-world countries are integrated into the world system, they begin more or less to follow the same developmental trajectory as Western societies did a hundred years ago. Thereafter, sooner or later the diffusion of Western capital, technology and culture would bridge the gap between agrarian and industrial societies, and all "modernizing societies" would move up the evolutionary ladder going through the same stages of development as Europe did in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. (See *ibid*, p. 217.)

The second distinction is between the modern and the traditional, and is related to a debate on the uniqueness of industrial societies in relation to pre-industrial ones. (See *ibid*, p. 215.) In this approach, modernisation is associated with democratisation not only in the political but also in the economic and cultural spheres. (See *ibid*, pp. 218-219.) In general, according to this approach, modernisation is the passage from pre-industrial to the industrial society:

The process itself entails the gradual disappearance of self-contained, traditional communities, the transformation of "subjects" into "citizens" and, more generally, the mobilization and inclusion of the majority of the population into the "imagined national community" - i.e., into the broader economic, political, and cultural arenas that we usually call the *nation-state*. (See *ibid*, pp. 217-218.)

The third distinction is that between early and late modernisation or development and is associated with neo-Marxist dependency theories. (See *ibid*, p. 215.) Greece (as well as several other Balkan, Latin American, and Asian countries) was a country that entered the development race a century or so later than the nations of Western Europe. In these latecomers, the nation-state took a form different from that of the West. The "modern" did not manage to become dominant and did not succeed in peripheralising the "traditional". Instead, the modern and the traditional coexisted side by side. Thus, in late modernisation, the articulation of the "modern" and the "traditional" tended to lead to: "(a) a more disarticulated capitalist economy, (b) a more authoritarian polity, (c) and a more formalistic/disorientating culture." (See *ibid*, pp. 219-220.)

The fourth distinction is that between successful and unsuccessful late modernisation. This distinction is linked with theories that transcend the contradictions and overgeneralisations of both neo-evolutionist and neo-

Marxist approaches to development. (See *ibid*, p. 215.) Within this perspective, the objective is the construction of more context-bound and context-sensitive theories, that seriously take into account the historical and cultural milieus of these countries' development; that is, the fact that there are a variety of developmental trajectories within the so-called 'third world'. (See *ibid*, p. 220.) For instance, a number of countries with late-industrialisation (such as Norway, Finland, New Zealand, even South Korea and Taiwan) managed to become part of the developed or "first" world in the following ways. Firstly, they successfully modernised their agriculture. This resulted in increased productivity and in a certain rural egalitarianism capable of engendering an important home market for industrial goods. Secondly, they succeeded strong links between agriculture and industry, and the creation of an industrial sector, which also became competitive in the world market in certain limited areas. Thirdly, the State apparatus was playing a key role in agriculture's modernisation and in its effective articulation with industry - a State apparatus, which intervened in the economy not in order to suffocate private capital but in order to assist and direct it. (See *ibid*, pp. 220-221.)

Finally, the fifth distinction is that of the "modern" and the "postmodern", which is relevant for studying present-day social structures in Greece. (See *ibid*, pp. 215-216.) If one of the meanings of modernity entails the notion of differentiation, one of the meanings of postmodernity entails the notion of de-differentiation on the levels of both social structure and culture. Also, if the idea of "modern" entails the destruction of traditional localisms via social mobilisation and the creation of all powerful nation-states, the idea of the "postmodern" entails the quite opposite process, that is, the revival of localism and its articulation with global forces in such a way that it bypasses the nation-state. (See *ibid*, pp. 222-223.) Moreover,

Relating now the distinction "modern/postmodern" to theoretical debates, one can point to arguments that try to assess the relevance of this distinction to contemporary societies on the shift from Taylorism or Fordism to flexible specialization (on the economic level); from working class organizations to the rise of the so-called new social movements (on the political level); and from the technocratic optimism of the Enlightenment to the present relativism, reflexivity, and radical antifoundationalism (on the cultural level). (See *ibid*, p. 223.)

Whether one calls the above state of affairs postmodernity or late modernity, in Greece, the obvious indicators of a postmodern trend are: a) the by-passing of state control by local-global banking networks (on the economic level), b) the growing disenchantment with class parties and trade unions (on the political level), and c) the striking depoliticisation of the younger generation, its orientation to individualistic consumerism and its return to the Orthodox faith (on the cultural level). (See *ibid*, p. 223.)

¹⁴ LAW, W. W., (1994), *The Higher Education Systems of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China: a Comparative Study*, (PhD Thesis), Institute of Education – University of London, pp. 267-268. Science and technology are also

cultural goods, with their own evaluation systems. Thus, they are associated with certain socio-economic and cultural patterns of relations and values of the society in which activities of science and technology are conducted. In considering that the transfer of science and technology is both an economic transaction and an intercultural activity between countries in the world system, the role of 'science' and 'technology' has a special impact on developing societies. The importation of foreign science and technology by developing countries from developed countries means incorporation of these relations and values from developed countries. (See *ibid*, pp. 267-268.)

¹⁵ NEAVE, G., (1988), "On the Cultivation of Quality, Efficiency and Enterprise: an Overview of Recent Trends in Higher Education in Western Europe, 1986-1988", *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 23, Nos. 1/2, p. 19.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁷ CARNOY, M., (1992), "Education and the State: From Adam Smith to Perestroika", in ARNOVE, R., ALTBACH, P., & KELLY, G., (eds), *Emergent Issues in Education: Comparative Perspectives*, New York, State University of New York Press, p. 145. Additionally, understanding the State's role is necessary to conceptualise education because assuming it away as an issue creates serious difficulties in interpreting educational policy analysis. Within this logic, a number of questions can be posed:

Do the conclusions result mainly from unstated political preferences (e.g. "the best government is the least government"; "the market is inherently inequitable")? Or do the results depend on the more usual implicit assumptions about how the state relates to society (e.g. "the state is independent from the economic and social structure"; "the capitalist state is a class state")? (See *ibid*, p. 143.)

The first question can be found in comparisons of private and public education, which consistently underestimate the costs of private education. On the other hand, policy analyses of educational interventions are an illustration of the second question. (See, *ibid*, p. 143.)

¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 145-146.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 145-146. But there are also other State theories, which implicitly underlie various educational analyses such as the theory of the instrumental State which, stemming from a Marxist perspective, claims that the State providing the education is not neutral, but it is a class State. (See *ibid*, pp. 147-148.)

²⁰ COWEN, R., (1996), "Last Past the Post: Comparative Education, Modernity and perhaps Post-Modernity", *Comparative Education*, Vol. 32, No. 2, p. 160. Nevertheless, it is still the state that remains at the centre of social action, and not the individual. In this conception, the main obligation the individual has is to make rational economic and educational choices within the frame of the

market established by the state. "This individual is free precisely because once economic choices are made there are no other choices to be made or obligations to be met. The individual is autonomous and socially and politically unrooted." [See COWEN, R., (1996), "Coda: Autonomy, the Market and Evaluation Systems and the Individual", in COWEN, R., (ed), *World Yearbook of Education 1996: The Evaluation of Higher Education Systems*, London, Kogan Page, pp. 183-184.]

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE

A DESCRIPTION OF THE GREEK HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Higher education in Greece includes the *AEI* and the *TEI*. The higher education system in Greece will be presented in the Tables that follow. These Tables, which have been presented by Kladis *et al*, offer the arrangement (order) of the Departments - and the corresponding degrees they provide - in the 18 "Highest Educational Institutions" (*Ανώτατα Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα*) which are the Universities and University Level Establishments, and the 12 "Technological Educational Institutions" (*Τεχνολογικά Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα*). The regional development of the Departments is also provided. The Tables also include the *SELETE* (School for Teachers of Technical and Vocational Education) and the Higher School of Rhodes.¹

The Departments and the corresponding degrees of the Greek *AEI* (Highest Educational Institutions) have been put into groups of 16 units of cognitive areas, in accordance with the system of grouping already used in the EEC. The co-ordination of the relevant activities and the necessary correspondences of the cognitive areas among the various countries within the framework of ERASMUS programme are based on this system. The grouping of the Departments and the corresponding degrees of the Greek *TEI* (Technological Educational Institutions) have been done on the basis of the arrangement of the Departments in the Schools of the *TEI* existing by 1993.²

In the following Tables, some General Departments which began functioning in 1993 have not been included. These Departments are in the Technical University of Athens, in the Polytechnical School of the University of Thessaloniki, in the Polytechnical School of the University of Patras, in the Technical University of Crete and in the School of Humanities of the University of Thessaly. Also, the General Department of Justice that had already been functioning in the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences is not included. The elements included in the Tables that follow are brought up to date according to the changes made until the end of October 1992.³

The 'map' of higher education in Greece, includes the following elements:

- All the Departments functioning during the academic year 1992-93. These Departments are marked with a circle (O).
- All the Departments that had been founded with the publication of the relevant Presidential Decree and which, during the academic year 1992-93, had not started functioning yet. These Departments are marked with an X.
- The Branches of the already existing Departments are marked with a second relevant symbol in the same position.⁴

ENDNOTES

¹ KLADIS, D., & PANOUSIS, Y., (1993), *Ο Νόμος Πλαίσιο για τη Δομή και Λειτουργία των Α.Ε.Ι. (όπως τροποποιήθηκε με το ν. 2083/92)* [Law for the Structure and Function of A.E.I. (as transformed with Law 2083/92)], Athens - Komotini, Sakkoulas, p. 239.

² Ibid, p. 239.

³ Ibid, p. 240.

⁴ Ibid, p. 239.

TABLES

| | University of Athens | Technical University (<i>Polytechnico</i>) of Athens | Agricultural University of Athens | Panteion University | Economics University of Athens | University of Piraeus | School of Fine Arts (Athens) | University of Thessaloniki | University of Macedonia | University of Patras | University of Ioannina | University of Thrace | University of Crete | Technical University (<i>Polytechnico</i>) of Crete | University of the Aegean | Ionian University | University of Thessaly | Charokopeio AEI of Home Economics | Charokopeio AEI of Home Economics |
|--|----------------------|--|-----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 01.00 AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.01 Agriculture | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.02 Crop & Animal Production | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | |
| 01.03 Crop Production (Plant Science) | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.04 Animal Production (Animal Science) | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.05 Agricultural Biology and Biotechnology | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.06 Agricultural Economics (Land Economy) | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.07 Land Improvements and Agricultural Engineering | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.08 Agricultural Industries | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.09 Tree Sciences and Natural Environment | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02.00 ARCHITECTURE - URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02.01 Architecture | O | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02.02 Planning and Regional Development | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | |
| 03.00 ART AND DESIGN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03.01 Theoretical Studies of Art | | | | | | | | x | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03.02 Visual Arts | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | University of Athens | Technical University (<i>Polytechnico</i>) of Athens | Agricultural University of Athens | Panteion University | Economics University of Athens | University of Piraeus | School of Fine Arts (Athens) | University of Thessaloniki | University of Macedonia | University of Patras | University of Ioannina | University of Thrace | University of Crete | Technical University (<i>Polytechnico</i>) of Crete | University of the Aegean | Ionian University | University of Thessaly | Charokopeio AEI of Home Economics | Charokopeio AEI of Home Economics |
|-------|---|----------------------|--|-----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 03.03 | Visual and Applied Arts | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03.04 | Music Studies | O | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | O | | | |
| 03.05 | Theatre and Theatrical Studies | O | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.00 | BUSINESS STUDIES - SCIENCE OF MANAGEMENT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.01 | Business Organisation and Management | | | | | O | O | | | O | | | | | | O | | | | |
| 04.02 | Business Research and Marketing | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.03 | Accountancy and Financial Management (or Economics) | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.04 | Financial Economics and Management of Banks | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.05 | Navigation (or Shipping) Management | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.06 | Statistics and Insurance Science | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05.00 | EDUCATION - TEACHER EDUCATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05.01 | Pedagogical Department for Primary Education | O | | | | | | | OO | O | O | O | O | | O | | O | | | |
| 05.02 | Pedagogical Department for Nursery Education | O | | | | | | | O | O | O | O | O | | O | | O | | | |
| 06.00 | TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.01 | Mechanical Engineering | | O | | | | | | O | O | | | | x | | | | | | |

| | | University of Athens | Technical University (<i>Polytechnico</i>) of Athens | Agricultural University of Athens | Panteion University | Economics University of Athens | University of Piraeus | School of Fine Arts (Athens) | University of Thessaloniki | University of Macedonia | University of Patras | University of Ioannina | University of Thrace | University of Crete | Technical University (<i>Polytechnico</i>) of Crete | University of the Aegean | Ionian University | University of Thessaly | Charokopeio AEI of Home Economics | Charokopeio AEI of Home Economics |
|-------|--|----------------------|--|-----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 06.02 | Mechanical Engineering for Industries | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.03 | Nautical Mechanical Engineering | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.04 | Chemical Engineering | | O | | | | | | O | | O | | | | x | | | | | |
| 06.05 | Electrical Engineering | | | | | | | | O | | O | | O | | | | | | | |
| 06.06 | Electrical Engineering and Computers Engineering | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.07 | Electronics and Computers Engineering | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | |
| 06.08 | Computers Engineering and Computer Science | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.09 | Civil Engineering | | O | | | | | | O | | O | | O | | | | | | | |
| 06.10 | Agronomy and Surveying Engineering | | O | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.11 | Mining and Metallurgical Engineering | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.12 | Mineral and Geological Engineering | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | |
| 06.13 | Production and Management Engineering | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | |
| 07.00 | GEOGRAPHY - GEOLOGY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 07.01 | Geology | O | | | | | | | O | | O | | | x | | | | | | |
| 07.02 | Environment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | |
| 08.00 | HUMANITIES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

[illegible]

| | | University of Athens | Technical University (<i>Polytechnico</i>) of Athens | Agricultural University of Athens | Panteion University | Economics University of Athens | University of Piraeus | School of Fine Arts (Athens) | University of Thessaloniki | University of Macedonia | University of Patras | University of Ioannina | University of Thrace | University of Crete | Technical University (<i>Polytechnico</i>) of Crete | University of the Aegean | Ionian University | University of Thessaly | Charokopeio AEI of Home Economics | Charokopeio AEI of Home Economics |
|-------|--|----------------------|--|-----------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 14.02 | Political Science | | | | | | | | | | | | | x | | | | | | |
| 14.03 | Political Science and International Studies | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14.04 | Public Administration | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14.05 | Psychology | | | | O | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | |
| 14.06 | Sociology | | | | O | | | | | | | | | O | | x | | | | |
| 14.07 | Social Politics and Social Anthropology | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14.08 | Social Anthropology | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | |
| 14.09 | Human Geography | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | x | | | | |
| 14.10 | Economic Science | O | | | | O | O | | O | O | O | | | O | | | | | | |
| 14.11 | International and European Economics Studies | | | | | O | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | |
| 14.12 | Urban and Regional Development | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15.00 | SCIENCES OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15.01 | Communication and Media | O | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15.02 | Journalism and Media | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15.03 | Keeping of Records and Librarianship | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | x | | |
| 16.00 | OTHER AREAS OF STUDIES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

[illegible]

| | | TEI of Athens | TEI of Piraeus | TEI of Chalkida | TEI of Larissa | Dept. of Lamia | Dept. of Karditsa | TEI of Kozani | Dept. of Florina | TEI of Thessaloniki | TEI of Kavala | Dept. of Drama | TEI of Serres | TEI of Patras | TEI of Kalamata | TEI of Messolongi | Dept. of Karpenisi | Dept. of Arta | Dept. of Ioannina | TEI of Heraklion | Dept. of Chania | SELETE | Higher School of Rhodes |
|-------|---------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|--------|-------------------------|
| 01.00 | AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.01 | Crop Production | | | | O | | | | O | O | | | | | O | | O | | O | | | | |
| 01.02 | Animal Husbandry | | | | O | | | | O | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.03 | Fisheries | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | |
| 01.04 | Agricultural Machinery and Irrigation | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.05 | Forestry | | | | | O | | | | | | O | | | | | O | | | | | | |
| 01.06 | Glasshouse Growing and Floriculture | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | O | | | |
| 01.07 | Farm Administration | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01.08 | Co-operative Organisations & Holdings | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | O | | | |
| 02.00 | FOOD TECHNOLOGY AND NUTRITION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02.01 | Food Technology | O | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02.02 | Enology and Beverage Technology | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02.03 | Nutrition | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03.00 | ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMICS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03.01 | Tourism Undertakings | O | | | O | | | | | O | | | | O | | | | | | O | | | O |
| 03.02 | Accountancy | | O | O | O | | | O | | O | O | | O | O | | O | | | | O | | | |
| 03.03 | Business Administration | O | O | O | O | | | O | | | O | | O | O | | | | | | | | | |
| 03.4 | Librarianship | O | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03.05 | Management of Units of Health Care | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | |
| 03.06 | Commerce and Marketing (Advertising) | O | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.00 | HEALTH AND CARING PROFESSIONS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.01 | Nursing | O | | | O | O | | | | O | | | | O | | | | | O | O | | | |

| | | TEI of Athens | TEI of Piraeus | TEI of Chalkida | TEI of Larissa | Dept. of Lamia | Dept. of Karditsa | TEI of Kozani | Dept. of Florina | TEI of Thessaloniki | TEI of Kavala | Dept. of Drama | TEI of Serres | TEI of Patras | TEI of Kalamata | TEI of Messolongi | Dept. of Karpenisi | Dept. of Arta | Dept. of Ioannina | TEI of Heraklion | Dept. of Chania | SELETE | Higher School of Rhodes |
|-------|--|---------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|--------|-------------------------|
| 04.02 | Obstetrics | O | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.03 | Health Visiting | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.04 | Baby and Infant Care | O | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | O | | | | | |
| 04.05 | Social Work | O | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | O | | | |
| 04.06 | Medical Laboratory Studies | O | | O | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.07 | Radiology and Actinology | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.08 | Dental Mechanics | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.09 | Optics | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.10 | Physiotherapy | O | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.11 | Occupational Therapy | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.12 | Public Hygiene | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04.13 | Aesthetics | O | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05.00 | GRAPHIC ARTS AND FINE ARTS STUDIES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05.01 | Graphic Arts | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05.02 | Graphic Arts Technology | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05.03 | Decorative Arts | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05.04 | Photography | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05.05 | Works of Art and Relic Conservation | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.00 | TECHNOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.01 | Civil Engineering Superstructure Works | | O | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | O | | O | | |
| 06.02 | Civil Engineering Substructure Works | O | | O | | | | | | O | | | O | | | | | | | | O | | |
| 06.03 | Topography | O | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06.04 | Mechanical Engineering | | O | O | O | | | O | | O | | O | O | | | | | | O | | O | | |

APPENDIX TWO

HISTORICAL CONTEXT, THEORETICAL HERITAGE AND METHODOLOGY OF WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

Within this Appendix, the theoretical universe of World Systems Analysis will be presented under three broad themes: the historical context, the theoretical heritage and the methodology.

2.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

During the 1950s, the modernisation school was dominant in the field of development. In the 1960s, the dominant school was the neo-Marxist dependency school. The failure of modernisation programmes in Latin America in the 1960s led to the neo-Marxist dependency school which was highly critical of the modernisation school, attacking it as a rationalisation of imperialism.¹

The terms “core - periphery” first began to be applied extensively to the operations of the world-economy in the context of a criticism in the 1960s of existing dominant views concerning the economic growth or “development” of nation-states. The critics, the first group who came mostly from Latin America, objected to the main thrust of the literature on “development”:

This developmentalist literature sought to analyze the sequence of descriptive characteristics of those sovereign states that were then relatively industrialized and prosperous in order to create a model that could in effect be copied by less industrialized and less prosperous sovereign states.²

The critics claimed that the various states were not separate, independent entities to be conceived as being in various “stages” of parallel processes of “development”. Rather, they were part of a single ongoing system: a “world-system”. The categories of “developed” and “underdeveloped” were simply the descriptive terms applied to the poles of a unified, centrifugal process of overall development. The new terms of “core” and “periphery” were to be seen as relational terms and they were implicitly the pluses and minuses of a zero-sum concept. The point of André Gunder Frank’s celebrated phase, “the

development of underdevelopment" was: "The more one zone became "core-like," the more another became "peripheral."³

During the 1970s, these contrasting perspectives in the field of development co-existed. However, by the mid-1970s the ideological battle between the previous two schools began to subside.⁴ The debate on Third World development became less ideological and emotional. A group of radical researchers led by Immanuel Wallerstein found that there were "many new activities in the capitalist world economy that could not be explained within the confines of the dependency perspective." These new activities were: a) the economic growth of East Asian countries that could not be portrayed as "dependent development", b) the crisis among the socialist states and c) the crisis in U.S. capitalism.⁵

Thus, world systems analysis emerged as a distinctive theory in the field of the sociology of development.

2.2 THEORETICAL HERITAGE OF WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

Wallerstein's world system perspective stems from the neo-Marxist literature on development and the French *Annales* school. Terms such as unequal exchange, core-periphery exploitation and the world market come from the neo-Marxist literature on development. Concepts used by Frank, Dos Santos, and Amin criticise both the modernisation school and the Marxist developmentalist perspective.⁶ In 1967, Gunder Frank stated that "for the new states it is not a matter of 'catching up' but rather one of changing the whole process of their development."⁷

At a later stage, Wallerstein had fully developed his world-system perspective and moved beyond the domain of the neo-Marxist dependency school. This shift is explained by the strong influence of Fernand Braudel and the French *Annales* School on Wallerstein's conception of the world-system. The French *Annales* school arose as a protest against the overspecialisation of social science disciplines within conventional academic boundaries. Through the works of its

long-time leader, Fernand Braudel, this school advanced the following arguments. First, Braudel sought to develop "total" or "global" history: instead of subordinating history to other disciplines, he considered history as an all-embracing and catholic discipline. Second, Braudel argued for the synthesis of history and social sciences through an emphasis on the long-term: *la longue durée* is a historical process in which all change is slow, a history of constant repetition, even recurring cycles. Third, Braudel was instrumental in shifting the centre of concern in historical discourse from the histories of periods to problem-oriented history. As Wallerstein pointed out, Braudel was willing to ask 'big' questions, such as "What is capitalism?".⁸

Moreover, the theoretical heritage of world systems analysis is closely interrelated with its methodology.

2.3 METHODOLOGY OF WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

According to Wallerstein, 'world - systems analysis' is not a theory about the social world, or about part of it. Rather this kind of analysis is a protest against the ways in which social scientific inquiry was structured at its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century. World-systems analysis offered a critique of social scientific inquiry, as it was being practised worldwide, which had come to be a set of often-unquestioned and *a priori* assumptions. The effect was that this mode of inquiry was closing off rather than opening up many of the most important or most interesting research questions:

In wearing the blinkers which the nineteenth century constructed, we are unable to perform the social task we wish to perform and that the rest of the world wishes us to perform, which is to present rationally the real historical alternatives that lie before us. World-systems analysis was born as moral, and in its broadest sense, political, protest. However, it is on the basis of scientific claims, that is, on the basis of claims related to the possibilities of systematic knowledge about social reality, that world-systems analysis challenges the prevailing mode of inquiry.⁹

Part of the methodology of World Systems Analysis concerns the definition of capitalism which is presented within Chapter Six, where the thesis introduces the concept of the 'semiperiphery'. Apart from "Capitalism", Wallerstein also

felt uncomfortable with six other common assumptions: "On Social Science Disciplines", "On History and Social Science", "On the Unit of Analysis: Society versus Historical System", "On the Role of the Revolutions", "On Science" and "On Progress".

2.3.1 On Social Science Disciplines

As So points out, Wallerstein rejects the artificial disciplinary boundaries among the various social scientific disciplines. The social science divisions derived from the dominant liberal ideology of the 19th century that the state (politics) and the market (economics) were analytically separate domains. For Wallerstein, "as the real world evolved, the contact line between 'primitive' and 'civilized', 'political' and 'economic', blurred."¹⁰ The argument of world-systems analysis is straightforward:

The three presumed arenas of collective human action - the economic, the political and the social or sociocultural - are not autonomous arenas of social action. They do not have separate 'logics'. ... We are arguing that there is a single 'set of rules' or a single 'set of constraints' within which these various structures operate.¹¹

This point of view underlined the debate about the unity of history and social science.

2.3.2 On History and Social Science

Wallerstein questions the "neat division" of intellectual labour with historical analysis focusing on particular sequences while social scientific analysis examines universal generalisations.¹²

"World - systems analysis offers the heuristic value of the *via media* between trans-historical generalizations and particularistic narrations."¹³ The optimal method is to pursue analysis within systemic frameworks. The systemic frameworks are long enough in time and large enough in space to contain governing 'logics' which 'determine' the largest part of sequential reality, while simultaneously recognising and taking into account that these systemic

frameworks have beginnings and ends and therefore, they are not to be conceived of as 'eternal' phenomena. This implies that at every instant both the framework (the 'cyclical rhythms' of the system, which are described conceptually) and the patterns of internal transformation (the 'secular trends' of the system which are described sequentially) that will eventually bring about the demise of the system are to be looked at. Therefore, the task is singular. There is neither historian nor social scientist. There is only a historical social scientist who analyses the general laws of particular systems and the particular sequences through which these systems have gone.¹⁴

The above argument is related to Wallerstein's theoretical position about the unit of analysis being the historical system.

2.3.3 On the Unit of Analysis: Society Versus Historical System

During the 19th century, the concept of "society" was opposite to that of "state". Wallerstein questions the treatment of society/state as unit of analysis. For him, the basic unit of analysis is the historical system and emphasis is placed on the unity of historical social science.¹⁵ Wallerstein argues that world-systems analysis makes the unit of analysis a subject of debate:

Where and when do the entities within which social life occurs exist? It substitutes for the term 'society' the term 'historical system'. Of course, this is a mere semantic substitution. But it rids us of the central connotation that 'society' has acquired, its link to 'state', and therefore of the presupposition about the 'where' and 'when'. Furthermore, 'historical system' as a term underlines the unity of historical social science. The entity is simultaneously systemic and historical.¹⁶

According to world-systems analysis, the capitalist world-economy is a particular historical system: if one wants to ascertain the mode of functioning of this concrete system, the optimal way is to look at the historical evolution of this system.¹⁷

Historical systems can be classified into three major types of entity. These entities are defined by their mode of production, which according to Wallerstein is the organisation of the material basis of a society. There are three modes of

production, associated with types of entity or systems of change. The first mode of production is the 'mini-system': the original mode of production based upon very limited specialisation of tasks. The second mode of production is 'the world-empire': "a large group of agricultural producers whose technology is advanced enough to generate a surplus of production beyond their immediate needs."¹⁸ The third mode of production is the 'world-economy':

the entity based upon the capitalist mode of production. The criterion for production is profitability and the basic drive of the system is accumulation of the surplus as capital. ... Competition between different units of production is ultimately controlled by the cold hand of the market.¹⁹

Wallerstein discusses two things about the varieties of historical systems: one concerns the link of 'logic' and form and the other concerns the history of the coexistence of forms. In terms of form, he takes as the defining boundaries of a historical system those within which the system and the people within it are regularly reproduced by means of some kind of ongoing division of labour. Empirically, there have been three such modes:

The 'mini-systems', so-called because they are small in space and probably relatively brief in time (a life-span of about six generations), are highly homogeneous in terms of cultural and governing structures. The basic logic is one of 'reciprocity' in exchanges. The 'world empires' are vast political structures (at least at the apex of the process of expansion and contradiction which seems to be their fate) and encompass a wide variety of 'cultural' patterns. The basic logic of the system is the extraction of tribute from otherwise locally self-administered direct producers (mostly rural) that is passed upward to the centre and redistributed to a thin but crucial network of officials. The 'world economies' are vast uneven chains of integrated production structures dissected by multiple political structures. The basic logic is that the accumulated surplus is distributed unequally in favour of those able to achieve various kinds of temporary monopolies in the market networks. This is a 'capitalist' logic.²⁰

In addition, revolutions had a role to play in the methodological debate.

2.3.4 On the Role of Revolutions

Wallerstein argues that: "The end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century represent a crucial turning-point in the history of the world, in that the capitalists finally achieved state-societal power in the key areas."²¹

The Industrial Revolution in England and the French Revolution were crucial in the development of social scientific theory.²²

The theory of degrees of capitalism assumed that a mismatch between 'economic' dominance and state-societal power is possible and can be overcome. Both revolutions represent the overcoming of this mismatch. The Industrial Revolution in England highlights the political arena (transformation of the pre-capitalist *ancien regime* into a capitalist state) and the French Revolution highlights the fruits of such a transformation. World-systems analysis calls for an evaluation of the centrality of these purportedly key 'events' (namely, the two revolutions) in terms of the long *durée* of the historical system within which they occurred. According to Wallerstein:

If the unit of analysis of the modern world-system is the capitalist world-economy (and this remains an 'if'), then we will need to ask whether the received categorical distinctions - agriculture and industry, landowner and industrialist - do or do not represent a *leitmotiv* around which the historical development centred.²³

Moreover, Wallerstein assumes that:

The continued development of the capitalist world-economy has involved the unceasing ascension of the ideology of national economic development as the primordial collective task, the definition of such a development in terms of national economic growth, and the corresponding virtual "axiom ... that the route to affluence lies by way of an industrial revolution."²⁴

Wallerstein claims that a central thesis of his work is that "cumulative, self sustaining change in the form of the endless search for accumulation has been the leitmotiv of the capitalist world-economy ever since its genesis in the sixteenth century."²⁵

The Industrial Revolution in Great Britain

The factors that made the processes of mechanisation and "liberation"/proletarianisation occur "for the first time" in Great Britain were the following : a) increased demand, b) availability of capital, c) demographic

factors, d) agricultural "revolution", e) a preexisting development of land-tenure patterns and f) a presumed attitude of mind.²⁶

Wallerstein cites Landes' argument that the capital improves through ""the quality of the inputs", that is, "the higher productivity of new technology and the superior skills and knowledge of both entrepreneurs and workers."" Wallerstein claims that this is true, but:

always true of a phase of expansion in the world-economy that the leading industries are high-profit industries precisely because of higher productivity which translates into lower costs, and is made possible by a temporary market monopoly of "skills and knowledge". The question remains whether there was anything very special about this period.²⁷

Wallerstein's basic argument is that industrial revolution in Britain was revolutionary from the point of view that it marked the creation of the factory as the framework for the organisation of work in industry. The major concern of the entrepreneurs was not dispensing with their workers but expanding their output.²⁸

The French Revolution

The French Revolution marked neither basic economic nor basic political transformation. Rather, in terms of the capitalist world-economy, this revolution represented the moment when the ideological superstructure finally caught up with the economic base. It was neither the cause of the transition nor the moment of its occurrence, but its consequence.²⁹

For Wallerstein, the ideology of the French Revolution also reflected the structural endpoint of the capitalist process and the final bourgeoisification of the upper classes. All advantage would be derived from current position in the economic structure rather than from past position. This revolution also represented the first of the antisystemic revolutions of the capitalist world-economy. In this respect this revolution was partly successful. The myth that it represented was an anti-bourgeois myth and not a bourgeois one. Ultimately,

the bourgeois revolution served the same function as the concept of the industrial revolution: it was a prerequisite to an "industrial revolution".³⁰

Apart from the role of the revolutions, the methodological debate had consequences also about the way Wallerstein conceived science.

2.3.5 On Science

According to Wallerstein, "Science is the search for the rules which summarize most succinctly why everything is the way it is and how things happen."³¹ Modern science has come strongly on the deterministic side of the equation, on the side of linearity and concision. In the name of this tradition, nomothetic social science asserted itself. Its methodology was that of the natural sciences: "systematic and precise empirical inquiry, then induction leading to theories."³² However, for Wallerstein:

historical social science must *start* with the abstract and move in the direction of the concrete, ending with a coherent interpretation of the processes of particular historical systems that accounts plausibly for how they followed a particular concrete historical path. The determinate is not the simple but the complex, indeed the hyper-complex. And of course no concrete situation is more complex than the long moments of transition when the simpler constraints collapse. ... World-systems analysis is not a paradigm of historical social science. It is a call for a debate about the paradigm.³³

Finally, Wallerstein's debate on methodology influenced the way he viewed progress.

2.3.6 On Progress

Evolutionary theorists and Marxist developmentalists had put emphasis on the progressive human history.³⁴ Yet, for Wallerstein, "World-systems analysis wants to remove the idea of progress from the status of a trajectory and open it up as an analytical variable."³⁵ Therefore, Wallerstein suggests:

We are now however living in the long moment of transition wherein the contradictions of the capitalist world-economy have made it impossible to continue to adjust its machinery ... World-systems analysis is a call for the construction of a historical social science that feels comfortable with the

uncertainties of transition, that contributes to the transformation of the world by illuminating the choices without appealing to the crutch of a belief in the inevitable triumph of good.³⁶

ENDNOTES

¹ SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, Newbury Park - London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 169.

² WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe", in ARRIGHI, G., (ed), *Semiperipheral Development: the Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, Beverly Hills - London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, pp. 31-39, pp. 32-33.

³ Ibid, pp. 32-33.

⁴ SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, op. cit., p. 169.

⁵ Ibid, pp. 169-170.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 171-172. Additionally, world systems analysis provides a framework, essential to an understanding of educational developments and reforms that are simultaneously sweeping many countries of the world:

linking educational events to the workings of an international economic order, helps explain why expansion and reform, in so many cases, have failed to effect structural change in education or society, and, indeed, why externally induced educational innovations may contribute to perpetuation of existing stratification systems within and between countries. [See ARNOVE, R. F., (1982), "Comparative Education and World Systems", in ALTBACH, P. G., ARNOVE, R. F., & KELLY, G. P., (eds), *Comparative Education*, New York, Macmillan, p. 463.]

The three key concepts of world systems analysis are: 1. economic and cultural dependency, 2. centre and periphery and 3. the convergence or divergence in the international order. Its basic framework of analysis comes from the dependency theory, which has mainly to do with the hegemony of metropolitan countries over peripheral countries. (See *ibid*, p. 454.)

Yet, there are differences between dependency theory and world system theories. The unit of analysis for the dependency perspective is the nation-state, while for the world-system perspective it is the world-system. For the first, the methodology is structural - historical (boom and bust of nation-states) while for the latter, it has to do with the historical dynamics of the world-system (cyclical rhythms and secular trends). For the dependency perspective, the theoretical structure is bimodal (core - periphery) while for the world - system perspective, it is trimodal (core - semiperiphery - periphery). The direction of development is, for the first, deterministic (dependency is generally harmful), while for the second, there is a possibility of upward and downward mobility in the world - economy. For the first, the research focus is on the periphery while for the latter it is on the periphery as well as on the core, the semiperiphery, and the world -

economy. [See SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World System Theories*, op. cit., p. 95.]

The origin of the dependency theory is the orthodox Marxist-Leninist perspective on development. This theory focuses upon the relationships between, as well as within, societies in regards to social, cultural, economic and political structures. Development and underdevelopment as relational concepts between and within societies are inversely related. The term dependency emphasises the causal relationship between the development of central or metropole societies and the underdevelopment of peripheral or satellite societies as an historical and at least indirectly an intentional process. [See FÄGERLIND, I. & SAHA, L., (1989), *Education and National Development: a Comparative Perspective*, Oxford, Pergamon Press, p. 22.] Furthermore,

The intellectual origins of dependency theory can be traced to Marx. It was Marx's concern with the exploitation by the bourgeois of the proletariat which led the American economist Paul Baran, in his work *The Political Economy of Growth* (1957), to see underdevelopment in the poor countries as caused by capitalism in the Western world. A further contribution to the intellectual origins of dependency came from Lenin's concept of imperialism, which dependency theorists used to describe the process whereby capitalism dominates and exploits the poor countries. (See *ibid*, p. 22.)

According to this theory, the world can be divided in the core and the peripheral countries which are seen as part of a global system dominated by a capitalist economic network:

The mode of articulation of the underdeveloped economies with the world economic system may result in a transfer of resources from the periphery to the centre and/or this articulation may give rise to various 'blocking mechanisms' which hold back or 'distort' the economies of the periphery, thereby preventing an allocation of resources which will produce economic growth (Roxborough, 1976:118) (See *ibid*, p. 23.)

The transfer of resources can occur in various ways, such as colonial or neo-colonial relationships, or the operations of multinational corporations. Dependency theory, as an alternative to theories of capitalist development, rejects the progressive and linear view of development and stresses the importance on factors external to society. The condition of the less developed regions and countries of the world is seen to be caused by the activities of the rich countries. It is not necessary that the rich country physically dominates the poor. "It is enough that the leaders or the elite of the poor countries hold attitudes, values and interests consistent with those in the rich countries." (See *ibid*, p. 23.)

There were several criticisms of the dependency theory. One of these was that at least in its early formulation, dependency theory focussed too heavily on factors external to societies and neglected the internal structures of underdevelopment. In the theory, there was also a confusion concerning the two concepts of the "capitalist mode of production" and "participation in a world capitalist

economic system". Foreign investment, trade and aid to a given country contributes to economic growth in the short run. Within this context, it makes more sense to speak of dependent development rather than the development of underdevelopment. Dependency theorists failed to take into account that some dependent nations succeeded to become rich, while others remained poor. The participation of non - capitalist countries, such as the Soviet Union, in the development of the poor countries and the extent to which it promoted its own form of dependency and underdevelopment in them were also not explained. The failure of the dependency theory to provide a viable strategy for development without creating some degree of dependency in the poor country has been one of its most serious difficulties. "To sever trade relations, to refuse international aid or to nationalize multinational companies are simplistic policies, which are not likely to eliminate dependency or promote economic growth." In the present-day world condition, the goals of complete self-sufficiency and autonomy by a nation are unrealistic. The important question is what kind of development should be pursued in any given context and the dependency theorists have given few guidelines in this regard. In the end, dependency theorists have not explained how the national elite of a poor country (seen as collaborators with the elites of rich countries in the dependency process) can be made to ignore their own interests in favour of those of society as a whole. (See *ibid*, pp. 24-25.)

The framework of analysis of the dependency theory is also related to Wallerstein's concepts concerning convergence and divergence in the global system. According to these concepts,

the world market and society produce convergence by subjecting all societies to the same force; they produce divergence by creating different roles for different societies in the world stratification system. ... Participation in the world system represents for peripheral countries an opportunity for access to valued resources (technology, capital, and skill) as well as the likelihood of economic subjugation by stronger nations. [See ARNOVE, R. F., (1982), "Comparative Education and World Systems", in ALTBACH, P. G., ARNOVE, R. F., & KELLY, G. P., (eds), *Comparative Education*, New York, Macmillan, p. 454.]

Within such a framework, international aid networks and their programmes can be seen as a series of educational panaceas such as comprehensive high schools, open universities and non-formal education. "Through these reforms, previously isolated or excluded individuals can be mobilized for multiple purposes: national building, the opening of national markets, the fulfilment of economic plans." (See *ibid*, pp. 456-457.) Consequently, questions arise from this approach which have to do with whether programmes in technical-vocational education (promoted by the World Bank and USAID) coincide with the employment demands of multinationals. They also have to do with the extent to which the programmes of the donor agencies support elite education as against mass education, or notions that social issues are scientifically managed and that social change comes only from higher-credentialed people at the top. (See *ibid*, pp. 462-463.)

Most of the neo-Marxist theories of development focus upon selected, problematic aspects of Marx's original theory. For instance, Marx never extended his idea of colonialism to include the notion of underdevelopment. Also, the 'mode of production' (production as a material process and as a social one) as one of the most important concepts in Marxist analysis is debatable particularly on the nature of various modes of production, the transition between them and the possibility of two modes coexisting in the same society (e.g. the theory of the 'dual economy'). Moreover,

The absence of a crystallized class structure in many less developed societies has made the application of Marxist concepts problematic for development theory and strategies. Mao Zedong recognised this difficulty and incorporated different types of the agricultural population into the Marxist class structure (Mao Zedong, 1967). On the basis of this extension of orthodox Marxism, Mao's revolutionary program for socialist development in China has been influential in many third world countries today. [See FÄGERLIND, I., & SAHA, L., (1989), *Education and National Development: a Comparative Perspective*, op. cit., pp. 21-22.]

⁷ TAYLOR, P. J., (1989), *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality*, New York, Longman Scientific & Technical, p. 5.

⁸ SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

⁹ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", in GIDDENS, A., & TURNER, J. H., *Social Theory Today*, Cambridge - Oxford, Polity Press, p. 309.

¹⁰ SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, op. cit., p. 174.

¹¹ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", op. cit., p. 313.

¹² SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, op. cit., p. 175.

¹³ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", op. cit., p. 314.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 314-315.

¹⁵ SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

¹⁶ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", op. cit., p. 317.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 320.

¹⁸ TAYLOR, P. J., (1989), *Political Geography: World Economy, Nation - State and Locality*, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 6-7.

²⁰ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", op. cit., p. 317.

²¹ Ibid, p. 320.

²² Ibid, p. 320.

²³ Ibid, pp. 321-322.

²⁴ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1989), *The Modern World - System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World - Economy, 1730 - 1840s*, San Diego, Academic Press, p. 4.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 22.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 22.

²⁷ Ibid, pp. 22-23.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 28.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 52.

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 52-53.

³¹ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", op. cit., pp. 323.

³² Ibid, pp. 323 - 324.

³³ Ibid, p. 324.

³⁴ SO, A. Y., (1990), *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories*, op. cit., p. 179.

³⁵ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", op. cit., p. 322. As Martin *et al* also argue, to conceive of development (and therefore change) as a natural process is to ignore that it is fundamentally a historical process with economic, political and cultural components (a criticism that holds for evolutionist versions of Marxism). "Theories of social change stand or fall on the test of the widest range of historical - comparative evidence." [See MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (1989), "Introduction", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., (eds), *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World*, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 7-8.] Development is considered to be a product of history and is increasingly conditioned by the structures of the world capitalist economy:

a model based on a structural dichotomy of core and periphery provides the conceptual framework to study the development experience in any country or region with regard to its position in the international division of labor ... This model must be constructed to take into account the relative and varying autonomy of national and regional historical processes as they occur within and, in turn, affect the modern world - system. (See *ibid*, p. 3.)

³⁶ WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", *op. cit.*, p. 324. According to Wallerstein, a hoary debate is also that of 'free will' versus 'determinism'. The re-opening of the issue of transitions is to suggest a different formulation of this debate. He therefore suggests that:

Perhaps it is the case that what we call 'determinism' is largely the process internal to historical systems in which the 'logic' of the system is translated into a set of self-moving, self-reinforcing institutional structures that 'determine' the long-term trajectory. But perhaps it is also the case that what we call 'free will' occurs largely in the process of 'transition' when, precisely because of the breakdown of these very structures, the real historical choices are wide and difficult to predict. (See *ibid*, p. 323.)

